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ABSTRACT
 
This thesis will offer evidence for satire in Niccold
 
Machiavelli's The Prince (published in 1532), in three areas
 
of inquiry. ^
 
The first is Machiavelli's life and character, from
 
which his intent and motivation for writing a satire, rela
 
tive to the Medici family in Florence and the political
 
climate of his era, can be discovered.
 
Second, I will offer evidence from Machiavelli's other
 
major writings, principally The Discourses On the First Ten
 
Books of Titus Livius and The History of Florence, to demon
 
strate that Machiavelli satirized the ^new prince' by refut
 
ing or distorting the democratic principles he advocated in
 
his other works.
 
Third, I will demonstrate the rhetorical elements of
 
satire in The Prince that correspond with those devices
 
commonly associated with the genre satire.
 
Rather than organize this thesis around general princi
 
ples or topics, I have approached The Prince methodically.
 
Chapter by chapter, to better demonstrate the development of
 
Machiavelli's satire, which evolves incrementally from the
 
first to the last chapter.
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 INTRODUCTION
 
In less than two decades (2013), the world community of
 
scholars will observe the 500th Anniversary of Niccold
 
Machiavelli's The Prince,^ a work that has provoked both ire
 
and approbation throughout the intervening centuries. On
 
that occasion, new interpretations and commentary on what
 
Isaiah Berlin refers to as "the question of Machiavelli"^
 
will likely appear, further expanding "a bibliography that
 
is vast and growing faster than ever."^ The spectrum of
 
opinion and analysis surrounding the Prince is a controver
 
sial clamor of conflicting theories from which a consensus
 
seems improbable in the near future. If we are to resolve
 
the question of Machiavelli, it will be necessary to probe
 
" \ ■ ■ 
beyond the literal interpretation of that work offered in
 
the past, from which a wealth of contradictory evidence and
 
justification have been found.
 
From the early part of the sixteenth century,
 
Machiavelli was "condemned" for his "political immorality
 
and cynicism,"'* an indelible mark against his reputation
 
that finds expression in the term ^Machiavellian,' in refer
 
ence to the political theory proffered by a man who "was
 
(and is) popularly misunderstood to have ajdvocated atheism,
 
treachery, and criminality as preferable to other means of
 
statecraft."^ Taken at his word in the Prince, Machiavelli
 
did advocate atheism, treachery, and criminality, and his
 
precepts have always found a receptive audience among the
 
unscrupulous. Thomas Cromwell had considerable influence
 
with King Henry VIII, for example, and Cromwell took his
 
inspiration from "a thin manuscript volume, recently pro
 
cured for him at Florence, whose rubrics referred to ^cruel
 
ty and clemency, and whether it is better to be loved than
 
feared'... and similar matters" which tended to inform his
 
counsel to the King:
 
...the great art of the politician was
 
to penetrate the disguise which princes
 
usually throw over their real inclina
 
tions, and to devise expedients by which
 
the prince may gratify his appetites
 
without appearing to outrage morality
 
and religion. The little book also
 
contained an exposition of the weakness
 
of the papacy more convincing to
 
Cromwell's practical mind than all of
 
Luther's thunder, and some happy sugges
 
tions for the combination of hypocrisy
 
and terrorism. But chiefly Cromwell ,
 
sucked from it the one heresy likely to
 
appeal to Henry: the more than divine
 
right of tyrants, the absolute sover
 
eignty and unlimited independence of the
 
omnipotent; amoral state.®
 
The Elizabethan scholars and dramatists took note of
 
Machiavelli's ideas, reflected in "the^murderous Machiavel'
 
of the famous 400 odd references in Elizabethan litera
 
ture,"'and in France, the "infiltration of Machiavelli's
 
ideas*' was thought, by Alberico Gentillet, to have arrived
 
"under the corrupt influence of the Italian queen mother,
 
Catherine de' Medici."^ Gentillet thought, however, that
 
the Prince was a form of "satire,"' and "the printer of the
 
first edition of the Prince [in 1532] ...sought Church
 
protection against those who ^do not know that those who
 
instruct in the use of herbs and medicine, also instruct in
 
poisons, in order to know how to guard against them,'"^° or,
 
stated another way, that the Prince was intended to educate
 
the unwary regarding the providence of princes. But these
 
views did not prevail in majority opinion. Soon after its
 
publication, the Prince earned Machiavelli a reputation as a
 
"toady" of princes, particularly of the Medici, or so
 
thought the "restorers of the short-lived [second] Floren
 
tine republic," (1527-1530)" who no longer trusted in
 
Machiavelli's republican credentials. By the year 1559,
 
"all of Machiavelli's works were condemned by the Roman
 
Church and placed on the Index.""
 
In the seventeenth century, Machiavelli was "denounced"
 
primarily by the Jesuits, and by the eighteenth century,
 
"clerics, philosophers, historians, and statesmen all in
 
veighed against him and with equal vigor."" Frederick of
 
Prussia wrote his Anti-Machiavelli "rejecting the advice
 
given by the Florentine secretary,"" which, as De Lamar
 
Jensen observes, would have earned the commendation of
 
Machiavelli, for "what could be more astute or more in tune
 
with The Prince than a denunciation of it!"" Voltaire, who
 
"helped" Frederick write "his Anti-Machiavel" would have
 
agreed that a "repudiation of Machiavelli would be the first
 
step of any tyrant.""
 
For Rousseau, "Machiavelli's notorious ^immorality'
 
simply doe's not arise since The Prince is a satire on princ
 
es written by a convinced republican: ^He proposed to teach
 
kings; but it was the people he really taught. His Prince
 
is the book of republicans,'"" and "the history of the
 
Borgias is a warning to citizens to be on their guard.""
 
Rousseau "reinvoke[s] the standards of Roman republican
 
virtue," and thus "Machiavelli leads away from the Enlight
 
enment, not to it.""
 
Following the French Revolution, "it became fashion
 
able" to examine the "works of Machiavelli" who was "only
 
seeking the good of his native land by eliminating both
 
national despots and foreign oppressors." The French "re
 
vised" their previous notions about "Cesare Borgia" and
 
"Machiavelli," which gave rise to "the birth of the precious
 
notion of historical relativity."^"
 
The great eighteenth century satirist, Jonathan Swift,
 
may have borrowed liberally from Machiavelli in his Works.
 
F.P. Lock makes the point that Machiavelli "provided...
 
practical political analysis for Swift to draw on in apply
 
ing his political ideals to the contemporary situation,"
 
from the "Discourses the "Art of War," the "History," and
 
"The Prince." Lock observes that both men shared "common
 
attitudes to the nexus of corruption, degradation, and the
 
need for reform that connect their analysis of contemporary
 
society.
 
The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century
 
ushered in a new perspective on Machiavelli. "Herder sug
 
gested that Machiavelli's motivation was a desire for the
 
national independence of Italy," a view accepted by Hegel,
 
Fichte, and Ranke as well. The Italians who championed this
 
view following the unification of Italy, in 1871, included
 
Pasquale Villari, Oreste Tommasini and Francesco De
 
Sanctis.^^ Machiavelli became a "saint of the Italian Risor­
gimento,"^^ Italy redeemed from the ashes of antiquity.
 
Felix Gilbert challenged this notion, however, faulting the
 
assumption that Machiavelli's desire to unify Italy "meant
 
the same thing" to him "as it did to the nationalist patri
 
ots of the nineteenth century."^
 
The twentieth century view of Machiavelli, "as a scien
 
tist—as a true analyst of political situations and events,
 
and formulator of general patterns and laws of political
 
behavior... has gained wide popularity among political
 
scientists and also among a substantial number of histori
 
ans," a Machiavelli who "possessed a detached, impartial,
 
scientific mind,"^^ a "founder of a modern school of politi
 
cal science, emphasizing power and how it is gained and
 
held, not what should be done to fulfill a providential
 
scheme."^® Frederick Meinecke, in his Doctrine of Raison d'
 
Etat and the emergence of "Realpolitik viewed the "very
 
essence of the development of the modern state" as "the
 
struggle for and against Machiavellianism."^' As Meinecke
 
understood, there were "sinister aspects of reason of
 
state... when triitti iiia justice are treated simply as ele
 
ments in the empirical situation, to be weighed against
 
material advantages, then the gates are opened to forces of
 
active evil which traditional morality had opposed... the
 
sources of a new dualism which plagues modern civiliza
 
tion,
 
Following World War I, many scholars "took up their
 
pens to combat the leviathan," including G.P. Gooch and
 
Jacques Maritain, who argued against the "myth" of
 
Machiavelli's "realism," and for the "reassertion of moral
 
courage and political justice" respectively.^' As Maritain
 
remarks, if "absolute Machiaveilianism triumphs over man
 
kind," it will be because of corruption "within a denigrat
 
ing civilization."^"
 
The notion that Machiavelli's Prince may be a satire,
 
however/ has not been fully explored, to my knowledge, by
 
Machiavelli scholars. Rousseau and Gentillet acknowledged
 
that the work was not what it pretended to be. Eric
 
Whelpton makes the point that we "cannot determine" whether
 
Machiavelli was "himself a Machiavellian," or "whether he
 
did not write The Prince as a satire on the errors of ty
 
rants instead of as a paean in praise of Cesare Borgia,"
 
having been "put on the rack for expressing his ideas too
 
freely," and having "served the republic of Florence with
 
great loyalty."^' Felix Gilbert and Quentin Skinner argue
 
that Machiavelli satirized and parodied "the humanists and
 
humanist literature. Mark Hulliung observes, however, that
 
"Gilbert and Skinner stop short of communicating what
 
Machiavelli's satire' ultimately meant; that the world-view
 
composed of Christian and Stoic values is to be not simply
 
criticized but actively crushed and replaced by an alterna
 
tive world view, which is to miss the point of his satire
 
altogether. Christian and Stoic values had already been
 
replaced to a large extent by the corrosive influence of
 
corruption, as evidenced in the actions and character of the
 
princes who ^ ^uled Italy in his time. If Machiavelli
 
"crushed" traditional "Christian and Stoic values" in his
 
satire, it was to make the point that if the present trends
 
continued; Italy would be ruined.
 
The late Professor Garrelpt Mattingly, however, offered
 
a satirical perspective on Machiavelli's Prince in his
 
essay, "Machiavelli's Prince; Political Science or Politi
 
cal Satire," that has been described as "a bold foray into
 
the region of Machiavelli studies, and from it [Mattingly]
 
emerged somewhat less bashed-up than most of us who have
 
ventured onto that dark and bloody ground of learning where
 
muddled armies clash by night. Mattingly finds that the
 
Prince "imitates, almost parodies... the handbook of advice
 
to princes, but more importantly, he suggests that it was
 
also "meant as a satire, as a taunt and challenge to the
 
Medici and a Tocsin to the people of Florence."'® As a
 
result of his insight and scholarship, then, the battle­
ground of Maohiavelli studies should be less "muddled" today
 
for his efforts. In his inimitable way, Professor Mattingly
 
argues from the more obvious contradictions contained in the
 
Prince, those positions and pronouncements that not only
 
defy Machiavelli/s political principles, but his life and
 
character as well. His essay thus constitutes a hallmark
 
contribution to future studies, in which the devious
 
Maohiavelli—long suspected but largely ignored—may at last
 
come to light.
 
Maohiavelli's intent in writing a satire was to issue a
 
critique of corruption and the men whose actions and influ
 
ence defined the quality of the times. Many aspects of his
 
character and experience in political affairs suggest his
 
motivation for targeting the modern princes, who threatened
 
liberty and freedom across the Italian Peninsula.
 
Maohiavelli's preference for ancient modes and order rather
 
than modern practices is clearly stated in his works that
 
followed the Prince. When considered together, the fraudu
 
lent nature of the Prince is exposed, in which he not only
 
mocks the aspirations of Italian princes, but his own polit
 
ical principles as well.
 
If truth is concealed in the artful rhetorical devices
 
of satire, it is made plain in its essence, in which the
 
satirist "perceives some absurdity inherent in the logic of
 
some position," and "draws the absurdity out and isolates
 
it, so that all can see it."^' I would argue that
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Machiavelli attempted to isolate and magnify, for the bene
 
fit of those who understood, the abuse of power he witnessed
 
in his time, a reality he masked in the benign concept of
 
^effectual truth,' and ridiculed in the guise of sincerity—
 
a little pasquinade intended to amuse the few, but which
 
has, rather, adorned the pages of history and confounded the
 
many. As Machiavelli cautioned in his play Clizia:
 
Oh you, whose lofty souls
 
Have barkened to our true though humble story.
 
Its message monitory
 
Recorded henceforth in your memory's rolls.
 
You now may know which goals
 
May rightly be pursued, and which to flee.
 
That we may go to heaven;
 
And 'neath the comic leaven
 
Were other truths too numerous for me
 
To tell now; so, kind audience, we pray
 
You reap the fruit you merit from our play.
 
Niccolo Machiavelli'38
 
PART I: Citizen Machiavelli and the Magnificent Medici
 
Chapter I. Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici
 
A satirical interpretation of the Prince is most com
 
pelling when one considers Machiavelli's life and character,
 
from which his motivation for turning to satire as a means
 
of voicing his political concerns can be discovered. He
 
might have chosen to write a scathing diatribe against the
 
growing problem of political corruption (although at great
 
personal risk), or concentrated his efforts solely on the
 
Discourses on the First Ten Books on Titus Livius (hereafter
 
referred to as the Discourses), in which he instructed his
 
fellow Italians on the merits of democratic principles and
 
how to found and maintain a republic as an antidote to the
 
rising tide of tyranny—modeled on the Republic of Rome. He
 
turned away from that work, however, to focus his attention
 
on the Medici who symbolized the ambition of modern princes
 
generally, the object of his contempt, who had contributed
 
so much to the loss of liberty and the destruction of peace
 
across the Peninsula.
 
The Medici not only destroyed the republican government
 
he had served faithfully for fourteen years, but humiliated
 
Machiavelli with imprisonment as well. In the political
 
climate of 1513, however, the year he wrote the Prince, he
 
could not have attacked the tyranny of the Medici openly,
 
and thus he chose the path of his great predecessors,
 
Phaedrus, Horace, Juvenal, and others, who, because the
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times were not amenable to their views, voiced their griev
 
ances in works that disguised their true motives.
 
The first hint that Machiavelli provides regarding the
 
true nature of the Prince is his dedication to the Medici.
 
Had he only intended a polite recognition of that family as
 
the first citizens of Florence, the dedication might be
 
considered extraneous to the body of the Prince and thus of
 
no particular significance in an interpretation of the work.
 
Two considerations stand in the way of that view, however.
 
The first is that Machiavelli's desire for employment from
 
the Medici is implied, which is not consistent with his
 
political views and character, thus raising the question of
 
his sincerity, which in turn reflects on the sincerity of
 
the work as a whole.
 
The second is that the Medici became an integral part
 
of the Prince as the designated beneficiaries of
 
Machiavelli's knowledge and advice, for the express purpose
 
of Giuliano or Lorenzo becoming the new prince, destined to
 
save Italy. Yet neither Medici demonstrated sufficient
 
ability to merit Machiavelli's confidence in meeting such
 
expectations. Nor was Machiavelli one to be fooled by
 
appearances, as a seasoned statesman with keen powers Of
 
observation.'
 
Machiavelli's dedication, then, was central to his
 
design—a unifying device that personalized his message and
 
enabled him to justify his precepts as necessary and urgent
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to the immediate circximstances of Italy. Without it, his
 
satire would have lost much of the flavor and luster that
 
makes it such a pleasure to read, for lurking behind every
 
page is the image of the heroic Medici, including Cardinal
 
Giovanni who became Pope Leo X, taunted by Machiavelli to
 
emulate rascals of every stripe, in all manner of villainy;
 
a family that hardly needed instruction in the abuse of
 
power or how to acquire it.
 
Giuliano is the first Medici associated with the dedi
 
cation. He was the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and
 
brother of Cardinal Giovanni. Bearing the title Duke of
 
Nemours, he is described as having "much less ambition" than
 
his brother, the pope,^ who relied on Giuliano to run the
 
government of Florence on his behalf; "no longer able to
 
exercise direct rule on the Arno, he was obliged to choose a
 
Medici to serve as the visible head of the city."^ Giuliano
 
was soon removed as the pope's representative, however, "by
 
a lack of aptitude for dealing with Florentine affairs,"'*
 
and was permitted "to follow him to Rome and, apart from
 
occasionally evolving an ambitious plan for his brother, he
 
permitted Giuliano to live the obscure existence he pre
 
ferred." In the opinion of Ferdinand Schevill, Giuliano
 
"was unfitted by temperament to play a political role in a
 
country so chaotic as Italy; and except for the fact that he
 
was a giracious aristocrat with many friends in the literary
 
and artistic circles... he cannot be said to have been much
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of an asset to his family,"^ nor did he demonstrate requi
 
site ability in military affairs.
 
When Cardinal Giovanni became pope, Francesco Vettori,
 
the Florentine ambassador to Rome, remained in his position.
 
He and Machiavelli had become friends as diplomats serving
 
the Republic of Florence. It is clear from the correspon
 
dence between them that Machiavelli first intended to dedi
 
cate the Prince to Giuliano. In a letter to Vettori (Decem
 
ber 10, 1513), Machiavelli referred to this "little work of
 
mine that I have spoken of, whether it is good to give it or
 
not to give it, whether it would be good to take it myself
 
or whether I should send it there. Not giving it would make
 
me fear that at the least Giuliano will not read it, and
 
that this rascal Ardinghelli will get himself honor from
 
this latest work of mine."® Scholars are in general agree
 
ment that Machiavelli first intended that the work be dedi
 
cated to Giuliano, whether or not he ever had any intention
 
of actually presenting it to him. There is no evidence that
 
it was presented to Giuliano before his death in March,
 
1516, nor is there evidence that Machiavelli ever had "kind
 
words, if not favors, from Giuliano."'
 
Precisely when the dedication was changed to Lorenzo
 
de' Medici, Duke of Urbino and grandson of Lorenzo the
 
Magnificent, is not known. Roberto Ridolfi estimates that
 
the earliest possible date for the change is September,
 
1515, and no later than September, 1516,* as Lorenzo re­
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ceived the title of Duke of Urbino October 8, 1516, and the
 
dedication "does not address him with the title of Dvike, and
 
uses Magnificence, not Excellence."' L. Arthur Burd sug
 
gests that Machiavelli may have "selected Lorenzo" before
 
Giuliano's death, having discovered that Giuliano did not
 
intend to devote himself to a military career and when he
 
became better acquainted with his character...,"^" but for
 
the purpose of satire, Giuliano was a perfect candidate for
 
his dedication and until his death, there was no particular
 
reason to change it, precisely for the reasons given by
 
Burd.
 
Lorenzo was chosen to represent Leo as a member of the
 
ruling family of Florence, as Giuliano had been, "designated
 
by the unwritten law of succession."" In a letter to
 
Vettori, August, 1513, Machiavelli describes Lorenzo in most
 
excellent terms, alluding to qualities of humility and
 
decorum; "though we see there much splendor and liberality,
 
nonetheless he does not abandon his life as a citizen.
 
Thus, in all his movements, outside and inside, nothing is
 
seen that offends anybody or is to be censored; at which
 
everybody appears to be much pleased." In his closing
 
remarks, however, we are provided with a sideward glance
 
into Machiavelli's humorous and often caustic observations
 
as he observes of Lorenzo, "And although I know from many
 
you can learn this same thing, I have chosen to describe it,
 
SO that from my account of it you can get that pleasure that
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comes to all the rest of us, who continually experience
 
it^iii2 Thus, Machiavelli probably viewed Lorenzo in much the
 
same way as did many of his contemporaries; although he is
 
remembered by historians as the father of Catherine, who
 
married King Henry II of France, he is not distinguished by
 
any noteworthy accomplishments. The Florentines had no
 
particular fondness for him; "Unpopular in the city because
 
of his behavior," he lived "the last years of his life...
 
surrounded by a few trusted advisors like a prince, and
 
would have liked to make himself absolute master" if Pope
 
Leo had not "held in check" his behavior." Further, Roberto
 
Ridolfi describes him as a "degenerate" in whom Machiavelli
 
had "no hope" of gaining "affection" or "favor."*'* The
 
astute Machiavelli would not have failed to perceive
 
Lorenzo's true character, and the implications of his rule
 
for the future governing of Florence.
 
Lorenzo "had himself elected captain general of the
 
Florentines in May, 1515,"" and "thereafter he had become
 
increasingly authoritarian, requiring councils to meet in
 
the Medici palace rather than in public places of govern
 
ment, rejecting the advice of the more moderate and experi
 
enced citizens while surrounding himself with young dandies
 
as subservient as courtiers."" With an eye toward a "uni
 
fied state," Pope Leo and Lorenzo attacked the Duke of
 
Urbino in 1516, the same duke that had sheltered Giuliano
 
during the long Medici exile (1494-1512). Giuliano begged
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[Leo] not to attack the duke "before his death. Lorenzo
 
took Urbino easily, but "less than a year later... the Duke
 
returned with Spanish troops... the short but arduous cam
 
paigns in the mountainous districts of Urbino cost the
 
Florentines and the Pope a great deal of money... and re
 
sulted in Lorenzo's being so badly wounded by arquebus, that
 
he was gradually to waste away in body and will,"'® although
 
his "enemies" would charge that his death, in 1519, was the
 
result of his "numerous vices."'®
 
Most scholars do not question Lorenzo's ability, that
 
merit which qualifies him as a credible liberator of Italy.
 
Quite the contrary. Some critics have devised a meahs of
 
explaining the highly charged rhetoric of chapter twenty-

six, the exhortation to seize Italy, by linking the composi
 
tion of that chapter to the later dedication to Lorenzo.
 
The added benefit of this interpretation is that it elimi
 
nates the need to reconcile Giuliano's lack of interest and
 
ability in undertaking such an enterprise. At least of
 
Lorenzo, it can be said that he craved power; "for many
 
critics, a gap of some years between the composition of the
 
first twenty-five chapters and the writing of the last
 
chapter supports the conviction that Machiavelli had one set
 
of purposes in mind when he wrote the body of the work in
 
1513 and then, in different circumstances and for quite
 
different purposes, altered its character by adding the
 
passionate last chapter with its call for liberation and
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redemption."^" Mario Martelli makes the point that "the
 
sections of the text... that call fpr liberation... could
 
only have been written with Lorenzo—and not his Uncle
 
Giuliano—in mind, and that the only moment in which such an
 
appeal would have been justified by circumstances was the
 
second half of 1518, when, according to some contemporary
 
accounts, Lorenzo contemplated the transformation of his
 
still largely unofficial rule in Florence into a formal
 
principate.
 
There is no evidence to support the notion that chapter
 
twenty-six Was written separately and after 1513, however,
 
to accommodate Machiavelli's dedication to Lorenzo. The
 
problem that these critics are really addressing is how to
 
reconcile chapter twenty-six, "the opposite of a scientific
 
or detached work"^^ because of its biblical language and
 
emotional demagoguery, with a scientific treatise, which the
 
Prince is thought to be by most scholars. And if chapter
 
twenty-six was an integral part of the work from the begin
 
ning, and there is no documentation to suggest otherwise,
 
then Machiavelli's intent would appear to be consistent in
 
both dedications.
 
To these Medici, then, Machiavelli dedicated his
 
Prince. In Giuliano, and then Lorenzo, he placed his confi
 
dence for seizing and uniting Italy. Even if we grant the
 
desirability of such action, which is improbable given
 
Machiavelli's distaste for "the rule of priests"^ (repre­
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sented in Pope Leo as head of the family), the enterprise
 
demanded extraordinary military virtue, leadership ability,
 
and political acumen. As Garrett Mattingly observes, howev
 
er, "Who could really believe that the lazy, insipid
 
Giuliano or his vicious successor were the liberators Italy
 
awaited?"^ The effect of the dedication, therefore, was to
 
mock and ridicule the ineptness of Giuliano and the arrogant
 
and pretentious nature of Lorenzo, and in this aspect
 
Machiavelli was quite brutal, for he not only revealed his
 
contempt for the Medici, but effectively associated them
 
with the tyrannical qualities of his new prince.
 
Before turning to the subject of Machiavelli's charac
 
ter and background (and that of the Medici in so far as one
 
had an effect upon the other), I would make the point that
 
when the Prince is read as satire, the problems concerning
 
inclusion of chapter twenty-six are resolved, and the work
 
flows from the dedication forward as one entity, each part
 
dependant on its precedent, a perfect crescendo of irony
 
upon irony that virtually explodes in condemnation, a su
 
preme mockery of pretense to power in the great abyss of
 
corrupt Italian political life.
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Chapter II. Machiavelli and the Republic of Florence
 
Allan Gilbert suggests that Machiavelli's desire to
 
serve the Medici can be explained by observing the operative
 
modes of American political parties. "What blame at present
 
would be laid upon a career diplomat who retained his posi
 
tion when a Republican regime in Washington gave way to a
 
Democratic one? Machiavelli's situation was similar,"^ In
 
fact, Machiavelli's situation was entirely dissimilar,
 
unless one can imagine the Democrats returning to Washington
 
in the train of foreign arms, flying the papal banner, and
 
prepared to alter the constitution to the benefit of their
 
faction. The tendency of historians to minimize this impor
 
tant issue, the issue of Machiavelli's convictions, iis
 
puzzling unless, of course, it must be minimized to justify
 
his apparent lack of conviction, if being a republican meant
 
anything at all to him, in his hasty capitulation to the
 
Medici with no.evidence of conscionable objection.
 
Nor was the return of the Medici, in 1512, without
 
extreme violence. Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, in accor­
dance with the terms generated in the Congress of the League
 
of Mantua (August, 1512), was to be reinstated as ruler in
 
Florence, with the aid of the Holy League and Pope Julius
 
11," the author of Machiavelli's long misfortunes,"^ who
 
wanted to "subdue the Florentines... determined not to rest
 
while the city remained under the rule of Soderini," Gon­
faloniere of the republic.^ Soderini refused to join the
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League in ousting the French from Italy. With the fall of
 
Prato, just ten miles from Florence, the republic was forced
 
to admit defeat. The ensuing carnage was described by
 
Machiavelli as "an appalling spectacle of horrors,"^ all the
 
more so as Machiavelli's militia, the principle defenders of
 
Prato, ran "as though the enemy had jumped on their backs.
 
The Spaniards went on an unholy rampage, "killing priests at
 
their alters, ransacking churches, burning monasteries,
 
breaking into convents," while "the people of Prato were
 
tortured to disclose the hiding places of their treasure
 
chests; then they were killed, stripped of their clothes,
 
and their naked bodies flung into ditches or wells already
 
chocked with limbs."® Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici wit
 
nessed the carnage' and commented in a report to Pope Julius
 
that the sack was "... not without some bloodshed as could
 
not be avoided... the capture of Prato so speedily and
 
cruelly achieved, although it has given me some pain, will
 
at least have the good effect of serving as an example and a
 
deterrent to others."®
 
"Cardinal Giovanni made a ceremonial entrance into
 
Florence on September 14..." and within two days, was ap
 
proached by his partisans "to change the government."' On
 
September 16, "a parliament was called, and with the Medi­
cean mercenaries holding all the entrances to the piazza and
 
letting only Medician adherents pass... a balia to ^reform'
 
the state was accepted by acclamation."^" The balia, or
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parliament, was "so thoroughly detested by the advocates of
 
a free regime" that is had been "outlawed in the days of
 
Savonarola.."" Force Was required to return to this "ban
 
ished institution," and the committees consisted of forty-

five members (later increased to sixty-five), all trusty
 
Medicians hand-picked by the Cardinal," which "went about
 
its business of destroying the republic with the greatest
 
good will," including the abolition of "numerous character
 
istic features of the constitution, more particularly the
 
democratic Grand Council... and Machiavelli's militia... not
 
because it had proved a poor prop of the State, but that it
 
represented a concession to popular principles.
 
Machiavelli was responsible for having persuaded the repub
 
lic to establish a militia to protect the liberty of Flor
 
ence "from conquest in a voracious political world."" In
 
his own words, "For that liberty I believe you will have
 
such regard as they always have had who are born free and
 
hope to live free.""
 
From a historical perspective, the events of 1512
 
define a long struggle for power going back many centuries.
 
The political ideals that divided the Florentines emerged
 
from "... two myths of origin that were in theory incompati
 
ble but in fact intertwined in the popular imagination: the
 
myth of an imperial past and the myth of a republican past.
 
The latter was associated with the city's link to republican
 
Rome, the former with its almost miraculous restoration by
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the Emperor Charlemagne."^^ The myth of a republican past
 
was advanced early in the fifteenth-century by "several
 
Florentine humanists, principally Leonardo Bruni and Coluc­
cio Salutati."^® They offered "the notion that Florence had
 
enjoyed at its foundation a republican form of government...
 
a colony of pre-imperial, republican Rome, and from this
 
they concluded that its first government had been by repre
 
sentation rather than despotic." Further, as a "government
 
responsible to the people," the "Florentine constitution,
 
which stressed ius and libertas was not the product of
 
generations of political struggle, but the simple birthright
 
of all citizens of the city.
 
The imperial myth was "chronologically older and also
 
the more popular... fused with the related notion of a
 
return to the past, especially of empire as a recurring
 
phenomenon and therefore in some sense, a continuous enti
 
ty."^* "Colonized by the Romans in the time of Julius
 
Caesar," Florence was destroyed by Totila, and then "rebuilt
 
by the Romans," assisted by Charlemagne, "thus associating
 
independent Florence with Charlemagne," which "probably
 
reflected the rise of Angevine power in Italy during the
 
previous two centuries." In the fourteenth century, the
 
"Second Charlemagne prophecies" appeared, "predicting a new
 
Empire under a new French King Charles," which "foresaw that
 
the King would descend into Italy, renew its political and
 
cultural life, and eventually conquer the holy land," fol­
lowed, in "the fifteenth century," by the "Brigette Prophe
 
cy," which "substantially repeats these assertions, and, in
 
a postscript to one manuscript, declares that this war of
 
liberation will occur between 1460 and 1470."^'
 
Preference for the imperial myth, in Florence, "was
 
exploited by the Medici who demonstrated their enthusiasm
 
for an imperialistic rather than a republican culture by
 
their sponsorship of various festivals that took place in
 
the city on great feast days."^" Further, Medici ambition to
 
"dominate Italy" through unification "in the form of a
 
Tuscan Empire" dates back to "Cosimo de' Medici, grandfa
 
ther of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and great-grandfather of
 
Cardinal Giovanni, restored to power in 1512. If the myth
 
of imperialism embraced prophecies Of empire and kings, the
 
republican myth, in contrast, is reflected in Machiavelli's
 
view that the Romans of the republic "were enemies to the
 
very name of King and lovers of glory and of the common good
 
of their country.
 
The two myths coalesced to some extent as the Medici
 
began to consolidate their power during the fifteenth^cent­
ury; "Despite a constitution that appeared to allow for
 
representative government, decisions affecting the life of
 
the city were, in the first half of the century, always (and
 
increasingly) the prerogative of the citizens whose finan
 
cial affairs had flourished."^ The form of government that
 
proceeded from a republican foundation had, as its end, the
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notion of common benefit, liberty, and faith in the citizens
 
to govern, while that which proceeded from the imperial
 
ideal sought consolidation of power and the promotion of
 
self-interest to achieve its end, empire. Thus, while the
 
"Medici supporters... could comprehend a party love founded
 
on self-interest,"^ which leads to factionalism and strife,
 
Machiavelli contends that "it is not the well being of
 
individuals that makes cities great, but the well being of
 
the community; and it is beyond question that it is only in
 
republics that the common good is looked to properly in that
 
all that promotes it is carried out; and, however much this
 
or that private person may be the loser on that account,
 
there are so many who benefit thereby that the common good
 
can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in conse
 
quence." (II. 2, 275)—Machiavelli "always inclined with all
 
his heart to the popular state, and this inclination he long
 
nourished on the deeds of Republican Rome, the only Rome he
 
ever loved.
 
In Citizen Machiavelli, Mark. Hulliung makes the point
 
that "today, almost no one doubts [Hans] Baron's contention
 
that Machiavelli was fundamentally a republican in his
 
political outlook."^® Garrett Mattingly refers to Alberico
 
Gentili, as far back as the reign of Elizabeth I, "An Ital
 
ian who lectured on the civil law at Oxford," who said of
 
Machiavelli, "He has been much calumniated and deserves our
 
sympathy. He was, indeed, a praiser of democracy (Democrat­
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iae la.uda.tor) and its most zealous champion. Born, educat
 
ed, and honored with office in a republic, he was a supreme
 
foe of tyrants. It was his purpose not to instruct tyrants
 
but to reveal their secret machinations, stripping them bare
 
before their suffering people... he aimed to instruct the
 
people under the pretext of instructing the prince, hoping
 
that thus his teaching might be tolerated."^'
 
Perhaps Machiavelli's most important contribution to
 
modern political thought is the Discourses, which provide an
 
important link from the Roman republic to the present in the
 
evolution of republican government. In his introduction to
 
the Discourses, Bernard Crick describes Machiavelli as one
 
whose "main substantial preoccupation, indeed his good
 
obsession, was with the condition for republican government.
 
The republic to him was the best of all possible worlds, and
 
he tried to show that it had to be and could be, not merely
 
should be, remarkably tolerant of internal conflicts and
 
dissent. Not merely does he have a coherent theory of the
 
condition for republican rule, but in many vital respects it
 
is more fully worked out than Aristotle—and there is no
 
rival in between."^®
 
Machiavelli's republicanism should not be viewed as a
 
quiescent intellectual construct, however, for he demon
 
strated his commitment by fully participating in the gov
 
ernment of the republic. The Machiavelli were "an old
 
Florentine family, noted for their devotion to the republic.
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In the two centuries before Niccold was born, they had given
 
Florence twelve gonfaloniere and fifty'^four priors
 
Mattingly refers to Francesco Machiav^lli, who said in a
 
public speech, "It is freedom that makes cities and their
 
citizens great. This is well known. Tyranny makes only
 
desolation. For Tyrants must always fear good citizens and
 
try to exterminate them."^° Mattingly contends that "Niccolo
 
made this assertion one of the central theses of his Dis
 
courses, thus prolonging the family tradition in which he
 
was brought up nearly one hundred years later.
 
Another Machiavelli, Girolamo, is mentioned by Niccold
 
in the History, in connection with the corrupt government
 
(of Cosimo) in 1458: "So when the government had been^ taken
 
over and the balia and then the chief magistrates elected
 
according to the desire of the few, in order with terror to
 
give a beginning to the government which they had set up by
 
force, they banished Messer Girolamo Machiavelli with some
 
others, and also deprived many of their offices. Thus
 
Messer Girolamo, who did not keep the rules of his banish
 
ment, was declared a rebel, and as he went traveling around
 
Italy, stirring up the princes against his own city, he was
 
arrested in Lunigiana through the treachery of one of those
 
lords; being taken to Florence, he was put to death in
 
prison.
 
Machiavelli married Marietta di Ludovico Corsini in
 
August, 1501. They had six children, four sons and two
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 daughters. Two of his sons were involved in liberation
 
enterprises. Ludovico was killed defending Florence in the
 
long siege of 1530,^^ which ended the heroic but short~lived
 
Republic of Florence, reconstituted in 1527 following the
 
sack of Rome by the imperial forces of Charles V of Spain,
 
and the subsequent expulsion of the Medici from Florence.
 
Another son, Piero, together with Gerolamo Muzio, "proposed
 
liberation projects to the Medici dukes of Tuscany," which
 
were impossible to implement "in pre-1494 terms, but had to
 
be seen in the perspective of great powers."^
 
Machiavelli's republicanism, then, was well established
 
within the traditions of his family, a tradition that had
 
historical significance in the city of Florence. Evidence
 
of his own devotion to the democratic principles that define
 
that tradition resides in his enthusiastic and selfless
 
years of service to the government of the Republic of Flor
 
ence, from 1498 to 1512, as secretary of the Second Chan
 
cery. A chronological review of his many activities in
 
that capacity is not pertinent to the question of his intent
 
in writing the Prince, but certain points should be made
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with regard to his participation in that government.
 
The first is that Machiavelli did not participate in
 
the government of the Medici, terminated in 1494, nor that
 
of the Savonarolan period, which ended with the friars'
 
execution in 1498. In fact, nothing is known about his
 
life, prior to 1498, with the exception of certain informa­
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tion regarding his education, found in a diary kept by his
 
father, Bernardo.^® If it mattered little to Machiavelli
 
what master he served, one would expect to find him seeking
 
employment in some capacity in the city prior to 1498, at
 
almost thirty years of age. As Nicolai Rubinstein suggests,
 
"it is unlikely that he would have been elected in June 1498
 
by the Great Council to the post of Second Chancellor, if he
 
had been known as an adherent of or sympathizer with the
 
Medici. The more so as he had no professional qualities to
 
recommend him for this post, as was, for instance, the case
 
of Alessandro Braccesi, his predecessor as Second Chancel
 
lor, who was a notary and had served in the Chancery at
 
least since 1479."^' As there is no evidence to affirm that
 
Machiavelli attempted to gain employment from the Medici,
 
and reason to doubt that he would have been inclined to do
 
so, it seems probable that he did not.
 
Despite Savonarola's theocratic inclinations, he was a
 
"democratic champion,"^* who, "in a succession of fiery ser
 
mons... declared in favor of the democratic principle as
 
represented in the Grand Council" which resulted in a new
 
constitution in 1494.^^ Savonarola, however, looked to King
 
Charles VIII of France (whose invasion of the peninsula in
 
1494 precipitated the slow decline of Italy over the next
 
half-century) as the savior of Italy, to "reform the church
 
which lies prostrate on the ground," and "to cure the ills
 
of Italy," which resonates a lot like the Florentine myth of
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imperialism and its prophecies of a savior king, although
 
Savonarola was not a monarchist. Schevill alludes to this
 
prospect when he suggests that Savonarola might "have re
 
duced this imaginary Charlemagne to the simpleton that he
 
was," had his "inner voices" not interfered with his ap
 
praisal of Charles VIII. Machiavelli may, as Allan Gilbert
 
observes, have realized Sayonarola's "capacity as a politi
 
cal thinker and practical statesman" while he "deplored his
 
partisan violence, his egotism, his reliance on histrionic
 
effect, [and] his mixture of the ecclesiastical with the
 
political.""*^ Machiavelli would indeed have disliked the
 
Frate's partisanship which lead, in his opinion, to disorder
 
and ruin in a republic. His tolerance of conflict and
 
dissent, as indicated by Bernard Crick aboye, should be
 
understood within the context of lawful restraint, for in
 
the larger framework of Italian city-states, Machiavelli
 
warns that warring factions turn to arms, "overthrow the
 
laws," and "those who are deprived of their offices [then]
 
turn to foreign arms.""*^ In discussing party strife in
 
Florence, Machiavelli states that "the enmities in Florence
 
were always those of factions and therefore always danger
 
ous."'*^ Thus, Savonarola's factionalism and theocratic
 
tendencies offer sufficient cause for Machiavelli not to
 
have become involved in the partisan disputes of that peri
 
od, which ultimately led to Savonarola's death, although the
 
inauguration of the new government, in 1498, opened the door
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 of opportunity for him.
 
I . ■ 
As I mentioned above, another important consideration
 
was the creation of Machiavelli's militia, for which he
 
fought hard in principle. It was customary in Italy to
 
fight battles with mercenary and/or auxiliary troops, as he
 
criticizes at great length in his works. "The idea of a
 
citizen army was so alien to the Florentine mind after a
 
lapse of nearly two centuries, as to appear extravagant and
 
fantastic, yet Machiavelli succeeded in securing funding
 
for the militia in April, 1503.''^ He was "the first to make
 
political theory of the national militia, the first to give
 
it practical application with regular levies and stable
 
ordinances under the control of a government official."'^
 
Machiavelli was made secretary of the Nine, who were in
 
charge of the newly formed militia, and Cardinal Francesco
 
Soderini (brother of Piero Soderini, gonfalonieri) wrote to
 
Machiavelli in praise of his efforts; "We do not believe
 
that in Florence anything as worthy and well-founded as this
 
has been done for some long time in defense of its new
 
freedom, ^a divine gift not a product of men.' In the
 
spring of 1509, with Machiavelli "substantially in charge,
 
the Florentine militia, combined with mercenary forces,
 
recovered Pesa after fifteen years of turmoil for the Repub
 
lic of Florence. There was great celebration over the
 
victory in Florence, an honorable triumph for Machiavelli.
 
In Schevill's judgment, the "Florentine republic reached its
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apogee" the day Pisa surrendered, and "the statement applies
 
with equal force to the publiq career of Niccold
 
Machiavelli. That the militia failed, in 1512, when
 
confronting the Spaniards at Prato, was undoubtedly a grave
 
disappointment for Machiavelli, but it should be recalled
 
that the Spaniards were seasoned veterans of war, while the
 
militia was comprised primarily of peasant stock, "a serious
 
flaw" in the opinion of Schevill, as it "cut down" the
 
number of men, and "excused from a primary obligation of
 
patriotism the very people who were the masters of state and
 
its leading beneficiaries."^® Machiavelli's interest in
 
military affairs never diminished over the years. In 1521,
 
he wrote The Art of War, the only one of his major works
 
that was published during his lifetime.
 
There was one Medici to whom Machiavelli might have
 
dedicated the Prince with probity—Giovanni delle Bande
 
Nere, great-great-grandson of Giovanni di Bicci (as was Pope
 
Leo). From a secondary line Of the Medici family, Giovanni
 
was married to Lorenzo the Magnificent's granddaughter.
 
Suggesting that the people of Florence wanted Giovanni as
 
their general,'^ Machiavelli lavishly praised him in 1526 for
 
his warrior ability, praise he was not willing to grant to
 
Giuliano or Lorenzo, whose military ability was significant
 
ly inferior. Of Giovanni, Machiavelli writes "I believe
 
anyone who believes that among the Italians there is no
 
leader whom the soldiers would more gladly follow, and whom
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the Spanish more fear and respect; everybody also thinks
 
that Lord Giovanni is bold, prompt, has great ideas, is a
 
maker of great plans. When Machiavelli wrote the Prince,
 
in 1513, Giovanni was only fifteen years old. However,
 
after the death of Lorenzo (1519), he was twenty-one, and in
 
1521, had "distinguished himself" in the battle at Vauri.^^
 
Machiavelli could have changed the dedication once again
 
following Lorenzo's death, calling upon this young Medici of
 
great promise, had he really intended that anyone from that
 
family should be called upon as liberator of Italy. It is
 
ironic that this Medici, Giovanni, is the ancestor of those
 
Medici who later became the grand-dukes of Tuscany under
 
Spanish hegemony.
 
Machiavelli's missions as a Florentine diplomat extend
 
ed to the courts of kings, princes, popes, and condotteri in
 
the field. In his position as envoy, he was sent to "ob
 
serve and report" his findings.^ In 1500, he made his first
 
trip to France, followed by others in 1504, 1510 and 1511.
 
He was sent to Cesare Borgia's camp in 1502, where he wit
 
nessed "the bloody vengeance taken by Cesare on his mutinous
 
captains at the town of Sinigaglia, and visited Borgia
 
once again in 1503, following the death of his father. Pope
 
Alexander VI, which precipitated Cesare's demise. In 1507,
 
he traveled to Germany to the court of Maximilian I, Holy
 
Roman Emperor. In Montefiascone, Machiavelli "recorded
 
without comment" the words of Pope Julius II, who "talked of
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delivering Italy from servitude and out of the hands of the
 
French," strange words from Pope Julius," who had himself
 
contributed so much to bringing theni into the Country, and
 
was indeed ^the fatal instrument of the ills of Italy.
 
On a visit to Rome, in 1503, Machiavelli was given to under
 
stand that he should "pretend not to see" Cardinal Giovanni
 
de' Medici," which he observed.
 
During the Savonarola period and the republican govern
 
ment which followed (1494-1512), the Medici were in exile.
 
Piero de Medici's surrender of Florence, in 1494, to Charles
 
VIII, which humiliated and angered the Florentines, ulti
 
mately led to the Medici fall from power. During his exile,
 
Piero "renjained in Italy... offering his services to the
 
republic's enemies, making repeated attempts to reinstate
 
himself in Florence by force, joining forces with Cesare
 
Borgia... who hoped that by re-establishing the Medici in
 
Florence he would make a valuable ally for himself in Tus
 
cany," although the "Florentines were not in the least dis
 
posed to favor a Medician restoration under Piero's leader
 
ship."" Piero drowned in the Gargliano River while serving
 
with French forces, "the worthless Piero [who] had never
 
ceased to harass the republic either by joining with its
 
enemies or by plots of his own devising.""
 
After Piero's death, the "Medici interests" passed to
 
Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano. The cardinal spent most of
 
his time in Rome, while Giuliano ''found shelter and hospi­
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tality at the court of Guidobaldo de Montefeltre, in
 
Urbino, as mentioned above. With the return of the Medici
 
to Florence in 1512, Machiavelli's career came to a close,
 
nor could he have expected more, for "if he were under the
 
illusion of still living in times when his good sense and
 
the style of his writings could bring him praise and favor,
 
[he] was soon to be disillusioned," for the Medici could
 
"not forget the coldness he had shown them—as indeed he was
 
obliged to do-^-as exiles in the courts of Rome and France.
 
Besides, they had their own creatures to reward.""
 
Unlike the families of Francesco Guicciardini and
 
Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli had no past association with
 
the Medici from which he might expect consideration for
 
continued employment, which they obtained. Peiro Soderini
 
fled the city under duress, but Machiavelli remained.
 
Perhaps he thought his reputation as statesman would protect
 
him from his adversaries, the Medici faction and others
 
opposed to the republic. Of this uncertain time,
 
Machiavelli does not inform us of his expectations.
 
34
 
Chapter III. Machiavelli: Honest and Good
 
On November 10, 1512, the Signoria restricted
 
Machiavelli to Florentine territory for one year. His
 
dismissal "was to mean blame, punishment, revenge... ," for
 
he was fined one thousand gold florins, "a huge sum," which
 
he managed to find with the help of "three friends."*
 
Machiavelli had not sought wealth or personal advantage
 
while in office. His expenses had often exceeded his in
 
come. On one of his missions to France, he "lacked funds
 
even to send urgent letters by special messenger,"^ and
 
while at Imola, his private "capital was diminishing, as he
 
had to spend for his own honor, and that of the republic,
 
more than he^earned."^ As Garrett Mattingly reminds us, "He
 
has left proof of his devotion ih the record of his activi
 
ties and in the state papers in which he spun endless
 
schemes for the defense and aggrandizement of the republic,
 
and constantly preached the same to his superiors... after
 
fourteen years in high office, in a place where the opportu
 
nities for dipping into the public purse and into the pock
 
ets of his compatriots and of those foreigners he did busi
 
ness with were practically unlimited... Machiavelli retired
 
from public life as poor as when he had entered it... if
 
this was not a unique feat in his day, it was a very rare
 
one.
 
Most profound, however, is Machiavelli's own testimony
 
to his character, shared with Francesco Vettori in a letter,
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December 10, 1513; "And of my honesty, there should be no
 
doubt, because having always preserved my honesty, I should
 
hardly now learn to break it; and he who has been honest and
 
good for forty-three years, as I have, cannot change his
 
nature; and as witness to my honesty and goodness, I have my
 
poverty.
 
On November 17, 1512, Machiavelli was forbidden to "set
 
foot for twelve months in that palazzo where he had done so
 
much for fourteen years," although he was required to return
 
to settle "accounts" regarding pay for the battalions which
 
had fought at Prato.® His former position in government was
 
taken by Nicolo Michelozzi, "former secretary of the Medici
 
who now served and spied on the Signoria... for their bene
 
fit."' Could Machiavelli possibly have desired such employ
 
ment, as a subservient lackey to the Medici? Except for the
 
pressure of need, collusion with the Medici seems altogether
 
improbable, and need had not caused him to flinch in his
 
principles or accommodate himself or his family at the ex
 
pense of his integrity for the previous fourteen years.
 
Machiavelli, who advised Cardinal Giovanni to "adopt a
 
wise and politic magnanimity" toward those who had confis
 
cated property from the Medici in 1494 (advice that was not
 
heeded),* who had seen the "Great Council abolished" and
 
with it the "system of magistrates and all the popular
 
liberties," and, above all, who saw the "nine in charge of
 
the militia" dismissed and the "military organization" he
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had "created... dissolved,"® this Machiavelli, scholars ask
 
us to believe, then began, in his leisure, to contemplate a
 
little manuscript calling upon the oppressors of Florence to
 
extend their oppression to all of Italy! There is no logi-^
 
cal reason for Machiavelli to abandon every defining notion
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we have about him as a man or as a political servant of the
 
Republic of Florence that he loved. "... he is not among
 
those who exert themselves to flatter and court the new
 
powers, nor among those who, as he will shortly write,
 
prostitute themselves to the people and the Medici... .'"i®
 
Considering the events that transpired through Decem
 
ber, 1512, it is difficult to imagine that Machiavelli put
 
forward the principles he expounds in the Prince with sin
 
cerity and earnest desire for service in such a government.
 
His imprisonment which followed should serve to eradicate
 
any lingering doubt, but scholars tend to dismiss that as
 
well, having accepted the Prince as a work of integrity
 
unencumbered by the other reality, so often ignored, that
 
the Prince "has to contend not only against Machiavelli's
 
life but against his writings as, of course, everyone who
 
wants to use The Prince as a centerpiece in an exposition of
 
Machiavelli's political thought has recognized."'^
 
Machiavelli's arrest and imprisonment prompted the last
 
defining experience, the last direct association he had with
 
the Medici government before he began, in his exile, to
 
write the Discourses on republican government, and the
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Prince, perhaps the most concise repository of tyrannical
 
precepts ever written, a reflection of the times and the
 
vile contempt for liberty and freedom that had destroyed the
 
Republic of Florence.
 
Machiavelli's arrest resulted from a conspiracy plot
 
against Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano de' Medici, perpe
 
trated by two Florentines, Pietro Paolo Boscoli and Agostino
 
Capponi. Many Florentines at that time probably still
 
remembered the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478, which resulted in
 
the death of Giuliano, the brother of Lorenzo the Magnifi
 
cent, who barely escaped-death himself. Even Machiavelli
 
may have had faint memories of that event, which occurred
 
when he was nine years old. Unfortunately for Machiavelli,
 
his implication in the present conspiracy would occasion new
 
trials and difficulties.
 
The plot was discovered in February, 1513, when "a
 
paper containing a list of eighteen or twenty names, written
 
by Pietro Paolo Boscoli, a well-known enemy of the Medici,
 
[was] found by chance in the house of the Lenzi family, who
 
were related to the Soderini; it [was] taken to the Otto di
 
Balia; Boscoli and his friend Agostino Capponi [were] ar
 
rested."'^ The liet contained "names of some friends whom
 
they knew or considered to be enemies of the Medici... the
 
only ones they had approached were Niccolo Valari and
 
Giovanni Folchi, who received them coldly... the Eight did
 
not hesitate to have all the people mentioned in the list
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 arrested. The seventh name was Niccolo Machiavelli.
 
Niccolo Valari was godfather to one of Machiavelli's child
 
ren/'* and he and Machiavelli had served in government to
 
gether in 1502.*^ Machiavelli dedicated his Tercets On
 
\ "
 
Ingratitude Or Envy to Giovanni Folchi (written between 1507
 
and 1515) Machiavelli, then, had close acquaintance with
 
three of the four conspirators mentioned above.
 
Only Capponi and Boscbli admitted their guilt, stating
 
"they had wanted to assassinate the Cardinal or, according
 
to others, Giuliano."*' Machiavelli may have had no interest
 
in entering into a conspiracy against the Medici, but clear
 
ly Boscoli, who created the list of names, had reason to
 
think that he might have.
 
The arresting officers did not find Machiavelli at
 
home, and it is a matter of speculation whether he was
 
warned and thought of "hiding", or was simply away at the
 
i . ■ , , 
time; "A proclamation was issued ^calling for anyone who
 
knew him' to denounce him within the hour under pain of
 
being declared a rebel and forfeiting his goods."**
 
Machiavelli came forward, and was placed under arrest;
 
"They could find nothing against him except some acquain
 
tance with Boscoli, his friendship with Valori and Folschi,
 
and certain jibes with which he probably repaid the Medici
 
for some of the harm they had done him in recent months."*'
 
Nevertheless, Machiavelli was subjected to the pain and
 
humiliation of torture which, if not to be relied upon for
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discovering the truth, does measure the resolve, courage,
 
and strength of its victim. "Four drops on the rope were
 
usually enough to subdue any body and spirit, and if they
 
did not suffice, the torture went on even though their hands
 
were dislocated and their flesh torn. Niccolo had six
 
drops and he confessed nothing. He was returned to
 
his cell, to wait.
 
On February 22, just before dawn," his friends,
 
Boscoli and Capponi, were led to the scaffold, to the sound
 
of funeral hymns. On March 7, the trials ended. Valori
 
and Folschi were "sentenced to two years imprisonment in the
 
dungeons of Volterra, and Machiavelii was fined.^ He wait
 
ed, "needing only the money to buy back his freedom."^
 
In the meantime. Pope Julius died February 21, and
 
Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici was elected pope on March 11,
 
taking the name of Leo X. The celebrations continued in
 
Florence for five days, each Florentine "thinking of the
 
honour and profit which could be expected in public and
 
private affairs from a pope who was a fellow-citizen and
 
lavish in spending and giving."^ In the spirit of the occa
 
sion, "the prisons were opened," and Machiavelii was set
 
free, his "fine and prison sentence being entirely remit
 
ted."^®
 
Virtually no scholars question Machiavelii's innocence
 
in this conspiracy. It is not known whether or not he was
 
approached. The fact that he withstood torture, however,
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does not prove or disprove his guilt or innocence, and the
 
appearance of his name on the list of potential conspirators
 
raises questions that, unfortunately, cannot be answered.
 
Had this been the only conspiracy implicating Machiavelli,
 
one could more readily dismiss it, but there was another, in
 
1522, against Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, the illegitimate
 
son of Giuliano (who was stabbed to death in the Pazzi
 
conspiracy, 1478) who later became Pope Clement VII fol
 
lowing the death of Pope Leo, in May, 1521, and Leo's suc
 
cessor, Pope Adrian VI, who died in 1523.
 
Cardinal Giulio granted the opportunity for Florentines
 
to submit proposals for the reform of their government. "It
 
was a clever way of investigating people's thoughts and
 
discovering what ambitions were fermenting in certain Flor
 
entine minds, or perhaps his intentions were sincere;
 
reflecting a concern for the future governing of Florence,
 
as no legitimate heirs remained in the Medici line.^'
 
Meanwhile, many proposals had been submitted to the
 
Cardinal. Among them was a plan formerly presented to Pope
 
Leo by Machiavelli, A Discourse on Remodeling the Government
 
of Florence, written about 1526,^" which involved "a return
 
to the popular state to be governed by the Medici during the
 
cardinal's lifetime, and thereafter to be free. As late
 
as 1522, then, Machiavelli continued as an advocate of
 
Florentine liberty, despite his failure to persuade Le(j5 to
 
adopt such a plan. Further, he had obtained his commission
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from Pope Leo, in 1520, to write the History, reflecting a
 
modicum of favor from the Medici which, if Machiavelli
 
really.desired it, one would expect he would not compromise
 
with the flagrant pursuit of republican principles. Yet, he
 
continued to press for such reforms.
 
When it became evident that Giulio was evading reform,
 
a conspiracy to assassinate him was planned and subsequently
 
discovered, a conspiracy that "was to be one of the expedi
 
tious ways of reforming the state. Zanobi Buondelmonte
 
(to whom Machiavelli's Discourses are dedicated, with Cosimo
 
Rucellai) and Luigi Alamanni, "Machiavelli's two greatest
 
friends," were the primary conspirators, although several
 
others were involved. "It was a gloomy prospect for
 
Niccolo, who was one of their friends and a reputed former
 
conspirator against the Medici. Worse still, Buondelmonte
 
was supposed to have mentioned his name to one of the accom
 
plices, among those of several citizens,whom it was suggest
 
ed should be invited to join the plot."^' The accomplice ad
 
vised against it, because in his view, as "Machiavelli was a
 
poor man and known not to be a great friend of the Medici,
 
he would not be able to do the things they wanted without
 
arousing suspicion."^'' It is not known whether Machiavelli
 
ever knew of the plot, but it would seem that if anyone
 
could be said to have understood Machiavelli's mind and his
 
inclinations, it would have been these old republican
 
friends of many years.
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Buondelmonte and Alamanni fled. Two of the other
 
conspirators were beheaded. In 1526, it was learned by the
 
Medici government that Machiavelli might have been implicat
 
ed in this conspiracy, by mention of his name, but "a lot of
 
water had flowed under the Arno bridge in the meantime,
 
and nothing was ever proven.
 
In any case, Machiavelli was more inclined, it seems to
 
me, to use his literary gifts to attack his enemies, which
 
is evident not only in his satire in the Prince, but also in
 
his sonnets to Giuliano de' Medici, written perhaps in the
 
spring or summer of 1513, when Machiavelli emerged from
 
prison. Machiavelli began his correspondence with Francisco
 
Vettori at this time, in which he makes reference to
 
Giuliano. In his first letter (March 13), he informed
 
Vettori that he was released from prison ••amid the universal
 
rejoicing of this city, even though I hoped for it because
 
of your doings and those of Pagolo, for which I thank you.
 
I won't go over the long story of my misfortune, but will
 
merely say Luck has done everything to cause me this trou
 
ble. Yet, thanks be to God! It is over. I hope I won't
 
run intd it again, both because I shall be more careful and
 
because the times will be more liberal and not so suspi
 
cious."^® The words ••even thbugh" suggest that Machiavelli
 
did not attribute his release to the efforts of the
 
Vettoris, and his statement "I shall be more careful" inti
 
mates that he was, perhaps, not careful enough in the past,
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either in his associations, or in his remarks regarding the
 
Medici government if, in fact, he was not involved in the
 
conspiracy.
 
In his second letter, (March 18), however, Machiavelli
 
thanks Giuliano de' Medici for his release, although the
 
occasion and influence to open the prison doors resided in
 
Pope Leo, not Giuliano; "I thank you as much as I can and
 
pray to God that to your profit and benefit he will give me
 
power to do something that will please you, because I can
 
say that all of life that is left me, I consider I owe to
 
the Magnificent Giuliano and your PagolQ. Giuliano was
 
not responsible for Machiavelli's release however; "On his
 
elevation to the papacy [Pope Leo] was inspired to publish
 
an amnesty, by which Machiavelli and all other suspects were
 
set free. Thus was the ex-secretary officially cleared of
 
specific charges but his person remained under a cloud."'*
 
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Giuliano made
 
any attempt to facilitate Machiavelli's release from prison,
 
nor is there reason to think that he would, given the nature
 
of the conspiracy for which he was incarcerated. As the
 
amnesty was made public, Machiavelli could not have mistaken
 
the circumstances of his release.
 
The Vettoris may have attempted to intercede on
 
Machiavelli's behalf, in which case his gratitude to them is
 
well deserved. To Giuliano, however, his grateful apprecia
 
tion smacks of sarcasm, particularly if the Vettori appeals
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to him found no response. Therefore, when Machiavelli
 
remarks that he prays that God "will give me power to do
 
something that will please you," having little in his bag
 
gage but his wits, he may have had the sonnets in mind—-the
 
means by which he might entertain Vettori with a proper
 
acknowledgement of the role Giuliano had played in the
 
humiliation Machiavelli suffered, even if that role was one
 
of silent acquiescence. The sonnets are probably the first
 
satire he directed toward the Medici, although they are not
 
generally acknowledged as such; and they echo typical
 
Machiavellian condescension and redress with keen subtlety.
 
As Jonathan Swift once remarked, with regard to a satirist's
 
intent:
 
I have a mind to be very angry, and let
 
my anger break out in some manner that
 
will not please them at the end of my
 
pen
 
The sonnets were ostensibly written while Machiavelli
 
was in prison, which Roberto Ridolfi argues were not only
 
written in prison, but may have helped in his release.^
 
Allan Gilbert disagrees, however, as the sonnets were not
 
discovered until 1828 and, therefore, "their real date can
 
only be inferred." Further, Gilbert observes that while
 
they may have been written "before Giuliano's death,.,
 
obviously they were not intended to be sent to him.""*^
 
Machiavelli's sonnets to Giuliano are tailed sonnets,
 
which are "satirical," a "fourteenth century vogue... in
 
45
 
  
 
 
which a couplet was added after the second tercet," as
 
demonstrated in Milton's 'On the New Forces of Conscience
 
under the Long Parliament' [which] adds six lines... to
 
allow him through insistence and perseverance to raise his
 
scornful voice even more loudly... than he could manage in a
 
conventional fourteen lines. Because they are tailed
 
sonnets, then, Machiavelli betrays his intent in form.
 
The first (of three) has been described as a "comic
 
poem," and "not to be relied on for accuracy."'*^ Machiavelli
 
would have seemed unfeeling indeed, if he had actually
 
written this sonnet on the day that Agostino Capponi and
 
Pietro Paolo Boscoli were executed, the confessed conspira
 
tors in the plot Machiavelli was accused of, as the content
 
suggests. His sardonic humor is apparent when he asks
 
Giuliano to (now) turn his pity (for them) toward himself.
 
X ■ 
I HAVE, GIULIANO, ON MY LEGS A SET OF FETTERS
 
With six pulls of the cord on my shoulders; my
 
other miseries I do not intend to recount to you,
 
since so the poets are treated!
 
5	 These broken walls generate lice so swollen that
 
they look like flies; never was there such a
 
stench at Roncesvalles, or in Sardinia among those
 
groves,
 
9	 As in my so dainty hospice; with noise such as if
 
I
 
truly jove oh earth were thundering, and all
 
■ . ■ , ■ 	 ■ ■ • ; ) ■ ' 
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Mongibello.
 
12 One is chained up and another is unironed with a
 
pounding of locks, keys and bars; another shrieks
 
he is too high above the ground!
 
15 What gave me most torment was that, sleeping near
 
dawn, I heard them chanting the words: "We are
 
praying for you."
 
18 Now let them go away, I beg, if only your pity may
 
turn itself toward me, good father, and loosen
 
these cruel bonds.
 
The comedy that Machiavelli refers to in the second
 
sonnet may have been written "toward 1504... a work called
 
Le Mashere [the Masks] in imitation of Aristophane's
 
Clouds,"*^ which is no longer extant due to an unfortunate
 
decision made by Machiavelli's nephew, Gitiliano de' Ricci,
 
who served as his "literary executive" after his death.
 
Ricci found "among his uncles manuscripts... a damaged,
 
imperfect draft of a ragionamento in a comic vein, reminis
 
cent of The Clouds and other Aristophanic comedies... so
 
full of reckless accusations, of both ecclesiastics and
 
laymen alike, that he decided not to copy it... the people
 
thus slandered were still alive in 1504.""^' Further, "under
 
fictitious names he works over and badly treats many citi
 
zens,""*® which may well have included references to the
 
Medici, a compelling reason for Ricci to destroy it. The
 
fact that Machiavelli demonstrated slander against citizens
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and ecclesiastics in a comic vein in this work offers early
 
evidence for Machiayelli's proclivity to express himself
 
with humor and satire.
 
Dazzo is in reference to "Andrea Dazze... a pupil of
 
the first chancellor, Marcello Virgilio [who] was trying
 
desperately to keep afloat in the rather stagnant waters of
 
Florentine letters.
 
■ .II • 
LAST NIGHT, BESEECHING THE MUSES THAT WITH
 
their sweet cither and sweet songs they would, to
 
console me, visit your magnificence and make my
 
excuses.
 
5	 One appeared who embarrassed me, saying: "Who are
 
you, who dare to call me?" I told her my name;
 
and she, to torture me, hit me in the face and
 
closed my mouth for me,
 
9	 saying: "You are not Niccolo but Dazzo, since you
 
have your legs and your heels bound and you sit
 
here chained like a madman."
 
12 	 I wished to give her my arguments; she replied to
 
me and said: "Go like a fool with that comedy of
 
yours in rags."
 
15 	 Give her proofs> Magnificent Giuliano, in the name
 
of high God, that I am not Dazzo, but am myself.^"
 
Machiavelli's third sonnet to Giuliano does not refer
 
to the days of his incarceration, but to a gift of thrushes
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which "here become in his imagination/ his poor present to
 
Giuliano,"^^ although it might be closer to the mark if one
 
thought of the birds in the context of a bribe, from a poor
 
Machiavelli shut away in his exile at his farm, for which he
 
has the Medici to thank in his leisure.
 
As Allan Gilbert explains, "the Italian word mordere
 
means to bite both literally and figurativelyj the latter
 
sense, to speak evil of, is now obsolete for English bite
 
except in backbite. Machiavelli plays with the two senses
 
throughout the poem."^
 
In lines fifteen and sixteen, Machiavelli is perhaps
 
warning Giuliano that he should not judge his sonnet by
 
appearances.
 
Ill
 
I SEND YOU, GIULIANO, SOME THRUSHES, NOT
 
because the gift is good or fine, but that for a
 
bit Your Magnificence may recollect your poor
 
Machiavelli.
 
5	 And if you have near you somebody who bites, you
 
can hit him in the teeth with it, so that when he
 
eats 	his bird, to rend others he may forget.
 
9	 But you say; "Perhaps they will not have the
 
effect you speak of, because they are not good and
 
are not fat; backbiters will not eat them."
 
12 	 I will answer such words that I am thin, even I,
 
as my enemies are aware; and yet they get off me
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 some 	good mouthfuls.
 
15 	 Won't Your Magnificence give up your opinion, and
 
feel and touch, and judge by the hands and not by
 
the eyes?'^
 
The sonnets are important because they reflect
 
Machiavelli's impulse to convey, through satire, his con
 
tempt for the Medici. The political reality of Florence
 
provided fertile ground for satire, between the opposing
 
forces of republican ideals and the relentless pursuit of
 
power symbolized in the Medici. Thus, when Machiavelli
 
appeals to his superior/ Giuliano (whom he could not have
 
considered superior in the least), the irony of the sonnets
 
is apparent, yet they constitute but a humble prelude to his
 
greater satiridal work, the Prince. Machiavelli's anger,
 
like the "fury'' of Juvenal, "is appropriate only to great,
 
obvious and widespread evils, the very putrification of
 
society, the Italy Machiavelli described as "besmirched
 
with filth. As Garrett Mattingly expressed it, "Indeed
 
the satirist seems to put forth his greatest powers chiefly
 
when goaded by anger, hatred, and savage indignation. If
 
Machiavelli wrote The Prince out of fullness of these emo­
tions rather than out of the dispassionate curiosity of the
 
scientist, or out of the base willingness to toady to the .
 
destroyer of his country's liberty, then one can understand
 
why his words bite and burn like acid, and why the whole
 
style had a density and impact unique among his writings."^®
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 Machiavelli's writings are consistent with his charac
 
ter and the political views represented in his service to
 
the Republic of Florence, with the exception of the Prince—
 
and when the Prince is recognized as satire, it proves to be
 
the strongest statement of all made by Machiavelli, in
 
defense of the democratic principles he believed in. From
 
the defeat of the republic, his dismissal from office, the
 
dark days of his imprisonment, and his exile, one can dis­
cover ample cause to motivate him to voice his contempt, not
 
only for those responsible for his own misfortune and that
 
of Florence, but for the misfortune that had befallen Italy
 
generally. His humor often disguised the agony that he
 
suffered, but he could not hide it from himself:
 
I hope, and hope increases my torment:
 
I weep and weeping feeds the weary
 
heart; I laugh and my laughter does not
 
touch my soul. I burn and no one sees
 
my passion; I fear what I see and what I
 
' hear; everything gives me fresh pain;
 
Thus hoping, I weep and laugh and burn,
 
and I fear what I hear and see.
 
If criticism is the "common purpose" of satire,^® it is
 
fueled by the "passion to make known, although, unfortu
 
nately, "satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do
 
generally discover everybody's face but their own; which is
 
the chief reason for that kind of reception it meets in the
 
world, and that so very few are offended with it."®°
 
Pope Leo made Florence "an annex of the papacy"" fol
 
lowing his election, and Wasted no time in his efforts "to
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make the House of Medici once more a dominating influence in
 
Italian politics [and] also to drive the foreigners from
 
Italian soil, "those same Spaniards who were so instrumental
 
in returning his family to its former position of power in
 
Florence." He intended to form central Italy into a single
 
state by uniting the duchies of Ferrera and Urbino, and by
 
joining to them the cities of Parma, Modena, and Piacenza.
 
This new unified state was meant eventually to be placed
 
under the rule of the Medici, perhaps under that of the
 
Pope's nephew, Lorenzo... ." After driving out the Span
 
iards from the Kingdom of Naples, through "diplomacy rather
 
than by war," that kingdom "would subsequently be given to
 
Giuliano de' Medici who, after his brother's election as
 
Pope, had been recalled from Florence to be created gonfal­
oniere of the Church and who seemed prepared to embark on
 
greater enterprises,"® although, as discussed above, the
 
Pope soon realized Giuliano had no aptitude for such enter
 
prises.
 
No longer in a position to participate in or influence
 
the political affairs of Florence, Machiavelli began to
 
write, turning first to the subject of republics, motivated
 
perhaps by the need to discover the causes which, over an
 
extended period of time, had created the climate in which
 
the Medici succeeded in elevating themselves to a position
 
of authority, which threatened the liberty of all Floren
 
tines. The existence of the Discourses and the nature of
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that work offer significant evidence for the notion that
 
Machiavelli did not forsake his republican principles to
 
embrace a new doctrine of absolute power in the Prince which
 
was indeed not new at all, but as old as the first glimmer
 
of covetous hoarding, most certainly older than the Italian
 
Renaissance; more ancient than the Roman Empire which fell
 
from the weight of its own ambition.
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Chapter IV. The Dedicatory Letter
 
How gentle is deception
 
When carried to fruition as intended.
 
For it defies perception
 
And soothes the blissful dupes we have befriended
 
Oh draught of heaven blended,
 
You show the quickest way to true contentment.
 
And with your magic power
 
You comfort those whose wealth we would devour
 
And vanquish, by your devious presentment.
 
Stone walls, and arm'd resentment.
 
Niccolo Machiavelli^
 
In his dedicatory letter, Machiavelli justified himself
 
with regard to his intent in approaching the Medici. He
 
gives the appearance of sincerity with the gift of his
 
knowledge and experience (although his political beliefs and
 
principles are misrepresented throughout the Prince to
 
accommodate his satire), but his intent in the dedication
 
was to gain the confidence of the Medici, his prey. With
 
pretended innocence, exaggerated sentiments, and rhetoric
 
designed to trap the unwary, Machiavelli cleverly manipulat
 
ed his intended victims. His profuse flattery of the
 
Medici, although fraudulent, was also his best defense
 
should his motives be questioned. Nevertheless, it took
 
considerable daring on his part to satirize his enemies,
 
particularly while reaffirming his devotion to republican
 
principles at the same time, in the Discourses. Thus,
 
Machiavelli was remarkable not only for the genius that
 
inspired the Prince, emphasizing the Medici above all oth
 
ers, but for his courageous spirit that brayed infamy in
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 order to be heard:
 
NicGold Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de'
 
Medici: ,
 
1
 It is customary most of the time for
 
those who desire to acquire favor with a
 
Prince to come to meet him with things
 
that they care most for among their own
 
or with things that they see please him
 
most. Thus, one sees them many times
 
being presented with horses, arms, cloth
 
of gold, precious stones and similar
 
ornaments worthy of their greatness.
 
Thus, since I desire to offer myself to
 
your Magnificence with some testimony of
 
my homage to you, I have found nothing
 
in my belongings that I care so much for
 
and esteem so greatly as the knowledge
 
of the actions of great men, learned by
 
me from long experience with modern
 
things and a continuous reading of an
 
cient ones. Having thought out and
 
examined these things with great dili
 
gence for a long time, and now reduced
 
them to one small volume, I send it to
 
your Magnificence.
 
2. 	 And although I judge this work undeserv
 
ing of your presence, yet I have much
 
confidence that through your humanity it
 
may be accepted, considering that no
 
greater gift could be made by me than to
 
give you the capacity to be able to
 
understand in a very short time all that
 
I have learned and understood in so many
 
years and with so many hardships and
 
dangers for myself. I have not orna
 
mented this work, nor filled it with
 
i fulsome phrases nor with pompous and
 
magnificent words, nor with blandishment
 
or superfluous ornament whatever, with
 
which it is customary for many to de
 
scribe and adorn their things. For I
 
wanted it either not to be honored for
 
anything or to please solely for the
 
variety of the matter arid the gravity of
 
the subject. Nor do I want it to be
 
thought presumption if a man from a low
 
and mean state dares to discuss and give
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rules for the governments of princes.
 
For just as those who sketch landscapes
 
place themselves down in the plain to
 
consider the nature of mountains and
 
high 	places and to consider the nature
 
of low places place themselves high atop
 
mountains, similarly, to know well the
 
nature of peoples one needs to be
 
prince, and to know well the nature of
 
princes one needs to be of the people.
 
3. 	 Therefore, your Magnificence, take this
 
small gift in the spirit in which I send
 
it. If your Magnifiqence considers and
 
reads it diligently, you will learn from
 
it my extreme desire that you arrive at
 
the greatness that fortune and your
 
other qualities promise you. And if
 
your Magnificence will at some time turn
 
your eyes from the summit of your height
 
to these low places, you will learn how
 
undeservedly 1 endure a great and con
 
tinuous malignity of fortune.^
 
The indirect satire of the Prince is apparent in the
 
dedication, which, "instead of meeting the foe upon the
 
field [as in direct satire]... may pretend to be neutral and
 
undermine him by suave and diplomatic ways. It may masquer
 
ade as a friend or as one of his own defenders and insidi
 
ously destroy his faith in himself."^ Wearing the mask of
 
deceit, the satirist conceals his or her true intent, pro
 
tected from the danger of reprisal. One miist "be careful
 
not to assume that everything the poet says about himself is
 
true 	to his actual character," for "there may be little
 
similarity" between the two/ With "pretended innocence,"
 
the satirist becomes a "disinterested arbiter judiciously
 
weighing pros and cons... a friendly onlooker [who] cries
 
out encouragements, even seizes weapons and offers [self] as
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an ally,"® an apt description of Machiavelli's dedication to
 
the Medici.
 
In arguing against the notion that Machiavelli is a
 
"scientific historian," Allan Gilbert reflects on
 
Machiavelli the "artist" with the "political mind," who
 
desired that the results distilled from his observations and
 
study be useful, that his readers profit from the example of
 
the Roman republic... the men and women on the comic
 
stage."® Thus, the Machiavelli of "the Prince and the
 
Discourses, as well as in Mandragola and the verses on
 
Ambition is a poet with a difference, wearing the mask—
 
indeed for some readers too effectively disguised—of his
 
torian and political observer, so the reader must needs be
 
alert, for the more dispassionate Niccold appears, the more
 
political his words become."' Thus, while Gilbert does not"
 
argue that the Prince is, in all respects, a satire, he
 
acknowledges the element of deception in Machiavelli's
 
writings, and the art of deception is nowhere more apparent
 
among his works than in the Prince, in which his dedication
 
sets the stage much like a prologue to one of his plays.
 
Machiavelli justifies his approach to the Medici in the
 
first paragraph of the dedication by establishing his pur
 
pose and credentials, thus masking his true intent. His
 
alleged purpose is to "acquire favor," to "offer" himself
 
with some testimony of my homage to you." His testimony,
 
however, is his gift of the Prince. Therefore, in effect he
 
57
 
honors the Medici with a book that recommends dishonorable
 
practices, and compounds the irony by expressing a desire to
 
participate in such a government himself, in the den of his
 
enemies, at a time when he was most suspect to them.
 
His purpose is further elaborated in paragraph two, in
 
which he states, "no greater gift could be made by me than
 
to give you the capacity to be able to understand in a very
 
short time all that I have learned and understood in so many
 
years and with so many hardships and dangers for myself."
 
To fully comprehend Machiavelli's intent in this passage, I
 
refer to chapter twenty-two of the Prince, in which he
 
defines his notion of three kinds of brains; "one that
 
understands by itself, another that discerns what others
 
understand, and the third that understands neither by itself
 
nor through others; the first is most excellent, the second
 
excellent, and the third useless... ." (Ch. 22, 92)
 
When Machiavelli suggests that he can give the Medici
 
the "capacity to be able to understand," he defines them as
 
having the second kind of brain, which is blatantly uncom
 
plimentary given their status and position, a mockery of
 
their political acimen. What Machiavelli could not say is
 
that, in reality, the Medici brain was of the third rank,
 
for he could never give them the capacity to understand the
 
value pf popular government, organized on the model of the^
 
Roman republic, as presented in the Discourses. From the
 
time of Cosimo, the Medici ruthlsssTy corrupted the consti­
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tution of Florence, for the benefit of themselves and their
 
faction. It would have been useless, indeed, for
 
Machiavelli to attempt to persuade them to accept his views
 
as represented in that work. He could, however, make them
 
/
 
understand the precepts of the Prince, to better refine
 
those attributes they and others like them already posses
 
sed, and with pretended innocence, expose their tyranny and
 
corrupt practices by appearing to justify them. His imper
 
tinence in the assumption that his brain is of the first
 
order, sharing his knowledge with the inferior brain of the
 
Medici, is cleverly concealed.
 
Machiavelli's reference to Pandolfo Petrucci as an
 
illustration of the second kind of brain, (Ch. 22, 92) then,
 
ranks the Medici with his kind, a petty tyrant who rose to
 
power with the aid of Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan (II
 
Moro), who was Petrucci's principal adviser and benefactor.®
 
Although Machiavelli refers to Petrucci as the "prince
 
of Siena" in the Prince, (Ch. 22, 92) he calls him
 
"Pandolfo, the tyrant of Siena" in the Discourses.^ As
 
Garrett Mattingly observes, in the Prince, Machiavelli
 
"never quite uses the word [tyrant] except ^ n illustrations
 
from classical antiquity, but he seems to delight in dancing
 
all around it until even the dullest of his readers could
 
not mistake his meaning."'"
 
Machiavelli's discussion of brains, in the Prince, is
 
offered in the context of choosing ministers, the employment
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 the Medici are to imagine he desires, for "governing through
 
the chancellors was an old Medician art"" which fit appro
 
priately with Machiavelli's experience as head of the second
 
/' , ,

Chancery. Of course, "Machiavelli cannot refer, not even in
 
the Epistle Dedicatory, to the fact that he once had honor
 
able employment in which he loyally served. For he was a
 
loyal servant of the republican regime in Florence, and this
 
fact by itself might compromise him in the eyes of his
 
prince."" Indeed, Machiavelli faced almost insurmountable
 
problems in convincing the Medici of his sincerity, and all
 
the more so with the intent to satirize "his prince," for
 
the dangers were great. If the Medici ever read the Prince
 
and recognized the satire, perhaps they did not react for
 
the reasons suggested by Garrett Mattingly; "A rasher
 
ruling family than the Medici might have answered the chal
 
lenge by another round of torture and imprisonment or by a
 
quiet six inches of steel under the fifth rib. But brother
 
Giovanni and brother Giovanni's familiar spirit, cousin
 
Giulio, though in fact they were aiming at exactly the kind
 
of despotism that Machiavelli predicted, hoped to achieve it
 
with a minimiam of trouble by preserving for the time being
 
the forms of the republic. It would not do, by punishing
 
the author, to admit to the pertinence of his satire. So
 
the Medici did nothing. But they were not a stupid family,
 
and they cannot have been very pleased."" In any case, $:he
 
Medici would have appeared comically naive to have taken
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into their confidence as adviser an exiled, suspected con
 
spirator, prominent in a former government opposed to their
 
own faction. Nor would that suit the historical reality of
 
Florence, where victorious factions often mobbed, maimed or
 
killed the defeated officials, confiscated their property,
 
and banished their families. Machiavelli was fortunate that
 
his own dismissal by the Medici only resulted in a fine and
 
his exile, given their cause to distrust him.
 
Phaedrus observes that "no one likes to revisit the
 
place which has brought him injury,"''^ and Machiavelli re
 
minds us that one should beware of anyone who does. In the
 
Discourses, he states, "a republic should take care not to
 
give any administrative post of importance to a,nyone to whom
 
notable wrong has been done," (III. 17> 454) to avoid the
 
opportunity for revenge. In reference to Claudius Nero, he
 
remarks, "If the passions aroused by such offenses could
 
have so great an effect on a Roman citizen at a time when
 
Rome was as yet free from corruption, one can well imagine
 
how great an effect injuries are likely to have on a citizen
 
of some other city which is not constituted as Rome then
 
was," (III. 17, 454-5) as was Florence.
 
Machiavelli also states in the Discourses that "...
 
malice is not to be placated with gifts," (III. 30, 487)
 
especially with a gift as impudent as the Prince. These
 
statements from the Discourses reflect on Machiavelli's
 
intent in dedicating the Prince to the Medici, as he had
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been offended by them, and warns that it would be imprudent
 
to involve anyone like himself in "any administrative post
 
of importance," although that is precisely what he pretends
 
to desire from the Medici.
 
In Machiavelli's masterful construction of the Prince,
 
he cleverly protected himself by appealing specifically to
 
the Medici while, at the same time, he exposed the growing
 
threat to liberty and freedom in Italy from all those seek
 
ing princely status by corrupt and vile means in ambitious
 
enterprises that depended for success on an equally corrupt
 
population, in which the Medici only represented one example
 
of such native tyrants. Just as he did in his plays,
 
Machiavelli endeavored to "root out ...corruption and boldly
 
hold it up for our scorn"^^ in the Prince. Perhaps the
 
greatest irony of all is that we have not only failed to
 
share Machiavelli's contempt for the corrupt practices of
 
his time, which he took considerable risk to reveal in the
 
Prince, but we have gone to great lengths to justify them.^*
 
As Machiavelli well knew, men are easily deceived. (Ch. 18,
 
70) He exploited the desire Of the Medici to expand their
 
power by recommending those practices that betrayed his own
 
beliefs, just as Horace "with fine subtlety... puts in
 
Tieresia's mouth words that are the very opposite of all his
 
own beliefs,"" the art of deception ever nurtured by the
 
great dissemblers.
 
Machiavelli establishes his credentials in paragraph
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 one of the dedication when he refers to his "knowledge of
 
the actions of great men, learned by me from long experience
 
with modern things and a continuous reading of ancient
 
ones," The Medici were, of course, very much aware of
 
Machiavelli's Credentials. By emphasizing "knowledge,"
 
however, his experience is equated with his study of the
 
^' ■ . / 
ancients as a secondary consideration, a source rather than
 
a statement that speaks for itself. Machiavelli informed
 
Vettori that the Medici, "through this thing, if it were
 
read, would see that for the fifteen years while I have been
 
studying the art of state, I have not slept or been play^
 
ing."^* Indeed, Machiavelli learned a great deal from his
 
observation of the princes in his time, from "his long
 
experience of modern things," but there is little evidence
 
in the Prince of a practical application of those things he
 
learned from a "continuous reading" of the ancients, with
 
regard tp liberty and justice.^'
 
One must turn to the Discourses to discover those
 
principles of governing that he found admirable in antiqui
 
ty. In that regard, certain distinctions can be made be
 
tween the two works, including the dedicatory sentiment in
 
each, for the tone and emphasis in the Discourses is so far
 
removed from that of the Prince, it is difficult to recon
 
cile them as companion works.^
 
Machiavelli dedicated the Discourses to his republican
 
friends, Zanobi Buondelmonte and Cosimo Rucellai, which
 
■ / 63 ■ . 
 marks an immediate distinction between the two works, having
 
dedicated his book on tyranny, the Prince, to the tyrants of
 
Florence, the Medici. At first glance, there appears to be
 
a striking similarity in the way Machiavelli begins both
 
dedications. To Buondelmonte and Rucellai, he states, "I am
 
sending you a present which, if it does not come up to the
 
obligations I owe you, is at any rate the best that Niccolo
 
Machiavelli is able to send you. For in it I have set down
 
all that I know and have learned from a long experience of,
 
and from constantly reading about, political affairs. In
 
the Prince Machiavelli finds nothing he values so much as
 
"the actions of great men," learned "from long experience
 
with modern things, and a continuous reading of ancient
 
ones."^^ In comparing the two statements, one finds that the
 
emphasis in the Discourses is on "political affairs," while
 
in the Prince, it is on "great men," with a specific refer
 
ence to the "ancients" as a source of his knowledge. The
 
distinction between the two is not as trivial as it may
 
appear. Rather, it reflects Machiavelli's purpose for
 
writing a satire on the modern era, if one considers his
 
remarks in the preface to books one and two of the Discours
 
es, with regard to antiquity.
 
' In book one, Machiavelli states that he is "impelled by
 
the natural desire I have always had to labour regardless of
 
anything, on that which I believe to be for the common
 
benefit of all, I have decided to enter upon a new way, as
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yet untrodden by anyone else,"^ to examine the wisdom of the
 
ancients and, because those who read about historical "inci
 
dents" never think of "imitating" them, to compare "ancient
 
and modern events... so that those who read what I have to
 
say may the more easily draw those practical lessons which
 
one should seek to obtain from the reading of history."^
 
Further, in the preface to book two of the Discourses,
 
Machiavelli offers his argument for praising the past more
 
than the present.
 
Hence, I am not sure but that I desire
 
to be reckoned among those who thus
 
deceive themselves if in these my dis
 
courses I have praised too much the days
 
of the ancient Romans and have found
 
fault with our own. Indeed, if the
 
virtue which then prevailed and the
 
vices which are prevalent today were not
 
as clear as the sun, I should be more
 
reserved in my statements lest I should
 
fall into the very fault for which I am
 
blaming others. But as the facts are
 
there for everyone to see, I shall make
 
so bold as to declare plainly what I
 
think of those days and our own, so that
 
the minds of young men who read about
 
what I have written may turn from the
 
one and prepare to imitate the other
 
whenever fortune provides them with the
 
occasion for doing so.
 
Although there is no preface to book three, Machiavelli
 
states in the first Chapter that he will discuss the actions
 
of "particular men" and their contribution "to the greatness
 
of Rome... I begin, then, with Brutus, the father Of Rome's
 
liberties.
 
His emphasis in the Discourses, then, is on "particular
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 men" and the city's greatness as opposed to the idea of
 
great men seeking personal glory and preeminence in the
 
Prince. In the Discourses, he offers "practical lessons" on
 
political affairs concerned with the common benefit, compar
 
ing "ancient land modern events" from which he concludes that
 
the "virtue"land "wisdom" of the past, particularly that
 
which he discerns from the actions of the Roman republic,
 
i
 
are regrettably absent in the present era.
 
The notion that Machiavelli was a scientist who re
 
mained neutral in moral and ethical concerns or who, as an
 
author of real politic, divorced morality and ethics from
 
politics, is disputed by his remarks concerning duty in his
 
conclusion to! the preface of book two; "For it is the duty
 
of a good manS to point out to others what is well done, even
 
though the malignity of the times or of fortune has not
 
permitted you to do it yourself, to the end that, of the
 
many who haveithe capacity, someone more beloved of heaven,
 
may be able tb do it."^ The words "duty" and "good man"
 
I
 
express moral|and ethical sentiment, and he conveys a sense
 
of hope that some individual will emerge to teach the value
 
of virtue and!wisdom, learned from the study of antiquity so
 
that, when fortune provides the opportunity, that example
 
will be imitated. Machiavelli admired leaders like "Moses,
 
Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and repub­
.i . . ■ '• ■ ■ 
lies who assuijied authority that they might formulate laws to
 
the common good." (I. 9, 133) Those who "read history" and
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 "make use of the records of ancient deeds... would prefer to
 
conduct himself in his fatherland rather as;Scipio did than
 
as Caesar did, or, if he be a prince, as did Agisilaus,
 
Timoleon and Dion, rather than as did Nabis, Phalaris and
 
Dionysius, for he could not but see how strongly the latter
 
are dismissed with scorn, and how highly the former are
 
praised." And of those who become prince in a republic,
 
"after Rome became an Empire, how much more praise is due to
 
those emperors who acted, like good princes, in accordance
 
with the laws... [who] had no need of soldiers to form a
 
/ ■ 
praetorian guard... for their defense lay in their habits,
 
the goodwill of the people, and the affection of the sen
 
ate," (I. 10, 135-6) unlike those in Rome who "looked upon
 
[virtue]" as a "capital crime," from which example one "will
 
thus happily learn how much Rome, Italy, and the world owed
 
to Caesar." (I. 10, 138)
 
Unlike the man "more beloved of heaven" whom
 
Machiavelli awaits in the Discourses, Mho will teach others
 
what is "well done" from the examples of antiquity, his new
 
prince typifies the practices in modern Italy, where "there
 
is no observance either of religion or of the laws, or of
 
military traditions."^* In fact, Machiavelli subverts the
 
wisdom and virtues of the past in the Prince, so critical to
 
his idea of good government in the Discourses, by appearing
 
to transform virtue and vice into their opposites to accom
 
modate the modern practices he recommends both in his pre­
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cepts, and in his choice of exemplars-'-primarily that of
 
: ■ , I 
■ . \ ' ■ ■ , 
Cesare Borgia. In praising Borgia, he praises the modes and
 
orders of the modern age; "for I don't know what better
 
teaching I could give to a new prince than the example of
 
his actions," (Ch. 7. 27) an appropriate illustration of the
 
"actions of great men" that Machiavelli referred to in his
 
dedication of the Prince. Both the Borgia and the Medici
 
represented the rise of private individuals who advanced
 
their interests by pernicious methods. Gesare was violent
 
and ruthless, a man of "foul reputation,"'® the "exemplar" of
 
Machiavelli's instruction in the Prince regarding "how to go
 
beyond morals, laws, and customs in order to gratify one's
 
awn will," by the use of force and deceit.'*
 
The Medici acquired their power and influence by fraud
 
ulent means, from behind the facade of custom, tradition,
 
and constitutional convention. Over several decades, begin
 
ning with the government of Cosimo in 1434, they gradually
 
achieved prominence and control of the government of Flor
 
ence during which time Italy declined, mired in corruption."
 
In the Prince, then, Machiavelli emphasizes great men,
 
whose object it is to further their own greatness and per
 
sonal glory (exemplified in the Borgia and the Medici),
 
while in the Discourses, he refers to particular men who
 
contribute to the city's greatness (a republican ideal), and
 
his first example of a particular man is Brutus, who assas
 
sinates a man of the other class, Julius Caesar. (III. 1,
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390) Further, Machiavelli expands on the theme of Brutus by
 
including a chapter on conspiracies, the longest chapter in
 
the Discourses, in which he gives "excellent lessons on the
 
methods of conducting conspiracies."^^ In significant ways,
 
Cesare Borgia was reminiscent of Julius Caiesar, and the sort
 
of new prince that Machiavelli might have a modern day
 
Brutus do away with, to preserve the liberty of Italy. In
 
grandiose imitation of Caesar, Borgia "took as his model his
 
illustrious namesake from the days of ancient Rome, Julius
 
Caesar," his aim "to win absolute power for himself alone,
 
his banner arrogantly emblazoned with "aut Caesar aut nihil"
 
(all or nothing)
 
Although there are numerous references to modern exam
 
ples throughout the Discourses, only passing mention is made
 
of Cesare Borgia, who should have figured prominently in
 
both works, having received so much praise from Machiavelli
 
in the Prince. That he is ignored in the Discourses, even
 
in discussions of military virtue,^® is not surprising,
 
however, if one accepts the Prince as a satirical work, for
 
he not only personified all that was evil and corrupt in
 
modern Italy, but chose to imitate, from the examples of
 
antiquity, a man Machiavelli also found contemptible, Julius
 
Caesar, who, when he became "head of the [Marian] faction,"
 
manipulated the people in such a way as to gain personal
 
advantage and power. (I. 17, 158) As Bernard Crick ob
 
serves, Julius Caesar "was, in a word, a tyrant, [and]
 
69
 
therefore detestable and traditionally the proper object of
 
assassination.""
 
Nor does Machiavelli refer to the Medici at length in
 
the Discourses, a significant omission in a work devoted to
 
the study of republics if one recalls that the Medici were
 
the first citizens of Florence (a city having at least the
 
appearance of a republic), and called upon as the saviors of
 
Italy in the Prince, which greatly expands the importance
 
Machiavelli assigned to that family. In fact, Machiavelli
 
indicates considerable lack of enthusiasm for the Medici by
 
making only scant reference to them in the Discourses, and
 
then, for the most part, holding them up as negative exam
 
ples.'*
 
By directing attention to the Medici and the Borgia in
 
the Prince, however, Machiavelli provided the focal point
 
for his satire, as primary exemplars of modern corruption.
 
Those who knew him and were familiar with his admiration of
 
ancient virtue and wisdom would have understood his intent
 
to satirize the modern age, particularly with those examples
 
before them.
 
The artifice employed by Machiavelli in his dedication
 
to the Medici becomes yet more apparent when it is compared
 
to the remainder of his dedication of the Discourses to his
 
republican friends, for in the latter, he conveys a tone of
 
sincerity rather than flattery, the reflection of a work
 
that is in harmony with his life, his character, and the
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expectations-of those who knew him best.
 
And believe me:when I say that I have in
 
this just one consolation. It is that
 
when I reflect on the many mistakes I
 
have made in other circumstances, I know
 
that I have made no mistake at any rate
 
in this, that I have chosen to dedicate
 
these my discourses to you in preference
 
to all others; both because, in my doing
 
so, I seem to be showing some gratitude
 
for benefits received, and also because
 
I seem in this to be departing from the
 
usual practice of authors, which has
 
always been to dedicate their works to
 
some prince, and, blinded by ambition
 
and avarice, to praise him for all his
 
virtuous qualities when they ought to
 
have blamed him for all manner of shame
 
ful deeds.
 
In this paragraph, Machiavelli may have made a direct
 
reference to the Prince when he remarks that one should not
 
praise a prince for "virtuous qualities" when, in fact, his
 
"deeds" are "shameful" and "blameworthy." One does so from
 
"ambition" and greed. If Machiavelli was accusing himself
 
of making the mistake of dedicating the Prince to the
 
Medici, he dignifies the Discourses in doing so, for he
 
negates the substance of the Prince when he suggests that
 
one should not falsely attribute virtue to those qualities
 
deserving blame (precisely his satire/ particularly flagrant
 
in chapters fifteen through eighteen).; At the same time,
 
Machiavelli falsely attributes blame to himself, for greed
 
and ambition that were foreign to his character. He was not
 
the sort of man to seek personal gain, yet his admission
 
gives the impression that his attempts to seek favor with
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the Medici were sincere. Thus, he maintained the mask of
 
innocence while, at the same time, he hinted at the true
 
nature of the Prince, further elaborated in his concluding
 
remarks;
 
So, to avoid this mistake, I have chosen
 
not those who are princes, but those
 
who, on account of their innumerable
 
good qualities deserve to be; not those
 
who might shower on me rank, honours,
 
and riches, but those who, though un
 
able, would like to do so. For, to
 
judge aright, one should esteem men
 
because they are generous, not because
 
they have the power to be generous; and
 
in like manner, should admire those who
 
know how to govern a kingdom, not those
 
who, without knowing how, actually gov
 
ern one. There are, indeed, writers who
 
praise Hiero the Syracusan though but a
 
private person, in preference to
 
Perseus, the Macedonian though he was a
 
king, because Hiero to become a prince
 
lacked but a principality, whereas the
 
other had no kingly attributes save his
 
kingdom. Entertain yourselves, then,
 
with what you were anxious to get, whe
 
ther it be good or bad; and should you
 
be so mistaken as to find my views ac
 
ceptable, I shall not fail to follow
 
this up with the rest of the history, as
 
I promised at the start. Farewell.40
 
Roberto Ridolfi makes the point that "the dedicatory
 
letter he wrote [in the Discourses] is perhaps the most
 
important document we have for his state of mind at this
 
time, and it surprises me that other biographers have not
 
understood it for what it is; a protest against the man who
 
had so long despised his talent and held his book of the
 
Prince to be of no account. One can almost read between the
 
lines the name of Lorenzo himself Where the author declares
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 that he did not wish to dedicate this other book of his to
 
any prince, but to private citizens who for their infinite
 
good qualities would greatly deserve to be [[princes]]."^'
 
Ridolfi singles out Lorenzo as the target of Machiavelli's
 
protest, but Machiavelli did not simply protest one particu
 
lar Medici. He certainly had that family in mind when he
 
wrote his dedication of the Discourses, but not to the
 
exclusion of modern princes generally, and it is doubtful
 
that he would miss any opportunity to chastise their ambi
 
tion in one literary form or another. If the Prince is
 
understood as satire, his "state of mind" would appear to be
 
no different when he wrote the Discourses than when he wrote
 
the Prince, for he is critical of tyranny in both works,
 
although by different routes. If he attributed lunacy to a
 
prince "who does what he likes" in the Discourses, (I. 58,
 
256) he provides us with an unforgettable portrait of that
 
madman in the Prince.
 
There were immediate and unfavorable Reactions to the
 
Prince, which may have prompted him to "reflect on the many
 
mistakes I have made in other circumstances, for there
 
were many who read his manuscript then, as now, who did not
 
appreciate the work as satire. "Everyone hated him because
 
of The Prince: the rich thought that his Prince was a docu
 
ment written to teach the Duke ^how to take away all their
 
property, from the poor all their liberty, the Piagnoni
 
regarded him as a heretic, the good thought him sinful, the
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wicked thought him more wicked or capable than themselves,
 
so that all hated him. Yet, "the ardent republicans
 
among Machiavelli's friends, like Zanobi Buondelmonte, were
 
not alienated by the Prince."''^ Had they not understood
 
Machiavelli's intention, they would have considered him a
 
traitor for appealing to that family, having encouraged them
 
to observe oppressive and tyrannical practices. As late as
 
1527, "Buondelmonte and Alammani began working at once to
 
bring their old friend back to the service of the restored
 
republic."'*® These passionate patriots who, finding no
 
remedy for the liberty of Florence but the sword, conspired
 
against the Medici in 1522, could hardly have viewed
 
Machiavelli as a dispassionate observer of political af
 
fairs; Buondelmonte, it will be recalled, wanted to invite
 
Machiavelli to join them in that affair.'*' If the Prince was
 
an unfortunate mistake for Machiavelli, it was because he
 
proved too clever for his own good.
 
Daniel Defoe suffered the consequences of his own
 
cleverness;when he carried the "pretense of innocence too
 
far in his irony.""*® In his The Shortest-Way With the Dis
 
senters (1702), Defoe, "to discredit the highfliers [the
 
High-Church Tories]" wrote "as if from their viewpoint but
 
reducing their arguments to absurdity,""*® with the result
 
that "the uncovering of Defoe's hoax alienated both sides,"
 
apd he wound up in the pillory.®"
 
Machiavelli used a similar tactic in the Prince, writ­
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ing from the viewpoint of a new prince, which resonated in
 
the Medici, Borgia, Petrucci, and others, while reducing
 
their tyrannical methods to the absurd when contrasted with
 
the ancient examples of virtue and wisdom that inspired the
 
Discourses.
 
The pretense of innocence is "an important characteris
 
tic of all successful irony... the facts seem their own
 
satire... we have the pleasure, invisibly aided by the
 
satirists' hand, of detecting the prey and bringing it down
 
ourselves... we may flatter ourselves that we have seen
 
through the deceptions by which he appears to have been
 
taken in. And when we no longer subscribe to this delusion
 
we are not apt to be enraged, for we have now penetrated the
 
ingenious trickery of a very clever fellow. The cleverer he
 
was to have almost fooled even us for so long, the cleverer
 
we are in having been able to join his sport. The whole
 
process of understood irony is a delightful massage to our
 
vanity."^'
 
Unfortunately, Machiavelli never reveals that the
 
Prince was a satire, nor could he. The times were too
 
dangerous while he was alive, the Medici too powerful.
 
Regrettably, his pretended innocence was altogether convinc
 
ing to those who were influenced by the times, who repre
 
sented the very state of mind he satirized, for those who
 
misinterpreted the Prince had become so accustomed to the
 
ways of the powerful, even Machiavelli could be imagined as
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a lackey of the Medici. And the greater irony is that the
 
corruption he criticized in the Prince was given new and
 
lasting legitimacy with the appearance of reasoned justifi
 
cations by numerous commentators, justifications for that
 
which constitutes the heart of his satire, and reflects
 
I
 
Machiavelli's true originality.
 
One means by which the aura of innocence can be
 
achieved, acknowledged by Machiavelli in the Discourses, is
 
in the value of playing the fool. Citing the example of
 
Junius Brutus, he recommends that "it is a very good notion
 
at times to pretend to be a fool," by "pretending to be
 
stupid," in part "to escape observation and that [one] might
 
get a better opportunity of downing the kings and liberating
 
[one's] country," whenever given the "chance." (III. 2,
 
390-1) That is, if one is "ill content with a prince," and
 
lacking sufficient forces to make war openly, one should
 
"use every endeavor to acquire the prince's friendship... by
 
becoming obsequidus to his wishes and taking pleasure in
 
everything in which he takes pleasure" which provides for
 
safety and the "opportunity for fulfilling your inten­
tions... to play the fool, as Brutus did, and to act more or
 
less like a lunatic, admiring, talking about, attending to,
 
and doing things in which they have not the slightest inter
 
est in order to ingratiate themselves with the prince."
 
(III. 2, 391-2)
 
In this sense, the Prince is an artful representation
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of Machiavelli's notion of pretending the fool. In an
 
attempt to gain the confidence of the Medici, Machiavelli
 
humbled himself and assumed a chameleon quality, becoming
 
"obsequious" to the wishes of the Medici,,in compliance with
 
their ambition. His recommendations were not new to the
 
Medici and other modern princes, however, and by instructing
 
them in how to proceed, he actually exposed them for what
 
they were-—dishonest, faithless, and immoral tyrants. In
 
regard to the Medici, he not only encouraged them to advance
 
their personal interests in and around Florence but extended
 
that interest to the entire Italian Peninsula, in his call
 
for liberation and unity in the closing chapter of the
 
Prince. Thus, Machiavelli's Satire contains "cosmic iro
 
ny... entwined in human fate," which "may inspire the in
 
sights that shape a satirist's entire design."®^ Like
 
Brutus, Machiavelli said things "against his opinion," but,
 
unlike Brutus, he had no real hope of getting "tied up with
 
them" (III. 2, 392) "Machiavelli was writing under the rule
 
of the Medici which forced him to disguise his love of
 
liberty, and even as late as the 1520's, while he was
 
writing his History, Donate Giannotti relates that
 
Machiavelli expressed the following concerns:
 
I cannot write this history from the
 
time When Cosimo took over the govern
 
ment up to the death of Lorenzo just as
 
I would write if I were free from all
 
reasons for caution. The actions will
 
be true, and I shall not omit anything;
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 merely I shall leave out discussing the
 
universal causes for events. For in
 
stance, I shall relate the events and
 
the circumstances that came about when
 
Cosimo took over the government; I shall
 
leave untouched any discussion of the
 
way and of the means and tricks with
 
which one attains such power; and if
 
anyone nevertheless wants to understand
 
Cosimo; let him observe well what I
 
shall have his opponents say, because
 
!	 what I am not willing to say as coming
 
from myself, I shall have his opponents
 
say.^
 
Allan Gilbert notes that "even in such speeches, Machiavelli
 
sometimes substituted for his first draft softer, second
 
thoughts.'®
 
In oppressive societies, it is often dangerous to
 
openly criticize those in power without great personal risk.
 
Phaedrus' poetry contained "enough suggestion of criticism
 
of existing evils" that it "did him harm,"" and Juvenal took
 
care to name "only names from the past."''' Machiavelli
 
states in the Discourses that writers were not permitted "to
 
speak freely" of Julius Caesar, but if "anyone desires to
 
know what writers would have said, had they been free, he
 
has but to look at what they say of Cataline. For Caesar is
 
more blameworthy of the two in that he who has done wrong is
 
more blameworthy than he who has desired to do' wrong.""
 
Clearly, Machiavelli understood the need for caution
 
when writing about the Medici, if Donato Giannotti is credi­
ble in that regard, and had cause to fear them—nor could he
 
have been so naive as not to have understood what the liedici
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thought about him and his republican sentiments. With the
 
exception of his comedies, Pope Leo did not, in fact, "es
 
teem Machiavelli..v highly."^'
 
Another indication of the Medici dislike for
 
Machiavelli can be traced to Piero Ardinghelli, secretary to
 
Pope Leo, whom Machiavelli comically referred to in his
 
letter to Francisco Vettori (December 10, 1513) as "this
 
rascal Ardinghelli" who "will get himself honor from this
 
latest work of mine," in reference to the Prince.^
 
Ardinghelli wrote to Giuliano on behalf of Cardinal Giulio
 
de' Medici, in response to discussions that Machiavelli was
 
rumored to have had with Pagolo Vettori, concerning how
 
Giuliano should govern his new state should it materialize;"
 
"Cardinal de' Medici questioned me yesterday very closely if
 
I knew whether Your Excellency had taken into his service
 
Niccold Machiavelli, and as I replied that I knew nothing of
 
it nor believed it. His Lordship said to me these words:
 
do not believe it either, but as there has been word of it
 
from Florence, I would remind him that it is not to his
 
profit or to ours. This must be an invention of Paplo
 
[Pagolo] Vettori: ... write to him on my behalf that I
 
advise him not to have anything to do with Niccold.'"®^
 
Roberto Ridolfi offers the opinion that "If it were not
 
clearly expressed in the unadorned eloquence of these docu
 
ments, it would be difficult to believe in so implacable a
 
hatred! If one considers the reality of the relationship
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between Machiavelli and the Medici, however, rather than the
 
imagination of it, there is no basis whatever to assume that
 
the Medici ever had anything but distrust and dislike for
 
Machiavelli. As for Piero Ardinghelli, Machiavelli mentions
 
him once again in a letter to Lodovico Alamanni, in Rome,
 
December 17, 1517. In closing, he writes," Give my regard
 
to Messer Piero Ardinghelli, because I forgot to ask you
 
to."^ In this playful innuendo, Machiavelli seems to sug
 
gest a less than congenial attitude toward Ardinghelli,
 
which Alamanni was expected to appreciate or Machiavelli
 
would likely not have bothered to amuse him with it.
 
In addition to playing the fool in the Prince, one
 
could say that Machiavelli played to fools as well. Lois
 
Spatz makes the point that in Aristophane's Clouds, "members
 
of the audience... are not only spectators of a comedy but
 
judges of the value of the play and the divinity of the
 
Clouds... manipulated by a chorus skilled in rhetoric to
 
decide both on the basis of noraos (aesthetic standards) and
 
physis (advantage to themselves). They are called alter
 
nately wise men and fools."®® So, too, can the readers of
 
Machiavelli's satire be characterized. The wise discern the
 
critical air of his intent, as he hoped the audience of his
 
play, Mandragola, would discover:
 
The sole reward he may hope to reap
 
Is for all to stand aside and snicker.
 
Decrying what they see and hear.®® ^
 
In like sense, Dante also distinguishes the wise:
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O you whose intellects keep their sanity.
 
Do you mark well the doctrine shrouded o'er
 
By the strange verses with their mystery/'
 
Machiavelli's satire was best understood by those "who
 
knew the thinker and his thoughts,"®* and who shared his
 
grievances, as when he states that it is his "intent to
 
write something useful to whoever understands it," (Ch. 15,
 
p. 61) for "If Machiavelli's friends were meant to read the
 
manuscript of the Prince and if they took it at face value—
 
an objective study of how to be a successful tyrant offered
 
as advice to a member of the species—they can hardly have
 
failed to be deeply shocked."®' But the evidence indicates
 
that he was not abandoned by his circle of friends, as
 
discussed above.
 
Unlike the wise, however, fools fail to recognize that
 
"not always are words what they seem to be. The look of
 
things deceives... . Ashley Brown and John L. Kimmey make
 
the point that, "Satire flourishes in homogeneous society
 
where satirist and audience share the same view as to how
 
normal people can be expected to behave, and in times of
 
relative stability and contentment, for satire cannot deal
 
with serious evil and suffering. In an age like our own, it
 
cannot flourish except in intimate circles as an expression
 
of private feuds; in public life the evils and sufferings
 
are so serious that satire seems trivial and the only possi
 
ble kind of attack is prophetic denunciation."'^ Machiavelli
 
did not deliver a diatribe, however, and the subtlety of his
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satire missed the mark, so to speak, in the upheaval that
 
defined his times:
 
[He] came into the world at a moment
 
when political corruption was general
 
throughout Europe, but more predominant
 
in Italy than elsewhere on account of
 
the greater number of persons taking
 
part in public life. Hence the evil
 
effects of this corruption infected
 
every section of society in our country.
 
Our culture enhanced the criminality of
 
the vices and misdeeds of a statecraft
 
no longer ruled by the blind and ungov~
 
erned passions of the Middle Ages, but
 
the product of refined calculation and
 
cunning, full of cruelty and deyoid of
 
scruples. With us, medieval institu
 
tions rapidly fell into decay, leaving
 
individual members of the community
 
deprived of all guidance save that of
 
their own instincts.'^
 
In the corrupt climate of his age, then, Machiavelli's
 
Prince was more likely to be taken at face value, and per^
 
haps the same could be said for our own century.
 
If the wise discerned his intent to criticize, fools
 
were easily manipulated by his satire for, like the fools in
 
his comedies, "the distinction between wise man and fool
 
presumes a cosmos in which everything does have its proper
 
place, its fixed limits and determinations. The fool does
 
not know this; he is a fool precisely because he has no
 
sense of the proper limit to, and of the appropriate context
 
of, things, words, and acts. He is, therefore, out of
 
harmony with the nature of things... an aberration,"'^ or, as
 
Machiavelli himself states it, "It is no marvel if in a
 
crazy time, the crazy come out well."''* So crazy were the
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times, that Pope Leo presided over the Roman Catholic Church
 
which had become so corrupt, Martin Luther precipitated the
 
Protestant Reformation on his watch; while Luther hammered
 
his Ninety-five Theses on the door of All Saints Church in
 
Wittenburg, Leo revelled in having gained, once again, the
 
duchy of Urbino for the aggrandizement of his family.
 
Thus, just as Phaedrus wrote for an intelligentsia that
 
could "discern even hidden meanings, Machiavelli wrote for
 
a circle of friends. Utilizing a literary mode that would be
 
understood by them, yet one that would protect him from his
 
adversaries. Horace chose "to forego publication and re
 
strict his readership to an elite circle of friends,"'^ which
 
inay ^ave, been Machiavelli's intent as well, when he first
 
circulated the manuscript. The irony in satire is "a kind
 
of ^double talk' which insiders understand,"^ and the great
 
er the degiree of distortion, the greater the need for a
 
"select audience... otherwise, as happened to Swift with The
 
Modest Proposal, the readers may think that the distortion
 
is the j work of a lunatic, a mai> whose own values have been
 
disturbed. Beneath its surface of detachment irbny conceals
 
a passion of the deepest involvement,"'® which may account
 
for the sense of detachment that has mislead scholars in the
 
assumption that Machiavelli was but a clinical observer of
 
political affairs.
 
Machiavelli makes the point in his History that "tyran
 
nical and wicked" rulers fear those who understand their
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ways, and "do not want anybody" to "censure" them,'' for
 
which Machiavelli's Prince is all the more brilliant in his
 
implicit censorship of the Medici while praising, with all
 
manner of flattery, their person and their vices. The
 
Prince must indeed have appeared comic to those who knew
 
Machiavelli, both for the Medici model of political corrup
 
tion (yet anointed as the saviours of Italy), and for his
 
absurd vindication of tyrannical practices, what Henry
 
Fielding describes as the general "mischief [brought] on
 
mankind" by the aspirations of "great men," in his The Life
 
of Jonathan Wild the Great; as "when the mighty Caesar, with
 
wonderful greatness of mind, had destroyed the liberties of
 
his country, and with all means of fraud and force [had]
 
placed himself at the head of his equals... [and] corrupted
 
and enslaved the greatest people whom the sun ever
 
saw... . In this work, Fielding's praise of Jonathan Wild
 
constitutes "a comment on [the reader's] sense of values in
 
choosing to bestow a quite spurious glorification on such an
 
utter rogue. Its mode of proceeding is ironic. It pretends
 
to glorify Wild as a hero, an example of true greatness," an
 
"ironic eulogy of a criminal, by which the destructive evil
 
of his ways may be made clear, and this is precisely what
 
Machiavelli did in his treatment of Cesare Borgia in the
 
Prince. Machiavelli's ironic portrayal of Borgia pretended
 
to glorify him as an example of greatness, but in describing
 
his modes of proceeding, particularly with regard to the
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elimination of his enemies, he also exposed Borgia as a
 
criminal, as well as the failure of his enterprise, and the
 
evil of his ways.
 
Machiavelli often repeats words or phrases "several
 
times in close proximity, and such density of usage can
 
alert us to the importance of that word in that context,"*^ a
 
rhetorical device he employed in his dedication of the
 
Prince, providing an indication (or marker) of the humor he
 
has invested, albeit in a very sly fashion, in his flatter
 
ing epistle. The word in question is magnificent (or mag
 
nificence) which he repeats seven times. It first appears
 
in the title; "Niccolo Machiavelli to the Magnificent
 
Lorenzo de' Medici" (reminiscent of II Magnifico, his grand
 
father), followed by two appearances in the first paragraph,
 
one in the second, and three in the third and last para
 
graphs. Granting that the word magnificent reflects common
 
usage, including that found in handbooks for princes, his
 
redundancy nevertheless calls our attention to it.
 
In the first place, he seems to be overextending his
 
sense of humility by placing exaggerated emphasis on the
 
magnificence of the Medici, a magnificence he could not have
 
admired, for traditionally the City of Florence had always
 
been wary of those fellow citizens who sought elevated ^ 
 
status or inequality.
 
Secondly, if Machiavelli seemed to be emulating the
 
literary custom of superfluous embellishment common to the
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traditional handbooks for princes, one should note that such
 
works were presented to legitimate princes and kings, not to
 
those who, like Cosimo de' Medici, ''lack [ed] nothing of
 
being prince but the title.
 
'1
 
In the second paragraph, however, Machiavelli gives
 
full play to his use of the word magnificent; "I have not
 
ornamented this work, nor filled it with fullsome phrases
 
nor with pompous and magnificent words, nor with any blan
 
dishment or superfluous ornament whatever, with which it is
 
customary for many to describe their things." Although he
 
announces that he is not going to "ornament" the work with
 
magnificent words, he proceeds to not only use the word, but
 
to virtually crowd his little dedication with it, and the
 
resulting effect is not only a tone of false humility and
 
insincerity, but ridicule as well.
 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Machiavelli's dedica
 
tion bears some similarity to the Proem of Savonarola's
 
political tract, De Regimine Principum, written in 1494, a
 
work that extols the "Consiglio Grande [Grand Council] as
 
the proper government for Florence... handed as a major idea
 
on the Florentine constitution to Machiavelli and the later
 
Florentine theorists... and since the pamphlet is the theory
 
of vivere libero, not the practice of Savonarola which may
 
destroy it for its own purposes, we may guess that they were
 
not wholly hostile eyes."^^ J.H. Whitfield observes:
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In his Proem, Savonarola proposes to
 
discuss the new government of Florence
 
in a manner appropriate to his modest
 
station, without superfluous adornment
 
of style, and for the common good... in
 
the Discorse', Machiavelli will make,
 
with conviction, the claim to be writing
 
for the coitimon good, but meanwhile in
 
the Prince, and in a very famous passage
 
(since it governs the whole style of the
 
book) he repeats these Savonarolan
 
statements> that of omission of super
 
fluous ornaments as well as that of
 
modesty of station, and in language
 
which might even be reminiscence:*®
 
In fact, Machiavelli calls attention to this passage by
 
repeating the word ornament twice, and it is the same pas
 
sage in which he states that he will use no magnificent
 
words, quoted above from the second paragraph. If
 
Whitfield's proposition is correct—that Savonarola/s state
 
ments may have served as a "model" for Machiavelli*'—it is
 
indeed ironic (and very clever) that he should have incorpo
 
rated language into his dedication to the Medici from a
 
political tract in opposition to the Medici and tyranny
 
generally. Strongly anti-Medician, Savonarola "did not aim
 
at monarchy in Florence, but away from one, and that the
 
whole conclusion of his matter, and of his treatise, is to
 
\
 
be the necessity of democratic government to avoid the rise
 
again of tyranny &-la-Medici."**
 
If Machiavelli intended to reflect the language of
 
Savonarola's treatise in his Prince, it serves as a satiri
 
cal marker, designed to entertain the informed who were
 
familiar with the political writings of the Frate, and it
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probably came as no surprise that Machiavelli neglected to
 
say he was writing for the common good as did Savonarola,
 
who feared the "rise again" of Medici tyranny. In the
 
Prince, Machiavelli not only sanctions the Medici tyranny,
 
he pleads to participate in it.
 
The tone of feigned humility that permeates the dedica
 
tion is intended to reflect Machiavelli's modest station,
 
the result of his dismissal from office by the Medici. In
 
paragraph two, he deems "this work undeserving of your
 
presence... nor do I want it to be thought presumption if a
 
man from a low and mean state dares to discuss and give
 
rules for the governments of princes." In a famous passage
 
from the same paragraph, he refers to the nature of princes
 
and that of the people; "For just as those who sketch land^
 
scapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the
 
nature o!f mountains and high places, and to consider the
 
nature of low places place themselves high atop mountains,
 
similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to
 
be a prince, and to know well the nature of princes, one
 
needs to be of the people." MachiaVelli creates the illu
 
sion of humility by placing himself, as one of the multi
 
tude, virtually at the feet of the Medici, but this passage
 
is a thinly veiled fabrication on his part, for to consider
 
the nature of a prince from a distance has everything to do
 
with appearances and little to do with reality. In the
 
History, Machiavelli remarks that "so much more at a dis­
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tance than nearby the things that make a show are feared,"®'
 
for appearances often deceive until it is too late to apply
 
a remedy. In the Prince, Machiavelli likens appearances to
 
consumption, "easy to cure and difficult to recognize" in
 
the early stages, but when it is far enough advanced to be
 
recognized, it is "difficult to cure," just as "in the
 
affairs of state... because when one recognizes from afar
 
the evils that arise in a state (which is not given but to
 
onfe who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they are
 
left to grow because they were not recognized, to the point
 
that everyone recognizes them, there is no longer any remedy
 
for them." (Ch. 3, 12)
 
Machiavelli offers the example of Cosimo de' Medici, in
 
the Discourses, whose reputation "began to arouse alarm for
 
the security of [Florence's] government; with the result
 
that his fellow-citizens thought it dangerous to touch him,
 
and still more dangerous to let him alone." (I 33, 192)
 
Failure to recognize such evils results from the art of
 
deceptive appearances. "Men in general judge more by their
 
eyes than by their hands because seeing is given to every
 
one, touching to few. Everyone sees how you appear, few
 
touch what you are... ," and thus the prince should "appear
 
all mercy, all faith, all honesty, all humanity,all reli-r
 
gion," (Ch. 18, 70) to better achieve his design, although
 
he need not actually have those qualities. The people,
 
then, cannot know the true nature of a prince from a dis­
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 tance, as Machiavelli suggests, for that is given only to
 
those who can touch. As his satire unfolds, however, he
 
will expose the true nature of princes, and in that sense
 
touching will be given to all.
 
Conversely, a new prince who elevates himself above the
 
level of his fellow citizens succeeds precisely because he
 
does understand their nature having touched them, so to
 
speak (and for his own self interest) with his wealth and
 
his influence, making them his partisans, as did the Medici
 
in Florence. Thus, when Machiavelli states that "to know
 
well the nature of the people one needs to be a prince," he
 
alludes to the corrupt means by which the new prince at
 
tained his position. In order for such a man to triumph,
 
however, the people must also be corrupt; "If anyone, then,
 
wants to seize supreme power in a republic and to impose on
 
it a bad form of government, it is essential that he should
 
find there a material which has in course of time become
 
disordered and that this disorder shall have been introduced
 
little by little and in one generation after another,"
 
(III. 8, 429) as in his example of Spurius Cassius, whose
 
ambition became suspect to the people because they were not
 
corrupt, and thus they "closed the way to tyranny." (III. 8,
 
I • ^ ■ 
426)
 
Despite Machiavelli's attempt to segregate the natures
 
of the prince and the people in his dedicatory remarks, for
 
the purpose of exposing the means by which a private indi­
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vidual rises to princely status, he did in fact think their
 
natures "pretty much the same, or, if one be better than the
 
other, it is the populace... due to the greater or less
 
respect which they have for the laws under which both are
 
living," and "a prince who contemns the laWs [as would be
 
consistent with the nature of a tyrant], will be more un
 
grateful, fickle, and imprudent than the populace." Thus,
 
"the nature of the masses, then, is no more reprehensible
 
than is the nature of the princes, for all do wrong and to
 
the same extent when there is nothing to prevent them doing
 
wrong." Further, there is more "inconstancy and changeabil
 
ity in behaviour" in the prince, and Machiavelli argues
 
against the "common opinion which asserts that the populac
 
es, when in power, are variable, fickle, and ungrateful...
 
were the accusation made against both the masses and the
 
prince, it would be true, but if princes be excepted, it is
 
false." (I. 48, 254) Yet, as though the people were in
 
power which they were not, Machiavelli incorporates that
 
"common opinion" into his assessment of the populace in the
 
Prince, "that they are ungrateful, fickle," and variable as
 
"pretenders and dissemblers," "evaders of danger," as well
 
as "eager for gain," (Ch. 17, 66) without making the same
 
accusations against the prince, who is in power, but "ex
 
cepted" by Machiavelli. In fact, he praises faithlessness,
 
deception, and gain in the policies and personal character
 
istics of the new prince which, in its irony, reflects the ;
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seductive distortion he creates in the Prince.
 
Although Machiavelli almost treats the populace as a
 
non-entity in the Prince, susceptible to manipulation by the
 
new prince but of little more account, he does not fail to
 
issue a warning to the prince, implied within the context of
 
variability, charged against the people: "While you do them
 
good, they are yours, offering you their blood, property,
 
lives, and children... when the need for them is far away;
 
but when it is close to you, they revolt," (Ch. 17, 66)
 
which prompted Garrett Mattingly to observe, "the only
 
lesson for princes would seem to be: ^Run for your life!'"®®
 
In the last paragraph, Machiavelli begins, "Therefore,
 
Your Magnificence, take this small gift in the spirit with
 
which I send it." Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that
 
**animo refers to the ^spirit' with which human beings defend
 
themselves, [and] never to a capacity for self-detachment
 
(anima, [or] soul, does not occur in The Prince) It is
 
quite provocative to imagine that Machiavelli may have in
 
tended the word "spirit" to imply that his little gift was,
 
in reality, a contrived defense against his enemies, the
 
Medici, and the power they represented. Mansfield also
 
provides a second interpretation; spirit "can also mean
 
^mind' in the sense of ^intent', but not in the sense of
 
^intellect,' and as I do not think it was Machiavelli's
 
intent to grovel at the feet of the Medici, begging for his
 
part in the destruction of liberty not only in Florence, but
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in all of Italy, he could only have intended to raise his
 
voice in denunciation of the "great, obvious, and widespread
 
evils"'^ that lead free cities to slavery. In the Italy of
 
his time, Machiavelli blamed the "princes," those "who have
 
done everything to bring us here,"^ described in chilling
 
detail, in his Prince.
 
And when Machiavelli expresses his "extreme desire," in
 
which the word ^extreme' exaggerates his point, that Lorenzo
 
(and formerly Giuliano) should "arrive at the greatness that
 
fortune and your other qualities promise you," in his clos
 
ing paragraph, he omits virtue, nor can fortune be consid
 
ered a human quality. In fact, he is alluding to "fortunate
 
astuteness," that oblique term he uses to describe the
 
attribute of those who become "prince of their Fatherland,"
 
in a "civil principality" where "neither all virtue nor all
 
fortune [are] necessary to attain it," a form of principali
 
ty in which "his citizens, always and in every quality of
 
time, have need of himself and of the state," (Ch. 9, 39-42)
 
the promise of Medici principality.
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 PART II: The Prince
 
Chapter V. Comic Writer
 
Therefore if I sometimes will laugh or sing,
 
It is because I have no other way
 
to conceal my distressful suffering
 
Petrarch'
 
so then if sometimes I laugh or sing
 
I do it because I have just this one way
 
for expressing my anxious sorrow.
 
Machiavelli^
 
Machiavelli had a wonderful sense of humor and extraor
 
dinary wit, as those who are familiar with his plays would
 
undoubtedly acknowledge, and his ability and inclination to
 
write a political satire, such as the Prince, would likely
 
come as no surprise to those who are so informed. Scholars,
 
however, who have focused primarily (if not exclusively) on
 
V . ,
 
his political works have resisted a satirical interpretation
 
of the Prince, with very few exceptions, despite the fact
 
that viewing it as satire "not only clears up puzzles and
 
resolves contradictions; it gives a new dimension and mean
 
ing to passages unremarkable before."' For the most part,
 
however, consideration of the Prince as satire has been
 
excluded from the debate regarding the mystery of
 
Machiavelli (prompted by those puzzles and contradictions
 
that abound in his works) and a satisfactory resolution to
 
the problem of interpretation has not found general agree
 
ment among scholars after nearly five centuries.
 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. remarks that "although
 
/
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 Machiavelli sch^olars permit themselves most of the human
 
indulgences, there is one rule of sobriety they observe with
 
monastic strictness; never laugh! If they laugh just once,
 
it may be because the preacher told a joke, and if he told a
 
joke, how can he be a preacher?""^ Thus, Machiavelli's
 
political views might be compromised in some way by admit
 
ting to his humor and wit, if not his chicanery. Perhaps
 
the Prince will never be recognized as satire without admit
 
ting to those attributes, but the fact remains that his
 
sense of the comic is evident in many of his writings.
 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. refers to a passage in the Dis
 
courses, in which Machiavelli, "In one of his objections to
 
the modern reliance on cavalry, compares this situation to a
 
spirited horse ridden by a cowardly man, or a cowardly horse
 
ridden by a spirited man... This remark becomes more and
 
more funny the longer one thinks about it. In another
 
example from the Discourses, in commenting on the good
 
effects of encouraging words in battle, Machiavelli advises
 
I • ■ ■ ' ■ . ■ ■ ■ • 
that, "if on a well disciplined army such remarks have a
 
great effect, on a disorderly and ill-disciplined army they
 
have a still greater effect, for the whole is swayed^ as it
 
were, by the wind." (III. 14, 446)
 
We have an occasional glimpse of his humor in the
 
History, as well. In the chapter following his discussion
 
of papal nepotism, he refers to the election of Peter of
 
Marrone, as Pope Celestine, who "being... altogether holy,
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after six months he renounced the papacy."® And in his
 
1
 
discussion of Antonio Tassino of Ferrara, who served Duke
 
Galeazzo of Milan as Chamberlain to the Duchess, his wife,
 
Machiavelli explains that, "Either because he was handsome
 
or because of some secret ability, after the death of the
 
Duke he rose to such influence with the Duchess that he
 
almost ruled the state."'
 
Machiavelli's playful nature is often in evidence in
 
his letters as well. Writing to Lodovico Alamanni, December
 
17, 1517, he remarks, "I have just read Orlando Furioso by
 
Ariosto, and truly the poem is fine throughout, and in many
 
places is wonderful. If he is there, give him my regards,
 
and tell him I am only sorry that, having spoken of so many
 
fine poets, he has left me out like a dog, and has done to
 
me in his Orlando what I shall not do to him in my Ass."*
 
Machiavelli is referring to his poem The Golden Ass, which
 
Tommasini maintains is properly titled The Ass.'
 
While on a mission to the Franciscan friars in Carpi,
 
in the spring of 1521, Machiavelli made the most of his poor
 
circximstances by sharing his comic observations in a letter
 
/
 
to his friend, Francesco Guicciardini, written in response
 
to one received from Guicciardini "while sitting on the
 
privy seat... thinking of the absurdities of this world.
 
To ease the idle hours, Machiavelli speculated as to "how I
 
can sow so much discord among them that either here or
 
elsewhere they may start hitting each other with their
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 sandals,"" and he pleads with Guicciardini to send a letter
 
by servant everyday;
 
... you would give me light on some
 
things quite to my purpose,.. you would
 
make me more esteemed by those in the
 
house, seeing the messages come thick.
 
And I can tell you that on the arrival
 
of this arbalester with the letter, and
 
making a bow down to the earth, and with
 
; 	 his saying that he was sent especially
 
and in haste, everybody rose up with so
 
many signs of respect and such noise
 
> that everything was turned upside down,
 
and I was asked by several about the
 
news and I, that its reputation might
 
grow, said that the Emperor was expected
 
at Trent, and that the Swiss had sum
 
moned new diets, and that the King of
 
France wanted to go in person to speak
 
with that king, but that his councilors
 
advised him against it; so that they all
 
stood with open mouths and with theiri
 
caps in their hands; and while I write I
 
have a circle of them around me, and
 
seeing me write at length they are as
 
tonished, and look on me as inspired;
 
and I, to make them wonder more, some
 
times hold my pen still and swell up,
 
and then they slaver at the mouth; but
 
if they could see what I am writing,
 
they would marvel at it more. Your
 
lordship knows that these friars say
 
that when one is confirmed in grace, the
 
Devil has no more power to tempt him.
 
So I have no more fear that these friars
 
will make me a hypocrite, because I
 
believe I am very well confirmed.""
 
There is a compelling tone of anguish throughout this
 
letter, despite its humor, for clearly he misses his former
 
position in the government of Florence, reveling in the
 
significant and often urgent affairs of state. That he
 
viewed his misfortune in comic relief reflects his true
 
character, as he who ridiculed others did not exempt him­
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self. And this letter testifies to his ability to mask his
 
agony with comic absurdity as, I would argue, he did in the
 
Prince, written at a time when his personal loss was inex
 
tricably joined to the misfortune of Florence as well. If
 
the absurd notions he championed in the Prince are not
 
recognized as such by us, his readers, it is because how we
 
look determines what we see, and in every corrupt age, we
 
can be fooled by "the false semblance of good and the false
 
semblance of renown." (I. 10, 135)
 
Nor did Machiavelli lack the skill to employ subtle and
 
clever rhetorical devices. Writing to Giucciardini in Au
 
gust, 1527, he described a farm in Tuscany; "I shall begin
 
everything from Finochieto,"" which was the "name of the
 
farm" and the "diminutive of finocchio (fennel), proverbial
 
ly the last thing to come to the dining table."" James B.
 
Atkinson makes the point that Machiavelli"is not above
 
manipulating language," and acknowledges his use of "poly­
ptoton, a reiteration of words derived from the same root,
 
but with different endings or forms," as well as his use of
 
puns."
 
Machiavelli's works are entertaining, even when the
 
subject matter is grave; "No paragraph in The Prince and The
 
Discourses has been understood until you have found some
 
thing funny in it. If you are not in more or less constant
 
amusement when reading Machiavelli's books, you should
 
consider yourself bewildered,"" as for example in his refer­
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ence to the people under a ^prince' in a "civil principali
 
ty" as "his citizens," in chapter nine. (Ch. 9, 42) Failure
 
to recognize Machiavelli's humor has created scholarly
 
problems as well. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. illustrates the
 
point by referring to MachiaveHi's discussion of a Publius
 
Ruberius in the Discourses:
 
In example, Machiavelli cites the tu
 
mults over the Terentillian law, pro
 
posed to limit the power of the consuls,
 
and remarks that on one occasion they
 
were stopped when ^one Publius Ruberius,
 
a grave citizen of authority, came out
 
of the Senate and with words partly
 
loving, partly menacing, pointed out to
 
them the danger to the city,' and got
 
the plebs to swear not to depart from
 
the wish of the consul. Now the trouble
 
is that the grave citizen's name accord
 
ing tp Livy was Publius Valerius, not
 
Publius Ruberius, and Machiavelli in
 
fact names him correctly in the next
 
sentence. Walker, the pre-Straussian
 
Commentator, looked high and low in the
 
annals of the Roman republic to find
 
^Publius Ruberius,' and reports his
 
failure, Strauss offhandedly suggested
 
translating ^publius Ruberius' into
 
Italian, by which it becomes ^public
 
rohher.' iWo post-Straussian commenta
 
tors, Bertelli and Puppo, who are well
 
acquainted with Walker's commentary and
 
not afraid to borrow from it, pass over
 
this difficulty in silence."
 
Thus, Machiavelli's humor seems everywhere apparent,
 
even in the letters he wrote from the "gloomy court of
 
Cesare Borgia" at Imola, to his colleagues in Florence,
 
letters that "made everyone die laughing! Unfortunately,
 
these are lost, and judging by the others he wrote to
 
friends, it is a serious loss to Italian literature."" That
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Machiavelli used humor, then, a!s a means of criticizing and
 
exposing the nature of a corrupt society should not surprise
 
anyone. In Mandragola, he revealed "the baseness of Italian
 
society,"^' and in his comedies generally, he sought "to
 
teach lessons useful to life... by holding up a mirror to
 
domestic life."^° So, too, in the Prince, he unmasked the
 
greed and ambition prevalent in political life, the destruc
 
tive influence of power in the service of self-interest;
 
"Satire offers considerable evidence that the good often
 
suffer, the wicked prosper, and lions prefer eating lambs to
 
lying down with them."^^ If there is, levity to be found in
 
such circumstances, trust the satirist to provide that as
 
well. The greater the danger, the more the poet must trust
 
in his own cleverness. We, his readers, may not laugh out
 
loud. We may hot laugh at all. But no matter how perverse
 
the satire, if the poet's intent is understood, and his wit
 
is equal to the task, we will be entertained^—and perhaps
 
enlightened as well.
 
Like the ever-laughing Sage
 
In a Jest I spend my Rage
 
(Tho' it must be understood
 
I would hang them if I cou'd:)
 
Jonathan Swift'22
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Chapter VI. Kinds of Principalities
 
Machiavelli originally titled his work "De Principati­
bus (of Principalities), and it is not known exactly when
 
the title was changed to the Prince, All of the early
 
printed editions give the title "II Principe," but it was
 
not published in Machiavelli's lifetime. Therefore, one
 
cannot "say with absolute certainty what title he would
 
finally have given it."^ Ivan Cloulas suggests that "the
 
character most often referred to is in fact Cesare Borgia.
 
In his honor posterity would change the book's title to The
 
Prince."^ While Machiavelli referred to the work as On
 
Princedoms, however, in a letter to Vettori (December 10,
 
1513)r and again, generalized in book two of the Discourses
 
On the First Ten Books of Titius Livius in reference to "my
 
treatise on principalities," he calls it "The Prince" by the
 
time he had written Book Three of the Discourses There
 
fore it is reasonable to surmise that perhaps posterity did
 
not title Machiavelli's work The Prince but Machiavelli
 
himself, if not officially. At any rate, in the earlier
 
manuscript form, he titled it Of Principalities, and it was
 
by that title that readers first became familiar with his
 
work.
 
L. Arthur Burd remarks that it is not "easy to see why
 
such importance should have been attached to the question
 
[of the title],"® but for an interpretation of the Prince as
 
satire, it is a significant consideration, for it appears to
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be a work concerned with principalities generally under,the
 
original title, Of Principalities. Yet, it soon becomes
 
clear that Machiavelli is concerned with only one kind of
 
principality, that which is acquired by a new prince of the
 
sort, described by Garrett Mattingly as those princes "who
 
have newly acquired their principalities and do not owe them
 
either to inheritance or to the free choice of their coun
 
trymen, The short and ugly word for this kind of prince is
 
^tyrant'... Opinions about relative merits of republics and
 
monarchies varied during the Renaissance, depending mainly
 
upon where one lived, but about tyrants there was only one
 
opinion... ^If we consult the laws of any well-constituted
 
republic, we should find them to decree no greater reward to
 
anyone than to the man who kills the tyrant'... so said the
 
Italian Renaissance with almost unanimous voice."'
 
Machiavelli thus does not go directly to his target by
 
beginning his work with a discussion of the new prince.
 
Rather, he begins by generalizing about principalities, as
 
the title Of Principalities vjould lead one to expect of the
 
work. Had he not done so, having dedicated the work to the
 
Medici, the parallels between the Medici and the new prince
 
would have been all too obvious, defeating the literary
 
advantage of satire, which masks intent when there is reason
 
for caution.
 
Chapter one, "How many are the kinds of principalities
 
and in what modes are they acquired," (Ch. 1, 5) is remark­
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able for its brevity (one short paragraph), in which he
 
presents the subject in mere perfunctory statements. As
 
Machiavelli did not write a preface to the Prince, his
 
introductory paragraph seems all the more abrupt. Further,
 
the lengthy title is in Latin, which lends an even greater
 
import to his brief narrative, symbolizing the learning,
 
dignity, and air of antiquity. Although it was not uncommon
 
for Machiavelli to give "Latin titles to his vernacular
 
works, in the Prince he gives Latin titles to the chapters
 
as well, a practice he did not observe in the Discourses,
 
despite the fa;ct that both works were begun at about the
 
same time, and are viewed by many scholars as "interdepen
 
dent aspects of an organically unified outlook,"® or, as
 
Machiavelli might describe it, "... one soul in two bodies,
 
or rather two souls in one body, in order not to make a
 
mistake."^"
 
Superficially, this discrepancy between the two works
 
does not seem an important one, merely reflecting a varia
 
tion in form. Machiavelli may, however, have intentionally
 
used Latin chapter titles in the Prince to amplify, in the
 
minds of those who understood his intent, his view of the
 
clear departure of modern practices from ancient modes of
 
proceeding. That is, Latin was "the language of traditional
 
learning."" Thus, his chapter headings allude to the tradi
 
tions and ancient wisdom he admired, while the body, written
 
in the vernacular, reflects the vulgar and corrupt present
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in which "one comes across nothing but extreme misery,
 
infamy, and contempt, for there is no observance either of
 
religion or of the laws, or military traditions... and so
 
much the more are these vices detestable when they are more
 
prevalent among those who sit in the judgement seat, pre
 
scribe rules for others, and expect from them adoration."'^
 
The symbolism of Machiavelli's Latin chapter titles,
 
then, is the key, which not only suggests the ancients in
 
terms of practices, but in literary form as well. Petrarch,
 
who is often quoted in Machiavelli's works, examined the
 
"literature of the ancients" for "their style and their
 
ethical value, for what they could teach about human nature
 
and human society, that which inspired the great poets of
 
the Italian Renaissance, and Machiavelli as well.
 
Felix Gilbert offers Machiavelli's Latin chapter head
 
ings as evidence for his assertion that "Machiavelli endeav
 
ored to adapt the form of his book to the conventional
 
literary form of this genre... like the works of [his]
 
predecessors," the "humanist prince-literature," in which he
 
"was consciously refuting his predecessors and that his
 
intention has left its mark on The Prince."^* The similari
 
ties between the traditional handbook for princes and
 
Machiavelli's Prince are quite apparent, although I would
 
suggest that his refutation was not aimed solely at the
 
humanists in the interest of power politics. Rather, he
 
took aim at the broad spectrum of political life that formed
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his experience, the people and events that contributed to
 
his cynicism, from which emerged an explosion of contempt.
 
As Garrett Mattingly observes, "The Prince imitates, almost
 
parodies, one of the best known and most respected literary
 
forms of the three preceding centuries, the handbook of
 
advice to princes... In some ways, Machiavelli's little
 
treatise Was just like all the other mirrors of Princes; in
 
other ways it was a diabolical burlesque of them all, a
 
political Black Mass."^^
 
Leo Strauss refers to the Prince as combining "a tradi
 
tional surface with a revolutionary center," in which at
 
first sight. The Prince belongs to the traditional genre of
 
Mirrors of Princes, which are primarily addressed to legiti
 
mate princes; and the most familiar case of the legitimate
 
prince is the undisputed heir, Machiavelli almost opens The
 
Prince by following custom in calling the hereditary prince
 
the ^natural prince.' Strauss is referring to Chapter Two
 
on hereditary principalities, (Ch. 1, 5-6) in which
 
Machiavelli abruptly dismisses the general topic of heredi
 
tary principalities while, as Strauss observes, adhering to
 
the traditional form of the genre of handbooks for princes.
 
He effectively preserves just enough of the form to give the
 
appearance of a traditional handbook. Why would he bother
 
with such trivia, or trouble himself to frame his new revo
 
lutionary ideas in a traditional genre? He was not reluc
 
tant to state, in his preface to Book I of the Discourses,
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 that "I have decided to enter upon a new way, as yet untrod
 
den by anyone else," a remark that would have provided a
 
provocative introduction to the Prince.
 
The traditional handbook for princes reflected an old
 
■ I ■ ■ ■ 
literary form which "occupied the center of the stage in the
 
intellectual discussions of his day." Begun in antiquity,
 
it "developed into a complete and compact literary form,
 
that of the ^mirror of princes,/ which survived until the
 
nineteenth century." During the second half of the fif­
'
 
teenth century... it re-emerged as a favorite topic of
 
discussion."" At issue was the medieval concept of the
 
prince, as "intermediary between God and man,'"* and the
 
Humanists view, which "abandoned religious motives in polit
 
ical theory," and "founded their arguments on historical
 
example instead of abstract theoretical deduction.""
 
Ferdinand Schevill reminds us that if Machiavelli
 
thought the "ideology of Christianity... dead," this was not
 
true in the "rest of Europe... at the very time that
 
Machiavelli propounded his doctrine of the state as power,
 
Erasmus set forth a diametrically opposed and strictly
 
pacifist view in his Plea of Peace and his Education of a
 
Christian Prince," while Sir Thomas More "projected, in his
 
i
 
Utopia, an ideal society patterned on apostolic Christiani
 
ty."^® The shock value of the Prince, then, can be attribut
 
ed both to its substance, and to Machiavelli's clever adap
 
tation of the traditional handbook for princes, that which
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 made the Prince "so provocative [with] its transformation of
 
a Christian and humanist genre, the moralistic ^mirror of
 
princes' literature, into a platform for expounding the
 
thesis of power politics,"^' what J.R. Hale refers to as "a
 
bomb in a prayerbook.
 
As a vehicle for satire, the handbook for princes was a
 
perfect choice, for certain expectations of tradition accom
 
panied it as a literary form, which intensified the degree
 
of distortion achieved by Machiavelli, between the ideal and
 
■ • ■ V 
the reality. He could not have accomplished the effect of a
 
"bomb in a prayerbook" with the same blush of humor had he
 
chosen another literary mode. ^
 
In yet another context, Machiavelli makes sport of
 
prince-literature when he discusses the "character Of
 
Cosimo" in the History; "If when writing of the things done
 
by Cosimo, I have imitated those who write the lives of
 
princes, not those who write general histories, nobody
 
should be astonished; since he was a man rare in our city, I
 
have been obliged with an unusual method to praise him."^'
 
That is, to categorize him as a prince; a subtle criticism.
 
In the History, Machiavelli commends Cosimo for his corrupt
 
ing influence; "But after he was forty years old, he lived
 
very happily, so that not merely those who sided with him in
 
public affairs but also those who had charge of his property
 
in all Europe shared in his prosperity. From this very
 
great riches came to many families in Florence... and in
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addition to these, all who depended on his advice and for
 
tune grew rich, creating inequality in Florence, which
 
ultimately leads to acquiring "sole authority, and fac
 
tional disunity. By using his wealth and influence, Cosimo
 
aided both "individuals" and the "people," and while being
 
"compassionate, helpful, liberal, and loved by everybody"
 
are all "methods that bring men flying to the principate,"
 
the people don't realize it, and do "not lend [their] ears
 
to such accusations."^®
 
If Machiavelli's Prince is a burlesque of the original
 
prince-literature, it was not simply an effort to satirize
 
the genre itself but, rather, in the spirit of the Latin
 
satirists, "to set up in the reader's mind a contrast be
 
tween the circumstances where such passages were appropriate
 
and the ridiculous and often sordid situations to which they
 
applied them.""
 
In Chapter Two, Machiavelli also dismisses the subject
 
of hereditary principalities with considerable economy.
 
Machiavelli's target, in the Prince, is new principalities,
 
acquired by a new prince. In the first three chapters,
 
however, he maintains the appearance of a comprehensive
 
analysis of principalities generally, at least with his
 
chapter titles. In Chapter Three, Machiavelli discusses new
 
acquisitions added to an old principality, "so that taken as
 
a whole it can be called almost mixed," (Ch. 3, 7) to make
 
way for the principality that is altogether new.
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In Chapter Three, Machiavelli remarks that there is a
 
certain "instability" brought about by the "natural diffi
 
culty that exists in all new principalities," (Ch. 3, 7-8)
 
even when they are acquired by an established prince. To
 
illustrate the point, Machiavelli turns to King Louis XII of
 
France, citing the mistakes he made in his acquisitions of
 
Milan and Naples, in effect demonstrating how it could be
 
better accomplished another time! Leo Strauss remarks, "the
 
primary example in Chapter Three is the policy of conquest
 
practiced by King Louis XII of France; but the country in
 
which he tried to acquire new territory was Italy...
 
Machiavelli discusses the difficulties obstructing foreign
 
conquests in Italy, a subject important to the liberator of
 
Italy. By discussing the mistakes the French King committed
 
/
 
in attempting to make lasting conquests in Italy,
 
Machiavelli undoubtedly gives advice to foreign conquerors
 
as to how to go about making conquests in his own father
 
land.
 
If we grant that Machiavelli did indeed give such
 
advice, what was his purpose? Strauss explains it as "the
 
reverse side, if the odious side, of advice as to how to
 
defend Italy against foreign domination or as to how to
 
liberate Italy,"^® certainly a convoluted approach to a
 
straight forward problem. Keeping in mind that the Prince
 
is a satire, however, there are two possible explanations.
 
The first is that by instructing the French as to how to
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invade Italy successfully, Machiavelli contradicts his
 
exhortation to "free" Italy "from the barbarians," in Chap
 
ter Twenty-six. (Ch. 26, 101) Contradictions of this sort
 
create confusion in the text, as he intended.
 
The Second explanation is less obvious. Throughout the
 
Prince, Machiavelli takes on the qualities of the new prince
 
himself. That is, he offers advice that accords with his
 
impressions of modern princes generally, although he disap
 
proves of their ambition and character. Therefore, in
 
suggesting the ways that Louis XII might successfully invade
 
Italy, he commits the error—a most grievous one—of those
 
princes who have invited foreigners into the country to aid
 
them in their enterprises. He is not so obvious as to
 
invite the French, but his counsel hints at that objective.
 
It is probably not a coincidence that he chose the example
 
of the French, in Chapter Three, who descended on Italy;at
 
the request of Ludovico Sforza, which launched four decades
 
of war and chaos, thus constituting a subtle criticism.
 
Machiavelli faults Louis, however, for "making the
 
Church great by adding so much temporal greatness to the
 
spiritual one that gives it so much authority," (Ch. 3, 14)
 
which directs our attention to the Medici who are, after
 
■ . ■ ■ ■ , . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ( 
all, the intended liberators of Italy in the Prince, Fur
 
ther, to emphasize his point, Machiavelli refers to his
 
conversation virith the Cardinal of Rouen, who remarked that
 
the "Italians do not understand war," to which Machiavelli
 
' 110
 
replied, "the French do not understand the state, because if
 
they understood, they would not have let the Church come to
 
such greatness," (Ch. 3, 16) which not only upset the bal
 
ance of power among the Italian states, but contributed to
 
the ruin of France in Italy as well.
 
Further, Machiavelli was opposed to the power of the
 
Church "because he did not like the rule of priests, who had
 
ruined both the religion of Christ and his other religion,
 
the state... as a Florentine and an Italian he hated the
 
temporal power of the Church. Yet, through his appeal to
 
the Medici in the Prince to seize and unite Italy, he invit
 
ed the expansion of the temporal power of the Church through
 
Pope Leo X; "Now the Church was led by a Florentine, who
 
united the power of the Florentine State with his ecclesias
 
tical power, he had a young brother and a young nephew, both
 
seeking to rule, and he himself was marvelously ^favored by
 
heaven and by fortune, as Roberto Ridolfi describes the
 
Medici. While Ridolfi finds Pope Julius II an undesirable
 
model for the Prince, in part for having been "the destroyer
 
of Florentine freedom, and the fact that Machiavelli did
 
not like the rule of priests, he curiously accepts the
 
Medici model, whose re-constituted rule was the ultimate
 
destroyer of Florentine liberty and the republic, and who
 
now occupied the throne of papal authority, the first neces
 
sity for expanding Medici power.
 
The sense of urgency that Machiavelli expresses in
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Chapter Twenty-six, then, with such remarks as "one should
 
not let this opportunity pass," (Ch, 26, 105) and "I do not
 
know what time has be^n more apt for it," (Ch. 26, 102) with
 
regard to seizing Italy and liberation, suggest the extent
 
of Machiavelli's satire which targets the temporal (and
 
corrupt) power of the Church, and the abuse of that power by
 
the Borgia Pope and others before him, whose nepotism al
 
lowed their family members to reach heights otherwise inac
 
cessible to them. To further amplify his point, Machiavelli
 
deliberately mentions that he had the conversation with the
 
Cardinal of Rouen "when Valentino (for so Cesare Borgia, son
 
of Pope Alexander, was called by the people) was occupying
 
the Romagna." (Ch. 3, 16) If the French did not "understand
 
the state..^ or they would not have let the Church come to
 
such greatness," (Ch. 3, 16) mention of Cesare Borgia empha
 
sizes his point, which extends to the ambition of the
 
Medici, as well. Thus, while Borgia is developed in suc
 
ceeding chapters as the primary model for the Prince,
 
Machiavelli makes first mention of him in what I would argue
 
admits to his true assessment of that family, deserving of
 
blame for advancing the secular power of the Church, and
 
using that power to install a family member as a new prince
 
in Italy. The Medici were blameworthy, as well, for harbor
 
ing similar ambitions.
 
Pope Leo is conspicuously absent in the Prince, al
 
though the Medici power was dependent on his influence.
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Machiavelli cleverly focused (in his dedication) on Giuliano
 
and Lorenzo, but the Church is implied, particularly in
 
Chapter Twenty-six, in which Machiavelli calls on Leo to
 
redeem Italy, "supported by God and by the Church of which
 
it is now prince." (Ch. 26, 102-3) Pope Leo is only men
 
tioned once by name, however, in the Prince, in Chapter
 
Eleven on ecclesiastical principalities in which Machiavelli
 
expresses the hope that he will continue to bring the Church
 
to greatness. (Ch. 11, 47) But that is precisely what
 
Machiavelli opposed, "a Church come to such greatness." (Ch.
 
3, 16) As was the case with Cesare Borgia in the Romagna,
 
neither Giuliano or Lorenzo had the slightest hope to
 
achieve princely power beyond Florence without the aid of
 
Vatican resources and political influence.
 
Nor did Machiavelli have faith in the Church to unite
 
Italy in coitonon cause, for the Church lacked "power|' and
 
"virtue." He accuses the Church of causing "weakness" in
 
Italy, and illustrates his point with the example of the
 
Swiss, "who are the only people who today, with respect both
 
to religion and to military institutions, live as the an-^
 
cients did," and were the Court of Rome to take "the author
 
ity it has in Italy" to the Swiss "territories," it would
 
"cause" more "disorder in that country" than any other event
 
at any time whatsoever has been able to hiring about." (I.
 
12, 145-6) If Machiavelli had so little faith in the abili
 
ty of the Church to unite Italy, it is ironic that he called
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on the Medici, then, to lead Italy's liberation. Only in
 
satire can Machiavelli's appeal to that family be under
 
stood, for not only was he opposed to priestly rule and
 
increasing the power of the Church, but he blamed the Church
 
for its inability to ward off aggressors and for Italy's
 
state of disarray. Nor were there secure foundations in
 
states acquired by popes on behalf of their sons and rela
 
tives, for the fortune and authority of such princes were
 
tied to that of the pope, the most ill-conceived of founda
 
tions owing to their relatively brief reign (as exemplified
 
in the Borgia), and thus deserving of blame, not praise.
 
Machiavelli was aware of Pope Leo's grandiose ambitions
 
for his family before he wrote the Prince, evidenced in his
 
correspondence with Francesco Vettori who, from his close
 
association with the pope in Rome, learned of Leo's plans
 
and attempted to dissuade him from them. Machiavelli re
 
ceived a letter from Vettori (July 12, 1513), in which
 
Vettori refers to the "contradiction between Leo's ambition
 
for the Church and those for his family." John M. Najamey
 
makes the point that "this letter contains the first mention
 
in the correspondence of the idea of installing Giuliano and
 
Lorenzo in territorial states of their own," in reference to
 
Pope Leo's "purpose... to maintain the Church in the pres
 
tige... in which he found it, not to allow any loss of
 
territory... unless what is lost be given to members of his
 
family, namely Giuliano and Lorenzo, to whom he plans in any
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case to give territories [[over which they can rule]]."^
 
While Vettori was convinced that Leo would ultimately lose
 
Parma and Piacenza (reacquired in May, 1513), due to forth
 
coming agreements among the major powers, and he argued his
 
)	reasons before the pope "on more than one occasion," none
 
theless, the pope "followed his own plan," and was "ulti
 
mately unable to realize his objectives in Lombardy... It
 
would have been wiser, if his purpose was indeed ;*to main
 
tain the Church in the prestige in which he found it,' to
 
forget about Parma and Piacenza and not to put himself in a
 
situation in which he might have to yield, as a result
 
either of military defeat or an embarrassing concession,
 
territories whose prompt teacquisition he himself had made
 
the first and most urgent aim of his pontificate,"^^ all of
 
which calls into question Machiavelli's remark concerning
 
Pope Leo, in the Prince, having "found this pontificate most
 
powerful... he with his goodness and infinite other virtues,
 
can make it very great and venerable." (Ch. 11, 47) If, in
 
fact, Machiavelli was in agreement with Vettori, his words
 
concerning Leo in the Prince are a mockery, for Leo's ac
 
tions were imprudent, impetuous, and highly questionable as
 
to motive. As Vettori suggests, "The pope was thus under
 
mining his own objectives," whose policies (Leo's) were
 
"similar" to those "pursued by nearly all the popes since
 
the previous century and that his relatives in Florehce
 
hardily thought of anything else... so little did Vettori
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think of the idea that he did not even wish to speculate
 
about what territories the pope had in mind for this pro
 
ject, ^because in this matter he will switch his plans as
 
circumstances require'... a final confirmation of the ga^
 
between Leo's stated purpose and his actions, between the
 
ends he said he was pursuing and the means he claimed to be
 
using in that pursuit."^® Vettori's views, it seems to me,
 
reflect those one might expect from the republicans of
 
Florence, including Machiavelli, who anticipated with dis
 
dain the Medicean efforts to expand their power, as evi
 
denced by the conspiracies against that family.
 
While Machiavelli's response to Vettori's letter is not
 
extant, he seems to have given full impetus to the notion of
 
Leo's nepotism in the Prince, and in his letter to Vettori
 
(January 31, 1514 or 1515), in which he also makes reference
 
to Cesare Borgia." The date that appears on the original
 
copy of this letter is January 31, 1514. The alternative
 
and generally accepted date is 1515. Machiavelli's mention,
 
of Reggio and Modena as cities to be governed by the Medici
 
suggest the later date as the correct one, although the text
 
of this letter seems more appropriate to the year 1514, upon
 
Machiavelli's completion of the Prince, Perhaps the letter
 
was altered by Machiavelli himself at a later date, to
 
accommodate the acquisition of Reggio and Modena by the pope
 
(1514), which further enhances the opportunity taken by
 
Machiavelli, in the letter in question, to advance his
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 counsel concerning the governing of a new Medicean state.'®
 
And perhaps, in the larger view, it is possible that
 
Machiavelli used this letter as a means of protecting him­
\ ,
 
self by rendering added credulity and sincerity to his
 
intent in the Prince, not for Vettori's benefit, who under
 
stood, but for the benefit of others who might become famil
 
iar with the correspondence between them. In fact,
 
Machiavelli, given his familiarity with ancient literati,
 
may have borrowed the idea from Horace that letters can
 
serve the intent of the satirist,''" and in this regard,
 
Machiavelli's letter is both pertinent and revealing.
 
Just as he did in the Prince, Machiavelli presumes to
 
instruct Giuliano in the governance of a new "sovereignty,"
 
and he advises that Giuliano, "if he is going to govern it
 
well, he needs to understand well the nature of the sub
 
ject."'" As he did in the Prince, Machiavelli established
 
the mask of innocence by pretending sincerity. The inter
 
esting (and comic) aspect of this letter, however, is that
 
he gives practical and personalized application of his
 
precepts from the prince in the example of Francesco
 
Vettori's brother, Pagolo, who hopes for appointment from
 
the Medici as governor in their new, unified state; "your
 
Pagolo has been here with the Magnificent [Giuliano], and in
 
the course of his discussions with me on his liopes, he said
 
His Lordship has promised to make him governor of orie of
 
those cities of which he is now taking the sovereignty."'*'
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Machiavelli gives the example of Gesare Borgia and Remirro
 
de Oreo, to make a mockery of what the appointment could
 
mean for Vettori's brother, Pagolo:
 
Duke Valentino, whose works I should
 
always imitate if I were prince... make
 
Messer Remirro President in Romagna;
 
that decision made those people united,
 
fearful of his authority, fond of his
 
power, and trustful in it; and all the
 
love they felt for him, which was great,
 
considering his newness, resulted from
 
this decision. I believe this thing can
 
easily be demonstrated, because it is
 
true; and if it should happen to your
 
Pagolo, this would be a step in making
 
him known not merely to the Magnificent
 
but to all Italy; and with honor and
 
profit to his Lordship, he could give
 
reputation to himself, to you, and to
 
your family. I spoke of it with him; it
 
pleased him, and he will consider making
 
use of it. I have thought it well to
 
write about it, so that you will know
 
our discussions and, wherever it is
 
necessary, can pave the way to this
 
thing.
 
Urging the Medici to follow the example of Cesare
 
Borgia is but to repeat a familiar theme from the Prince,
 
but in associating Pagolo with the fate of Remirro,
 
Machiavelli makes a joke of Pagolo's aspirations and ridi
 
cules his own recommendations at the same time, for Remirro
 
was sacrificed at the behest of his prince, Duke Valentino.
 
As Ivan Cloulas describes the event, "the people of Cesena
 
found [Remirro's] headless body lying in the middle of the
 
piazza. He was dressed in his rich suit and purple mantle.
 
His head, with its black beard, was impaled on a pike, while
 
beside the corpse lay the bloodstained execution block and
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blade," from which "Machiavelli drew a moral... the reason
 
for his death is not known, save that the Prince willed it
 
SO, which shows that he can make and unmake men at his will,
 
according to their merits," as he recorded in a dispatch
 
from Cesena, December 26, 1502."^
 
Machiavelli gave yet another explanation in the Prince,
 
however. In Chapter Seven, he notes that, in order to
 
"reduce" the Romagna to "peace and obedience to a kingly
 
arm," Cesare installed Remirro, "a cruel and ready man, to
 
whom he gave the fullest power," and then "to purge the
 
spirits of that people and gain them entirely to himself...
 
to show that if any cruelty had b^en committed, this had not
 
come from him but from the harsh nature of his minister,"
 
(Ch. 7, 29-30) he had him hacked to pieces. The reference
 
to Remirro, then, with regard to Pagolo Vettori, is meant to
 
be a humorous one, a hint of the reputation that Pagolo can
 
expect from the new prince, which would make him "known not
 
merely to the Magnificent but to all Italy," whose actions
 
(and fate) would reflect on his family,as well, including
 
Francesco Vettori. Machiavelli makes no mention of
 
Remirro's untimely death in the letter, of course, which he
 
leaves to be inferred by Vettori, and savored as the great
 
irony of his recommendations to Giuliano and Pagolo.
 
If Cesare was loved by the people of Cesena for killing
 
Remirro, he was "hated, feared, and despised" everywhere
 
else, "even by most of the faction who had stood by the old
 
119
 
pope [Alexander VI Machiavelli does not state that he
 
was loved in the Prince or the Discourses, as he does in
 
this letter, but he does observe, in one of his dispatches,
 
that Cesare was "universally feared."'*® And in the Discours
 
es, he observes that those princes who have "become tyrants
 
in their own country" will find the people desire to "avenge
 
themselves against the persons who have become the cause of
 
their servitude," as did Clearchus, who "cut to pieces all
 
the nobles to the immense satisfaction of the popular party,
 
and in this way satisfied one of the demands of the popu
 
lace, namely, the demand for vengeance." (I. 16, 156)
 
Machiavelli, recognizing that such methods are useful tools
 
for tyranny, then, appropriately applied them in the Prince.
 
There is, of course, a third explanation for Remirro's
 
death, not referred to by Machiavelli in the Prince. He was
 
"condemned to death for embezzlement, accused of exporting
 
huge quantities of wheat he was suppose to bring back." As
 
Ivan Cloulas points out, however, "What really earned him
 
the death penalty was that he had treacherously plotted with
 
the condottiere to trap II Valentino,"'*' at Sinigaglia.
 
Cesare put down the plot in ruthless fashion, having discov
 
ered it from Remirro after his arrest."** Rather than make
 
the point that Cesare was threatened by Remirro, an assoc
 
iate of long standing, however, he encourages the new prince
 
to betray others at will. If the prince avoids hatred and
 
contempt, he "will find no danger in his other infamies,"
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 (Ch. 19, 71-2) but ^ 'infamies" of the sort he recommends in
 
the Prince breed hatred and contempt.
 
Even when Machiayel11 touches on the topic of conspira
 
cy, he advises that the prince will prevail "provided he has
 
ordered and lived as I said, as long as he does not forsake
 
himself, he will always withstand every thrust as I said
 
Nabis the Spartan did." (Ch. 19, 72) Nabis, however, was
 
killed in a conspiracy,^' which Machiavelli records in some
 
detail in the Discourses. (III. 6, 414-15) Therefore,
 
I ' ' ' ■ 
Machiavelli not only demonstrates a difference in emphasis
 
in the Prince and in the Discourses but often leaves it for
 
the reader to discern, from what he does not say, the mes
 
sage he is trying to convey in the former work which, in
 
this case, is that the prince has much to fear. As in his
 
letter to Vettori associating Pagolo with the fate of
 
Remirro, what is left unspoken has yet its own voice, and
 
Machiavelli took great delight in flirtatious implication
 
concerning the comically grave in his writings.
 
One of the mechanisms used in verbal irony is to "[re
 
fer] vaguely to important people as nonentities or subordi
 
nates,"®" which describes the manner in which Machiavelli
 
refers to Ludovico Sforza, in Chapter Three. In his discus
 
sion of how Louis XII lost Milan, Machiavelli remarks, "So
 
it was that, if one Duke Ludovico stirring up commotion at
 
the border was enough to make France lose Milan the first
 
time... ," (Ch. 3, 9) Machiavelli treats Sforza as an insig­
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nificant interloper, although it was Sforza's state that
 
Louis XII seized when he took Milan. If this humorous
 
remark eludes the modern reader, it must certainly have
 
amused Machiavelli's contemporaries, who understood Sforza's
 
unscrupulous rise to power followed by his demise at the
 
hands of the French, his former allies. Because Sforza
 
exemplified the new prince in many significant ways, as both
 
ruthless and cunning, it seems remarkable that Machiavelli
 
makes no other mention of him in the Prince. Perhaps he
 
refrained from doing so because "no contemporary Italian
 
with as much as a touch of patriotism can have viewed the
 
catastrophe of the Moor with any other feeling than that a
 
traitor had received his reward, strong emotions that
 
Machiavelli wisely avoided to preserve credulity in his sat
 
ire.
 
Machiavelli makes a distinction, in Chapter Three,
 
between states that are acquired of the same province and
 
language, and those that are not. The former "may be held
 
with greater ease," and he cites the examples of "Burgundy,
 
Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been with France
 
for so long a time." (Ch. 3, 9) Brittany, however, had only
 
been "with France" since 1491, acquired through the marriage
 
of Anne of Brittany to King Charles VIII, further preserved
 
for France by the marriage of Anne to Louis XII, after the
 
death of Charles VIII. In fact, Brittany was not actually
 
incorporated into France until 1547. The "ease" that
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Machiavelli refers to, then, with which Brittany was held,
 
had more to do with a marriage alliance than with language
 
or geography. In Machiavelli's First Decennale, a poem
 
written in 1504, he writes of the agreement made between
 
Pope Alexander VI and Louis XII, that made the marriage
 
possible:
 
So because by himself alone the Pope had
 
no strength to do Anything great, he set
 
out to win the new king's favor. Granted
 
his divorce, and gave him Brittany, and
 
in return the king promised him the
 
lordship and the states of Romagna.^'
 
In reference to the errors made by Louis and faith kept
 
by princes, however, Machiavelli dismisses out of hand the
 
agreement made between Alexander and Louis by simply stat
 
ing, "And if some others should bring up the faith that the
 
king had pledged to the pope, to undertake that enterprise
 
for him in return for dissolving his marriage and for the
 
hat of Rouen, I reply with what I will say below on the
 
faith of princes and how it should be observed," (Ch. 3, IS
 
IS) a reference to Chapter Eighteen. Although Machiavelli
 
faults Alexander for not keeping faith in that chapter/^ he
 
does not expound on the agreement between Alexander and
 
Louis in the Prince, because the initial terms of the agree
 
ment were kept. Louis obtained his divorce from Jeanne of
 
France to marry Anne of Brittany, and Georges d' Amboise was
 
granted the position he sought as Cardinal. In return,
 
Alexander not only secured the aid promised by Louis in his
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Romagna enterprise, but also Louis' word that he "would do
 
what he could to promote Cesare's marriage to the princ
 
ess,"^' Carlotta of Aragon, a marriage objected to by her
 
father, Federigo, King of Naples, and by herself as well.'®
 
Further, Cesare acquired the "counties of Valence, and
 
Die in the Dauphine." Valence was "made,a duchy," granting
 
title to Cesare, in 1498. He made a trip to France to
 
receive his property and honors with such pomp and ostenta
 
tious splendor that the "chronicler Brantome" said of it,
 
"There is little doubt that he [Louis] and his courtiers
 
laughed at such a grand display for the petty duke of Va
 
lence," upon his arrival at the king's chateau." Added to
 
the agreement between Alexander and Louis was the provision
 
that the county of Asti would be granted to Cesare, when
 
Louis reached Milan.
 
So adamant was Louis in keeping his part of the bar
 
gain, having been granted his annulment December 17,'* that
 
when Carlotta failed to respond to Cesare, he sought yet
 
another bride for the fledgling prince. His second endeavor
 
failed as well, refused by his niece, the "daughter of Jean
 
de Foix." Alexander feared the "his son would soon be the
 
laughingstock of all Europe," but Alain d' Albret offered
 
the hand of his daughter, Charlotte, "whose brother, Jean,
 
was King of Navarre, which proved agreeable to all parties."
 
As Ivan Cloulas observes, "since the ultimate goal of this
 
marriage was to ensure that the king receive the pope's help
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in the coming Italian wars, Louis had a clause added to the
 
effect that the duke, together with his relatives, friends,
 
and allies, would aid him in the conquest of Naples and the
 
duchy of Milan; in return he promised the Vatican the assis
 
tance of the royal armies if the pope requested,"^® which
 
Cesare used to his great advantage in his future enterpris
 
es. ' '
 
Thus, the marriage of Louis XII to Anne, Queen of
 
Brittany, and the preservation of Brittany for France,
 
devolved upon favor received from the pope, which ultimately
 
led to an agreement with far reaching consequence for the
 
Italian Peninsula, beneficial to both the Borgias and the
 
King of France; an agreement which the short-^sighted Louis
 
failed to see would promote the power of the Church, seed of
 
the kings own demise. By trivializing the importance of
 
their agreement, Machiavelli touched on "irony by under
 
statement, the appearance of representing something as much
 
less serious than it really is," which "requires a select
 
and responsive audience to recognize its peculiar direction
 
of meaning."®"
 
With regard to states acquired "in a province disparate
 
in language, customs, and orders," as was the difficulty
 
that confronted Louis XII in Italy, (Ch. 3, 9) Machiavelli
 
faults the king for having made five errors: "he had elimi
 
nated the lesser powers; increased the power of a power in
 
Italy; brought in a very powerful foreigner; did not come to
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live there; did not put colonies there*" (Ch. 3, 15)
 
In considering that Louis should have come to Italy to
 
live, "one of the greatest and quickest remedies for whoever
 
acquires it," (Ch. 3, 16) could Machiavelli really have
 
imagined that the king of France would make his residence in
 
Milan? Or the head of any other great power, such as
 
Maximillian I? The suggestion is absurd, and meant to be
 
so.
 
Machiavelli also mentions living there as an option in
 
Chapter Five, concerning administration of those cities or
 
principalities acquired which are accustomed to liberty and
 
freedom, but he does not elaborate on the benefits that
 
would accrue from doing so, perhaps because there are none,
 
as he "should expect to be destroyed by it," (Ch. 5, 21) for
 
those accustomed to liberty never forget it, that which "no
 
force crushes, no time wears away, and no gain counter-bal
 
ances.'"^^ As the Florentines would recall, Charles VIII of
 
France, "resided in the Medici palace"® after his triumphant
 
entrance into Florence in 1494, "as though he were a con
 
quering hero."® The young republic responded to his demands
 
with aplomb, demonstrated in the courage of Peiro di Gino
 
Capponi, who warned the king, "If you sound your trumpets,
 
we will ring our bells," words that became a Florentine
 
proverb,®^ symbolizing the will to fight foreign oppression.
 
Machiavelli ends Chapter Eight with the advice that a
 
prince should live with his subjects, a chapter that is
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 devoted to the subject of crime, injury, and cruelty.
 
Machiavelli might have recommended that the prince live with
 
his subjects to promote the welfare and security of all but,
 
unlike the Discourses, that is not the emphasis he wishes to
 
convey in the Prince. Rather, he Offers his notion of liv
 
ing there in the context of securing the welfare of a ty
 
rant, as is the sum of his advice throughout the Prince,
 
having more concern for the security of the new prince than
 
the security of his subjects—and in this he is wholly con
 
sistent.
 
Machiavelli's treatment of colonies in Chapter Three is
 
also transparent and revealing. He had great respect for
 
the Roman practice of colonizing, which offered "protection
 
on Rome's boundaries," and provided "a garrison there at no
 
expense to themselves," but, as he notes in the History,
 
this "great and wonderful provision of ancient republics and
 
principalities" that "filled empty places with inhabitants,
 
and kept men well distributed within the provinces" result
 
ing in the rise of cities "has vanished" in "present
 
times.
 
And in the Discourses, he states that in the conduct of
 
' ' • ' ■ ! ■ 
war, the Romans, "when they had won, the enemy, to prevent
 
them devastating the surrounding country, came to terms; and
 
the Romans confiscated some of his lands, which they handed
 
over either for private use or to a colony which they placed
 
on the enemies frontiers for the protection of Rome's bound­
127
 
aries, with the advantage both to the colonies who had the
 
land and to the Roman public who had a garrison there at no
 
expense to themselves." (II. 6, 292)
 
In the Prince, however, his tone is markedly different;
 
"Tiie other, better remedy is to send colonies that are, as
 
it were, fetters of the state, to one or two places, because
 
it is necessary either to do this or to hold them with many
 
men-at-arms and infantry." (Ch. 3, 10) He is not suggesting
 
here that colonies function as protection for the bound
 
aries, or that they serve to inhabit desolate places from
 
which cities might rise and flourish. Rather, he implies
 
that colonies, as an extension of the state, restrain the
 
subject people—a better remedy than holding them by mili
 
tary means. He neglects to explain how colonies, small in
 
number, will succeed in holding the people in check. He
 
refers to the despoiled, in this case his fellow Italians,
 
as those "from whom one takes fields and houses in order to
 
give them new inhabitants-—who are a very small part of that
 
state." (Ch. 3, 10) By representing the despoiled as "a
 
very small part of the state," he diminishes the importance
 
of their loss. Jonathan Swift used diminution as a satiri
 
cal device, in A Tale of a Tub, when he wrote, "Last week I
 
saw a woman flayed, and you would hardly believe how much it
 
altered her person for the worse. Had Machiavelli not had
 
reason for caution in writing his satire, his own penchant
 
for quick-witted humor would likely have graced the pages of
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the Prince in a more overt manner than he managed under the
 
circumstances—but the humor is there nonetheless.
 
Machiavelli observes that "those whom [the new prince]
 
offends, since they remain dispersed and poor, can never
 
hurt him." (Ch. 3, lO) This is untrue, of course, for it is
 
from the ranks of malcontents that conspiracies are formed,
 
who may call in outsiders to avenge their complaints. He
 
emphasizes the point by repeating this assertion; "and those
 
who are offended can do no hurt, since they are poor and
 
dispersed, as was said." (Ch. 3, 10) Yet, as he states in
 
the Discourses, a prince should always beware of the veng­
ence of those he has despoiled. (III. 6, 400)
 
One does find similarity, however, in the Discourses
 
and the Prince, in what Machiavelli has to say about puni
 
tive colonization, despoiling and dispersing the people, and
 
in connection with avoiding a middle path. In the Discours
 
es, he cites the action taken by the Roman Senate against
 
rebellious Latium, which considered each town individually,
 
rendering either pardon or punishment for their rebellion.
 
The latter was administered "by demolishing the towns...
 
sending colonies there, and taking the inhabitants back to
 
Rome or so dispersing them that they could no longer do harm
 
either by appeal to arms or by their machinations," (II. 23,
 
348) in which case the possibility for revenge is indeed
 
reduced. Leaving the despoiled "poor and dispersed," howev
 
er, as he stated in the Prince, (Ch. 3, 10) would not have
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the same effect, in providing security for the prince.
 
The other similarity that is distorted in the Prince is
 
the notion of avoiding a middle path or middle course. In
 
both works, he recommends that the middle path is least
 
desirable. "Men should either be caressed or eliminated,"
 
(Ch. 3, 10-11) as he states in the Prince, and in the Dis
 
courses, with reference to Latium, he remarks that the
 
Romans, to their credit, never "adopt[ed] a middle course as
 
I have said... and other rulers should imitate them in
 
this," (II. 23, 348) The fact is, however, Machiavelli did
 
recommend a middle path in the Prince, rather than an ex
 
treme. Leaving the despoiled homeless and poor did not
 
eliminate them, and those he has injured, though despoiled,
 
"still have arms." (II. 24, 353) Nor did the prince "ca
 
ress" the others, whom he merely left alone. The real
 
operative is fear. "They are afraid to err from fear that
 
what happened to the despoiled might happen to them," and so
 
they should "be quiet." (Ch. 3, 10) Failure to win them
 
over, however, could prove costly to the prince.
 
Machiavelli also advances his argument for colonies by
 
criticizing the use of arms. "But when one holds a state
 
with men-at-arms in place of colonies, one spends much more
 
since one has to consume all the income of that state in
 
guarding it. So the acquisition turns to loss... ," (Ch. 3,
 
11) with no profit to the prince. "... And one offends much
 
more because one hurts the whole state as one's army moves
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 around for lodgings. Everyone feels this hardship, and each
 
becomes one's enemy: and these are enemies that can hurt
 
one since they remain, though defeated, in their homes."
 
(Ch. 3, 11) If the people are defeated, however, and in
 
their homes, how Will they "hurt" an invading army? It is
 
the people who will be hurt by such practices. A prince who
 
has so little discipline over his troops that "all the
 
income of that state is consimed in guarding it" is impru
 
dent and unwise. The methods of such a prince do, however,
 
bring Cesare Borgia to mind.
 
In passing through Tuscany, Gesare's troops left terri
 
ble carnage. In 1502, Machiavelli wrote (in a dispatch from
 
Imola), "^they have devoured everything here except the
 
stones... here in the Romagna they are behaving just as they
 
■ ■ ' ■ ■ / ■ , 
did in Tuscany last year, [of their passage then, Landucci
 
noted in his diary that none of the foreign armies that had
 
crossed Tuscany in the past seven years had behaved so
 
abominably as these Italians under the papal banner] and
 
they show no more discipline and no less confusion than they
 
did then.' There is no subsequent indication that
 
Machiavelli ever changed his mind."®' Machiavelli criticizes
 
such practices in his remarks concerning men-at-arms, in
 
Chapter Three, but the irony of his criticism is not appar
 
ent, until he unveils Cesare Borgia as his model prince,
 
particularly when he states, "I shall never hesitate to cite
 
Cesare Borgia and his actions," (Ch. 13, 55) whom he never
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 criticizes in the Prince, and in the Discourses, he ignores.
 
Machiavelli also faults Louis XII for having "eliminat
 
ed the lesser powers," (Ch. 3, 15) in part by "giving aid to
 
. ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Pope Alexander so that the pope might seize the Romagna."
 
(Ch. 3, 14) A wise prince would "make himself head and
 
defender of lesser powers," (Ch. 3, 11) and Machiavelli
 
lists several such powers of the Romagna that came to meet
 
Louis as friends, after he acquired Lombardy. What
 
Machiavelli does not say, however, is that it was part of
 
Louis' agreement with Alexander that he assist the Borgias
 
in their Romagna campaign in exchange for Borgia's assis
 
tance in his own enterprises in Italy. That is, Louis did
 
not have the choice that Machiavelli faults him for not
 
making. He needed the help of the Borgia to consider his
 
campaign in the first place.
 
Further, to better inform the present by making refer
 
ence to the ancients, Machiavelli cites the Roman example in
 
Greece; "And I want the province of Greece alone to suffice
 
as an example," (which should alert the reader to be wary,
 
as Machiavelli has employed the device of omission, exclud
 
ing all other examples), in which the Romans indulged the
 
lesser powers, "the Achaeans and the Aetolians," (Ch. 3, 12)
 
to achieve their objective in Greece and Macedonia, from
 
which example we are to draw a comparison between the legen
 
dary and formidable Achaeans and Aetolians, and the petty
 
lords of the Romagna. As Leonard Feinberg observes, "Humor
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is always a distortion of the familiar, and the humorous
 
comparison is simply one form of distortion.
 
The remaining errors for which Louis XII is blamed,
 
"increasing the power of a power in Italy [the Church]," and
 
bringing in "a very powerful foreigner [Spain]," (Ch. 3, 15)
 
led ultimately to the defeat of France. Louis was himself,
 
of course, a powerful foreigner who invited himself into
 
Italy. As for bringing Spain, it was not Louis, but the
 
actions of Charles VIII and, even more directly. Pope
 
Alexander, who bore the responsibility. When Charles en
 
tered Naples in 1494, "Alfonso fled, and Charles entered
 
without firing a shot." When he attempted to leave, howev
 
er, he encountered the forces of an alliance put together by
 
Pope Alexander, and was defeated at Fornovo, in 1495. "The
 
son of Alfonso, Ferrante II, returned [to Naples] but with
 
troops furnished by his Spanish relative King Ferdinand...
 
and thereafter the Spanish monarchy no more let go from
 
southern Italy."®'
 
Machiavelli devoted Chapter Three to the five errors
 
committed by Louis XII, but in his conclusion, he remarks,
 
"Yet if he had lived, these errors could not have hurt him
 
if he had not made a sixth; depriving Venice of their
 
state," (Ch. 3, 15) which effectively negates the importance
 
of the original errors, including the error of increasing
 
the power of the Church, which ultimately ruined Louis. And
 
if Louis "had lived," he would haVe encountered the Medici
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pope, who did not "favor" France,™ and who found the Church
 
greater than when Louis first arrived in Italy.
 
In Chapter Three, then, Machiavelli gives us our first
 
glimpse of modern Italy. He sets the tone with respect to
 
the "quality of the times." (III. 8, 428-9) There is no
 
mention of nor concern with the common good or the common
 
benefit, a central principle in the Discourses. Nor does
 
Machiavelli make any reference to letting the people "live
 
by their laws" (Ch. 5, 20) and retain their institutions.
 
Louis is portrayed as a tyrant whose intent was to exact
 
complete control and authority over his new subjects—in
 
effect to enslave them. By associating Louis, who repre
 
sents a country with good civic order,™ with tyrannical
 
practices, Machiavelli creates a transition in the minds of
 
his readers toward acceptance of such practices. One of the
 
rhetorical devices employed by Swift in his Modest Proposal
 
was "the progression of diminution," of "man to animal to
 
food," which means "the impression of normalness (and the
 
reluctant acceptance) is gradually achieved."™
 
By means of the errors that Louis committed,
 
Machiavelli reveals how a tyrant must view his subjects, as
 
an enemy against whom he must guard. By living there, he
 
can guard them himself. Or he could use military force.
 
The better remedy, however, is to plant one or two colonies,
 
which would never be sufficient to contain a people accus
 
tomed to "liberty," whose "refuge in rebellion" and "its own
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ancient orders... are never forgotten." (Ch. 5, 21)
 
Machiavelli does succeed in ridiculing France/ however, for
 
its pretensions to empire, by suggesting that France colo
 
nize in Italy, in imitation of the Roman Empire.
 
Machiavelli also reveals the growing power of the
 
Church in secular affairs in Italy. And, by mentioning the
 
Borgias in the context of the Romagna, he suggests the
 
corrupt state of the Church in his time, a standard against
 
which his satire unfolds, inherited by the Medici pope in
 
whom the Medici power resides.
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Chapter VII. Slavery and Freedom
 
By its title, "Why the Kingdom of Darius which
 
Alexander Seized did not Rebel from his Successors after
 
Alexander's Death," Chapter Four gives the appearance of a
 
digression, having no apparent connection to the preceding
 
chapter. As L. Arthur Burd remarks, "the following chapter
 
[four] is one of those which have received the least atten
 
tion from the critics and commentators. It is not difficult
 
to see why this should be so, for it is indeed hardly more
 
than a digression." Burd suggests that Machiavelli may have
 
anticipated objections to his conclusion in Chapter Three;
 
"If the difficulties of establishing and maintaining a
 
government absolutely new are so great, why did the succes
 
sors of Alexander find no other difficulty in maintaining
 
his ^new conquests' except that which arose from their own
 
ambition?"^
 
I think the answer to that question depends on whether
 
or not the conquered people were accustomed to living in
 
servitude or in freedom. In Chapter Four, Machiavelli
 
distinguishes between two different kinds of states in which
 
servitude is the norm, yet governed in "two diverse modes:
 
either by one prince, and all the others servants who as
 
ministers help govern the kingdom by his favor and appoint
 
ment," in which case the prince will find them difficult to
 
conquer because they are "united," but easy to hold, once
 
the "blood "line of the prince is "eliminated." The other
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mode is represented by France, "by a prince and by barons
 
who hold that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity
 
of blood line" which, while easier to conquer as "you can
 
easily enter there, having won over to yourself some baron
 
of the kingdom," it will be harder to hold, due to difficul
 
ties arising from "those who have helped you and from those
 
you have oppressed." (Ch. 4, 16-19) In neither case, howev
 
er, is the prince attempting to subject a populace accus
 
tomed to freedom.
 
As the kingdom of Darius was like that of the Turk,
 
Alexander had no difficulty in maintaining it, once it was
 
conquered, and his successors (had Alexander provided for
 
this eventuality) would have maintained it as well, if
 
united, for as Machiavelli states in the Discourses, "cities
 
accustomed to subjection are usually not so particular about
 
changing masters: on the contrary, they are often glad to
 
do so." (III. 12, 441)
 
The tone of Chapter Four is significantly different
 
than that of Chapter Three. I detected none of the satiri
 
cal malice and contempt that animated the pages of the
 
previous chapter. As a digression, however, it serves a
 
function within the satire. Digression is an element of
 
classical rhetoric, employed by Swift in his Modest Propos
 
al, in which the "projector" digressed into subject matter
 
that contained a "historical parallel" to the subject matter
 
of the essay," followed by the proof, which contained rea­
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sons why the proposal should be accepted.^ There are simi
 
larities in Chapters Four and Five of the Prince with the
 
classical form followed by Swift. In Swift's digression,
 
the historical parallel is provided by relating the custom
 
of the Formosan Court in eating the flesh of young girls
 
whose bodies have just been cut down by the public hang
 
man."^ Machiavelli's historical parallel is demonstrated in
 
the progression from freedom to servitude exemplified by the
 
"frequent rebellions in Spain, France, and Greece against
 
the Romans" that, for "as long as their memory lasted,"
 
caused the Romans to be "uncertain of their possessions, but
 
when their memory was eliminated with the power and long
 
duration of the empire, the Romans became secure possessors
 
of them." (Ch. 4, 19) The historical examples of servitude
 
in Chapter Four, and particularly the gradual movement from
 
freedom to servitude over time, corresponds with the rise of
 
the Medici. Thus, the threat of slavery was as great from
 
within Italy as from without. As Francesco Guicciardini
 
said of Lorenzo the Magnificent, "He had such great authori
 
ty that one may say that the city yas not free in his time,
 
even though it was rich in all those glories and good for
 
tune which a city may enjoy when free in name but in fact
 
ruled as a tyrant by one of its citizens."'*
 
In one of his earliest letters, to Ricciardo Bechi,
 
Machiavelli gave an account of one of Savonarola's sermons
 
and observed, "He said next—having digressed, as his custom
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is, further to weaken his adversaries, and also to make a
 
bridge to his next sermon—that our discords might cause a
 
tyrant to rise up who would destroy our homes and lay waste
 
to our fields."^ Iri so far as a digression can be employed
 
to "weaken" one's adversaries, then, Machiavelli's attention
 
to the subject of servitude, like Swift's reference to
 
eating human flesh in Formosa, disarms the reader by lessen
 
ing the shock of what one is asked to believe as the satire
 
unfolds. We are desensitized in a gradual process of ac
 
cepting the unacceptable. '
 
Despite its brevity. Chapter Five constitutes an impor
 
tant segment of Machiavelli's satire. The key to its sig
 
nificance resides in his statement, "And whoever becomes '
 
patron of a city used to being free and does not destroy it,
 
should expect to be destroyed by it," (Ch. 5, 201) because
 
it is clear from his Discourses that he does not suggest to
 
every new prince that a free city must be destroyed to hold
 
or maintain it. As Leo Strauss reminds us, "In the Dis
 
courses, he says that precisely a prince, as distinguished
 
from a republic, provided he is not a barbarian, would spare
 
and protect conquered cities and would leave intact, as much
 
as possible, their autonomy."® Further, it is Machiavelli's
 
opinion that as people are "frequently influenced more by
 
appearances than reality," a new government introduced in a
 
free city should "retain as much as possible of what is
 
old... by one who proposes to set up a political regime
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whether by way of a republic or by way of a monarchy." (I.
 
25, 175-6) Yet Machiavelli is quite emphatic in Chapter Five
 
that if a prince wants to be certain of possessing a free
 
city, he must "ruin" or "destroy" it. The explanation is
 
that the new prince is not setting up a "political regime"
 
for a republic or monarchy, but, rather, a despotism; "But
 
he who proposes to set up a despotism or what writers call a
 
tyranny, must renovate everything," (I. 25, 175-6) that is,
 
to make everything new, the old must be destroyed, including
 
the destruction of cities. Thus, a new prince should
 
... appoint new governors with new ti
 
tles and new authority... make the rich
 
poor and the poor rich... build new
 
cities and destroy those already
 
built... move the inhabitants from one
 
place to another far distant from it...
 
such methods are exceedingly cruel, and
 
are repugnant to any community, not only
 
to a Christian one, but to any composed
 
of men. It behooves, therefore, every
 
man to shun them, and to prefer to live
 
as a private citizen than as a king with
 
such ruination of men to his score.
 
None the less, for the sort of man who
 
is unwilling to take up this first
 
course of well doing, it is expedient,
 
should he wish to hold what he has, to
 
enter on the path of wrong doing. Actu
 
ally, however, most men prefer to steer
 
a middle course, which is very harmful.
 
(I. 26, 176-7)
 
Without exception, Machiavelli will advise, in the
 
Prince, that the new prince follow the "path of wrong doing"
 
as distinguished from the "course of well doing," and by so
 
advising it can be inferred that his new prince is, by his
 
own description, a tyrant.
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Further, Machiavelli used the word "patron" rather than
 
prince, which is inconsistent with his usual habit; "And
 
whoever becomes patron of a city and does not destroy it,
 
should expect to be destroyed by it." The word "patron"
 
harbors multiple nuances of interpretation. As benefactor,
 
it implies one who gives aid, perhaps even comfort, to
 
another, in which case Machiavelli has used the word with
 
h\amor and sarcasm in reference to the prince. It also
 
suggests the beneficent liberality practiced by the Medici
 
in the City of Florence, of the kind that redounds to the
 
benefit of the people from which the benefactor gains influ
 
ence and position to his own advantage. In the context of
 
force and warfare. Pope Alexander VI was patron extraordin­
are of Cesare Borgia's campaign, nor can we forget the aid
 
given by France, in that regard. Perhaps Machiavelli in
 
tended that "patron" be interpreted in all of these ways
 
(and perhaps more) by those who understood his intent. At
 
the very least, I think that he meant to imply the patronage
 
of the Medici in Florence, as such forms of patronage ulti
 
mately lead to corruption and ruin in a republic (and repub
 
lic is his reference in the concluding sentence to Chapter
 
Five), by means of fraud. Thus, he alludes to the ruin of
 
the city's liberty by that family in a subtle manner, in a
 
chapter devoted to the destruction of liberty.
 
The title of Chapter Five, "How Cities or Principali
 
ties Which Lived Under Their Own Laws before They Were
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Occupied Should Be Administered" suggests two things: that
 
the cities were occupied, not destroyed, and second, they
 
were given some form of new government. One cannot adminis
 
ter a city that has been destroyed, however, which is
 
Machiavelli's primary recommendation, and therefore the
 
chapter title is comically misleading.
 
The notion that the prince might "Let them live by
 
their laws, taking from them and creating within them an
 
oligarchical state which keeps them friendly to you,"
 
(Ch. 5, 20) is the most reflective of the chapter title, but
 
it is dismissed by Machiavelli with a few historical examr­
ples demonstrating that it doesn't work. The Spartans lost
 
Athens and Thebes by such methods, and the Romans, after
 
establishing an oligarchy in Greece, were compelled to
 
destroy it, as they destroyed the rebellious Capua, Carthage
 
and Namantia. Having disposed of the-subject, he does not
 
return to it in his conclusions.
 
When Cosimo de' Medici returned from his exile, "and
 
some citizens said to him... that the city was ruined and
 
that it was an act against God to drive out of it so many
 
important men, he answered that a city ruined was better
 
than one lost."' Machiavelli might have responded that the
 
Medici should beware of their own ruin; "When [a] government
 
has been brought into being by the common consent of a whole
 
people which has made it great, there is no reason why, when
 
the said people as a whole meets their downfall, they should
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harm anyone except its head. This was the case with Rome's
 
government and with the expulsion of the Tarquins. It was
 
also the case with the government of the Medici in Florence,
 
which, when it fell in 1494, harmed nobody but the Medici
 
themselves," (III. 7, 425-6) and the people returned to a
 
republican government.
 
I would conclude that in Chapter Five, Machiavelli
 
emphasized the need to ruin and destroy free cities, for the
 
purpose of justifying the tyrannical precepts he recommends
 
in the Prince} for in those restless bastions of liberty,
 
the people are "extraordinarily revengeful towards those who
 
have destroyed their liberty." (II. 2, 276) He also makes
 
it clear that the idea of freedom can never be erased from
 
their memory; thus, his conclusion that "the most secure
 
path is to eliminate them or live in them" is only partly
 
true for in neither case will the prince extinguish their
 
memory of freedom. Unless the prince exterminates or dis
 
perses the entire population, he must always fear the peo
 
ple, and thus the draconian measures Machiavelli advocates
 
in the Prince become a necessity.
 
Within the realm of distorted reality created by the
 
satirist, the poet's true voice can sometimes be heard. In
 
A Modest Proposal, one can detect it in Swift's negation of
 
sound solutions to the problems of Ireland: "Therefore, let
 
no man talk to me of other Expedients; Of taxing our Absen
 
tees at five Shillings a Pound... of being a little cautious
 
143
 
not to Sell our Country and Conscience for nothing...
 
Machiavelli's voice can be heard as well, even as he urges
 
the prince to ravage free cities, for as he reminds us, a
 
city "always has as a refuge in rebellion the name of liber
 
ty and its own ancient orders which are never forgotten
 
either through length of time or because of benefits re
 
ceived... in republics there is greater life, greater ha
 
tred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient
 
liberty does not and cannot let them rest," (Ch. 5, 21)
 
reflecting, above all, the Republic of Rome he admired.
 
As Machiayelli would write long after his composition
 
of the Prince,
 
I am now beginning to write again, and I
 
relieve myself by blaming the princes,
 
who have all done everything to bring us
 
here. Farewell.
 
Niccolo Machiavelli
 
Historian, comic writer, and
 
tragic writer'
 
I By his own self-description—historian, comic writer,
 
and tragic writer (he ignored his former statesmanship from
 
which experience his major works emerged), his literary
 
gifts are readily apparent, nor did he lack a motive for a
 
critical appraisal of his times. Of Florence, Ridolfi
 
remarks, "As freedom ebbed away, there went also the old way
 
of life in the city which we have described, surviving only
 
in the regrets of those who had enjoyed its last moments,
 
and if Machiavelli was concerned "that peoples of old were
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more fond of liberty than they are today," (II. 2, 277) the
 
danger was compounded by the rising ambition of those who
 
were eager to take it away. As a cutting edge for his own
 
vengeance, satire was perfectly suited to Machiavelli, and
 
in Gilbert Right's "tribute to the power of satire,"" one
 
r
 
can sense the tormented spirit of the satirist in relentless
 
pursuit of his prey, and we are left to discern his meaning
 
or not, as though it were enough for him that he gnawed the
 
1
 
bone for his own satisfaction.
 
Hail, Satire! Hail, clear-eyed, sharp-

tongued, hot tempered, outwardly disil
 
lusioned and secretly idealistic Muse!
 
Mother of Comedy, Sister of Tragedy,
 
defender and critic of Philosophy, hail!
 
You are a difficult companion, a mis
 
tress sometimes elusive and tantalizing,
 
sometimes harsh and repellent; but in
 
your mercurial presence no one is ever
 
bored. Stupidity, Self-satisfaction,
 
Corruption, the Belief in Inevitable
 
Progress—these and other intellectual
 
monsters, produced spontaneously from
 
the waste energy of the human mind, you
 
have destroyed again and again. Still
 
they are reborn, and still you arise to
 
destroy them. Hail to Satire, the tenth
 
Muse... who is not so devoted to build
 
ing immortal works as to cursing the
 
endemic ills of human beings; and who
 
nevertheless often creates one of her
 
own peculiar masterpieces, a portrait
 
which has a beating heart within and
 
which, when we look into its eyes, seems
 
to be a reflection, distprted with pain,
 
of our own soul."
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Chapter VIII. Virtue and One's Own Arms
 
In Chapter Six, Machiavelli unveils the intended target
 
of his satire with regard to type, the private individual
 
who has risen to power, becoming a new prince in a new
 
principality, carved from within his own native land.
 
Although Italy became prey to such established powers as
 
France, Spain, and Germany, which was a grave concern of
 
Machiavelli's, the intrusion of foreign powers was precipi
 
tated by another problem within Italy itself, the phenomenon
 
of Ludovico Sforza, Cesare Borgia and others of their ilk.
 
Prior to the invasion of King Charles VIII of France,
 
in 1494, the balance of power in Italy was maintained by
 
five major states: Venice, Milan, Florence, the Kingdom of
 
Naples (ruled by a branch of the Aragonese), and the Papal
 
States. The imperialist tendencies of these states, howev
 
er, led to calling in foreigners which upset the balance of
 
power, causing Italy to become prey to the greed and ambi
 
tion of larger powers. As Machiavelli observes in Chapter
 
Eleven of the Prince, the five states that dominated Italy
 
"had to have two principal concerns: one, that a foreigner
 
not enter into Italy with arms; the other, that none of them
 
enlarge his state." (Ch. 11, 46) Ludovico Sforza violated
 
the first principal by inviting Charles VIII into Italy.
 
The Borgia were guilty on both counts, having joined forces
 
with the French to facilitate their acquisitions in Italy,
 
hoping "not only to carve out a huge Italian estate for
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their family but [ironically] also to unify the entire
 
country and thus save it from the depredations of the French
 
king and the German (i.e. Holy Roman) emperor,"^ although it
 
is unclear who or what would have saved the Italians from
 
the depredations of the Borgia themselves. At the time
 
Machiavelli wrote the Prince, the Medici were poised to
 
continue a policy of conquest within Italy. Thus, the
 
problems in Italy emanated both from within and without, and
 
the first cause, the ambition of the new princes of Italy,
 
became the target of Machiavelli's satire, the object of his
 
contempt and loathing.
 
Machiavelli first satirizes the origin of the new
 
prince, one who rises from ^privatie individual.' Iri Chapter
 
Six; he refers to the man who becomes "prince from private
 
individual" for the first time, which "presupposes either
 
virtue or fortune," (Ch. 6, 22) but not legitimate authori
 
ty, as when it is conferred by a process of selection, or
 
inherited through the bloodline of the prince. In Chapter
 
Seven, he considers "those who become princes from private
 
individual solely by fortune... ." (Ch. 7, 25) Again, in
 
Chapter Eigiit, he states, "one becomes prince from private
 
individual" also by two modes other than "fortune or vir
 
tue," namely by "crime" or "with the support of fellow
 
citizens," (Ch. 8, 34) and, finally, in Chapter Nine, he
 
turns to the theme of private individual most closely relat
 
ed to the rise of the Medici in Florence, "when a private
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citizen becomes prince of his fatherland,"; in what he calls
 
a "civil principality." (Ch. 8, 38).
 
Thus, when Machiavelli speaks of a new prince, he is
 
referring to a particular model, a breed of man who, because
 
of personal ambition, is not content to live in equality
 
with his peers, under judicial and constitutional restraint.
 
Rather, he threatens the liberty, peace and security of all.
 
Nor could he have found a "fresher example" than Cesare
 
Borgia, (Ch. 7, 33) or the Medici, to whom he directed his
 
advice in the Prince. In developing his satire, however,
 
Machiavelli was faced with the dilemma of making such a
 
prince appear acceptable, even desirable and worthy of
 
imitation. By appealing to ancient examples no less incred
 
ible than Moses, Romulus, Theseus and Cyrus, he provides a
 
transition from the destruction of freedom, in Chapter Five,
 
to the source of that destruction, the modern princes,
 
exemplified in Chapter Seven onward, who, in the company of
 
the four virtuous exemplars, do not appear threatening as
 
private individuals newly rising. His standard, as always,
 
resides in the ancients, and from that standard one can
 
discern what is lacking in the contemporary models of
 
princely power and aspirations.
 
The example of Moses reflects the lack of virtue in the
 
modern princes of Italy and of the Church, as well, which
 
had descended into new depths of corruption with the advent
 
of Pope Alexander VI. In the Discourses, Machiavelli offers
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a perspective on Moses that goes to the heart of the matter,
 
with regard to the achievement of Moses that won his praise
 
and admiration, as a builder of a free city. "The virtue of
 
the builder is discernable in the fortune of what was built,
 
for the city is more or less remarkable according as he is
 
more or less virtuous who is responsible for the start.
 
This virtue shows itself in two ways: first in the choice
 
of site, and secondly in the drawing up of laws," (I. 1,
 
102) which, in the case of Moses/ were "based on a Covenant
 
relationship with God."^ Although Machiavelli advises the
 
new prince to imitate moses in Chapter Six, he recommended
 
that he destroy free cities in the previous chapter, to
 
preserve his state. A truly virtuous prince would not find
 
the destruction of a free city a desirable end, and if he
 
had the opportunity, he would turn his thoughts from tyranny
 
and found a city or state for the greater good. He would
 
build, rather than destroy.
 
In his first reference to Moses, Machiavelli writes,
 
"And although one should not reason about Moses, as he was a
 
mere executor of things ordered for him by God, nonetheless
 
he should be admired if only for that grace that made him
 
deserving of speaking with God." (Ch. 6, 22) The word
 
"mere" severely qualifies the achievement of Moses. The
 
exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt was an accomplishment of
 
the highest order, wrought with extreme hardship and danger.
 
And while Moses was deserving of admiration for his grace—
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and as a faithful servant of God--the word "only" excludes
 
the virtue of Moses as a courageous leader. In fact,
 
Machiavelli seems to reserve his highest praise for Moses'
 
faith rather than his achievements, a notion that is decid
 
edly out of place in a work that recommends the new prince
 
need only pretend to have faith.
 
Machiavelli then reverses himself, however, by exalting
 
Moses almost to the exclusion of God, with regard to oppor
 
tunity. In considering the "actions and orders" of Cyrus,
 
Romulus, and Theseus, Machiavelli remarks, "they will appear
 
no different from those of Moses, who had so great a teach
 
er... It was necessary then for Moses to find the people of
 
Israel in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so
 
that they would be disposed to follow him in order to get
 
out of their servitude... Such opportunities, therefore,
 
made these men successful, and their excellent virtue en
 
abled the opportunity to be recognized; hence their father
 
lands were ennobled by it and became very prosperous." (Ch.
 
6, 22-3) Moses did not return to Egypt of his own accord,
 
however. God told him to return. Moses did not recognize
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an opportunity; God created the opportunity for him, and he
 
reluctantly obeyed.
 
Thus, the points that Machiavelli makes regarding Moses
 
are thinly veiled efforts to disguise what he really intend
 
ed with his example. Unlike the tyrannical prince
 
Machiavelli advises in Chapter Five, who had of necessity to
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enslave the people to preserve his state, Moses led the
 
oppressed Hebrews to freedom. Moses was not a prince seek
 
ing his own principality, nor did he covet personal gain and
 
glory. "Moses was the vehicle and interpreter of [the]
 
Covenant stipulations, including the Ten Commandments," who
 
"exerted a lasting influence on... religious life [and]
 
moral concerns."^ Machiavelli's inclusion of Moses as an
 
exemplar in the Prince is absurd, particularly when consid
 
ered in the company of Cesare Borgia and the Medici, but as
 
a standard for comparison, Machiavelli could have chosen
 
none better, for not only did Moses lead the Hebrews to
 
freedom, but God chastised him for being too harsh on the
 
people.''
 
Perhaps Machiavelli was also prompted to include Moses
 
in his satire as a reminder of the occasion of Cesare
 
Borgia's appointment as "Captain General and gonfalonier of
 
the Church" for "the salvation of the people," in 1500.
 
Following a blessing from the pope, a "long list of great
 
biblical leaders in whose steps Cesare was about to follow"
 
was given. : Alexander credited Cesare with "not only nobili
 
ty but power and virtue."^ As statesman of Florence at that
 
time, Machiavelli might reasonably have been expected to be
 
informed of this event as it was an important one, investing
 
Cesare with the power and authority to pursue his ambitions
 
in the Romagna, which threatened Tuscany, as well.
 
Satirists also resort to myth, a source of giantism, to
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establish certain standards. Juvenal used anecdotes from
 
myth in his Satire.^ Myth provides examples of moral behav
 
ior which, handed down over centuries, often conflict with
 
contemporary moral values, particularly in a society that
 
has become corrupt.' In comparing the victim to mythologi
 
cal giants as Machiavelli does in Chapter Twenty-six, and
 
holding them up as models worthy of imitation in Chapter Six
 
(and who could hope to emulate the heroic actions of The
 
seus?), grand absurdities are created that make the victim
 
appear ridiculous.
 
Of Theseus, Machiavelli remarks that he "could not have
 
demonstrated his virtue if he had not found the Athenians
 
dispersed," but he does not explain the praiseworthy actions
 
of Theseus, or what he finds particularly praiseworthy,
 
which is more to the point. In fact, Theseus personifies
 
all of the attributes of good governance and virtue lacking
 
in the new prince:
 
That age produced a sort of men, in
 
force of hand, and swiftness of foot,
 
and strength of body, excelling the
 
ordinary rate and wholly incapable of
 
fatigue; making use, however, of these
 
gifts of nature to no good or profitable
 
purpose for mankind, but rejoicing and
 
priding themselves in insolence and
 
taking the benefit of their superior
 
strength in the exercise of inhumanity
 
and cruelty, and in seizing, forcing,
 
and committing all manner of outrages
 
upon everything that fell into their
 
hands; all respect for others, all jus
 
tice, they thought, all equity and hu
 
manity, though naturally lauded by the
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common people, either out of want of
 
courage to commit injuries or fear to
 
receive them, yet no way concerned those
 
who were strong enough to win for them
 
selves.®
 
Theseus, however, "set forward with a design to do
 
injury to nobody, but to repel and revenge himself on all
 
those that should offer any,"' so that in his actions, he
 
rose above the villains of his time, and achieved greatness.
 
He brought the dispersed people of Attica together as "one
 
people of one city" to promote the "common interest... He
 
then dissolved all the distinct statehouses, council halls,
 
and magisteries, and built one common state-house and coun
 
cil hall on the site of the present upper town, and gave the
 
name of Athens to the whole state." Most importantly,
 
however, and I would submit that Machiavelli included The
 
seus as an exemplar principally for this reason, "Then, as
 
he had promised, he laid down his regal power and proceeded
 
to order a commonwealth, entering upon this great work not
 
without the advice from the Gods."; Theseus "promised a
 
commonwealth without monarchy, a democracy, or people's
 
government, in which he should only be continued as their
 
commander in war and the protector of their laws, all things
 
else being equally distributed amOng them."^®
 
How much in common, then, does Theseus have with the
 
new prince, who would demand that all power and authority be
 
invested in himself? The comparison is stunning, and all
 
the more so as Machiavelli urges the new prince to imitate
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 the virtue of Theseus, whose actions contradict the advice
 
he actually gives throughout the Prince.
 
The example of Theseus giving up his power is reminis
 
cent of Machiavelli's Remodeling^^ in which he offered his
 
recommendations to the Medici for returning the government
 
of Florence to the people after the death of the Medici
 
elders. Pope Leo X and Cardinal Giulio,'^ yet securing their
 
power during their lifetime." In Mark Hulluing's summary of
 
the Remodeling, he writes, "Doomed to fight perpetually
 
against the natural order of things, a Medici prince can
 
only be a hated tyrant, subject to a ^thousand dangers' and
 
condemned to infamy; whereas ((an adaptation of Discourses
 
I. X, 10)), a Medicean ruler who reconstitutes Savonarola's
 
Great Council, giving everyone a stake in a republican
 
status quo, and then becomes in fact what the Medici have
 
traditionally claimed to be, merely the leading citizens of
 
a republican government, will enjoy the ^everlasting fame'
 
that has always been the reward of ^those men who have with
 
laws and with institutions remodeled republics and king
 
doms. Machiavelli's advice in the Remodeling was ignored
 
by the Medici. It seems clear, however, if one considers
 
the sentiments expressed by him in that work, that his
 
admiration for Theseus extended beyond his uniting of the
 
dispersed to the means by which he organized the government
 
of Athens, and his criticism of the Medici is implicit in
 
the example of that Greek hero.
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Unlike Moses, Theseus, and Cyrus, Romulus is not men
 
tioned in Chapter Twenty-six of the Prince. As the mythical
 
founder of Rome, Romulus should have been the most signifi
 
cant symbol of virtue in Machiavelli's final chapter, in
 
which he calls on the Italians to unite under the Medici and
 
expel the barbarians—but he is not mentioned there despite
 
Machiavelli's closing lines from Petrarch alluding to an
 
cient Italian virtue. (Ch. 26, 105)
 
The omission of Romulus from the last chapter is sig
 
nificant, suggesting that perhaps Machiavelli thought the
 
ancient virtue of Italians was, indeed, dead—or so dimin
 
ished as to warrant such a criticism. He also states in
 
Chapter Twenty-six, "And in Italy matter is not lacking for
 
introducing every form: here there is great virtue in the
 
limbs, if it were not lacking in the heads," in which con
 
text he finds Italians superior in "duels," but poor with
 
regard to "armies" and leadership; "Everything follows from
 
weakness in the head... ." (Ch. 25, 104) He goes on to
 
exalt the Medici as the long-awaited saviors of Italy, but
 
the point remains that he demonstrates no examples of Ital
 
ian virtue in the final chapter, omitting even Romulus, who
 
was certainly as important and virtuous an example (as
 
founder) in the minds of the Italians as a Greek hero or a
 
Persian warrior.
 
Further, Machiavelli writes, "It was fitting that
 
Romulus not be received in Alba, that he should have been
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exposed at birth, if he was to become king of Rome and
 
founder of that fatherland." (Ch. 6, 23) The issue of
 
Romulus' obscure "birth" is riot germane to the question of
 
opportunity, however, except with regard to his origins in
 
heroic myth. The birth of Moses was also obscure, found in
 
a floating basket in the riyer and raised as a prince in
 
Egypt by the Pharaoh's daughter. Cyrus was given to a
 
shepherd to raise because the king, Astyages, feared him; "a
 
Cyrus legend" evolved that "follows a pattern of folk be
 
liefs about the almost superhuman qualities of the founder
 
of a dynasty. Machiavelli, however, only makes an issue
 
of the birth of Romulus, the quintessential example of
 
Italian virtue. With the Medici in mind, perhaps he was
 
pointing a playful finger at the obscure births in the
 
Medici family, which qualified them (as it qualified
 
Romulus)—together with their opportunity touted so loudly
 
in Chapter Twenty-six—to perform the heroic salvation of
 
Italy he claimed to expect of them. One may recall that
 
Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was the illegitimate son of
 
Giuliano (brother of Lorenzo the Magnificent), whose legiti
 
macy was later arranged by Pope Leo." Further, there were
 
the two younger Medici bastards, "Ippolito, the son of
 
Giuliano [to whom the Prince was first dedicated], and
 
Allesandro, who was thought to be the cardinal's own child,
 
although at that time, he passed as the son of Lorenzo, Duke
 
of Urbino."^' If Machiavelli intended that a subtle compari­
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son be made between the illegitimate births in the Medici
 
family and the "literary pattern of heroic life" in which
 
"the hero often has a miraculous begetting and an obscure
 
birth, it only becomes clear when considered in conjunc
 
tion with Chapter Twenty-six in which the Medici are raised
 
so high, their mission is compared to that of Moses,
 
Theseus, and Cyrus—rendering epic stature to a family that
 
could hope to achieve little more than the "odor of it."
 
(Ch. 6, 22)
 
As for Cesare Borgia, his parentage is obscure as well.
 
Before he became Pope Alexander VI, Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia
 
took as his mistress Vannozza Cattanie, who gave birth to
 
Cesare in 1475. As she was married at the time, "the child
 
was thought to be legitimate, but Rodrigo Borgia lost no
 
time in acknowledging himself as the father."''
 
Machiavelli praises Romulus in the Discourses for
 
having made "many good laws quite compatible with freedom"
 
(I. 2, 110) and for his "intention" to "govern... for the
 
common good," and "not in his own interests." (I. 9, 131-2)
 
Machiavelli notes that he "instituted a senate with which he
 
consulted, and with whose views his decisions were in ac
 
cord." Further, Romulus only kept authority to "command the
 
army in time of war and the convoking of the senate." Thus,
 
the "original institutions" of Rome conformed more to "a
 
political and self-governing state than with absolutism or
 
tyranny." (I. 9, 133)
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Those qualities that Machiavelli,found admirable in
 
Moses, Theseus, and Romulus are blatantly deficient in
 
Cesare Borgia and the Medici. Any comparison would be
 
absurd, and yet we are invited to make that comparison when
 
he urges the new prince to imitate their excellent example.
 
The humor that he weaves through this chapter on virtue
 
reflects the wit and genius of Machiavelli, his literary
 
gifts and his passion to be heard united in perfect accord
 
which, as in all satire, "should, like a polished razor keen
 
wound with a touch that's scarcely felt or seen."^°
 
The inclusion of Cyrus among Machiavelli's virtuous
 
giants reflects his notion of those attributes a good prince
 
should have. Like the others, he was "stern, sagacious, and
 
incorruptible,"^^ and, as Machiavelli points out in the Dis
 
course, "Xenophon, for instance, is at considerable pains to
 
show what great honors, what great victories, and how much
 
good repute Cyrus gained by his humanity, and his affabili
 
ty, and how entirely free he was from pride, cruelty, licen
 
tiousness and other vices by which the lives of men are
 
marred." (III. 20, 462) Machiavelli also notes that Cyrus
 
"attained" greatness by means of fraud [rather] than force,
 
(II. 13, 310-11) which parallels the Medici mode for acqui
 
sition of power in Florence, but unlike the Medici, Cyrus
 
was a great warrior, capable of founding a great kingdom and
 
in his conduct worthy of Machiavelli's admiration. He was
 
held in "high esteem... not Only by his own people, the
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Persians, but by the Greeks and others... tolerant toward
 
the Babylonians and others [his conquests]... supporting
 
local customs... thus it was by diplomacy as well as force
 
of arms that he established the largest empire known until
 
his time... a great conqueror and administrator..; the
 
epitome of the great qualities expected of a ruler in antiq
 
uity, and he assumed heroic features as a conqueror who was
 
tolerant and magnanimous as well as brave and daring.
 
Cyrus freed the Jews held captive in Babylonia, allow
 
ing them to return to their homeland—and perhaps
 
Machiavelli chose Cyrus as an exemplar in part for that
 
reason, to suggest a comparison with a modern prince, the
 
Catholic King of Spain, Ferdinand. In Chapter Twenty-one of
 
the Prince, Machiavelli says of Ferdinand, "If you consider
 
his actions, you will find them all very great and some of
 
them extraordinary... in order to undertake greater enter
 
prises, always making use of religion, he turned to an act
 
pf pious cruelty, expelling the Marranos from his kingdom
 
and despoiling them; nor could there be an example more
 
wretched and rarer than this." (Ch. 21, 88) Thus, while
 
seeming to praise Ferdinand for his actions, offered as an
 
illustration of how "nothing makeis a prince so much esteemed
 
as to carry on great enterprises and to give rare examples
 
of himself," (Ch. 21, 87) Machiavelli includes, among
 
Ferdinand's other qualities, his "pious Cruelty" in expel
 
ling both the Jews and the Muslims which, if contrasted with
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the example of Cyrus, indicates the extent to which the
 
virtue of modern princes fails the test of antiquity.
 
In satire, subtle inferences help to clarify the intent
 
of the satirist, but the success of such subtlety relies on
 
alert readers to make important connections. That is, the
 
passage on Ferdinand and the Inquisition is remarkable not
 
only in the context of a chapter devoted to princely esteem,
 
but also in regard to cruelty, when it is understood against
 
the actions of Cyrus on behalf of the Jews in Babylonia, in
 
which esteem is demonstrated through right actions, his
 
"humanity," and the absence of vice. (III. 13, 310-11)
 
Machiavelli's understanding of virtue seems clear
 
enough from his examples in Chapter Six, if one examines the
 
lives of the individuals he portrays as most deserving of
 
imitation for their virtue and their practices. Certain
 
themes emerge. The importance of establishing good laws-­
not mentioned in the Prince because the new prince is, after
 
all, maintained by force rather than law—provided stability
 
and continuity to the cities and states begun by these great
 
builders and founders of antiquity. None of his exemplars
 
personified tyrannical practices, for above all, the notion
 
of public welfare is demonstrated in their actions, which is
 
one of the most important principles of governing put forth
 
by Machiavelli in his works, with the exception of the
 
Prince, in which the public interest is sacrificed entirely
 
to the arrogant and despotic rule of one individual. On
 
160
 
this point alone one could undertake a lengthy proof against
 
the validity and integrity of the Prince as an exposition of
 
Machiavelli's political beliefs.
 
As a device in satire, colossal models serve the pur
 
pose of "offering violent changes in perspective so that the
 
reader [intended victim] can see himself for what he really
 
is from strange new angles of vision... Rabelais with his
 
giants and their tremendous comical appetites, for example,
 
and Swift with his Brobdingnagians and their loathsome giant
 
rats and lice. Here again, however, Lucian in his True
 
History provided a model.^ Machiavelli's giants are enor
 
mous in stature, but each of them symbolized the actions and
 
qualities that he found praiseworthy in the dim past and
 
deficient or absent in the present, including Cyrus, who has
 
his place in the "minds of the Persian people similar to
 
that of Romulus and Remus in Rome, or Moses for the Israel
 
ites."^ Machiavelli's giants are meant to be compared with
 
the modern dwarfs who occupied center stage in Italy. The
 
quality that separated the ancients from the moderns was
 
virtue, formidable in Moses, Theseus, Romulus and Cyrus, and
 
notably absent in the Borgias, Petrucci, Medici and Sforzas.
 
The standard of virtue is an important element in
 
Machiavelli's satire—-the key to understanding his intent,
 
for in the remaining pages of the Prince (and in Chapters
 
Three and Five, as well), he undermines virtue in every
 
conceivable way. The ancient giants he presents, in Chapter
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six, suggest "high burlesque," which "compares by placing
 
our standard above the victim, thus making his shortcomings
 
stand out sharply."^® A comparison with the Medici (and
 
other modern princes) is meant to be inferred, as in his
 
remark, "a prudent man should always enter upon the paths
 
beaten by great mean, and imitate those who have been most
 
excellent. "and a new prince in a new principality "en
 
counters more or less difficulty in maintaining them accord
 
ing to whether the One who acquires them is more or less
 
virtuous." (Ch. 6, 22) In Chapter Twenty-six, Machiavelli
 
will make direct comparisons to the Medici specifically,
 
when he turns our attention once again to Moses, Theseus,
 
and Cyrus; "This is not very difficult if you summon up the
 
actions and lives of those named above. And although these
 
men are rare and marvelous, nonetheless they were men, and
 
each of them had less opportunity than the present; for
 
their undertaking was not more just than this one, nor
 
easier, nor was God more friendly to them than to you." (Ch.
 
26, 102-3) Setting aside for the moment the farcical ele
 
ments contained in his statement, it is clear that
 
Machiavelli intended a comparison between the circumstances
 
surrounding the ancient models with those pertaining to the
 
Medici in the present, in which virtue is required to over
 
come all obstacles. (Ch. 26, 105)
 
Throughout most of the Prince, however, particularly
 
between Chapters Six and twenty-six, Machiavelli conforms
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more to low burlesque, "the process of diminishing and
 
degrading the object... it creates a standard below its
 
victim and makes the reader measure him against that stan
 
dard... [it] compares its subject with what is base and
 
sordid... [and] treats an elevated subject in a trivial
 
manner."^ Thus, comic tension is created between what ought
 
to be, as offered by Machiavelli in the virtuous achieve
 
ments of his grandiose models in Chapter Six, and the re
 
ality—what is—that fills the pages of the Prince with its
 
captivating horrors. If, in our present age, scholars have
 
deigned to recognize the comic operative of the *is' and
 
^ought' in his satire, they nonetheless acknowledge the
 
shocking quality of the Prince, which suggests that
 
Machiavelli's precepts continue to be evaluated against a
 
higher moral standard of what political life ought to be.
 
As, Isaiah Berlin remarks, "What is there, then, about his
 
words, about his tone, which has caused such tremors among
 
his readers?,"^* a view expressed by Bertrand Russell, who
 
labeled the Prince "a handbook for gangsters," views- si;:;.. ':.d
 
by Leo Strauss and others as well.^'
 
While "satirists have always taken vice and corruption
 
as their targets, Machiavelli did that and much more; he
 
made vittue, traditionally the hanging judge of satire, his
 
special target,"^® first by establishing the traditional idea
 
of virtue as the standard, in Chapter Six, followed by a
 
slow descent throughout the Prince into its opposite, vice,
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which he skillfully transforms into a new concept of virtue.
 
There are no modern examples of virtue in Chapter Six.
 
Savonarola is cited, but for his failure rather than his
 
virtue. This omission, together with the fact that no
 
living person is mentioned at all, suggest that virtue is an
 
attribute beyond the reach of moderns grasping for power,
 
which Machiavelli comically refers to in his analogy of the
 
prudent archer:
 
For since men almost always walk on
 
paths beaten by others and proceed in
 
their actions by imitation, unable ei
 
ther to stay on the paths of others
 
altogether or to attain the virtue of
 
those whom you imitate, a prudent man
 
should always enter upon the paths beat
 
en by great men, and imitate those who
 
have been most excellent, so that if his
 
own virtue does not reach that far, it
 
is at least in the odor of it. He
 
should do as prudent archers do when the
 
place they plan to hit appears too dis
 
tant, and knowing how far the strength
 
of their bow carries, they set their aim
 
much higher than the place intended, not s
 
to reach such height with their arrow,
 
but to be able with the aid of so high
 
an aim to achieve their design. (Ch. 6,
 
22)
 
A literal translation of the word "strength" is "vir
 
tue," which better represents Machiavelli's meaning when he
 
states, "and knowing how far the [virtue] of their bow
 
carries,"^* far the arrow represents the intent of the
 
prince, and as he is not virtuous, he can hope for no more
 
than to be "in the odor of it." He can, nonetheless, imi
 
tate the "greatest examples" (offered by Machiavelli) by
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 pretending to be virtuous, and thus "achieve" his "design,"
 
in which case the "odor" is all that is required, for ap
 
pearances. The prince should take "great care," as he
 
advises in Chapter Eighteen, to "appear all mercy, all
 
faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion," but be
 
prepared, at the same time, not to "observe" them at will.
 
(Ch. 18, 70) Machiavelli thus ridicules the new prince, in
 
Chapter Six, by intimating that he does not measure up to
 
the high standards personified in his models, but he also
 
makes clear that such a prince can succeed in achieving his
 
aims through ignoble means. And by ridiculing him,
 
Machiavelli criticizes the new prince just as he criticized
 
Cosimo de' Medici who was always in the odor of virtue, as
 
such methods "bring men flying [like that arrow] to the
 
principate, and cause citizens to fear that "he would
 
become their prince, and destroy their liberty.
 
The intent of Machiavelli's new prince is to acquire a
 
principality for himself, a state in which "his citizens
 
always and in every quality of time, have need of the state
 
and of himself," (Ch. 9, 42) a tyrant who rules according to
 
his own interests, and what a prince "does in his own inter
 
ests usually harms the city and what is done in the inter
 
ests of the city harms him. Consequently, as soon as tyran
 
ny replaces self-government, the least of the evils which
 
this tyranny brings about are that it ceases to make prog
 
ress and to grow in power and wealth... and Should fate
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decree the rise of an efficient tyrant, so energetic and so
 
proficient in warfare that he enlarges his dominions, no
 
advantage will accrue to the commonwealth, but only to him
 
self... ," (II. 2, 276) for the glory of acquisition belongs
 
to him, and the "citizens would gain not subjects but fellow
 
slaves."^
 
As Allan Gilbert remarks in his introduction to
 
the Prince, "His figure dominates the little work," but,
 
ironically, he finds "the figure of the prince perfect in
 
goodness, in active energy, in prudence, ruling for the
 
common good of all the people of Italy" despite the fact
 
that Gilbert includes, in his appraisal of Italy's "sorrow,"
 
a "desire" to be "liberated" from the "native tyrant."^® Who
 
is Machiavelli's new prince if not a "native tyrant?" Nor
 
should we be fooled by his assignation of the innocuous term
 
new prince to such a man. The same device of diminution was
 
utilized by Swift in A Modest Proposal, "the substitution of
 
the lesser word, and the imputation of lesser motive," which
 
creates an "illusion,"^® one that is quite convincing if we
 
accept Machiavelli's arguments for absolute power in the
 
interest of liberating Italy, manifest in the ^new prince.'
 
In truth, however, the 'new prince' is a tyrant—seeking his
 
own advantage. Italy will not be liberated, but enslaved.
 
The art of satire is not to state your objective directly,
 
however. "The true satirist, no matter how violent his
 
feelings, usually tries to get at his target indirectly.
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otherwise, we have only diatribe.
 
The great irony of the Prince, as previously stated, is
 
that Machiavelli turned to his oppressors for salvation from
 
oppression, and the more entrenched the Medici became in
 
their personal power and influence, the less likelihood
 
there was that the republic would be revived. The Discours
 
es affirm that Machiavelli never lost sight of the value of
 
democratic principles for the common benefit, in a republic
 
devoted to liberty and justice, and his models of virtue
 
reflect, in various ways, his preoccupation with governments
 
founded on principles conducive to the evolution of freedom.
 
The Prince contradicts those principles in every aspect, but
 
most especially with regard to common interest; the new
 
prince, unrestrained by laws, does what he likes, and "a
 
prince who does what he likes is a lunatic." (I. 58, 256)
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Chapter IX. Fortune and the Arms of Others: Cesare Borgia
 
In Chapters Seven through Nine, Machiavelli discourses
 
on those principalities acquired by means other than virtue,
 
by fortune and the arms of others, by crimes, or with the
 
support of fellow citizens. These chapters reflect the
 
means by which the modern princes acquired their positions
 
o^ power, and are meant to be understood as inferior to the
 
standard of virtue presented in Chapter Six—manifestlyi
 
absent in the modern examples.
 
In Chapter Seven, Machiavelli gives his example of a
 
modern prince "with a great virtue of his own," Francesco
 
Sforza, who "acquired with a thousand pains," but "main
 
tained with little trouble," whom he contrasts with Cesare
 
Borgia, who "acquired his state through the fortune of his
 
father and lost it through the same... ." (Ch. 7, 25-6)
 
Sforza, it would seem, should have been included in Chapter
 
Six, but he was omitted because his example does not reflect
 
the virtue of antiquity. Rather, he personifies the virtue
 
of a modern prince. That is, virtue re-defined by
 
Machiavelli, to suit the present era.
 
Francesco Sforza was a condotterie, "hired to protect"
 
the Ambrosian Republic of Milan, in 1447. He betrayed the
 
republic and "made himself Duke of Milan" in 1450, ruling as
 
a despot.^ In a set speech from the History,^ Machiavelli
 
gives his assessment of Sforza's attributes in the words of
 
a Milanese ambassador, who accuses Sforza of "treachery,"
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"wickedness," "cruelty, ambition, and arrogance," stating
 
further, "O unhappy those cities forced to defend their
 
liberty against the ambition of him who wishes to oppress
 
them!"^ Unlike Moses, then, who led the enslaved to free
 
dom, Sforza led the people into servitude, through the
 
ignoble means of betrayal and deceit. In his desire to
 
"[carve] out a principality for himself in Italy's north and
 
center, he exhibited the greed and ambition common to the
 
new princes of Italy. Theseus gave the authority to govern
 
to the people; Sforza took authority unto himself, ruling as
 
a tyrant. Further, the good princely qualities exhibited by
 
Cyrus are not evident in Sforza, who was corrupt, vile, and
 
treacherous. Nor did Sforza lay proper foundations, as did
 
Cyrus and Romulus. In the discourses, Machiavelli blames
 
Sforza for building a fortress (castle) in Milan;
 
And if Count Francesco Sforza, having
 
become Duke of Milan, was reputed a wise
 
man, and yet built a fortress in Milan,
 
I maintain that in this he was not wise,
 
and the result has proved that this
 
fortress did harm to his heirs instead
 
of affording them security. For with a
 
fortress they thought they were safe and
 
could oppress their citizens and sub
 
jects, so lost no opportunity of doing
 
them violence; with the result that they
 
came to be detested beyond all measure,
 
and lost their state to the first enemy
 
who attacked them."
 
Thus, Francesco Sforza was not virtuous or wise when
 
compared to the examples of antiquity. When compared ^ to
 
Cesare Borgia, however, he appears virtuous indeed, for he
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acquired a state to pass down to his heirs (facilitated by
 
his marriage to Bianca Maria, daughter of Filippo Maria
 
Visconti, former Duke of Milan), and he prevailed in over
 
coming obstacles to his personal ambition largely by his own
 
devices, from private individual, without the wealth of the
 
Church at his disposal—truly a great modern exemplar. Both
 
Borgia and Sforza threatened Tuscany, and neither succeeded,
 
but if one were to assess who was the greater villain,
 
Sforza must be considered superior for having succeeded,
 
while in all important respects, Cesare Borgia was "a noto
 
rious, spectacular failure."^
 
Machiavelli praises Cesare lavishly in Chapter Seven,
 
however, in a provocative discourse on a man most of
 
Machiavelli's contemporaries "hated, feared, and despised."®
 
The Florentines nurtured "a long standing hatred" of him,'
 
including the aristocrats who "shared the people's revul
 
sion,"* which, as Garrett Mattingly observes of their num
 
ber, "Giuliano de' Medici" would have been the "last man to
 
be attracted by the notion of imitating the Borgia,"' for
 
reasons of ambition and ability. Precisely because Borgia
 
was "universally despised,"^" "universally feared,"" and a
 
dismal failure, Machiavelli could not have chosen a better
 
representative of his type to satirize the new prince, in a
 
supreme mockery of all he stood for.
 
Machiavelli mentions Cesare Borgia's "high intention"
 
(Ch. 7, 32) which should be understood in the context of
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Machiavelli's analogy of the prudent archer, in Chapter Six.
 
Machiavelli also uses the word "empire" in reference to
 
Cesare; "to acquire so much empire before the pope died that
 
he could resist a first attack on his own," and that he
 
should be "imitated by all those who have risen to empire
 
through fortune and the arms of others." (Ch. 7, 31-2)
 
Empire is a comical reference to his actual achievement.
 
Machiavelli states that he "planned to become lord over
 
Tuscany," and "he would have jumped on Pisa" had he not had
 
to "pay regard to France (which he did not have to do any
 
longer, since the French had already been stripped of the
 
kingdom by the Spanish, so that each of them was forced of
 
necessity to buy his friendship)," and, further, "Lucca and
 
Siena would have quickly yielded." (Ch. 7, 31) In reality,
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Cesare had only succeeded in acquiring the "cities of Ro­
magna and the Marches,"'^ an accomplishment rendered even
 
more insignificant by Machiavelli's understatement, "he
 
already possessed Perugia and Piombino." (Ch. 7, 31) And
 
had Cesare acquired all that Machiavelli says he intended to
 
acquire, one would not dignify it as empire but as a state.
 
The word empire relates, again, to Julius Caesar-

Machiavelli's way of ridiculing the pretentious arrogance of
 
the other, lesser Cesare. Just as he did in Mandragola,
 
Machiavelli "exaggerated for comic effect."^'
 
Borgia's banner prophesying "all or nothing" fluttered
 
majestically over a principality founded on the capricious
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whims of fortune, and his "failure to achieve his ambition
 
to seize total power reflected badly on the efficacy of his
 
underhanded methods."^'' Indeed, his foundations were exceed
 
ingly poor. In the opinion of Renzo Sereno, "Niccolo's
 
judgment of Caesar is so grossly flattering as to be nonsen
 
sical... Caesar's attempts at kingdom-building in Romagna
 
fell very short of the most pessimistic expectations. His
 
realm collapsed almost at once with the death of Alexander
 
VI. As soon as the Spaniards were ousted from the Court of
 
Rome, Caesar's political power vanished. Garrett
 
Mattingly makes the point that, "without papal support his
 
principate was built on quicksand," and when he "slinked"
 
out of Italy, utterly defeated, he was "followed by the
 
scornful laughter of Italy. For nothing is more absurd than
 
the great straw-stuffed giants of carnival, and when such a
 
giant has for a season frightened all Italy, the laughter is
 
that much the louder."^®
 
Cesare failed because he was dependent on the fortune
 
and aid of his father, who provided him with the means to
 
acquire. To finance his "government and his wars,"
 
Alexander "sold offices, took over the estates of dead
 
cardinals, and exploited the jubilee of 1500 to the full.
 
Dispensations and divorces were given as profitable parts of
 
political bargains... Cesare Borgia used jubilee funds to
 
finance his campaigns for recovery of the Papal States. To
 
further celebrate the jubilee, Alexander... created twelve
 
172
 
new cardinals, who paid a total of 120,000 ducats for their
 
appointment... he named nine additional cardinals at a
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commensurate price... he created ex nihilo eighty hew offic
 
es in the Curia, and these places... were sold at 760 ducats
 
each."' Satirists and pamphleteers took notice. A "sting
 
ing pasquenade" was "attached to the statue of Pasquino
 
(1503)," critical of Alexander; "The keys, the alters,
 
Alexander sells, and Christ; with right, since he has paid
 
for them."'®
 
With "the abominable Borgia, Alexander VI, the Church
 
had grown so profoundly corrupt that it was threatened with
 
estrangement from its mission."'' The infamous Alexander,
 
"addicted to all lusts of the flesh," could be said, "like
 
many other men of the culminating Renaissance, [to have]
 
lost both his religion and his morals by his' too exclusive
 
pursuit of purely selfish advantage,"'® including "the ag­
grandizement of his children."" He "plotted" to "elevate
 
his son [Juan] to the throne of Naples,"" but Juan was mur
 
dered. Alexander "became almost certain that his son Cesare
 
was his brother's murderer,"" although his guilt was never
 
proven. Juan's death, however, was distinctly advantageous
 
to Cesare, for it "would force the pope to make Cesare a
 
layman once again. He could then obtain a princely posi
 
tion... [his] destiny decreed that he should physically
 
eliminate the Duke of Gandia [Juan]: no one had more inter
 
est in this elimination than he.""
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Cesare was made gonfalonier of the Church and captain
 
general, to recapture the papal lands of Romagna for the
 
Church but, in reality, Alexander's ambition was to carve
 
out a principality for Cesare in central Italy. To this
 
end, the Borgia used religion to achieve their design.
 
Under the power of papal authority, Cesare seized one city
 
after another with "bulls excommunicating rebellious sub
 
jects and interdicting their cities."^ Machiavelli intro
 
duced the notion of using religion with regard to King
 
Ferdinand who despoiled his subjects on the grounds of
 
suspected heresy, (Ch. 21, 88) which increased his wealth,
 
and helped provide for his eventual supremacy in Italy, by
 
defeating the French. Pope Alexander used religion in
 
striking his bargain with King Louis XIII, dissolving his
 
marriage in exchange for military aid. Machiavelli makes a
 
point of this indirectly in Chapter Seven when he states
 
that the pope did "not oppose" the Venetian efforts to bring
 
the French into Italy. Rather, he facilitated it "by the
 
dissolution of the former marriage of King Louis. So the
 
king came into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the
 
consent of Alexander, and he was no sooner in Milan than the
 
pope got men from him for a campaign in Romagna, which was
 
granted to him because of the reputation of the king." (Ch.
 
7, 27-8) Just as he did in Chapter Three, (Ch. 3, 15)
 
Machiavelli diminished the importance of the agreement
 
between Louis XII and Alexander, granting only "consent" by
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Alexander, and attributing the aid of French forces to the
 
"reputation of the king" rather than acknowledging the quid
 
pro quo arrangement for what it was, made long in advance,
 
reflecting the corrupt abuse of papal authority exhibited by
 
Alexander.
 
Alexander thus used religion in a variety of ways to
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promote secular advantage for himself and his family. He
 
was perhaps the most corrupt pope in the history of the
 
Church, and he, together with his son, Cesare, are deserving
 
of the satirical scorn Machiavelli heaps upon them in the
 
Prince as models extraordinaire of corruption. Nor does
 
Machiavelli reserve his contempt solely for explication in
 
the,Prince. He refers to Cesare's demise as "deserved by
 
rebels against Christ" in the First Decennale,'^ a remark
 
that appropriately charges him with those abuses against God
 
and man for which he later praises him in the Prince.
 
Machiavelli also displays his contempt for Alexander in the
 
Decennale; ?'the soul of splendid Alexander, that it might
 
have rest, departed to the blessed spirits; his sacred
 
footsteps were followed by his three dear and intimate
 
handmaids; Luxury, Simony, Cruelty."^' There was "incredible
 
rejoicing," writes Francesco Giucciardini in his History of
 
Italy, vjhen the "Romans viewed Alexander's body in St.
 
Peters... the dead serpent who, with his immoderate ambi
 
tion, his cruelty and avarice, had infected the whole
 
world.
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 Machiavelli's satire is evident, then, in his praise of
 
Cesare, a new prince who was dependent on the fortune of
 
another (particularly that of a vile and corrupt pope who
 
symbolized ecclesiastical rule), and one who lacked the
 
requisite virtue to overcome the demise of his benefactor,
 
even to the extent that Machiavelli excuses Cesare for his
 
lack of virtue; "And if his orders did not bring profit to
 
him, it was not his fault, because this arose from an ex
 
traordinary and extreme malignity of fortune," (Ch. 7, 27)
 
the death of his father and his own illness. But there was
 
nothing extraordinary or extreme about the death of the
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pope, "who died at the age of seventy-two after a papacy of
 
eleven years (not such a short life and not such a short
 
reign). In the History, Machiavelli cites the "short"
 
life of popes generally as one reason "why a secular prince
 
cannot wholly rely one a pontiff and cannot securely share
 
his fortunes with him. In reference to Pope Nicholas III
 
(1277-1280), Machiavelli remarks:
 
he was the first of the popes who openly
 
revealed his personal ambition... as
 
before this time no mention had ever
 
been made of any pontiff's nephews or
 
relatives, so in the future they will
 
fill history and at last we shall come
 
to the sons; and there is nothing left
 
for the pontiff's to try except that, as
 
up to our times they have planned to
 
leave their sons as princes, in the
 
future they may Strive to leave them the
 
popedom as hereditary. It is indeed
 
true that up to now the princedoms they
 
have established have had short lives.
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because most of the time, the pontiffs,
 
since they lived but a short while,
 
either did not finish setting our the
 
plants, or if they did set them out,
 
left them with so few and so weak roots
 
that, since the strength sustaining them
 
was gone, at the first wind they with
 
ered away.
 
Thus, Machiavelli could not have considered the death
 
of Pope Alexander an extraordinary event in terms of expec
 
tations. In the Prince, he describes a state similar to
 
that begun by the Borgia with similar language, but also
 
suggests how it might be preserved; "states that come to be
 
suddenly, like all other things in nature that are born and
 
grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches, so that the
 
first adverse weather destroys them—unless, indeed, as was
 
said, those who have suddenly become princes have so much
 
virtue that they know immediately how to prepare to keep
 
what fortune has placed in their laps," (Ch. 7, 26) virtue
 
that Machiavelli could not possibly attribute to Cesare, who
 
failed to make such preparations.
 
Nor should Cesare's illness be considered an "extreme
 
malignity of fortune," for he was not too ill to give orders
 
to "the faithful Michelotto" to seize "200,000 ducats worth
 
of silver and jewels and two chests containing 100,000 gold
 
coins" from the papal coffers, when he received "news of his
 
father's death. And although he suffered a "bout with
 
malaria," he was "not too ill to stall the election and then
 
maneuver the choice of the old and ailing Pius III, thus
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delaying an unavoidable doom."^^ Machiavelli's many refer
 
ences to Cesare's illness are tantamount to overstatement,
 
which suggests the real significance he attaches to it:
 
Alexander "left the duke with only the state of Romagna
 
consolidated... and sick to death;" (Ch. 7, 31) "so sound
 
were the foundations that he had laid in so little time,
 
that if he had not had these armies on his back or if he had
 
been healthy, he would have been equal to every difficulty;"
 
(Ch. 7, 32) "But if at the death of Alexander the duke had
 
been healthy, everything would have been easy for him. And
 
he told me, on the day that Julius II was created, that he
 
had thought about what might happen when his father was
 
dying, and he had found a remedy for everything, except that
 
he never thought that at his death he himself would also be
 
on the point of dying." (Ch. 7, 32) As Garrett Mattingly
 
explains, however, "he did not even record then that Cesare
 
ever said anything of the sort; and though it would not be
 
unlike some of the duke's whimperings, he could not have
 
said it on the day of Julius II's election, when he was
 
boasting to everyone that the new pope would obey him.
 
Cesare's illness was but a feeble excuse, exaggerated
 
by Machiavelli to ridicule Cesare's ineptness. Machiavelli
 
could hardly have admired a prince who, although ill, was
 
well enough to raid the wealth of the Church and influence
 
the papal election, but whose foundations were so poor, he
 
could not arrange to defend and maintain his acquisitions in
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adversity.
 
And perhaps Machiavelli had something else in mind as
 
well, when he referred to Alexander's death and Cesare's
 
illness as "an extraordinary and extreme malignity of for
 
tune," the suggestion of a rumor that they were poisoned at
 
a banquet together with other guests, a "legend" related by
 
Giucciardini and most later historians. How ironic and
 
appropriate to his satire, if Machiavelli attributed
 
Cesare's failure to an illness that was, in fact, the result
 
of foul play, particularly since poisoning was a method of
 
extermination so favored by their own family that Ivan
 
Cloulas mentions the "notorious potion of the Borgias" when
 
discussing this event. Even more interesting, the "legend"
 
asserts that "in agreement with the pope, Cesare had sent
 
Cardinal da Cornetto some poisoned wine that was to be
 
served only to the host but which, through carelessness, was
 
poured out to everyone present," including the Borgia—^
 
extremely bad fortune indeed. "According to another ver
 
sion, Adriano da Cornetto himself poisoned the pope."
 
Although "the different phases of Alexander's illness and
 
the hideous appearance of his corpse pointed to poisoning,"
 
their deaths are generally attributed to malaria.^®
 
In his praise of Cesare, Machiavelli lauds his actions
 
in eliminating the Colonna and Orsini, great noble families
 
of Rome, as grounds for having laid "very good foundations
 
for his power," (Ch. 7, 29) and following the death of
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Alexander, "although the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came
 
to Rome, none followed them against him." (Ch. 7, 32) In
 
truth, the Colonna and Orsini who survived rallied forces
 
against him almost immediately; "the news of Alexander's
 
death [spread] havoc among the Roman populace... but it was
 
mainly in the Romagna that violent opposition arose, incited
 
by the Orsinis and the Colonnas. From all sides, the Orsini
 
were rushing back to reoccupy their lands. Salvio Savelli
 
retook his Roman palace, opened up the jails, and released
 
the Borgia prisoners. Prospero Colonna meanwhile was making
 
a forced march north from Naples," and when he arrived in
 
Rome, "he took possession of the palace from which he had so
 
long been banished. That night the Capitol was lit up by
 
Colonna supporters while pro-Colonna areas of the city
 
resounded with exuberant shouts. Meanwhile, the Orsini's
 
were zeroing in on the pro-Orsini quarter... from there they
 
roughed up Borgia supporters and set fire to 100 Spaniards'
 
homes. Thus, when Machiavelli writes of Cesare, "and the
 
first thing he did was to weaken the Orsini and Colonna
 
parties in Rome. For he gained to himself all their adher
 
ents, who were gentlemen, by making them his gentlemen, and
 
by giving them large allowances; and he honored them, ac
 
cording to their merits, with commands and with government
 
posts, so that in a few months the partisans' affections in
 
their minds were eliminated, and all affection turned toward
 
the dvike," (Ch. 7, 28) he falsely attributes good founda­
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 tions to Cesare that did not, in fact, exist. So adamant
 
were the Orsini in their hatred of the venal Cesare, they
 
resolved "to capture the duke in person or pursue him ^to
 
the death,'" as participants in a "secret" pact with Spain.
 
Machiavelli makes the point that Cesare "thought espe
 
cially that he had acquired the friendship of Romagna, and
 
that he had gained all those peoples to himself since they
 
had begun to taste well-being," (Ch. 7, 29) and notes that ,
 
although Cesare was "half-alive," yet "Romagna waited for
 
him for more than a month." (Ch. 7, 32) But not all of
 
Romagna waited. There and elsewhere, the petty tyrants
 
ousted by the Borgia rushed into the vacuum to reclaim their,
 
lands, together with others well loved by the people (such
 
as Guidobaldo da Montefeltro), as well as the Venetians
 
pressed for territory as well. During the conclave that i
 
elected the new pope, Pius III (whose reign only lasted
 
twenty-two days), the Venetians had: already come to,the aid
 
iOf "Guidobaldo of Urbino with troops, and allowed him to
 
take over the fortress of San Leo... the next move was to
 
i '
 
oust Pedro Ramirez from Urbino. The Florentines... helped
 
GiampaolO Baglioni clear Cesare's partisans out of Magione
 
and Giacomo Appiano to return to his fief of Piombino.
 
Baglioni was advancing on Caimerino, accompanied by the last
 
surviving member of the Varano family. The Vitellis, now
 
once more ensconced in Citta di Castello, were celebrating
 
their homecoming by triumphantly carrying a golden calf
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through the streets to erase the memory of the red Borgia
 
bull. On the Adriatic coast, Bartolomeo Alviano had set
 
Pandolfo Malatesta up once again in Rimini, and Giovanni
 
Sforza in Pesaro. Luckily for Cesare, his capital of
 
Cesena, with its solid fortifications, could hold fast,
 
protected by Dionigi di Naldo's tough force of 1,000 veter
 
ans."^® It was in Cesena that Pedro Ramirez hanged Pedro de
 
Oviedo as a traitor, which ultimately led to Cesare's ar
 
rest. Oviedo had accompanied a representative of Julius II,
 
to "take possession of the fortresses." The murder so
 
enraged Julius that he imprisoned Cesare in Rome, and "[con
 
fiscated] all the duke's possessions, proclaiming that he
 
was going to use them to compensate those people who had a
 
grievance against him... this spelled Cesare's financial
 
ruin."'^"
 
One of those compensated was Guidobaldo da Montefeltro,
 
Duke of Urbino, dispossessed by the Borgia in 1502. His
 
court inspired "the setting for Castiglione's The Court
 
ier,"'*^ and during the reigns of Guidobaldo and his father,
 
Federico, Urbino "was admired throughout Italy for its
 
humanist learning and cultivated ways. Guidobaldo was not
 
a tyrant but loved by his subjects. Betrayed by Cesare, he
 
was forced to flee from Urbino leaving behind his works of
 
art and his extensive library, which Cesare confiscated for
 
his personal use.''' Shortly before his imprisonment, Cesare
 
visited Guidabaldo in his Vatican chamber, "who had been
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 newly restored to his former estates by the loyalty of his
 
subjects, and to his former rank of gonfaloniere of the
 
church by the new pope [a position previously held by Cesare
 
under Pope Alexander]. There, Cesare kneels on the floor,
 
sobbing in pure terror, begging the old friend whom he had
 
betrayed and robbed, with incredible meanness, not just of
 
his duchy, but of his books and his antique medals, not to
 
kill him, please not to kill him, to leave him at least his
 
life, until Guidobaldo, beyond any feeling about this curi
 
ous monster, says he does not wish to kill him; he only
 
wishes him to go away
 
This pitiful portrayal of Cesare Borgia leaves little
 
to be admired by Machiavelli. Above all, Machiavelli would
 
likely have found Cesare culpable for never managing to
 
forge together his own conquering army. Even in his desper­
/ . ■ ■ 
ation at the end, having had five years to acquire his own
 
arms, Cesare struggled to "raise soldiers" for his return to
 
the Romagna, according to Machiavelli's own official reports
 
contained in the Legations*^. As Machiavelli explains in
 
Chapter Seven, Cesare "armed to suit himself," (Ch. 7, 20)
 
an uncomplimentary statement, and he "depended on the for
 
tune and force of someone else." (Ch. 7, 31) Garrett
 
Mattingly notes that while Machiavelli praises Cesare's arms
 
in Chapter Thirteen of the Prince, in the Legations, he
 
"never once refers to the military capacity of the Duke or
 
praises the courage or discipline of his army,""*® nor does he
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praise him for exceptional arms in the Discourses or in The
 
Art of War.^'' And although Machiavelli states that Cesare
 
"was never so much esteemed as when everyone saw that he was
 
the total owner of his arms" in Chapter Thirteen, (Ch. 13,
 
55) he was never the "total owner," and those he assembled
 
from his own territory constituted but a small part of his
 
army, nor was he ever financially able to support any of his
 
forces without continual support from the Church.'** In Octo
 
ber, 1502, just ten months before the death of Alexander, by
 
Machiavelli's own estimates, Cesare's arms consisted of
 
"2,500 footsolders, plus 800 men enlisted in the Val da
 
Lamona and 1,000 mercenaries that Michelotto was to recruit­
-in all, 4,300 infantry. He had 1,000 mercenaries raised,
 
Gascons in Lombardy as well as Swiss. Supporting these
 
offensive forces would be a reserve army of 5,000 Romagnols.
 
As for the cavalry, it was based on Cesare's company of 100
 
lances and three 50-lance companies under the command of
 
three Spanish captains... By the end of the month, Cesare's
 
army totaled 5,350 footsolders, including 600 Gascons and
 
Germans. It would later gain 3,000 Swiss. The men-at-arms
 
numbered 340... With the addition of the five French comp
 
anies—some 2,000 men in all—promised by Louis... that made
 
840 units of heavy cavalry (3,300 men) already raised,"'*'
 
which demonstrates the vast array of mercenary, auxiliary,
 
and Romagnal arms assembled by Cesare. He was aided by
 
Swiss mercenaries^® when he eliminated the Orsini and Vitelli
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in Sinigaglia, in December, 1502. Thus, when Machiavelli
 
states, in Chapter Thirteen, that he "eliminated" the merce
 
nary arms of "Orsini and Vitelli," and "turned to his own
 
arms," (Ch. 13, 55) the context of "own arms" always includ
 
ed mercenaries. Only the Romagnal forces could be said to
 
constitute Cesare's own arms, if he hoped to defeat the
 
forces that would collaborate against him following the
 
death of the pope, including the Church and the foreign
 
invaders, France and Spain. Cesare never gathered suffi
 
cient forces to prepare for that eventuality. Far from it.
 
And even to support his own troops, which he never "owned"
 
because of it, he was dependent on the Church.
 
Cesare Borgia was so wretched an example, predictably
 
doomed to failure by Machiavelli's own estimation of like
 
circumstances, (Ch. 7, 26) that he could never have sincere
 
ly intended that Cesare's example be imitated. Combined
 
with Cesare's failure to provide sufficient arms of his own
 
and his financial dependence on the Church (from revenues
 
furnished by simony and other ignoble means), one must,also
 
consider the treachery of the pope and his son, to fully
 
comprehend the impact they had on the Italy of Machiavelli's
 
time, both terrifying and repugnant to those in their wake:
 
The pope was playing his role to perfec
 
tion. He invited Cardinal Orsini to the
 
New Year's celebrations [1503]~lavish
 
banquets in the company of beautiful
 
women and fancy dress parades, at one of
 
which a row of thirty transvestites
 
sauntered past wearing false noses *in
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the shape of a priapus,' that is, male
 
genitals. Thus entertained,
 
Giambattista [Orsini cardinal] felt
 
reassured about his fate and thought it
 
would be a good move to congratulate the
 
pope on the capture of Sinigaglia. As
 
he was on his way to the Vatican to wait
 
for Alexander... he was promptly arrest
 
ed and taken prisoner to the Castle
 
Sant' Angelo. Incarcerated with him
 
were Rinoldo Orsini, the archbishop of
 
Florence, Bernardino Alviano... and
 
Giacomo Santa Croce, a friend of the
 
Orsinis, who was soon let out on bail.
 
The cardinals' estates were seized and
 
his eighty-year-old mother hounded out
 
of her house and thrown into th^
 
street... no one would risk taking her
 
^ 	in... all these moves threw Rome into a
 
panic; the bishop of Chiusi actually
 
died of fright.
 
On hearing of the cardinals' arrest,
 
Cesare had his relatives, Paolo Orsini
 
and the duke of Gravina, strangled on
 
the spot... That done, Cesare pushed
 
deep into Sienese territory, laying
 
waste the little towns of Pienza, Chiu
 
si, and San Quirico... [he] then set
 
down the long road to Rome, passing
 
Acquapendente, Montefiascone, and Viter­
bo, which he pillaged. He had no re-'
 
spect for Church property and preferred
 
to give his old troopers pleasure rather
 
than provoke mutiny in their ranks.
 
After the death of Alexander, Cesare laid part of the
 
blame for his actions on the "perverted character" of his
 
father, so perverted was he, himSelf,: in estimating his own
 
responsibility for events. As Machiavelli writes in his
 
dispatch of November 20, 1503, "All the favors that the Pope
 
[Julius], Rouen, and those here have done Valentino have
 
been in order that he may go away, the sooner the better...
 
everybody here laughs about his affair?... We shall see
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where the wind will carry him... . Machiavelli could not
 
have imagined that his own satire would, ironically, carry
 
Cesare Borgia to heights undreamed of at the moment he wrote
 
these critical and disparaging words of contempt.
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Chapter X. Acquiring through Crimes: Ancient and Modern
 
Of those who follow a "criminal and nefarious path,"
 
(Ch.. 8, 34) in their assent to principality, the subject of
 
Chapter Eight, no example would have been more appropriate
 
than Cesare Borgia, but he is never blamed for his crimes,
 
as Machiavelli blames Agathocles and Liverotto da Fermo. In
 
Chapter Seven, he treated Cesare's actions as praiseworthy,
 
but before the ink was dry, he reiterated his crimes in the
 
name of others, in the following chapter. The extent to
 
which he actually blames Cesare thus becomes clear. As Leo
 
Strauss observes, "Machiavelli does not even suggest that
 
Cesare Borgia, the model, was animated by patriotism or
 
concerned with the common good. It is true that he con
 
trasts Cesare with the criminal Agathocles by not calling
 
Cesare a criminal. But if one looks at the actions of the
 
two men, the contrast vanishes: in describing Agathocles as
 
a criminal, he provisionally adopts the traditional judgment
 
on that man, whereas there does not yet exist a traditional
 
judgment on Cesare,"^ thus permitting Machiavelli his decep
 
tion.
 
Machiavelli begins Chapter Eight by making the point
 
that there is no distinction between ancient and modern
 
examples with regard to criminal paths, thereby leaving
 
aside his usual preference for the practices of antiquity;
 
"And to speak of the first mode [not altogether fortune or
 
virtue, but crimes], it will be demonstrated with two exam­
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pies, one ancient, the other modern, without entering other
 
wise into the merits of this issue, because I judge it
 
sufficient, for whoever would find it necessary, to imitate
 
them." (Ch. 8, 34) He does, however, devote this chapter to
 
the merits of this issue, and is by no means value neutral
 
in his conclusions.
 
One of the devices employed by Machiavelli that invites
 
closer scrutiny of his remarks concerning Agathocles and
 
also of Cesare is the fact that in both cases, Machiavelli
 
attributes virtue to their actions, but then subtracts it in
 
his final assessment of the modes by which they succeeded in
 
acquiring power. Of Cesare's virtue, he states that, "he
 
made use of every deed and did all those things that should
 
be done by a prudent and virtuous man to put his roots in
 
the states that the arms and fortune of others had given
 
him," (Ch. 7, 27) and "there was such ferocity and such
 
virtue in the duke, "that he would have been "equal to every
 
difficulty had he not been threatened by foreign armies," or
 
"if he had been healthy." (Ch. 7, 31-2) "Nevertheless,"
 
Cesare "acquired his state through the fortune of his father
 
and lost it through the same," (Ch. 7, 26-7) because he
 
lacked the virtue to keep, in adversity, what fortune had
 
given to him.
 
And of Agathocles, Machiavelli notes that his "crimes
 
were accompanied with such virtue of spirit and body that
 
when he turned to the military, he rose through its ranks to
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become praetor of Syracuse," (Ch. 8, 34) and "whoever might
 
consider the actions and virtue of this man will see nothing
 
or little that can be attributed to fortune," (Ch. 8, 35)
 
which implies (since this chapter follows the chapter on
 
Cesare, fortune, and the arms of others) that Cesare is
 
inferior to Agathocles. At least of Agathocles, Machiavelli
 
is willing to grant ability. Because of his crimes, howev
 
er, Agathocles is robbed of his virtue, but in listing his
 
crimes, Machiavelli directs our attention back to Cesare,
 
whose crimes are similar to those of Agathocles, as well as
 
those of Liverotto da Fermo. |
 
Machiavelli notes, for example, that "one cannot call
 
it virtue" to "kill one's citizens," (Ch. 8, 35) "citizens"
 
being those one kills in order to seize absolute authority.
 
Agathocles killed thousands, including the senate and those
 
of the ruling party, the "richest of the people." (Ch. 8,
 
34). Cesare "killed as many [of the lords he had despoiled]
 
as he could reach." (Ch. 7, 31) Agathocles betrayed his
 
"friends," (Ch. 8, 35) as did Cesare when he betrayed
 
Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, taking "the duchy of Urbino."
 
(Ch. 7, 28) Agathocles is accused of being without "faith,"
 
(Ch. 8, 35) and of Cesare, Machiavelli refers to his deceit
 
in Sinigaglia. Further, of Agathocles, Machiavelli charges
 
that "one cannot call it virtue" to be "without religion"
 
(Ch. 8, 35) and of Cesare and his father, Alexander VI,
 
Machiavelli states that the pope "did not see the path to
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being able to make [Cesare] lord of any state that was not a
 
state of the Church," and so he "decided to take that of the
 
Church," (Ch. 7, 27) which reflects the abuse of his faith
 
in making use of religion on behalf of his son.
 
Machiavelli also refers to the "savage cruelty and
 
inhumanity" of Agathocles, (Ch. 8, 35) while, in Chapter
 
Seven, as I stated above, he makes the point that Cesare had
 
killed Remirro to appease the people, revealing his own
 
cruel and inhumane nature (if we accept the version of
 
affairs offered by Machiavelli in the Prince). (Ch. 7, 30)
 
Many other examples could be given of the crimes, violence,
 
and ambition of Cesare Borgia and his father, but I have
 
cited those from Chapter Seven that parallel the references
 
Machiavelli makes to Agathocles in the following chapter to
 
illustrate that for those actions and qualities that
 
Agathocles is blamed, Cesare is praised. Further, having
 
indicated that he found Agathocles admirable, for having
 
raised himself up without the aid of fortune or the arms of
 
others (which imputes blame to Cesare for having depended on
 
both), Machiavelli "nonetheless" attributes neither "for
 
tune" or "virtue" to Agathocles, relegating him to a posi
 
tion inferior even to that of Cesare in his esteem, who at
 
least had fortune on his side. And although Agathocles is
 
not "celebrated among the most excellent men," (Ch. 8, 35)
 
because of his actions, Cesare, whom he defined by similar
 
actions, is lauded as a model of such excellence that
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Machiavelli "[does] not know what better teaching I could
 
give to a new prince" than his example. (Ch. 7, 27)
 
The example of Liverotto da Fermo offers the modern
 
counterpart to Agathocles, in kind if not in scope. Cesare
 
would have provided a much grander example, having threat
 
ened a large portion of Italy with his treachery. Through
 
the actions of Liverotto, however, Machiavelli offers an
 
illustration of Cesare's own villainy, for whether the fox
 
is large or small, deceit for personal gain stems from the
 
same qualities of greed, ambition, and immoral (or amoral)
 
behavior, all the more intriguing when one fox outwits
 
another, as Cesare outwitted Liverotto.
 
As the adopted son of his maternal uncle, Giovanni
 
Fogliani, Liverotto, who became proficient as a mercenary,
 
returned to Fermo for a visit, "to acknowledge his patrimo­
ny." (Ch. 8, 36) He arranged for a "banquet," after which
 
he had his uncle and "other citizens" murdered, "besieged"
 
the "magistery,H and made himself "prince." (Ch. 8, 37)
 
Liverotto's perfidy was outmatched by Cesare, however, who
 
had him "strangled" at Sinigaglia, together with other
 
mercenary captains who had plotted against the Borgia.
 
(Ch. 8, 37) Cesare's part in villainy, however, is left
 
uncriticized by Machiavelli, and one has the sense that
 
Cesare simply meted out punishment that Liverotto deserved.
 
Both Cesare and Liverotto, however, enticed their victims by
 
devious and cunning means, and with savage cruelty extermi­
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nated them to further their own selfish interests. Thus,
 
they are alike in kind as well.
 
One of the points made by Machiavelli in calling up the
 
example of Agathocles from antiquity, is that ability unac
 
companied by virtue is insufficient to judge excellence in a
 
prince, and in the examples of Cesare Borgia (in Chapter
 
Seven) and Liverotto da Fermo, he shows how far from excel
 
lence the modern princes had deviated, particularly when
 
contrasted with Moses, Theseus, Romulus, and Cyrus who, as
 
"excellent" (Ch. 6, 22) exemplars, exhibited ability and
 
virtue combined in their enterprises. Despite his profuse
 
praise for Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli does not refer to him
 
as excellent in the Prince. In fact, in blaming Agathocles,
 
Machiavelli shows that he has not deported from his prefer
 
ence for and admiration of the virtue displayed in antiquity
 
by Moses and the others, for whom his praise is sincere. In
 
the illustration of Liverotto, Machiavelli transfers blame
 
to the modern princes. Nor does he attribute virtue to the
 
Borgia or the Medici, who represent force and fraud respec
 
tively, the lion and the fox. Machiavelli thus uses the
 
examples of Agathocles and Liverotto as a mirror, in which
 
is reflected the modern princes generally—and the Borgia in
 
particular.
 
With the appearance of his reasoning on cruelty in
 
Chapter Eight, there should be little doubt that we are
 
being manipulated by a clever Machiavelli who indeed "has
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his sleeves full,"^ not only of things "he knows [that]
 
other men do not," but of grand illusions created with
 
trickery and deceit—equal to that displayed by the worst
 
villains he portrays in the Prince.
 
From the example of Agathocles who, "after infinite
 
betrayals and cruelties, could live for a long time secure
 
in his fatherland," Machiavelli argues that Agathocles'
 
success resulted from "cruelties badly used or well used.
 
Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak
 
well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of necessity to
 
secure oneself and then are not persisted in but are turned
 
to as much utility for the subjects as one can. Those
 
cruelties are badly used which, though few in the beginning,
 
rather grow with time than are eliminated," for "injuries
 
must be done all together so that, being tasted less, they
 
offend less." (Ch. 8, 37-8)
 
As part of his satire, Machiavelli's comment, "if it is
 
permissible to speak well of evil" suggests his humaneness
 
in partially rejecting the use of cruelty, a device used by
 
Jonathan Swift as well.^ And, like Swift, Machiavelli's
 
comment has the tone of an aside. Swift used parenthesis to
 
"slip in cutting asides reflecting the judgment of the
 
projector,"'^ and it seems clear from this remark that
 
Machiavelli does find cruelty as evil (having so labeled
 
it), despite his recommendations to use it.
 
Quentin Skinner makes the point that "Aristotle had
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laid it down in his Politics that rulers generally come to
 
be hated as a result of confiscating the property of their
 
subjects or violating the honour of their womenfolk. (1311
 
\
 
a-b) To this the Roman moralists had added that cruelty is
 
another leading cause of hatred. As Seneca had put it in De
 
dementia, cruelty always increases the number of a king's
 
enemies and eventually makes him hated and loathed (1,8,7;
 
1,25,3) It is striking that Machiavelli completely ignores
 
this latter argument. But it is even more striking that, in
 
offering his own opinion about how to avoid hatred, he
 
simply reiterates what Aristotle had already said,"^ in
 
Chapter Nineteen, that the prince should "abstain" from the
 
"women of his subjects," and their property." (Oh. 19, 72)
 
Machiavelli thus ignores the "Roman Moralists" who "added
 
that cruelty is another leading cause of hatred."® Rather,
 
he encourages the new prince to practice cruelty in the
 
context of "well" or "badly" used, and the effect is to
 
suggest the true nature of the prince.
 
Machiavelli may also have intended that the phrase, "if
 
it is permissible to speak well of evil" be understood as a
 
criticism of the Church, which failed to halt the corruption
 
of its own prelates. Of the Franciscan and Dominican fri
 
ars, Machiavelli notes, in the Discourses, "they also lived
 
so frugally and had such prestige with the populace as
 
confessors and preachers that they convinced them it is an
 
evil thing to speak evilly of evil doing, and a good thing
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to live under obedience to such prelates, and that, if they
 
did wrong, it must be left to God to chastise them. And,
 
this being so, the latter behave as badly as they can,
 
because they are not afraid of punishments which they do not
 
see and in which they do not believe. It is, then, this
 
revival which has maintained and continues to maintain this
 
religion," (III. 1, 389) a strong commentary on the Church
 
offered by Machiavelli, and one that I think has relevance
 
to the Prince, as well, for if "it is an evil thing to talk
 
evilly of evil doing," as he says above, then might it not
 
be a good thing, and thus "permissible," to speak "well of
 
evil"? Machiavelli hints at this absurd notion when he asks
 
"if it is permissible to speak well of evil," in the Prince.
 
And he dutifully follows the advice of the friars by omit
 
ting moral considerations from his recommendations (with the
 
exception of the phrase in question), nor does he speak
 
evilly of cruelty (which he implicitly labeled as evil).
 
Rather, he speaks "well" of it in the sense that it can be
 
"well used." Machiavelli thus mocks the friars for that
 
teaching which left (and continued to leave) the Church
 
mired in corruption.
 
In Machiavelli's time, the Dominicans "were entrusted
 
with [the] execution of the Spanish Inquisition,"^ autho
 
rized by Sixtus IV in 1478. In 1492, the Spanish Jews and
 
Muslims were given four months to convert to the Rqman
 
Catholic faith or leave Spain, forfeiting wealth and proper­
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ty, as described above. The savage cruelty that accompanied
 
the Inquisition was done in the name of God, the same God
 
that would (the friars taught) chastise those who were
 
guilty of evil doing among the Church prelates, which sug
 
gests an irony that is compounded by Machiavelli's observa
 
tion that the prelates neither feared or believed in such ^
 
punishments.
 
If the priests had so little fear of God's punishment,
 
what had the princes of Italy to fear? Pasquale Villari
 
attests to this moral vacuum when he remarks that, in
 
Machiavelli's time, "individual members of the community
 
[were] deprived of all guidance save that of their own
 
instincts,"* and the instinct for self-preservation in the
 
new princes of Italy permitted no conscionable objection to
 
cruelty or crimes, to achieve their ends.
 
A general principle of Machiavelli's that finds expres
 
sion in all of his major works is that new benefits do not
 
make men forget old injuries. In Chapter Eight, however, he
 
suggests the opposite; "in taking hold of a state, he who
 
seizes it should examine all the offenses necessary for him
 
to commit, and do them all in a stroke, so as not to have to
 
renew them everyday and by not renewing them, to secure men
 
and gain them to himself with benefits... for injuries must
 
be done all together, so that, being tasted less, they
 
offend less; and benefits should be done little by little so
 
that they may be tasted better." (Ch. 8, 38)
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To illustrate the extent to which Machiavelli has
 
distorted his principles in the above passage, I refer to
 
the Discourses, in which he cautions, "when a man is de
 
prived of something which possesses intrinsic value, he
 
never forgets it, and you are reminded of it every time you
 
in any way need it; and since such need is of daily occur
 
rence, you are reminded of it every day," (III. 23, 472) and
 
he warns "all potentates" that "old injuries are never
 
canceled by new benefits, least of all when the benefits are
 
of less importance than the injuries previously inflicted,"
 
(III.4, 394-5) which must be the case when injuries are done
 
all at once, and the benefits a little at a time.
 
Further, he states in the History that "an old love or
 
hate cannot by new benefits or new injuries easily be can
 
celed,"' and "men are naturally guicker in their revenge for
 
an injury than in their gratitude for a benefit; they feel
 
that gratitude causes them loss, but revenge brings them
 
profit and pleasure."'®
 
Even in the Prince, Machiavelli observes that men don't
 
forget their "ancient orders" and "liberty," "either through
 
length of time or benefits received," (Ch. 5, 20-1) and in
 
Chapter Seven, he warns, "And whoever believes that among
 
great personages new benefits will make old injuries be
 
forgotten deceives himself." (Ch. 7, 33) Yet, he urges the
 
new prince to ignore his advice, in the following chapter,
 
not only urging that benefits be granted following injuries,
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"to secure men and gain them to himself," (Ch. 8, 38) but
 
advising the manner in which they should be bestowed as
 
well.
 
Therefore, having admitted that cruelty is both injuri
 
ous and evil, Machiavelli yet encourages the new prince to
 
be cruel by offering the artful caveat that it be "well
 
used," that is, done all at once, which in a civil society
 
accustomed to liberty, would likely provoke great hatred and
 
desire for revenge. Machiavelli's counsel in Chapter Eight
 
is deceptive, then, for should the cruelty of the prince
 
give rise to a rebellion, even if he has sufficient force to
 
defeat it, he must still hold "a knife in his hand" (Ch. 8,
 
38) as a precaution against conspiracy, an option that
 
remains to the populace; "In the midst of universal hatred
 
no security is ever to be found, because you do not know
 
from where the evil is going to come; and he who fears all
 
men cannot secure himself against anybody, and if you do try
 
to do so, you augment your dangers, because those who are
 
left are more fiery in their hate and more prepared for
 
vengeance."" Machiavelli's failure to warn the new prince
 
that cruelty is a cause for hatred coupled with his advice
 
to grant benefits to secure himself, following injury and
 
offense, is not advice for the wise, but counsel for fools.
 
As logical as it may appear, it does not represent the
 
wisdom of the ancients, nor is it consistent with
 
Machiavelli's thought as represented in his other works.
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In the Discourses, Machiavelli offers a sentiment
 
similar to that given in Chapter Eight, but one can readily
 
see that the similarity is only superficial one:
 
It does considerable harm to a state to
 
arouse every day fresh discontent in the
 
minds of your citizens by inflicting
 
fresh injuries on this or that person,
 
as happened in Rome after the fall of
 
the Decemviri. For all ten of them, and
 
other citizens besides, were at various
 
times accused and condemned, so that the
 
whole nobility was in a state of extreme
 
terror, since they thought there would
 
be no end to such condemnations until
 
the whole of the nobility was destroyed.
 
This would have caused great incon
 
veniences in the city if Marcus Duilius,
 
a tribune, had not made provision
 
against it by issuing an edict which
 
made it unlawful for anyone to cite or
 
accuse any Roman citizen for the space
 
of a year; whereby the whole nobility
 
was reassured. This shows how harmful
 
it is to a republic or to a prince to
 
keep the minds of their subjects in
 
suspense and fear by continually in
 
flicting punishment and giving offense.
 
Than this there is unquestionably no
 
practice more pernicious. For when men
 
begin to suspect that evil may befall
 
them, they take any means to protect
 
themselves and grow more bold and less
 
restrained in attempting a revolution.
 
It is necessary, therefore, either never
 
to injure anyone, or to inflict the
 
injuries at one go, and then to reassure
 
men and give them ground to expect peace
 
and security. (I. 45, 221-2)
 
A distinction should be made between the above passage
 
and Machiavelli's remarks in Chapter Eight, in regard to
 
context. In the Discourses, his discussion centers on the
 
appointment of the Decemviri for the purpose of establishing
 
new laws in the Roman republic "whereby the freedom of that
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 state might be stabilized." (I. 40, 210-11) What actually
 
occurred, however, was the rise of one Appius Claudius, and
 
the threat of tyranny. The Ten were eventually brought down
 
by the plebs, who desired vengeance. The plebs wanted all
 
of them handed over, whom they "proposed to burn alive." (I.
 
44, 219) While the plebs did not succeed in administering
 
that cruelty, they did succeed in continuing with fresh
 
accusations and condemnations which, as Machiavelli points
 
out, does harm to a republic or a prince when renewed every
 
day.
 
In the Prince, Machiavelli's, remarks are offered in
 
support of seizing power and securing the safety of a tyrant
 
who is, after all, above the law once he is established, and
 
outside the law at the moment he seizes power, those actions
 
that caused Machiavelli to accuse Agathocles of crimes.
 
Further, the injuries inflicted by the new prince are la^­
beled simply as cruelty rather than a continuum of accusa
 
tions and condemnations finding redress within established
 
laws, observed by all. Therefore, he urges in the Prince
 
that injuries be done all at once followed by benefits,
 
while in the Discourses, he recommends "[giving the people]
 
ground to expect peace and security" by lawful means, in the
 
example of the edict issued by Marcus Duilius. The edict
 
should not be confused with a benefit which is offered a
 
■ V-
little at a time such as wealth, honors, and position.
 
Rather; it constituted a mode of lawful restraint issued for
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one year, in which no accused could be brought before the
 
people; a remittal of injury and offense altogether. While
 
security for the tyrant is paramount in the Prince, security
 
for the people forms the thrust of his opinion in the Pis-

courses, whether in a republic or in a state governed by a
 
good prince.
 
In the Prince, Machiavelli seems to parody his discus
 
sion of the Decemviri in the Discourses which, because the
 
Discourses were begun before the Prince and the quote is
 
from Book One, may already have been written, or formulated
 
in his notes. He shows only contempt for the means used by
 
Agathocles and Liverotto da Fermo, and the whole point of
 
Chapter Eight is an attempt on his part to demonstrate that
 
there is no virtue in such a path, nor is there any glory,
 
and his contempt extends to Cesare Borgia for the reasons I
 
have given above. Cruelty well or badly used is not quali
 
fied as virtuous, but simply as a means to safeguard the
 
prince, and Machiavelli does not explain how cruelty "well
 
used" (having been committed in some grand fashion, all at
 
once) will protect the prince from hatred, which scholars
 
might have expected him to address. Further, his mention of
 
the fact that the plebs wanted the Ten burned alive, in the
 
Discourses, suggests the punishments of the Spanish Inquisi
 
tion and the cruelty of that spectacle, if only because he
 
drew the Dominican friars into his discourse, in the Prince,
 
by alluding to their remonstrance that "it is evil to speak
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evilly of evil doing," casting a pall over the Church as
 
well. As Pasquale Villari observed, the "statecraft" of
 
Machiavelli's time was "full of cruelty and devoid of scru
 
ples,"'^ and the Church was not exempt from those practices.
 
Machiavelli's sardonic humor is apparent throughout
 
Chapter Eight, devoted to (of all things) cruelty and inhu
 
manity, demonstrating his ability to illuminate the comic
 
stage with the dark obsessions of his fellow man, no simple
 
feat, even for Machiavelli. One has only to read the Prince
 
as Machiavelli intended that it be read to discover the wit
 
and humor that lies just below the surface—those less than
 
conspicuous gems that qualify him as a most entertaining
 
satirist, and I offer the following example: Of Liverotto
 
da Fermo (who embodies all that was vile and contemptible in
 
the modern dwarfs), Machiavelli remarks, "And to overthrow
 
him would have been as difficult as to overthrow Agathocles
 
if he had not permitted himself to be deceived by Cesare
 
Borgia when at Sinigaglia, as was said above, he took the
 
Orsini and the Vitelli." (Ch. 8, 37)
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Chapter XI. Civil Principality: The Medici
 
Machiavelli introduces Chapter Nine on civil principal
 
ities (an apt description of Florence under the Medici)
 
under the heading of Chapter Eight, devoted to crimes; "But,
 
because one becomes prince from private individual also by
 
two modes which cannot be altogether attributed either to
 
fortune or virtue, I do not think they should be left out,
 
although one of them can be reasoned about more amply where
 
republics are treated. These are when one ascends to a
 
principality by some criminal and nefarious path or when a
 
private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland by the
 
support of his fellow citizens." (Ch. 8, 34) Harvey C.
 
Mansfield, Jr. notes that Machiavelli "does not say which of
 
the two modes is reasoned about more amply ^where republics
 
are treated,'"^ a point well taken, because the statement is
 
thus confusing, blurring the distinction between the two
 
modes of acquisition, and intended to be so. Although
 
Machiavelli never mentions the Medici in Chapter Nine, it is
 
a chapter devoted to the means by which a new prince rises
 
"with the support of his fellow citizens," precisely as the
 
Medici did, and if doing so does not quite meet the defini
 
tion of crime (having always preferred to subvert the con
 
stitution to their benefit rather than seize power with
 
violence and force), their actions were no less malfeasant—
 
as fraudulent, corrupting, and dangerous to the liberty of
 
Florence. Thus, the Medici were criminal in their intent,
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in the broader context of crimes against the republic,
 
particularly to one who valued the principles of republican
 
government, as did Machiavelli. In Chapter Nine,
 
Machiavelli restates the introduction he gave in the previ
 
ous chapter; "But, coming to the other policy, when a pri
 
vate citizen becomes prince of his fatherland, not through
 
crime or other intolerable violence but with the support of
 
his fellow citizens (which one could call a civil principal
 
ity; neither all virtue nor all fortune is necessary to
 
attain it, but rather a fortunate astuteness)—I say that
 
one ascends to this principality either with the support of
 
the people or with the support of the great," (Ch. 9, 38-9)
 
a passage that appears to clarify the distinction between
 
rising by means of a criminal path or with the support of
 
fellow citizens but which, through repetition and by associ
 
ation, again suggests a link between the two modes, contami
 
nating the latter with the former in negative connotation.
 
Further evidence that Machiavelli is less than candid
 
in his remarks is his reference to "fortunate astuteness," a
 
derogatory tribute to those who lack virtue, but have on
 
their side that part of fortune which provides the opportu
 
nity to pursue a nefarious path of fraud in the willful
 
destruction of liberty. In Chapter Eighteen, Machiavelli
 
remarks, "How laudable it is for a prince to keep his faith,
 
and to live with honesty and not by astuteness, everyone
 
understands. Nonetheless one sees by experience in our time
 
205
 
that the princes who have done great things are those who
 
have taken little account of faith and have known how to get
 
around men's brains with their astuteness; and in the end
 
they have overcome those who have founded themselves on
 
loyalty." (Ch. 18, 68-9) "Fortunate astuteness" is the
 
ability to acquire with shrewdness and trickery, having the
 
appearance of honorable practice but, in fact, resorting to
 
dishonorable means, as when he urges the new prince to
 
"astutely" foster enmities to achieve personal recognition,^
 
without also acknowledging that all such enterprises, while
 
useful in elevating the reputation of the prince that he
 
desires for himself, are ultimately won with hardship for
 
the people. This example offers but one instance of many in
 
which Machiavelli sets aside his interest in the common good
 
of the people in favor of the self-interest of the prince,
 
in the Prince.
 
In referring to Severus as a "very astute fox," (Ch.
 
19, 79) Machiavelli again uses astute in a generally deroga
 
tory manner, for he alludes to the "criminal" nature of his
 
actions,^ describing him as a "wicked man" (I. 10, 137) in
 
the Discourses, and "cruel and rapacious" in the Prince.
 
(Ch. 19, 77-8) Having founded the Severan Dynasty (193-235
 
A.D.) during the Roman Empire, his example provides an
 
excellent model for a new prince who also lusts for empire.
 
His qualities and actions which find expression throughout
 
the Prince are demonstrated in Machiavelli's assessment of
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the Roman Empire before and after the period of the five
 
good emperors (96-180 A.D.);
 
Let a prince put before himself the
 
period from Nerva to Marcus, and let him
 
compare it with the preceding period and
 
with that which came after, and then -let
 
him decide in which he would rather have
 
been born, and during which he would
 
have chosen to be emperor. What he will
 
find when good princes were ruling, is a
 
prince securely reigning among subjects
 
no less secure, a world replete with
 
peace and justice. He will see the
 
Senate's authority respected, the magis
 
trates honored, rich citizens enjoying
 
their wealth, nobility and virtue held
 
in highest esteem, and everything work
 
ing smoothly and going well. He will
 
notice, on the other hand, the absence
 
of any rancor, any licentiousness, cor
 
ruption or ambition, and that in this
 
golden age everyone is free to hold and
 
to defend his own opinion. He will
 
behold, in short, the world triumphant,
 
its prince glorious and respected by
 
all, the people fond of him and secure
 
under his rule.
 
If he then looks attentively at the
 
times of the other emperors, he will
 
find them distraught with wars, torn by
 
seditions, brutal alike in peace and in
 
war, princes frequently killed by assas
 
sins, civil wars and foreign wars con
 
stantly occurring, Italy in travail and
 
ever prey to fresh misfortunes, its
 
cities demolished and pillaged. He will
 
see Rome burnt, its capitol demolished
 
by its own citizens, ancient temples
 
lying desolate, religious rites grown
 
corrupt, adultery rampant throughout the
 
city. He will find the sea covered with
 
exiles and the rocks stained with blood,
 
in Rome he will see countless atrocities
 
perpetrated; rank, riches, the honors
 
men have won, and, above all, virtue,
 
evoked upon as a capital crime. He will
 
find calumniators rewarded, servants
 
suborned to turn against their masters.
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freed men to turn against their patrons,
 
and those who lack enemies attacked by
 
their friends. He will thus happily
 
learn how much Rome, Italy, and the
 
world owed to Caesar. (I. 10, 137-8)
 
An "astute fox" such as Severus does not represent the
 
good government described by Machiavelli in his reference to
 
the government of "good princes," who clearly had the common
 
good in mind. His contempt for princes who disregard the
 
common good could not be more plainly stated than in the
 
above passage, and yet the Prince represents nothing if not
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the sacrifice of common good for the personal benefit of the
 
ruler, for his own security. Security from what? Revolt,
 
conspiracy, and rebellion from within, attack from foreign
 
ers, often invited by exiles and other malcontents, from
 
without. Therefore, although Machiavelli attributes "good
 
luck" (fortune) and "virtue" to Severus in the Discourses
 
(I. 10, 137) he does not consider Severus a good prince.
 
"Fortunate astuteness" is intended to mock those who
 
possess those qualities that will enable them to succeed by
 
nefarious means, ability that, as Machiavelli explained in
 
the context of Agathocles, cannot be called virtue. And
 
while the Medici did not seize Florence with force and
 
violence (for the most part), as did Agathocles in Syracuse,
 
and Cesare Borgia in Romagna, their means were no less
 
wicked because they resorted to fraud and deceit, over a
 
period of several decades.
 
Machiavelli's statement, "the people desire neither to
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be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great
 
desire to command and oppress the people," (Ch. 9, 39) is a
 
principle of such importance that he repeats it three times
 
in this rather short chapter. He notes that "the end of the
 
people is more decent than that of the great, since the
 
great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppres
 
sed," (Ch. 9, 39) and two paragraphs later, he again re
 
marks, "one who becomes prince through the support of the
 
people should keep them friendly to him, which should be
 
easy for him because they ask of him only that they not be
 
oppressed." (Ch. 9, 40)
 
The new prince is, of course, one of the great, who has
 
elevated himself to a position of power either with the
 
support of the great, who "see they cannot resist the peo
 
ple, [and] begin to give reputation to one of themselves,"
 
or with the support of the people, who, "when they see they
 
cannot resist the great, give reputation to one, and make
 
him prince so as to be defended with his authority." (Ch. 9,
 
39) If the prince is a "good prince," as Machiavelli de
 
scribes a ruler who respects the laws, the "authority of the
 
Senate," and "justice," the prince and the people will find
 
security in the common good. (I. 10, 137-38) If the prince
 
desires to impose tyranny, however, to "ascend from a civil
 
order to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 42) his need to oppress
 
will be of the greatest magnitude because of the necessity
 
to protect himself against both the great (the few) and the
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people (the many). Because the people desire not to be
 
oppressed, they would not willfully give power to a tyrant.
 
Therefore, a private individual who desires to establish
 
himself as prince in a civil state must either use force of
 
arms (as did Agathocles and Julius Caesar who rose to power
 
through the ranks of the military, or follow the example of
 
Cesare Borgia, who used the wealth and arms of others), or
 
resort to fraud and deception. Machiavelli notes, in the
 
Discourses, that a tyrant "will wait until, with the support
 
of the populace, he has got rid of the nobility, and will
 
not begin to oppress the people until he has got rid of it,
 
by which time the populace will have come to realize that it
 
is a slave and will have no way of escape." The mistake
 
made by Appius in establishing his tyranny was that he
 
"deserted the populace and courted the nobles,"for "though
 
nobles desire to tyrannize, that part of the nobility which
 
finds itself left out in a tyrannical regime, is always the
 
tyrant's enemy. Nor can he win them all over, for so great
 
is the ambition and the avarice with which 
( 
they are imbued,
 
that no tyrant can have enough riches and enough honors to
 
satisfy all." (1.40, 214-15)
 
Therefore, although Machiavelli emphasizes the point
 
that the people do not want to be oppressed, he devotes
 
Chapter Nine to instructing the new prince that he should
 
found on the people (as opposed to the great) which will
 
give him the best chance for success. And because the
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 Prince teaches the art of tyranny, the end result for the
 
people will indeed by "slavery." In this sense, Machiavelli
 
issues a warning in the Prince, for in satire, "warning
 
/ ■ 
examples" are given "in order to help others," and "If we
 
[the satirists] show our fellow-men the painful and absurd
 
consequences of certain types of conduct... others will be
 
cured," a view that is traced to Socrates and the "Greek
 
philosophical schools" that followed, "emphasizing the power
 
of reason. If you understand, they said, you will do right.
 
Indeed you must do right, if you understand. Only strive to
 
see the truth," a view shared by Horace and other satir
 
ists.''
 
If in a free city the people want to avoid tyranny,
 
then, they should understand the danger in giving reputation
 
to one of the great, who will use every covert means avail
 
able to gain them to himself. He warns against the ambition
 
of those striving for power when he remarks, "these princ
 
ipalities customarily run into peril when they are about to
 
ascend from a civil order to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 41-2)
 
yet, he does not specify the means by which the people are
 
won over to the new prince. In fact, he only remarks that
 
"the prince can gain the people to himself in many modes,
 
for which one cannot give certain rules because the modes
 
vary according to circumstances, and so they will be left
 
out." (Ch. 9, 40-1) By leaving out any discussion of "cer
 
tain rules" that govern the modes, he employs the rhetorical
 
211 ,
 
device of omission, dismissing the subject on the authority
 
of his own statement. He need not defend it or offer proof
 
for his claim that there are such "rules," nor does he
 
define the different "modes" that give rise to different
 
"rules." Had he elaborated on this topic, however, he could
 
not have avoided throwing the spotlight on the Medici who
 
exemplified various modes of gaining popular support, and I
 
do not think it unreasonable to question why he did not
 
seize the opportunity to praise the Medici in that regard,
 
if the Prince is a work of sincerity and integrity as many
 
scholars think it to be. The answer, of course, is that he
 
objected to the fraudulent methods of the Medici, and did
 
not support the notion of a private citizen rising with the
 
support of his fellow citizens.
 
In the History, Machiavelli emphasizes the example of
 
Cosimo, who "gave his attention to doing good to everybody
 
and, with his liberality, to making many citizens his parti
 
sans. Hence his example brought about further censure of
 
those who ruled; yet he thought in this way either to live
 
in Florence as powerful and secure as anybody or, if through
 
the ambition of his adversaries he came up against something
 
beyond the laws, to be in both arms and support their super
 
ior, which contributed to factionalism and strife within
 
the city. "Civil strife always increased his influence in
 
Florence, and external wars his power and reputation."® The
 
greater the reputation of a private individual, the greater
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the danger to the liberty of the city, particularly if the
 
populace is corrupt and thus more susceptible to the influ
 
ence of benefits, honors, privilege, rank—all the modes
 
utilized in acquiring favor and preference.
 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli makes the point that
 
Cosimo "began to arouse alarm for the security of its gov
 
ernment; with the result that his fellow citizens thought it
 
dangerous to touch him, and still more dangerous to let him
 
alone," due to "favours gained by his own prudence and
 
through the ignorance of the citizens." (I. 33, 191-2) By
 
his methods, men achieve their designs, as he notes in the
 
History, and the dilemma is that "it will be necessary to
 
urge as the reasons for driving him out that he is compas
 
sionate, helpful, liberal, and loved by everybody. Tell me
 
now, what law is it that forbids or that blames and condemns
 
in men, pity, liberality, love?"'
 
The weight of Machiavelli's views in the History and
 
the Discourses profoundly discredits the advice Machiavelli
 
gives to the new prince, and this is especially obvious with
 
regard to Chapter Nine, devoted to the subject of free
 
cities and how one might transform them into a principality
 
by becoming "prince" of their "fatherland," (Ch. 9, 38) an
 
absurd advocacy on Machiavelli's part, for not only did he
 
have contempt for such men, but also for principality it
 
self, one of the "six types of government," that he classed
 
as "pernicious." (I. 2, 106)
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Referring to those cities which from the beginning have
 
"been governed in accordance with their wishes" as opposed
 
to those "subject to another power," (I. 2, 104-5)
 
Machiavelli sviinmarizes, in the Discourses, the "variations"
 
of government that arise in such cities. He first notes
 
that "those who have written about states say that there are
 
to be found in them one of three forms of government, called
 
by them Principality, Aristocracy and Democracy," while
 
"others—and with better judgment many think—say that there
 
are six types of government," of which principality, aris
 
tocracy, and democracy are "good," but because they "easily
 
become corrupt," cannot be classed as good: (I. 2, 106)
 
For Principality easily becomes Tyranny.
 
From Aristocracy the transition to Oli
 
garchy is an easy one. Democracy is
 
without difficulty converted into Anar
 
chy. So that if anyone who is organiz
 
ing a commonwealth sets up one of the
 
three first forms of government, he sets
 
up what will last for awhile, since
 
there are no means whereby to prevent
 
its passing into its contrary, on ac
 
count of the likeness which in such a
 
case virtue has to vice. (I. 2, 106)
 
When men first chose a prince, having already estab
 
lished justice, they chose "one who excelled in prudence and
 
justice," but when the prince passed his title to his heirs
 
and was no longer elected, "his heirs soon began to degen
 
erate as compared with their ancestors, and, forsaking
 
virtuous deeds, considered that princes have naught else to
 
do but to surpass other men in extravagance, lasciviousness,
 
and every other form of licentiousness. With the result
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 that the prince came to be hated, and since he was hated,
 
I
 
: I
 
came to be afraid, and from fear soon passed to offensive
 
action, which quickly brought about a tyranny." (I. 2, 107)
 
Machiavelli emphasizes that the new prince has need to
 
"secure himself," (Ch. 9, 39) and the sum of his advice
 
throughout the Prince is designed to preserve and protect
 
his power. Unlike the "first prince" he defined in the
 
Discourses, who "excelled in prudence and justice," the new
 
prince more resembles his "heirs" who corrupted the original
 
notion of "Principality,^' and brought it to "tyranny."
 
Virtue not only bears a "likeness" to vice, but has the
 
appearance of becoming vice—and vice, virtue. As he re
 
marks in Chapter Fifteen, "if one considers everything well,
 
one will find something appears to be virtue, which if
 
pursued would be one's ruin, and something else appears to
 
be vice, which if pursued results in one's security and well
 
being," (Ch. 15, 62) which reflects in part his argument for
 
tyranny and the transvaluation of virtue and vice into their
 
opposites, from necessity. Everyone is bad; therefore the
 
new prince must learn to be bad as well, as though the
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ambitious and greedy required lessons in that art.
 
One need only consider how far such a corrupt world
 
would lead the people from liberty and justice to question
 
Machiavelli's sincerity in offering the advice he gives in
 
the Prince, unless, as he notes in the Discourses, "it is
 
present evils that are terrifying, but for the future there
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is hope, since men are convinced that the evil ways of a bad
 
prince may make for freedom in the end," (I. 58, 257) In
 
this statement, he suggests the passing of tyranny to aris
 
tocracy, the form of government that follows principality
 
and its contrary. Tyranny is overthrown when the "dishon
 
ourable life" of the prince becomes intolerable. The people
 
rise up against the prince with "arms," led by "powerful
 
leaders" from the ranks of the great," men conspicuous for
 
their liberality, magnamity, wealth, and ability." When the
 
prince has been "liquidated," the great form "themselves
 
into a government" without a "sole head," the "very term"
 
having become "odious" to them. The new government "ruled
 
in accordance with the laws which they had made, subordinat
 
ed their own convenience to the common advantage, and, both
 
in private matters and public affairs, governed and pre
 
served order with the utmost diligence." (I. 2, 107-8)
 
Aristocracy passes into oligarchy when, once again,
 
the government passes to the "descendants," a government "in
 
which civic rights are entirely disregarded." The people,
 
not wanting to return to princely rule and to rid themselves
 
of government by the few, turn against the oligarchs, "liq
 
uidate" them, and organize a "democratic form of govern
 
ment." In time, however, the first generation having
 
"passed away," democracy passes into anarchy, "in which no
 
respect was shown either for the individual or for the
 
official, and which was such that, as everyone did what he
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liked, all parts of outrages were constantly committed," so
 
that, to rid themselves of anarchy, "principality was once
 
again restored." (I. 2, 108-9)
 
The cycle would likely continue "for ever," were it not
 
for the fact that in periods of transition, in which the
 
"commonwealth" lacks "both counsel and strength," it becomes
 
prey to "neighboring and better organized" states. (I. 2,
 
109) Thus, Machiavelli maintains "that all the forms of
 
government mentioned above are far from satisfactory, the
 
three good ones because their life is so short, the three
 
bad ones because of their inherent malignity. Hence, pru
 
dent legislators, aware of their defects, refrained from
 
adopting as such any one of these forms, and chose instead
 
one that shared in them all, since they thought such a
 
government would be stronger and more stable, for if in one
 
and the same state there was principality, aristocracy and
 
democracy each would keep watch over the other." (I. 2, 109)
 
Machiavelli would likely have agreed with Aristotle that in
 
such variations of government, "none of them" served "the
 
common good of all."*
 
Of course Machiavelli does not include his discourse on
 
the cycles of government in the Prince, although it would
 
have been appropriate to his work, if only to warn the new
 
prince of the dangers inherent in tyranny. But he alludes
 
to it, for the benefit of those familiar with his views;
 
"From these two diverse appetites [the great want to op­
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press, and the people want not to be oppressed], one of
 
three effects occurs in cities; principality or liberty or
 
license." (Ch. 9, 39) He does not label the "effects" in
 
logical order, however, for principality (brought about by
 
anarchy) is not followed by liberty (manifest, although
 
short-lived, in aristocracy and democracy). Rather, princi
 
pality is followed by license, the effect of corruption,
 
which causes the principality to pass into tyranny. Had he
 
ordered them principality or license or liberty he would
 
have gone more directly to the point--that a new principali
 
ty founded by the new prince was doomed from the start.
 
I
 
In recommending that the new prince acquire and found a
 
principality, then, Machiavelli casts himself in the role of
 
an "[im]prudent legislator," (I. 2, 109) by his own defini
 
tion, a wonderful irony that those familiar with his view
 
would surely have discovered in the Prince.
 
Machiavelli began his discourse in Chapter Nine by
 
addressing his advice to a private citizen; "But, coming to
 
the pther policy, when a private citizen becomes prince of
 
his fatherland," followed by his observation that "one
 
ascends to this principality either with the support of the
 
people or with the support of the great." (Ch. 9, 38-9)
 
Before closing the chapter, however, having advised the
 
prince to found on the people as the best course (or at
 
least keep them "friendly"), he remarks, "And let no one
 
resist my opinion on this [we must take it on his authority
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alone] with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the
 
people founds on mud. For that is true when a private
 
citizen lays his foundation on them and allows himself to
 
think the people will liberate him if he is opposed (in this
 
case one can often be deceived, like the Gracchi in Rome and
 
Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence)," although, a "prince,"
 
who has also founded on the people, "will never find himself
 
deceived by them," provided he has the qualities enumerated
 
by Machiavelli.' If it is true that a private citizen who
 
lays his foundations on the people founds on mud, what is
 
the distinction between that private citizen and the private
 
citizen who becomes the so called "prince of his father
 
land," who also founded on the people? In what he calls a
 
"civil principality," they are one and the same. A princi
 
pality is a sovereign state ruled by a reigning prince.
 
There is no reigning prince in a "civil" principality, in
 
which the "magistries, who, especially in adverse times, can
 
take away his state [it is not his state if supreme power is
 
not vested in the prince] with great ease either by turning
 
against him or by not obeying him," in a state in which the
 
people take "commands from the magistrates," rather than the
 
prince. (Ch. 9, 42) What Machiavelli is describing und^r
 
the heading of civil principality is a free city or state in
 
which a private individual rises to power with the support
 
of the people, and maintains his position with prudent
 
actions, "and with his spirits and orders keeps the general­
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ity of the people inspired," (Ch. 9, 41) until he turns his
 
thoughts to tyranny. If he is to "ascend from civil order
 
to an absolute one," (Ch. 9, 42) he must eliminate opposi
 
tion to his power in civil government,|and seize power for
 
himself alone, in which case liberty is lost, and "civil
 
principality" easily becomes principality.
 
In the context of "civil principality," then,
 
Machiavelli warns against the phenomenon of a private citi
 
zen who is prince in everything but name, as were the
 
Medici. Cosimo lacked "nothing of being prince but the
 
title, one who "had been brought so high that, unless
 
something were done about it, he would become their prince
 
[of Florence]."" Over the decades from Cosimo's rise to
 
power in 1434, the Medici gained great reputation in
 
Florence, and their influence in government rose proportion
 
ately. In this sense, the city was not a principality, nor
 
was the government completely controlled by the people, for
 
the Medici influence determined who was chosen to serve in
 
government, based on fidelity to the Medici faction and
 
interests. The Medici rose with the support of the people,
 
as Machiavelli advises the new prince to do as well. At the
 
same time, however, he reminds both the Medici and the
 
people that such attempts to acquire excessive authority
 
have failed in the past, with his example of Giorgio Scali,
 
whom he associates (in context) with the "trite" proverb
 
that "whoever founds on the people founds on mud," a proverb
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that is anything but trite with regard to cities accustomed
 
to freedom, should anyone desire to found a tyranny there.
 
Giorgio Scali began his rise in reputation as a defend
 
er of the people, and was beheaded when he betrayed them,
 
for, having gained a position of power, he turned to tyran
 
ny,12 message seems clear enough. As Machiavelli re
 
marks in the History, relative to the attempt made by the
 
Duke of Athens to become prince of Florence, the Florentines
 
"cannot keep their liberty and yet cannot endure servi
 
tude,"^^ the very dileitima reflected in the notion of a "civil
 
principality."
 
To avoid the fate of Messer Scali, then, a private
 
citizen who would become sole authority in a free city such
 
as Florence, must rid himself of the obstacle of government
 
intervention and its authority, as the magistries have the
 
power to ruin him, and if this difficulty is partially rec
 
tified in the control and influence exerted in civil govern
 
ment by the private citizen himself (as it was in the case
 
of the Medici), it is by no means solved. Thus, Machiavelli
 
introduces his argument for the need to establish absolute
 
authority in the last paragraph, in preparation for that
 
time in which "the state has need of the citizens," ensuring
 
that "always and in every quality of time [they] have need
 
of the state and of himself; and then they will always be
 
faithful to him." (Ch. 9, 42) There is no assurance, of
 
course, that they will "always be faithful to him." In
 
221
 
fact, the more odious he becomes in his tyranny--as he must,
 
if the people are to have need of him "always and in every
 
quality of time"—the more hatred he will encvimber, which
 
ultimately will lead to his ruin.
 
Machiavelli only states that the prince "must think of
 
a way" (Ch. 9, 42) to make the people have need of him. He
 
does not say how this is to be accomplished. Nor does he
 
explain how the prince rids himself of "civil order" to make
 
way for his "absolute" rule. He could, of course, liquidate
 
his opposition with the expedience and means demonstrated by
 
Cesare Borgia. Were it not for the advice offered by
 
Machiavelli in Chapter Seventeen, 1;he new prince might have
 
cause to hesitate in following the example of Cesare for, in
 
doing so, he risks the blame heaped upon Agathocles for "his
 
savage cruelty and inhumanity," which prevents his "[cele
 
bration] among the most excellent men." (Ch. 8, 35) In
 
Chapter Seventeen, however, Machiavelli counsels that a
 
prince "should not care about the infamy of cruelty,"
 
(Ch. 17, 65) because modern princes are not celebrated by
 
the standard of virtue and excellence represented in antiq
 
uity. Rather, if a new prince were inclined to seek lessons
 
from the past, he would find the best instruction in the
 
examples of men like Julius Caesar and Agathocles, who
 
demonstrated how far personal ambition and great enterprises
 
can raise a private individual from a low station to one of
 
supreme power.
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 As the world is a corrupt world, pf necessity the new
 
prince must act accordingly, if he is to succeed, particu
 
larly when others, like himself, crave power, principality,
 
and empire. Such a man will stop at nothing to satiate his
 
ambition, and if Machiavelli seems to nourish his vile na
 
ture with every persuasion to the contrary of his own be
 
liefs, in the Prince, it is to render his nature transparent
 
and thus subject to the scrutiny of all. With the exception
 
of Chapter Six, Machiavelli does not plead with his readers
 
to consider the good examples of the past. Rather, he holds
 
up for our scorn the degradations of the present, which is
 
but another path to the same end; by "inspiring a horror of
 
evil," one can "convey love of virtue. In the Discourses,
 
he does not hesitate to criticize the present. Of the
 
"highly virtuous actions performed" in the past, "so shunned
 
by everybody in each little thing they do," he notes "that
 
of bygone days there remains no trace, it cannot but fill.me
 
at once with astonishment and grief.
 
In Chapter Nine, then, Machiavelli exposes the danger
 
of the rise of a private citizen in a civil state, in which
 
the people should,beware of jeopardizing their liberty and
 
i
 
freedom by supporting such a man, for in time, to ensure his
 
authority and power, he will give up the good qualities that
 
earned their confidence, and think only of his own interest
 
and personal benefit. Surely the Medici would have recog
 
nized themselves in this portrait of a rising tyrant.
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Chapter XII. Weak Princes and Ecclesiastical Principality
 
Because Chapter Ten addresses the subject of the mili
 
tary forces of the new prince, it would seem more appropri
 
ate to join it to Chapters Twelve through Fourteen, which
 
also treat military affairs. Further, Machiavelli might
 
reasonably have followed Chapter Nine on civil principali
 
ties, with the subject of Chapter Eleven, ecclesiastical
 
principalities, thus concluding his commentary on the kinds
 
of principalities that are acquired by a new prince, before
 
turning to a new topic. He seems to have turned the two
 
chapters around, so to speak, and the net effect is to give
 
the appearance of digression in Chapter Ten, separating the
 
rule of priests from that of secular princes (one could
 
almost charge Machiavelli with a pause of reverence), but of
 
course they were inextricably joined, the popes and their
 
relatives, in common pursuit of worldly gain.
 
Machiavelli offers his thoughts as to "whether a prince
 
has enough of a state that he can rule by himself when he
 
needs to, or whether he is always under the necessity of
 
being defended by others." (Ch. 10, 42) He "[judges] those
 
capable of ruling by themselves who can, by abundance of
 
either men or money, put together an adequate army and fight
 
a battle against whoever comes to attack them." (Ch. 10, 43)
 
This is not prudent counsel, however, and if the new prince
 
follows his advice, "either men or money," and relies on
 
wealth rather than arms of his own, he risks inherent weak­
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ness. As in the case of Cesare Borgia, when the source of
 
wealth dries up, you are finished. Machiavelli makes this
 
point in the Discoursesz the importance of money is rela
 
tive to whether or not the prince or "country" is "well
 
equipped with arms." The "King of France and the Italians
 
today" should keep the enemy at a distance, "for since
 
[their] virtue lies in money, not in men, as soon as any
 
thing gets in the way of your obtaining it, you may be
 
undone." (II. 12, 308) The notion that wealth alone will
 
enable a prince to rule by himself leads the new prince down
 
the path followed by Cesare Borgia, for a prince who is
 
dependent on someone else for either arms or wealth cannot
 
quite be said to rule by himself because he lacks the requi
 
site independence. Machiavelli made that point in Chapter
 
Nine with regard to authority. (Ch. 9, 42)
 
Further, if a prince has money but not men, he must
 
hire mercenaries or auxiliary forces. In Chapter Thirteen,
 
Machiavelli refers to them both as "useless," (Ch. 13, 54)
 
advising that a "wise prince, therefore,has always avoided
 
these arms and turned to his own," (Ch. 13, 55) for there is
 
danger of ruin in the use of such arms, and "without its own
 
arms no principality is secure."^ As he observes in the
 
Discourses, "money is not the sinews of war, as it is com
 
monly thought to be," for although money "adds to your
 
strength," it does "not provide you with it," because with
 
out "faithful troops... no amount of money will suffice
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you... nor can any opinion be more false than that which
 
asserts that money is the sinews of war." (II. 10, 300)
 
Therefore, the prince who must rely on his "abundance
 
of money" rather than "arms" is "always under the necessity
 
of being defended by others," and thus could be said not to
 
have "enough of a state that he can rule by himself" despite
 
the fact that Machiavelli suggests the contrary. Without
 
going directly to the point, Machiavelli suggests that not
 
only do weak princes not have arms of their own, but they
 
fail to understand the need for such arms, thinking their
 
wealth alone will sustain them. He encourages them in this
 
fallacy, when he stresses "either men or money," despite the
 
fact that he completely contradicts this notion in Chapter
 
Thirteen. Because Chapter Ten follows his commentary on
 
civil principalities, in which the Medici were his intended
 
target, perhaps his purpose was to expose their ignorance in
 
the matter of arms. As I have stated, at the time he wrote
 
the Prince, the Medici had already disbanded his militia. In
 
their self-interest, the Medici sacrificed the security of
 
the Florentines for their own political principles.
 
The remainder of Chapter Ten is devoted to the subject
 
of siege, in which the prince must take refuge "behind walls
 
and to guard them" (Ch. 10, 43) which is a somewhat humorous
 
way of stating it, for obviously the prince will have to
 
guard the walls if he is hiding behind them. This prince
 
"always has necessity of others," (Ch. 10, 43) specifically
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the people, but also the possibility of aid from the out
 
side, which Machiavelli does not address.
 
In his recommendations for preparation, Machiavelli
 
advises that the prince "fortify and supply their own
 
towns," arid he specifically urges the prince "to take no
 
account of the countryside." (Ch. 10, 43) Again,
 
Machiavelli's counsel is suspect. In Chapter Fourteen he
 
makes the point that a prince learn "to know one's own
 
country," to "better understand its defense," (Ch. 14, 59)
 
and in The Art of War, he states, "cities and castles can be
 
strong either by nature or by artificial fortification,"^ in
 
which case the countryside would itself determine the par
 
ticular requirements needed to provide maximum security for
 
defense.
 
Secondly, Machiavelli recommends that "for at least a
 
mile around the walls, no one [be] allowed to carry on
 
farming or to put up walls, but the land must be all plain,
 
without a bush or a bank or trees or houses to obstruct the
 
view and give shelter to an enemy who pitches his camp."'
 
Having so ordered the countryside, the prince would have
 
less need to deal with the circumstances portrayed in the
 
Prince, in which the "enemy" finds it expedient to "burn and
 
ruin the countryside on his arrival," causing the people who
 
"have their possessions outside and see them burning," to
 
lose their "patience" and "forget the prince" through con
 
cerns for their own loss. (Ch. 10, 44)
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Third, the countryside can provide "extraordinary
 
means" by which "friends" can "aid you." Machiavelli cites
 
the example of the town of Casalino, besieged by Hannibal.
 
As there was a river running through it, the Romans "threw
 
into it a great quantity of nuts, which, carried by the
 
stream without any possibility of being stopped, fed the
 
Casalinensians for some time.""*
 
Finally, the besieged should guard against deception on
 
the part of the enemy positibned outside the walls. In The
 
Art of War, he cautions that the besieged "should not rely
 
on anything they see the enemy do continually, but should
 
invariably believe that such habitual actions hide some
 
deception and that the habit to their injury can change,"
 
for "one must guard against the" deception and tricks of the
 
enemy. Failure to pay close attention to the movements
 
of the enemy beyond the walls could have dire consequences
 
for the prince, and Machiavelli's failure to warn him of it
 
betrays the insincerity of this discourse in the Prince.
 
There is the dilemma, of course, of how a tyrannical
 
prince inspires the people to defend him in a siege, as
 
opposed to defending their own interests. As he explains in
 
the History, when defending "themselves," the "glory" goes
 
to the people, but when defending a "tyrant," the "glory of
 
defense" goes to "another." And in the matter of defending
 
their liberty, the people can be inspired to noble and
 
courageous actions. In a set speech given by one of the
 
228 .
 
"old and wise" of Lucca to the lower classes, for the pur
 
pose of inspiring resistance to the Florentines in order to
 
preserve their liberty, Machiavelli makes the following
 
points; "You should not be disturbed on seeing your fields
 
laid waste, your farmhouses burned, your town captured,"
 
because if the city is saved, "they will of necessity be
 
saved; if we lose her, they will be saved without any profit
 
to us; because if we continue free, our enemy only with
 
difficulty can hold them; if we lose our freedom, in vain we
 
hold them." Thus, as "one man," the people "promised to die
 
rather than surrender or rather than consider any agreement
 
that in any way would taint their liberty."®
 
If a prince is "respected" by the people because he has
 
protected their interests and "acted in accordance with the
 
laws," (I. 10, 136-7) such a prince should find the people
 
inspired to defend him. Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, Duke of
 
Urbino, was so revered by the people that when Urbino was
 
threatened by Cesare Borgia and other condottierie, he
 
called the people together to inform them of the danger, and
 
they replied "that they intended to die with him."^ As
 
Machiavelli remarks in the Discourses, "a prince should seek
 
to gain the obedience and affection of his soldiers and his
 
subjects; their obedience by his fidelity to the constitu
 
tion and by the reputation he has for virtue; their affec
 
tion by his affability, kindliness, compassion, and other
 
qualities for which Valerius was conspicuous,"
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(III. 22,' 470) but a tyrant has the conspicuous problem of
 
fidelity.
 
In the Prince, Machiavelli only suggests that, in
 
addition to a "strong city," the prince not "make himself
 
hated." (Ch. 10, 44) Unlike the example of Lucca above,
 
when the people see their possessions ruined, there is no
 
noble cause to inspire them, nor can the new prince appeal
 
to the respect the people have for him, as in the case of
 
the Duke of Urbino. Machiavelli thus urges the prince to
 
inspire "fear of the enemy's cruelty," (Ch. 10, 44) thereby
 
advising the prince to encourage fear in the people, at a
 
time when there is need to calm their fears lest they aban
 
don him. Had the prince made adequate preparations for this
 
adversity in advance, he would not be left with such petty
 
devices as reliance on fear, which offer little or no secur
 
ity for the prince. As Machiavelli remarks in the Discours
 
es, the prince should not "put off conferring benefits on
 
people until danger is at hand," for "the people as a whole
 
will not consider that they owe this benefit to you [siege,
 
hunger, war], but rather to your enemies." (I. 32, 188)
 
Machiavelli does not offer this advice in Chapter Ten,
 
however. He only remarks that the people will "unite with
 
their prince all the more," having lost their homes and
 
belongings, for which the prince "appears" to have "an
 
obligation toward them," followed by "And the nature of men
 
is to be obligated as much by benefits they give as by
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benefits they receive." (Ch. 10, 44) When Machiavelli says
 
the prince "appears" to have an "obligation," it does not
 
mean the prince will, in fact, entertain an "obligation."
 
As Machiavelli advised in Chapter Nine, the new prince "must
 
think of a way by which his citizens always and in every
 
quality of time, have need of the state and of himself,"
 
(not the other way around), "and then they will always be
 
faithful to him," (Ch. 9, 42) a notion that would be seri
 
ously compromised if the new prince allowed himself to
 
acknowledge and act on obligations to his subjects for any
 
reason.
 
The people, however, are obligated to continue fighting
 
if they are to defend themselves (as well as the prince),
 
because they constitute his defense. Therefore, the prince
 
is, in fact, dependent on his subjects, who might readily
 
abandon him, particularly if they do not feel obligated from
 
affection, and their only inspiration is fear. As the
 
prince has more need of the people than they of him, he has
 
no assurances, then, that they will remain faithful to him.
 
Machiavelli also advises the prince to "secure himself
 
skillfully against those who appear to him too bold."
 
(Ch. 10, 44) If he intends "bold" to indicate opposition to
 
himself, Machiavelli is, in fact, suggesting that the prince
 
must defend against the enemy from within as well, his own
 
subjects.
 
Further, he urges the prince "to give hope to the
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 subjects the evil won't last long.," (Ch. 10, 44) This
 
should not be difficult for a new prince if he believes
 
Machiavelli's counsel that "worldly things are so variable
 
that it is next to impossible for one to stand with one's
 
armies idle in a siege for a year." (Ch. 10, 44) In the
 
Discourses, however, Machiavelli observes that the Romans
 
"realized that if the army was routed, they acquire a king
 
dom in a day; whereas, if they besieged an obstinate city,
 
it might take years to get it," (II. 32, 381) and in a
 
letter to Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, he expresses the same
 
opinion, acknowledging the modern examples of "Rhodes and
 
Hungary" as well.®
 
Perhaps Machiavelli meant to imply that the prince need
 
not expect the siege to last long, owing to his weak prepar
 
ations for defense, for one could not describe the circum
 
stances of siege in Chapter Ten as a reflection of an "ob
 
stinate city." He makes no mention of military forces,
 
leaving the city's protection in the hands of his subjects—
 
or so it would appear. Machiavelli makes the pbint in the
 
Discourses that the people "cannot remain faithful to yoii
 
unless you are able to protect them." (II. 10, 300) The
 
prince> then, has little hope to "keep the spirits of his
 
citizens firm in the siege," (Ch. 10, 44) who, by the way,
 
are not his "citizens," but his subjects. Machiavelli's wry
 
hximor closes a chapter that is, in fact, a discourse on
 
weak princes who do not have "enough of a state" to rule by
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themselves, although he encourages them in the belief that
 
they do. His counsel that "men or money" suffice as the
 
sinews of war is antithetical to his beliefs, and reflects
 
\
 
the means by which he satirizes Cesare Borgia and other
 
Italian princes who were dependent on others, because they
 
lacked virtue of their own.
 
In Chapter Eleven, Machiavelli introduces the notion of \
 
ecclesiastical principalities, distinguishing the pope as
 
yet another manifestation of the rise to princely status
 
from private individual. As princes of the Church, most of
 
the popes in Machiavelli's time were prime movers in the
 
secular affairs of Italy.
 
Machiavelli notes, in the History, that Sixtus IV
 
(1471-84) "was the first to show what a pope could do, and
 
how many things earlier called sins could be hidden under
 
papal authority." He "gave the city of Forli" to his son,
 
Girolamo, and "this ambitious way of acting made the pope
 
more esteemed by the princes of Italy." Girolamo married
 
the daughter of the Duke of Milan and he received, as her
 
dowry, the "City of Imola."®
 
Innocent VIII (1484-92) fathered "sixteen children"^®
 
and "lived surrounded by [them]," as did his successor,
 
Alexander VI. Innocent wanted to "provide" his son,
 
Francesco, "with states and with friends through which he
 
could maintain himself." A marriage was arranged between
 
his son and the daughter of Lorenzo the Magnificent,'^ fol­
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lowing lavish solicitation on the part of Lorenzo for the
 
pope's affection, which resulted in the "[acceptance]
 
throughout Europe that the policies of the Curia were in
 
future to be directed by Florence, that, as in the time of
 
Cosimo, a Medici was once again to be virtual arbiter of
 
Italian policy," despite the fact that "Lorenzo's reputation
 
as a master of diplomacy was largely undeserved."'^
 
A great deal has already been said about the Borgia
 
pope, Alexander VI (1492-1503), singled out by Machiavelli
 
as the pope "of all the pontiffs there have ever been," who
 
(
 
"showed how far a pope could prevail with money and forces."
 
(Ch. 11, 46) The corruption of Alexander reflected the
 
corruption of Rome itself, a "sink of inequity" in which a
 
legion of prostitutes "[worked] in brothels licensed by the
 
papal authorities and many of them suffering from syphilis,
 
^a kind of illness very common among priests.'" Often "pro
 
fessional criminals" escaped punishment with "bribes. There
 
were alleged to be an average of fourteen murders a day [in
 
a population of roughly 50,000]," and the "stench from the
 
rows of rotting corpses of executed men" made it unpleasant
 
to "cross the bridge" beneath the Castle Sant' Angelo;
 
Rodrigo Borgia "secured his own succession as Alexander VI
 
by disbursing the most lavish gifts to all his rivals and
 
potential supporters. Five asses laden with gold were
 
believed to have entered the courtyard of one Cardinal,
 
Ascanio Sforza, whose own riches and influences might have
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defeated But the corrupt means that purchased the
 
papacy for Alexander paled in comparison with the venality
 
that sustained him during his tenure as prince of the Church
 
of Rome. "Obsessed" with his children, he gave away "the
 
riches of the Church" to them, for, "like many other men of
 
the culminating Renaissance, he had lost both his religion
 
and his morals by the too exclusive pursuit of purely self
 
ish advantage."^® Machiavelli describes him as a "wicked
 
pope, his head full of his own designs, [who] preyed on
 
Milan and Florence; the times served him well."^'
 
Nor was Julius II (1503-1513) "devoid of the family
 
spirit of his uncle, Sixtus IV. He persuaded the childless
 
Guidobaldo da Montefeltro to adopt his nephew, Francesco
 
della Rovere. His chief concern, however, was the defense
 
of the Papal State, and to that end, he strove "to prevent
 
the French from dominating Italy. To rid Italy of the
 
French, however, he formed an "inconsistent alliance with
 
Spain, and thus helped to rivet upon Italy the chains of its
 
first permanent subjection to foreign domination,"^" prompt
 
ing Francesco Guicciardini to accuse him as "the fatal
 
instrument of the ills of Italy. With Spanish arms,
 
Julius aided the return of the Medici to Florence, in 1512,
 
which terminated the republican government in which
 
Machiavelli had served, an enterprise that must have caused
 
feelings of deep resentment in Machiavelli. All the more
 
so, perhaps, because Julius soon realized the implications
 
235
 
of his actions, but too late; he became "[angry] with Cardi
 
nal de' Medici whom he had sent to get rid of Soderini, not
 
to make himself tyrant," and "declared [his] intention of
 
changing the government of Florence again, which, of
 
course, never transpired. Even if Julius had lived longer,
 
it is doubtful that he could have unseated the Medici,
 
reunited with their supporters and reclaiming the position
 
of power they took such pains to increase over so many
 
decades.
 
The death of Julius and the election of Cardinal
 
Giovanni as the new pope, in 1513, the same year that
 
Machiavelli wrote the Prince, extended the power of the
 
Medici in new and disconcerting ways for if, before, the
 
Medici endeavored to become princes of Florence, the wealth
 
and forces of the Church opened new vistas to their ambi
 
tion, which Machiavelli knew Leo X intended to pursue.^
 
Superficially at least, the parallels between the Borgia and
 
the Medici are quite striking, and once again, a Medici was
 
in position to influence the affairs of Italy.
 
Therefore, one should not be surprised to find that
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Machiavelli introduces the subject of ecclesiastical princi
 
palities with the same detached objectivity as that reflect
 
ed in his introduction to secular principalities, relative
 
to their acquisition "by virtue or by fortune," and how they
 
are maintained, in this case "without the one or the other."
 
(Ch. 11, 45) Quentin Skinner refers to the "self-conscidus­
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ly cool and abstract style" with which he "presents this
 
classification," and he remarks, "when he ends by discussing
 
the papacy [in Chapter Eleven], he insists on treating that
 
august institution--in a manner that must certainly have
 
startled his original readers—as nothing more than one of
 
the various principalities contending for power in Italy,
 
which is precisely the point that Machiavelli intended to
 
make with the style of his presentation. By referring to
 
the acquisitions of popes made on behalf of their sons and
 
relatives as "ecclesiastical principalities," Machiavelli
 
goes directly to the problem—that such acquisitions amount
 
ed to nothing more than the carving out of princedoms from
 
nepotic ambitions, and such enterprises both disrupted the
 
peace in Italy and threatened to upset the balance of power.
 
Further, the Church had become so corrupt it failed to
 
admonish those who made extravagant use of religion, from
 
reaching for empire to the sale of indulgences and profi
 
teering from the sale of "Church benefices,"^® as did
 
Alexander VI. To fund the mercenary condottieri of Cesare's
 
"Romagna army," Alexander "used the donations left by the
 
Jubilee Year pilgrims, dipped into the levies raised for the
 
Crusade on the incomes of clerics and Jews... [and] created
 
new cardinals" who paid handsomely "for the privilege."^
 
Machiavelli's contempt for the princes of the Church is
 
revealed in the manner in which he feigns innocence with the
 
false appearance of reverence with regard to ecclesiastical
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principalities; "But as they subsist by superior causes to
 
which the human mind does not reach, I'will omit speaking of
 
them; for since they are exhalted and maintained by God, it
 
would be the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to
 
discourse on them." (Ch. 11, 45) Foolhardy indeed. The
 
satirical malice he displays in this statement "bathes
 
[their] crimes in acid,"^ as satire is meant to do, for the
 
pontiffs made a mockery of God and the church, and
 
Machiavelli mocks them in turn for their lack of faith.
 
While Machiavelli says he "will omit speaking" of ecclesias
 
tical principalities, he devotes the remainder of his dis
 
course in Chapter Eleven to that subject. In fact, whenever
 
he mentions Cesare Borgia in the Prince, he is discussing
 
ecclesiastical principalities, and implicit in his dedica
 
tion of the Prince to the Medici is the notion that the
 
Medici seize power in Italy, in imitation of the Borgia
 
nepotism. Machiavelli's Prince not only beckons the Medici
 
to greatness, then, but the Church as well.
 
with the phrase "nonetheless," Machiavelli launches
 
into his discourse on ecclesiastical principalities, despite
 
the fact that he judges a man "presumptuous and foolhardy"
 
to do so; "Nonetheless, if someone were to inquire of me how
 
it came about that the Chutch haS: come to such greatness in
 
temporal affairs despite the fact, that, biefore Alexander,
 
the Italian powers, and not only those that are called
 
powers but every baron and lord, even the least, held her in
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low esteem in temporal affairs—and now a king of France
 
trembles at her and she has been able to remove him from
 
Italy and, to ruin the Venetians-—though this is known, it
 
does not seem to me superfluous to recall a good part of it
 
to memory."^* Although he speaks matter-of-factly regarding
 
the power and increasing reputation of the Church, we should
 
be on guard, for in the Discourses, Machiavelli faults the
 
"Church of Rome" for "approaching either ruin or scourge."
 
The bad example set by the "Court of Rome" has caused Italy
 
to lose "all devotion and all religion," and "has kept and
 
keeps Italy divided," preventing her from uniting under "one
 
prince" or "one republic." He observes that "in our own
 
day, it stripped Venice of its power with the help of
 
France, and, later on, drove out the French with the help of
 
the Swiss." (I. 12, 144-5) In Machiavelli^s view, then,
 
the Church was not an agent for unity, but disunion, and his
 
call to the Medici to unite Italy a fraudulent and cynical
 
barb.
 
Ivan Cloulas makes the point that from the time of
 
Sixtus IV, the papal states increasingly "came to resemble a
 
principality like all the others that squabbled for their
 
material interests alone. The only difference between it
 
and the petty Italian tyrannies was in the way power was
 
passed on—by election, not inheritance,"^® and, as
 
Machiavelli observes, "if up to our times they have planned
 
to leave their sons as princes, in the future they may
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strive to leave them the popedom as hereditary."^®
 
Machiavelli thus had little praise for the pontiffs of
 
a Church that had grown so corrupt, he viewed it as disrup
 
tive and dangerous to the peace of Italy, and the first
 
point he makes regarding the increasing "greatness in tempo
 
ral affairs" of the Church, in Chapter Eleven, (Ch. 11, 45)
 
concerns the balance of power maintained in Italy prior to
 
the arrival of King Charles VIII of France in 1494.
 
(Ch. 11, 45-6) Historically, from the time of the "Roman
 
ruins, nothing has afterwards been built to redeem her from
 
those ruins so that under the government of a strong ruler
 
she could proceed gloriously; nonetheless some of the new
 
cities and new states born among the Roman ruins showed such
 
great ability "that, though one of them did not master the
 
others, they nevertheless were so united and so well orga
 
nized that they freed Italy and defended her from the bar
 
barians," including Florence. The decline in "vigor,"
 
however, that followed Cgsimo's rise to power, in 1434,
 
"opened" a new road to the "barbarians" in what Machiavelli
 
describes as a "corrupt world," in the History, leading
 
ultimately to a severe disruption of the balance of power
 
previously maintained by "the pope, the Venetians, the king
 
of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines," (Ch. 11,
 
45-6) as described by Machiavelli in the Prince. The ambi
 
tion of the popes played a significant role in disrupting
 
that balance, which he emphasizes in the remaining discourse
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of Chapter Eleven. The problem, as Machiavelli pointed out
 
in the History, is that no ruler emerged from the "Roman
 
ruins" who could govern in such a manner as to inspire Italy
 
to "proceed gloriously." No Romulus reappeared to found a
 
new civic state—one that Machiavelli would have approved
 
of—governed to promote the public interest with good laws
 
and justice, defended with well-organized military forces,
 
"enlisted," from the ranks of the people who "were of age
 
to bear arms;" the virtue of one's own arms.'^
 
The tenuous balance of power maintained by the five
 
major powers in Italy, imperfect as it was, at least pre
 
vented any one member from rising up to tyrannize the oth
 
ers. As Machiavelli remarks in the Prince, "these powers
 
had to have two principle concerns; one, that a foreigner
 
not enter into Italy with arms; the other, that none of them
 
enlarge his state," (Ch. 11, 46) both of which were violated
 
by the popes, although it was the duke of Milan who initiat
 
ed the process of decline by inviting King Charles into
 
Italy, which "completely shattered the delicately balanced
 
peninsular relations"^^ of the past, from which Italy never
 
recovered.
 
Of the major powers in Italy, Machiavelli states that
 
"the pope and the Venetians" were the greatest, "and to hold
 
back the Venetians the union of all the others was needed,
 
as in the defense of Ferrara; and to hold down the pope they
 
made use of the barons in Rome," the "Orsini and Colonna"
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factions. (Ch. 11, 45-46) Having already made the point in
 
Chapter Eleven that the Church "[ruined] the Venetians,"
 
(Ch. 11, 45) Machiavelli then turns to the greatness of
 
Alexander VI who, "with Duke Valentino as his instrument [a
 
generally degrading reference to Cesare], did all the things
 
I discussed above in the actions of the duke." (Ch. 11, 46)
 
That is, Cesare murdered or otherwise destroyed both the
 
Colonna and the Orsini, as discussed in Chapter Seven, thus
 
freeing the pope from the former restraints to his power
 
provided by their factions. Therefore, the opportunity for
 
the Church to seize power in Italy had never been greater
 
than in the present, or, to be more accurate, the opportuni
 
ty for a pope to establish his family in power had never
 
been greater, were it not for the inconvenience of the
 
"brevity of their lives," (Ch. 11, 46) which was the cause
 
of Cesare's ruin, for the "princedoms" established by pon
 
tiffs "lived but a short while.""* Thus, when Machiavelli
 
urges the Medici to seize Italy in Chapter TWenty-six, as
 
"he does not know what time has been more apt for it,"
 
(Ch. 26, 102) he is, in fact, issuing a call to arms that he
 
knew had little hope of lasting success, but which would
 
ultimately "[redound] to the greatness of the Church," with
 
the death of the pope. And, as I mentioned above,
 
Machiavelli had little regard for priestly rule that had
 
ruined both the Church and state.
 
Therefore, when Machiavelli concludes Chapter Eleven by
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stating, "His Holiness Pope Leo, then, has found this pon
 
tificate most powerful; one may hope that if others made it
 
great with arms, h4, with his goodness and infinite other
 
virtues [^infinite' greatly exaggerates his point], can make
 
it very great and venerable," (Ch. 11, 47) he expresses a
 
desire that the Church continue increasing in greatness, an
 
end that Machiavelli opposed not only as an Italian, but as
 
a Florentine republican devoted to democratic principles.
 
There was no reason to think that the Medici would govern
 
Italy in a manner other than that Which they had demonstrat
 
ed in Florence. And of Leo's nepotic ambition, although
 
doomed to failure for the reasons given above, his enter
 
prises Would, nonetheless, hasten the demise of Italy,
 
already in travail.
 
Machiavelli began to establish the ground in this
 
Chapter for his farcical treatment, in Chapter Twenty-six,
 
of the greatness of the Church inextricably joined with the
 
greatness of the Medici, in a biblical calling comparable to
 
the Exodus in the Old Testament-^-a provocative lampoon on
 
the first family of Florence.
 
And in the proud rascal's fall, he nev
 
ertheless did not forget Mohametf.^®
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Chapter XIII. No Art But the Art of War
 
In Chapters Twelve through Fourteen, Machiavelli advis
 
es the new prince on military affairs. He faults reliance
 
on Italian mercenaries and foreign auxiliary forces, which
 
is in accord with his principles or theory of the art of
 
war. He first dedicated the Prince to Giuliano de' Medici,
 
however, who had no interest or ability in military matters
 
and thus, although his recommendations are sincere for the
 
most part, they are also humorous and ironic in their ef
 
fect. Giuliano was "the last man to be attracted by the
 
notion of imitating the Borgia," and "wanted no more than to
 
occupy the same social position in Florence that his magnif
 
icent father had held, and not even that if it was too much
 
trouble."^ The notion that Giuliano should practice no art
 
"but the art of war," (Ch. 14, 58) then, as Machiavelli
 
advises the new prince, smacks of ridicule and contempt, not
 
only for Giuliano but for Pope Leo, as well, who made
 
Giuliano "Gonfaloniers" of the Church, the same position as
 
that held by Cesare under Pope Alexander.
 
Before Machiavelli offers his argument against the use
 
of mercenary arms, in Chapter Twelve, he satirizes the
 
absence Of good laws and justice in tyrannical regimes; "the
 
principle foundation that all states have, new ones as well
 
as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And because
 
there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and
 
where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall
 
244
 
leave out reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms." (Ch.
 
12, 48) This omission is a critical one, used by
 
Machiavelli to minimize the importance of law despite the
 
fact that "justice is the foundation of Machiavellian theo
 
ry."^ Commentators such as Ernest Cassirer have observed
 
that Machiavelli "discarded" th^e "idea" of "Plato and his
 
followers [who] saw the state as founded on law, but that
 
is not the case, although Machiavelli would have us believe
 
that it is in the Prince. Rather, he thought that laws were
 
the critical element of good foundations, such as those
 
"laws" given by "Romulus, Numa, and others," that kept Rome
 
"so rich in virtue," (I; 1, 104) providing for good order
 
from which proceeded well ordered arms. The notion, then,
 
that there "cannot be good laws where there are not good
 
arms" is simply not true. In his Preamble to A Provision
 
For Infantry, Machiavelli states;
 
\
 
Whereas it has been observed by the
 
Magnificent and Exhalted Signers that
 
all republics which in times past have
 
preserved and increased themselves have
 
always had as their chief basis two
 
things, to wit, justice and arms, in
 
order to restrain and to govern their
 
subjects, and in order to defend them
 
selves from their enemies; and whereas
 
they have observed that your republic is
 
well founded on good and holy laws, and
 
organized for the administration of
 
justice, and that she lacks only to be
 
well provided with arms; and since
 
through long experience, indeed with
 
great expense and danger, she has
 
learned how little hope it is possible
 
to place in foreign and hired arms, be
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cause when they are numerous and of high
 
repute they are either unendurable or
 
suspected, and if they are few and with
 
out reputation, they are of no use,
 
these signers judge it well that she
 
should be armed with her own weapons and
 
with her own men/
 
Therefore, good laws do not mean that a city or state
 
will have good arms. In fact, Florence relied on arms that
 
were not good (mercenary and auxiliary) for "nearly two
 
centuries,"^ during which time the preservation of the
 
republic was always at risk.
 
Nor is it accurate to suppose that "where there are
 
good arms there must be good laws." It is true that in the
 
Discourses, Machiavelli remarks, "Although I have said
 
elsewhere that the security of all states is based on good
 
military discipline, and that where it does not exist, there
 
can neither be good laws nor anything else that is good, to
 
repeat this does not seem superfluous... one sees that the
 
soldiery cannot be good unless they are in training, and
 
that it is impossible to train them unless they are your own
 
subjects." (III. 31, 491) The point he is making in this
 
passage, aside from the importance of organizing and train
 
ing one's own forces, is that nothing is good in the sense
 
that it will endure and remain secure without good military
 
discipline, because "where military organization is good
 
there must needs be good order,"® and "no government is
 
stable without providing itself with a protector," comprised
 
of citizens of the state or one's own subjects.
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To suppose/ however, that "where there are good arms
 
there must be good laws [Italics mine]" Is untrue, particu
 
larly if we consider Machiavelli's understanding of good
 
laws, which centered upon the issue of the common good, laws
 
favorable to the preservation of liberty rather than those
 
formulated to secure and increase the power of a tyrant. It
 
is doubtful that Machiavelli would have described the law of
 
t
 
Agathocles as good, despite the fact that his arms were very
 
good. Julius Caesar made himself dictator after raising
 
himself up-through the ranks of the military as well. Of
 
Caesar, Machiavelli observes, "it was neither the name nor
 
the rank of the dictator that made Rome servile, but the
 
loss of authority of which the citizens were deprived by the
 
length of his rule. If in Rome there had been no such rank,
 
the dictator would have found some other; for it is easy for
 
force to acquire a title, but not for a title to acquire
 
force," (I. 34, 194) Agathocles and Julius Caesar, then, did
 
not generate laws for the public good as a consequence of
 
good arms but, rather, increased their own authority and
 
security, which was prejudicial to the security of the
 
larger community.
 
Further, Machiavelli does not merely dismiss the sub
 
ject of law in this chapter, but states that he will "leave
 
out reasoning on laws." (Ch. 12, 48) As he says in Chapter
 
Eighteen, "Laws" are proper to "man," and "force" is proper
 
to "beasts." (Ch. 18, 69) As a product of reason, laws
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should serve "the common good," in Machiavelli's view, as
 
exemplified in the actions of "Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and
 
other founders of kingdoms and republics" who used their
 
authority for that purpose. (I. i, 133) Force, on the other
 
hand, is proper to beasts and, in Chapter Eighteen,
 
Machiavelli advises the new prince to cultivate that side of
 
his nature. (Ch. 18, 69) The force of arms becomes the law
 
in tyrannical regimes. The notion that "I shall leave out ^
 
reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms" (Ch. 12, 48) is,
 
then, perhaps one of the most distinctive markers of his
 
satire in the Prince.
 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli makes the point that
 
after Rome "became an Empire," the emperor deserved "praise"
 
if he "acted like good princes, in accordance with the
 
laws," in which case he would have "no need of soldiers to
 
form a praetorian guard, nor a multitude of legions to
 
protect" him, for his "defense" resides in his "habits, the
 
goodwill of the people, and the affection of the senate."
 
(I. 10, 136) This would seem good advice for a new prince
 
were it not for the fact that Machiavelli is not educating a
 
good prince, in the Prince, but a tyrant.
 
Because of his vile crimes, Cesare Borgia is described
 
by Garrett Mattingly as having been seen "sometimes swagger
 
ing through the streets with the powerful armed guards he
 
felt he needed to protect him from the vengeance of the
 
Orsini,"' an arrogant Cesare, even in his demise. Lorenzo
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the Magnificent was provided with an armed guard to "defend
 
him from domestic plots" following .the Pazzi conspiracy,®
 
furnished by Florentine citizens to protect him from other
 
citizens in the city. Before he became pope. Cardinal
 
Giovanni de' Medici returned to Florence, in 1512, "with
 
1,500 troops and entered his former palace in the full
 
panoply of his rank with the air of a man who had returned
 
to his native city in order to rule it."' As Machiavelli
 
observes, the "constitution was destroyed," and force was
 
required to return to the (Medici faction) former modes of
 
governing. Corrupt factions "make laws and statutes not for
 
the public benefit but for their own."^"
 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli cautions that a prince
 
should not rule "tyrannically" and "violate the laws," for
 
"princes should learn... that they begin to lose their state
 
the moment they begin to break the laws and to disregard the
 
ancient traditions and customs under which men have long
 
lived." (III. 5, 395-6) Yet, Machiavelli remarks, in Chap
 
ter Twenty-six, that "nothing brings so much honor to a man
 
rising newly as the new laws and the new orders found by
 
him." (Ch. 26, 103-4) At every opportunity, then, in the
 
Prince, Machiavelli mocks the new prince for his reliance on
 
force rather than the rule of law, the beast that overtakes
 
reason.
 
Of mercenary arms, Machiavelli notes that they are both
 
"useless and dangerous," (Ch. 12, 48) and "have led Italy
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into slavery and disgrace." (Ch. 12, 53) Most importantly,
 
"one sees that only princes and armed republics make very
 
great progress; nothing but harm ever comes from mercenary
 
arms. And a republic armed with its own arms is brought to
 
obey one of its citizens with more difficulty than is a
 
republic armed with foreign arms," (Ch. 12, 50) such as
 
those of "Alberigo da Conio from Romagna" who first "gave
 
reputation to this kind of military," followed by, "among
 
others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their times were the
 
arbiters of Italy. After them came all the others who have
 
controlled these arms until our times," (Ch. 12, 52-3) which
 
includes Cesare Borgia who was, himself, a condottieri.
 
Thus, "Italy has been overrun by Charles, taken as booty by
 
Louis, violated by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss," as
 
a result of the Italian mercenaries who fought disgraceful
 
ly, with "military orders" described by Machiavelli as
 
"discovered by them... so as to escape trouble and dangers."
 
(Ch. 12, 53)
 
In Chapter Thirteen, Machiavelli continues his argument
 
against "useless arms," (Ch. 13, 54) those of auxiliary and
 
mixed forces. Auxiliary arms "are those of a power that is
 
called to come with its arms to help and defend you," (Ch.
 
13, 54) as in the example of Pope Julius II, who created
 
alliances with France, Germany, and Spain. "Mixed" arms are
 
"part mercenary and part [one's] own." (Ch. 13, 56)
 
Machiavelli gives the example of France, who hired the
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Swiss, but a more pertinent example would have been Cesare
 
Borgia who relied on a few of his own forces, the French,
 
and the Italian mercenaries. Nor does Machiavelli mention
 
that Louis not only hired the Swiss, but relied on Cesare,
 
as well.
 
With mercenary arms, Machiavelli notes that "laziness
 
is more dangerous," while with auxiliary arms, "virtue is,"
 
for with auxiliary forces, "ruin is accomplished; they are
 
all united, all resolved to obey someone else." (Ch. 13, 55)
 
Machiavelli is consistent in this opinion in his works,
 
which contributes to an air of authenticity in his satire.
 
And in his conclusion to Chapter Thirteen, he reiterates a
 
familiar theme, applicable to republics and principalities
 
alike; "without its own arms no principality is secure; in
 
deed, it is wholly obliged to fortune [as was Cesare Borgia]
 
since it does not have virtue to defend itself in adversi
 
ty." (Ch. 13, 57) Nevertheless, there are elements of dis
 
tortion in both Chapters Twelve and Thirteen.
 
In Chapter Twelve, Machiavelli cites Philip of Macedon,
 
who "was made captain of their troops by the Thebians; and
 
after his victory he took their liberty from them." (Ch. 12,
 
50) As Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. observes, however, "Philip
 
(who does not appear to have been a mercenary captain) be
 
came king of Macedon in 359 and occupied Thebes in 338."^^
 
The example of Philip, then, is not appropriate to the con
 
text of mercenary arms, and renders the text untrustworthy.
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In the example of Pope Julius II, in Chapter Thirteen,
 
Machiavelli states that he turned to foreign (auxiliary)
 
arms but was saved by his "good fortune" and the Swiss; "for
 
when his auxiliaries [Spain] were defeated at Ravenna [in
 
1512], the Swiss rose up and, beyond all expectations, his
 
own and others, drove out the victors; and he came out a
 
prisoner neither of his enemies [France], who had fled, nor
 
of his auxiliaries, since he had won with arms other than
 
theirs." (Ch. 13, 54) Julius was saved by mercenary arms,
 
the Swiss, whom Machiavelli lauds as "masters of modern
 
warfare." (I. 16, 321) Machiavelli creates confusion over
 
the issue of mercenary arms by giving praise to the Swiss
 
mercenaries while faulting mercenary arms generally. Had he
 
made the point that the Swiss exhibited extraordinary abili
 
ty in Chapter Twelve, he would have contradicted his criti
 
cism of mercenary arms, which, despite his reference to the
 
"Carthaginians" and "Philip of Macedon," (Ch. 12, 50) was
 
aimed solely at his fellow Italians. Of the Swiss, he
 
states that they "are very well armed and very free,"
 
(Ch. 12, 50) thereby neglecting to define them as mercenar
 
ies, as in his reference to Julius II, in this chapter, who
 
was saved by the "Swiss" when his "auxiliaries were defeated
 
at Ravenna."
 
While Machiavelli makes the point that Julius II did
 
not come out a "prisoner" of France or Spain, as a result of
 
his campaign, the Florentines did become prisoner of the
 
252
 
 Medici once again, a notion that Machiavelli would avoid in
 
a work dedicated to the Medici, but one that is appropriate
 
to his republican sentiment. He refers to Florence in the
 
following sentence, but in a different context, (Ch. 13, 54)
 
prompting the realization that what Julius avoided was, as a
 
result of his actions, visited on his native city. Subtle
 
nuances of interpretation rely on an intimate knowledge of
 
the satirist's thoughts and beliefs, and therein resides the
 
■ V 
elusive quality of indirect satire, far better understood in
 
intimate circles of the author, among those who are not
 
fooled by the slick surface of sincerity but who are, rath
 
er, regaled by his wit and chicanery.
 
As a Condottieri, Cesare Borgia's arms were in the hire
 
not only,of the Church (which funded his enterprises), but
 
also of others, such as "Bentivoglio" of Balogna, who "en
 
gaged the pope's son as a condottieri in his service, prom
 
ising to reward him with 100 cavalry squadrons of three men
 
each—a sizeable revenue for Cesare." Further, "the Floren
 
tine government signed a treaty with him, offering him a
 
condotta—that is, taking him for three years as a condotti
 
eri at a salary of 30,000 ducats a year, with Cesare supply
 
ing 300 cavalry squadrons," although the Florentines "had
 
signed the agreement without the slightest intention of
 
sticking to it. In Chapter Twelve, Machiavelli makes a
 
"pun on the contract (condotta) by which a condottieri is
 
hired,"" in reference to the faults of mercenaries. As
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Cesare was a condottieri, then, with arms for hire, a great
 
irony is apparent, for when Machiavelli praises the arms of
 
Cesare, he is, in fact, praising the arms of a mercenary in
 
Italy.
 
In praise of having arms of one's own, in Chapter Thir
 
teen, Machiavelli gives the example of David and Goliath
 
from the Old Testament, in an illustration that is loaded
 
with symbolism appropriate to satire, and one that has
 
(justifiably) bewildered scholars down to the present;
 
Machiavelli puts a knife in David's hand:
 
I want further to recall to memory a
 
figure of the Old Testament apt for this
 
purpose. When David offered to Saul to
 
go and fight Goliath, the Philistine
 
challenger, Saul, to give him spirit,
 
armed him with his own arms—which
 
David, as soon as he had them on, re
 
fused, saying that with them he could
 
hot give a good account of himself, and
 
so he would rather meet the enemy with
 
his sling and his knife. (Ch. 13, 56)
 
Machiavelli's "account of this episode differs signifi
 
cantly," as Harvey C. Mansfield observes, "from the biblical
 
original in I Samuel 17:38-40, 50-51."" Indeed, having re
 
fused the armour and sword offered by Saul, the bible gives
 
the following account of David's arms; "And he took his
 
staff in his hand, and chose him five smooth stones out of
 
the brook, and put them in a shepherd's bag which he had,
 
even in a scrip; and his sling was in his hand; and he drew
 
near the Philistine. Clearly David had no knife, nor did
 
Saul offer him one. "Since [the biblical account] says that
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David had no sword, coltello is hardly to be translated
 
sword, as often in sixteenth-century Italian. David is>
 
however, often represented with Goliath's sword, which he
 
took after striking the giant down with a stone from his
 
sling," as Felix Gilbert explains.^® L. Arthur Burd remarks,
 
"strictlyv speaking this is inaccurate: there is no mention
 
of ^cotello' in I. Samuel xvii. Possibly Machiavelli mis
 
read verse 51."" That is, if Machiavelli didn't get it
 
right, he must have read it wrong—not a very compelling
 
explanation. Machiavelli was very familiar with the Bible,
 
having made several references to it in his works.
 
A more likely explanation is that Machiavelli intended
 
the "knife" to represent a satirical marker, a device to
 
"call attention" to a "disruptive detail" which is "funny
 
[or remarkable] when it is considered a sign of inferiori
 
ty,"" which is indeed the effect Machiavelli achieves, when
 
it is understood. Because David is misrepresented, the
 
story of David and Goliath is robbed of its moral integrity
 
and meaning.
 
According to the account in the Bible, "David put his
 
hand in his bag, and took thence a stone, and slang it, and
 
smote the Philistine in his forehead, that the stone sunk
 
into his forehead; and he fell upon his face to the earth.
 
So David prevailed over the Philistine with a sling and
 
stone, and smote the Philistine, and slew him; but there was
 
no sword in the hand of David. Therefore, David ran, and
 
\
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stood upon the Philistine and took his sword, and drew it
 
out of the sheath thereof, and slew him, and cut off his
 
head therewith."^® Thus David used, in part, the arms of
 
another, his enemy, to slay Goliath. In weighing the value
 
of one's own arms, there are shades of humor and irony in
 
his example.
 
The point that Machiavelli makes in the example of
 
David, however, represented with a knife, is that modern
 
princes combat their enemies more often than not with
 
treachery, rather than meet their foe on the battlefield,
 
the traditional proving ground of valor and ability (and
 
even in battle, the Italian mercenaries fought disgraceful
 
ly). Cesare Borgia did not defeat the Orsini and Colonna in
 
the arena of battle, but with villainous deceit. A "knife"
 
reflects the inglorious path of murder, conspiracy, intrigue
 
and revenge, while a sword symbolizes the art of war, glory,
 
and military virtue, a notion expressed in Aristophane's The
 
Clouds—a play that emphasized the departure from custom and
 
tradition (Philosophy) evident in the moderns (Sophistry),
 
and the teachings of Socrates: 
Philosophy 
Er... Peleus, for e
sword. 
xample. 
Why, i
His vi
nstances abound. 
rtue won him a 
V 
Sophistry 
A sword, 
you say? What a charming little profit for the
 
poor sucker! Look at our Hyperbolos: nothing
 
virtuous, about him, God knows, and yet, what with
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peddling lamps—plus a knack for swindling—he
 
piled up a huge profit. All cold cash.
 
No swords for him. No sir, hypbolos and
 
swords just don't mix.^^
 
If the sword is associated with chivalry and military
 
might, the knife, in contrast, reflects underhanded methods
 
that are often used to combat power and authority, as in
 
conspiracies against princes. In the Discourses,
 
Machiavelli remarks that a prince "can never so despoil
 
anyone but that there will remain to him a knife with which
 
to wreak vengeance," (III. 6, 400) and in the Prince, he
 
cautions that the new prince "is always under necessity to
 
hold a knife in his hand" if he does not commit all offenses
 
"in a stroke," (Ch. 8, 38) in which case a prince would
 
likely have every necessity to beware of conspiracy. In the
 
Pazzi conspiracy, Giuliano de' Medici, brother of Lorenzo
 
the Magnificent (who survived) was murdered with a knife,
 
and perhaps Machiavelli intended that the knife in David's
 
hand symbolize that event and other conspiracies against the
 
Medici, which I will discuss in connection with the particu
 
lar relevance of David to the Republic of Florence.
 
Symbolism is a useful device in the satirists arsenal
 
of ci:*eative artifice. "Like the poet, the satirist uses
 
symbols frequently, but his reason for using them is not
 
quite the same as that of the poet. The poet uses symbols
 
to represent things; the satirist sometimes ulses symbols to
 
misrepresent things. He often makes use of symbols as a
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 means of indirection and distortion." Machiavelli used the
 
"knife" both to represent and misrepresent David, in the
 
eyes of his fellow Florentines.
 
In the biblical account of David and Goliath, David is
 
the moral exemplar of virtue inspired by his faith in God,
 
and it is his faith that is compromised by Machiavelli's
 
misrepresentation with the knife. The point is not that
 
David downed the giant with his sling and a stone, but that
 
they were sufficient because he was empowered by God,
 
anointed as the new king of Israel.^' Therefore, when
 
Machiavelli states that David "could not give a good account
 
of himself [Italics mine] with Saul's arms," (Ch. 13, 56) he
 
makes it appear that the defeat of Goliath was David's
 
personal victory, thus robbing David of his faith, which
 
mirrors the lack of faith in modern princes. Putting a
 
knife in David's hand removes the obstacle of faith
 
altogether.
 
■ 1 
On another level, as I said above, the knife may have
 
been intended to represent the defence of the Florentine
 
republic. David "had long been a symbol of, Florentine
 
liberty" and "civic virtue,"^ represented in the marble
 
figure of David by Michelangelo, completed in 1504, and
 
"placed at the entrance of the Palazzo Vecchio, on the
 
Piazza della Signoria," in Florence. Michelangelo's David
 
is described as having the quality of "some timeless moment
 
as a personification of vigilance and courage,"^ appropriate
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to the traditional republican ideals of the city. Although
 
he did many works of sculpture for the Medici during his
 
lifetime, Michelangelo remained in Florence during the
 
period in Which the Florentines fought to restore the repub
 
lic, (1527-30) and the Medici were in exile, designing fort
 
ifications to aid in defense of the city. His fidelity to
 
the Republic of Florence would seem to have outweighed any
 
sense of personal gratitude he may have felt toward the
 
Medici, as his benefactors of long standing^
 
A knife in David's hand, then, may have signified the
 
defense of Florentine liberty by a means as corrupt as the
 
Medici were themselves, whose lack of "civic virtue" and,
 
disregard for "1iberty" perverted the traditional symbolism
 
of David. There was another figure of David that also stood
 
in the Palazzo Vecchio, that of Donatello's, which was
 
associated with the Medici. From the time of Cosimo,
 
Donatello's David stood in the Medici courtyard. In 1495,
 
however, following Piero de' Medici's exile from Florence,
 
it was moved to the Palazzo, and is described as having
 
"little to do with the ethos of Biblical heroes," reflecting
 
"not an ideal but an object of desire, strongly androgynous
 
in its combination of sinewy angularity with feminine soft
 
ness and fullness, attired in "military boots," and a hat
 
similar to "a type of hat popular in the fourteenth and
 
fifteenth centuries for hunting and traveling. It was a
 
modernized David, and not the sort of image that would
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likely have appealed to Machiavelli as a representation of
 
David's virtue, or as symbolic of republican liberty and
 
civic virtue. In the Discourses, Machiavelli observes that
 
idle republics become "effeminate or give rise to factions"
 
in time of peace, "and these two things, either in conjunc
 
tion or separately, will bring about its downfall."
 
(I. 6, 123) The Medici faction contributed to the ruin of
 
the republic, and the Medici themselves typified the Renais
 
sance as patrons of the arts and men of letters, the refined
 
pursuits that times of peace provide. As Machiavelli ob
 
serves in the History, "the discerning have noted that
 
letters come after arms, and that in countries and cities
 
generals are born earlier than philosophers... the virtue of
 
military courage cannot be more corrupted with a more honor
 
able laziness than that of letters, nor with a greater and
 
more dangerous deception can this laziness enter into well-

regulated cities.^" The Medici typified the honorable pur
 
suits that defined the Italian Renaissance, but by
 
Machiavelli's standards, their appreciation of the past was
 
but a superficial endeavor. That is, it was one thing to be
 
familiar with the ancients and their ethics and values, but
 
quite another to think of imitating them in one's own ac
 
tions and character.
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Donatello's David, then, poised in the shade of his
 
Renaissance hat, typified in its own way the transition from
 
military virtue to the more delicate pursuits that dignified
 
the Medici and other great men of the Renaissance era. That
 
is not to suggest that Machiavelli did not find such pur
 
suits honorable; "those are to be held to be infamous and
 
detestable who extirpate religion, subvert kingdoms and
 
republics, make war on virtue, on letters, and on any art
 
that brings advantage and honour to the human race, i.e. the
 
profane, the violent, the ignorant, the worthless, the idle,
 
the coward," (I. 10, 135) but "honour" for the "human race"
 
is not quite the same thing as seeking reputation as patrons
 
of the arts for personal reputation and political gain. As
 
Garrett Mattingly remarks, the motives of "Italian prince
 
lings" led them to "[patronize] scholars" in order "to
 
foster an empty Ciceronian elegance designed solely to
 
secure the immortality of the patron by enshrining his name
 
in aureate verse and ornate prose, and while these pur
 
suits, including the construction of great buildings, can be
 
said to have benefited the public, they also contributed to
 
the persona of wealth and power enjoyed by the Medici, whom
 
Machiavelli might have charged with having more concern for
 
their personal reputation than the safety and preservation
 
of the city of Florence and her liberty, particularly in
 
times that demanded full attention to military preparedness.
 
Donatello's David, then, may have suggested the subject of
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David for his satire, especially when viewed in contrast
 
with Michelangelo's David, each symbolic of different values
 
in different times, reflecting the corrosive influence of
 
the Medici themselves on the traditional ideals of Florence,
 
"civic virtue" and "liberty," more revered in the past than
 
in the corrupt present.
 
Machiavelli introduces Chapter Fourteen with the notion
 
that the new prince should think of nothing but war; "Thus,
 
a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought,
 
nor take anything else as his art but the art of war and its
 
orders and disciplines; for that is the only art which is of
 
cpncern to one who commands," (Ch. 14, 58) and "he should
 
never lift his thoughts from the exercise of war, and in
 
peace he should exercise it more than in war." (Ch. 14, 59)
 
I'm not certain that anyone could say, with confidence, what
 
he intended to convey in the latter sentence. In the for
 
mer, however, he clearly meant to exclude from the reader's
 
consideration all other arts associated with princely rule
 
save that of the art of war. John H. Geerken makes the
 
point that "Fabrizio Colonna, who is the principal interloc
 
utor in The Art of War (Book One), said that war is not his
 
only business and occupation; rather, his profession is
 
governing his subjects well and defending and protecting
 
them—ends requiring as means the simultaneous study of the
 
arts of peace and war,"^^ and in the Discourses, Machiavelli
 
argues that a "good prince" provides for the security of his
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subjects with "a world replete with peace and justice," (I.
 
10, 137) in which the common good is not sacrificed to the
 
ambition of the ruler. Because the new prihce must think of
 
his own interests before all other considerations, however,
 
he must constantly be in "command" and conduct his affairs
 
accordingly. If his rule is absolute, he will always be at
 
war with his enemies within, who desire to recover their
 
liberty, nor can he grant any measure of authority to his
 
subjects, without diminishing that of his own.
 
Machiavelli betrays his own principles when he states
 
that "it is of such virtue [the art of war] that not only
 
does it maintain those who have been born princes but many
 
times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that
 
rank," (Ch. 14, 58) a reference to men like Julius Caesar,
 
Sulla, and Marius:
 
When a citizen had been for long in
 
command of an army, he won the army over
 
and made it his partisan; so that it
 
came in time to forget of the Senate and
 
to recognize its commander alone as its
 
head. It thus came about that Sulla and
 
Marius were able to find troops to sup
 
port them in actions contrary to the
 
public good, and it thus came about that
 
Caesar was able to reduce his country^ to
 
subjection. Had the Romans not pro
 
longed offices and military commands,
 
they would not have attained such great
 
power in so short a time, and, had they
 
been slower in making conquests, they
 
would also have been slower to arrive at
 
servitude. (III. 24, 474)
 
Machiavelli's "heroes" were men like "Agesilaus and
 
Timoleon, Brutus and Scipio" rather than "Pisistratus or
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Julius Caesar who extinguished republican regimes and de
 
stroyed their spirit by exploiting human weaknesses. With
 
their armies, "Caesar" and "Agathocles... at one stroke sub
 
jugated their country by means of the forces they command
 
ed," while others, such as "Pisistratus" and "Pandolfo
 
Petrucci" achieved the same "aim" with smaller forces, over
 
time. (III. 6, 421) Ruin comes about because, in corrupt
 
times, the people are "blinded" and "unaware of the yoke
 
which they thetiselves [have] placed on their necks." Thus,
 
even "when Caesar was killed, and Gaius Caligula and Nero
 
were killed, and the whole of Caesar's stock was extermin
 
ated," Rome "was not only unable ever to maintain liberty,
 
but could not even make a start... This was due to the
 
corruption with which the Marion faction had impregnated the
 
populace." (I. 17, 158) One is reminded of Pope Leo's mot
 
to, "Truly my yoke is easy," written beneath "his personal
 
device—an ox-yoke,"^ in Florence, reflective of the power
 
of the Medici faction, destructive to the liberty of Flor
 
ence as was the Marius faction in Rome.
 
Machiavelli's recommendation, then, that the new prince
 
take no art but the art of war, together with his tacit
 
approval of commanders who rise through the military to the
 
rank of prince indicate the degree to which he distorts his
 
advice in the Prince, to suit the necessity of the prince.
 
Machiavelli himself imitates the moderns by advocating the
 
ends and means of his adversaries, those who craved personal
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power and empire. He puts into his own mouth the counsel of
 
a fool, in mockery of the times and the men who shaped
 
events.
 
And as Machiavelli exhorts the new prince to "do as
 
some excellent man has done in the past who found someone to
 
imitate who had been praised and glorified before him, whose
 
actions he always kept beside himself," he includes the ex
 
ample of "Caesar" who imitated "Alexander." (Ch. 14, 60)
 
Machiavelli did not consider Julius Caesar an "excellent
 
man," but his example reminds one of Cesare Borgia who in
 
turn imitated Julius Caesar—and always kept the actions of
 
his "illustrious namesake" beside himself in the "episodes
 
of Caesar's triumphs" that were "engraved" on his "parade
 
sword. As Garrett Mattingly remarked, reading "The Prince
 
as satire... gives a new dimension and meaning to passages
 
unremarkable before,"^® even in the small details that other
 
wise pass unnoticed.
 
Machiavelli's mention of Xenophon's "Life of Cyrus," in
 
Chapter Fourteen, permitted him—should anyone wonder that a
 
prince take no art but the art of war—the pretense of^
 
1
 
sincerity, for Cyrus was a great warrior who created an
 
empire. The modern princes, however, did not have the
 
requisite military virtue to imitate Cyrus in the art of
 
war. Machiavelli displays his caustic humor in suggesting
 
such comparisons.
 
Most obvious, however, is Machiavelli's omission of
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Cesare Borgia, his model prince, in a chapter devoted to war
 
and its modes and orders—for Cesare was a man born to
 
arms,the quintessential prince who thought of nothing but
 
war, the prime exemplar whom, Machiavelli states, he would
 
imitate himself if he "were a new prince."''
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Chapter XIV. Effectual Truth; The Vices of Princes
 
In Chapters Fifteen through Eighteen, Machiavelli
 
discourses on the character of the new prince, and how he
 
should conduct himself with regard to those qualities that
 
are deserving of praise or blame—whether to be liberal or
 
parsimonious, cruel or merciful, faithful or unfaithful, and
 
how to avoid hatred and contempt. He remarks, "and because
 
I know that many have written of this, I fear that in writ
 
ing of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially in
 
disputing this matter I depart from the orders of others.
 
But since my intent is to write something useful for whoever
 
understands it, it has appeared more fitting to go directly
 
to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination
 
of it," because "a man who wants to make a profession of
 
good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are
 
not good." Therefore, "it is necessary to a prince, if he
 
wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be
 
good, and to use this or not use it, according to necessi
 
ty." (Ch. 15, 61)
 
There is nothing revolutionary (or even new) in the
 
notion that in affairs of state republics, monarchs and
 
princes alike have always been under the necessity to be
 
vigilant in their responsibility to the governed, to cor
 
rectly and prudently assess the actions of any power that
 
might threaten the peace, stability, and well being of their
 
state, and respond accordingly. Machiavelli's intent is not
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merely to admonish the new pririce to exercise caution,
 
however, as any wise ruler should do. Rather, he has set up
 
in the minds of his readers a necessity to pursue corrupt
 
means, thus "departing from the orders of others," the an
 
cients whose wisdom and virtue he resolutely defends in his
 
other works. He just closed Chapter Fourteen with the
 
reminder that Cyrus should be imitated, (Ch. 14, 60) the
 
example of a prince who did not "come to ruin" despite his
 
virtuous qualities and actions. Unlike the modern princes,
 
Cyrus is praised by Machiavelli for his virtue in Chapter
 
Four, and in the Discourses, Machiavelli offers his example
 
to illustrate the point that "humanity" often "makes a much
 
greater impression than an act of ferocity or violence."
 
(III. 20, 461-2)
 
If a "wise prince should observe" the "modes" that
 
Cyrus exemplifies, (Ch. 14, 60) as Machiavelli recommends in
 
Chapter Fourteen, Machiavelli appears to contradict himself
 
in the following chapter, when he advises the new prince to
 
"learn not to be good," and indeed it is a contradiction.
 
He observes that if the prince doesn't "learn not to be
 
good," he will "come to ruin among so many who are not
 
good," and this is the key to understanding his real intent.
 
In referring to the "many who are not good," he is making a
 
statement about the present era, the quality of the times,
 
an age in which "the vices" are "as clear as the sun,"* one
 
in which no one thinks of "imitating" the past, "as if the
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heaven, the sun, the elements and man had in their motion,
 
"X
 
their order, and their potency, become different from what
 
they used to be."^ If men would only turn their thoughts to
 
the ancient example of virtue, perhaps present abuses could
 
be corrected. While he "consider[s] in what honour antiqui
 
ty is held" in the present, he observes that the past "is
 
rather admired than imitated; nay, is so shunned by every
 
body in each little thing they do, that of the virtue of by
 
gone days there remains no trace. And he expresses a
 
desire to effect a change; "Since I want to get men out of
 
this wrong way of thinking, I have thought fit to write a
 
commentary on all those books of Titus Livius" which "will
 
comprise what I have arrived at by comparing ancient and
 
modern events and think necessary for a better understanding
 
of them, so that those who read what I have to say may the
 
more easily draw those practical lessons which one should
 
seek to obtain from the study of history,"'^ the example of
 
virtuous actions and character.
 
"A bad citizen cannot do much harm in a republic that
 
is not corrupt," (III. 8, 426) in which "political life is
 
still vigorous." But "if anyone... wants to seize supreme
 
power in a republic and to impose on it a bad form of gov
 
ernment, it is essential that he should find there a materi
 
al which has in course of time become disordered, and that
 
this disorder shall have been introduced little by little
 
and in one generation after another. And this, as we have
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remarked in a previous discourse, must of necessity come
 
about unless that republic be given fresh life by the exam
 
ple of good men or by fresh legislation be brought back to
 
what it was at the start." (III. 8, 429)
 
As Allan Gilbert remarks, Machiavelli wanted to "teach
 
the ignorant and give advice to the erring," and if at times
 
he seems cynical and pessimistic in his dim view of the
 
present, he yet expresses optimism in the belief that, with
 
proper education, the young will turn from the ways of the
 
present, and follow the path demonstrated in the examples
 
from antiquity. Nor does he withhold this opinion from his
 
other major work, the History, in which he condemns the
 
present age, from the time Cosimo came to power in 1434:
 
The reader will see there that at last a
 
new road was opened to the barbarians,
 
and Italy put herself back into slavery
 
to them. So if the things done by our
 
princes, abroad and at home, cannot,
 
like those of the ancients, be read with
 
wonder because of their ability and
 
greatness, perhaps for their other qual
 
ities they will be viewed with no less
 
wonder; for one can see how such weak
 
and badly handled armies held in check
 
so many splendid peoples. And if in
 
describing the things that happened in
 
this corrupt world, I do not tell of the
 
bravery of soldiers or the efficiency of
 
generals or the love of citizens for
 
their country, I do show with what de
 
ceptions, with what tricks and schemes,
 
the princes, the soldiers, the heads of
 
the republics, in order to keep that
 
reputation which they did not deserve,
 
carried on their affairs. It is perhaps
 
as useful to observe these things as to
 
learn ancient history, because if the
 
latter kindles free spirits to imita­
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tion, the former will kindle such spir
 
its to avoid and get rid of present
 
abuses.^
 
Thus, Machiavelli attempted to show,in the History and
 
the Discourses, that the cause for Italy's decline was the
 
growth of corruption, and in the Prince he voices the same
 
criticism. (Gh. 15, 61) It was an overarching concern for
 
the former statesman of the Republic of Florence, who under­
stood that "only in corrupt times can liberty be
 
overthrown."®
 
In Felix Gilbert's "analysis of the evolution of the
 
Florentine Histories," he finds a "consistency between
 
[Machiavelli's History] and the Prince and Discourses
 
grounded in the process of corruption and decline."' In
 
fact, Machiavelli thought Italy more corrupt than "all other
 
lands," (I. 55, 244) the result of "weakness... misery...
 
the defenselessness of the faction ridden Italian principal
 
ities of his own day before the trampling armies of the
 
great, well-organized, national states of the North and
 
West,"* invited by popes and princes alike.
 
The phenomenon of corruption and its influence was
 
especially observable in Florence. Prior to 1434, "equality
 
of opportunity was a basic principle of Florentine constitu
 
tionalism," enhanced by "the system of electing magistrates
 
by lot," This system was eroded by the Medici, "especially
 
Lorenzo," for they "used the oligarchical trend in Floren
 
tine politics to underpin their personal ascendancy," a
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process that was not reversed until 1494, with the "vesting
 
of sovereign power in a [Great Council] of over 3,000 citi
 
zens,"' a reform that remained in place until the return of
 
the Medici in 1512, at which time it was abolished.
 
Machiavelli observes that "where equality exists, it is
 
impossible to set up a principality, and, where it does not
 
exist, impossible to set up a republic," (I. 55, 243) and,
 
thus, as the Medici gained power, the phenomenon of the
 
rising private individual reflects the eroding influence of
 
inequality. And if Florence "was still, in name, a repub
 
lic" at the time Lorenzo was a young man,^° his "iron hand
 
within the velvet glove was quietly extinguishing the liber­
ty of Florence. At ten-year intervals, in '70-'71, '80 and
 
'90, reforms had gradually restricted the governing power in
 
ever fewer hands, faithful to Lorenzo, which^ ensured the
 
security of his personal rule... The corruption of morals,
 
beginning with the corruption of political life, which arose
 
inevitably from the changing times and was imported from
 
other courts, was favored by Lorenzo as an instrument of
 
government," prompting Machiavelli to remark, "The one who
 
could rend his fellows most cleverly, was deemed the wisest
 
I
 
and most estimable."" As for the reforms of the Medici, his
 
contempt is revealed in the Discourses:
 
Those who governed the state of Florence
 
from 1434 to 1494 [the Medici] used to
 
say that it was necessary to reconsti
 
tute the government every five yhars;
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otherwise it was difficult to maintain
 
it; where by ^reconstituting the govern
 
ment' they meant instilling men with
 
that terror and that fear with which
 
they had instilled them when instituting
 
it—in that at this time they had chas
 
tised those who, looked at from the
 
established way of life, had misbehaved.
 
As, however, the remembrance of this
 
chastisement disappears, men are embold
 
ened to try something fresh and to talk
 
sedition. Hence, provision has of neces
 
sity to be made against this by restor
 
ing that government to what it was at
 
its origins. (III. 1, 388)
 
Machiavelli is clearly voicing a criticism of the
 
Medici as their example follows that of the Roman Republic,
 
which returned to "its start" with the "introduction of the
 
plebeian tribunes, of the censorships, and of all the other
 
laws which put a check on human ambition and arrogance,"
 
(III. 1, 387) a prescriptive antidote he might have liked to
 
impose in some form in Florence.
 
The rise of corruption, then, can be thwarted by
 
"laws," "institutions," and the example of "the simple
 
virtue of one man" whom "men seek to imitate," (III. 1, 388)
 
all of which were demonstrated in the ancient model of the
 
Republic of Rome. At regular intervals, renovation is re
 
quired to return the government to its original principles—
 
to "show [the] people that not only is it essential to up
 
hold religion and justice, but also to hold in high esteem
 
good citizens" (III. 1^ 386) which, as an ideal, stands in
 
stark contrast to the notion of renovation in the example of
 
the Medici, who "reconstituted" the government at regular
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intervals by "instilling men" with "terror" and "fear" as
 
they "had instilled them when instituting it."
 
(III. 1, 388)
 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli advises how to found a
 
state for the purpose of establishing and preserving liber
 
ty—for the benefit of the people and the glory of the
 
country. In the Prince, he reverses himself, instructing a
 
would-be prince how to acquire, establish, and maintain
 
himself as an absolute ruler, a tyrant who must take as his
 
first priority his own security and his own interest. In
 
the Discourses, Machiavelli offers the models from antiquity
 
as exemplary and worthy of imitation. In the Prince, he
 
makes a mockery of the advice he gives in the Discourses,
 
offering instead the modern examples of vice and corruption
 
as deserving of emulation and praise, even discounting
 
ancient wisdom and the traditional notion of how a good
 
prince should conduct himself and his affairs, as commonly
 
recorded in the numerous handbooks for princes, and under
 
stood in the traditional ideas of morality and virtue. If
 
Machiavelli did not oppose tyranny, why did he bother to
 
write the Discourses, to instruct the many in how to defy
 
the currents of corruption and defeat the rise of tyranny?
 
In fact, Machiavelli opposed tyranny in both the Prince
 
and the Discourses, but by two different means. In the
 
latter, he took the approach of one, as defined by Bernard
 
Crick, whose theory for republican government qualifies him
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for favorable comparison with Aristotle. In the Prince,
 
he adapts his views to the genre satire, in which he criti
 
cizes tyranny by exploring the modes and orders of absolute
 
rule that are anathema to liberty and democratic principles.
 
And by relating it to modern examples, he shows how far
 
Italy had plunged into corruption. It is clear in the pas
 
sage from ttie History cited above how he views the lessons
 
from the past and the present, and how they should be ap
 
plied. While the Discourses reveal the value of "ancient
 
history" which inspires "free spirits to imitation," the
 
Prince reflects his observation of "things that happened in
 
[the] corrupt world," from "1434-94," that "should kindle
 
such spirits to avoid and get rid of present abuses.
 
The Prince then, constitutes the unmasking of that
 
corrupt world (lest we be fooled by appearances) in an ex
 
traordinary and unprecedented manner, by lauding the art of
 
tyranny itself, written in such detail as to resemble a pre
 
scriptive manual, accompanied by a sense of urgency that
 
almost makes it compulsory as a matrix of essential attri
 
butes the new prince must acquire. He not only should have
 
these attributes, he must have them, to succeed, which mag
 
nifies to an even greater degree the reader's perception of
 
the distance between how things ought to be, and what is,
 
the reality. Like Shakespeare's "principal Machiaval, lago­
-who is probably the most famous of all such characters,"
 
the "very obviousness [of his villainy] to the audience
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presumes its invisibility to the characters,"^'' just as
 
Machiavelli intended that his readers recognize the new
 
prince as the villain and rogue that he was, oblivious to
 
his own greed, ambition, and the prospect of inevitable
 
ruin, a warning that Garrett Mattingly reminds us occurs
 
several times in the Prince, despite its "brevity."'^
 
This political reality is defined by Machiavelli as the
 
"effectual truth of the thing," rather than the "imagination
 
of it." (Ch. 15, 61) As I am not aware of any other refer
 
ence to "effectual truth" in his works, and because he
 
places considerable emphases on it in the Prince, in any
 
case, it perhaps has a special significance that is perti
 
nent to this work alone. "Effectual truth" can be defined
 
as a truth that is derived from observing effects, as in the
 
outcome of one's actions, or the end achieved—as opposed to
 
what is "imagined," what it is thought to be in appearances,
 
or the ideal. An example would be Pope Alexander VI. The
 
papal image is one of holy piety, humility and faith, al
 
though Alexander's true nature allowed^none of those quali
 
ties. The founding of the papal office, augmented by cen
 
turies of custom and tradition, created an ideal which the
 
popes of Alexander's time nourished with appearances, but
 
the effects of their actions (more notably repugnant in
 
Alexander than in any of his predecessors) exposed the
 
reality. By the end of his reign, little evidence remained
 
of those attributes formerly associated with the Vicar of
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Christ, the Bishop of Rome, and the head of the Church. The
 
Romans did not mourn his death, and as Voltaire would
 
later comment, "the holiness of his ministry made him more
 
guilty.""
 
The "effectual truth of the thing" may be deserving of
 
praise or blame, and it is not always justified. To make
 
this point, Machiavelli gives the example of Romulus in the
 
Discourses:
 
... Many perchance will think it a bad
 
precedent that the founder of a civic
 
state, such as Romulus, should first
 
have killed his brother and then have
 
acquiesced in the death of Titus Tatius,~
 
the Sabine, whom he had chosen as his
 
colleague in the kingdom. They will
 
urge that, if such actions be justifi
 
able, ambitious citizens who are eager
 
to govern, will follow the example of
 
their prince and use violence against
 
those who are opposed to their authori
 
ty. A view that will hold good provided
 
we leave out of consideration the end
 
Which Romulus had in mind... Wherefore,
 
the prudent organizer of a state whose
 
intention it is to govern not in his own
 
interests but for the common good, and
 
not in the interest of his successors
 
but for the sake of the fatherland which
 
is common to all, should contrive to be
 
alone in his authority... It is a sound
 
maxim that reprehensible actions may be
 
justified, by their effects, and that
 
when the effect is good, as it was in
 
the case of Romulus, it always justifies
 
the action." (I. 9, 131-2)
 
Further, "it is the man who uses violence to spoil
 
things, not the man who uses it to mend them, that is blame
 
worthy." (I. 9, 132) Therefore, in defense of liberty,
 
Machiavelli offers "counsel" that "merits the attention of.
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and ought to be observed by, every citizen who has to give
 
advice to his country," that, as in the example of Romulus,
 
the end justifies the means, and that course should be
 
adopted "which will save the life and preserve the freedom
 
of one's country," and no man will "blame him for taking
 
such action, however extraordinary, which may be of service
 
in the organizing of a kingdom or the constituting of a
 
republic." (I. 9, 132)
 
Although Machiavelli states, however, that "reprehens
 
ible actions" (the means) are justified when the "effect is
 
good" (the end), as he defines good (with regard to kingdoms
 
and republics), further elaborated in the example of
 
Romulus, he does not state that sole authority is justified
 
in establishing or preserving a tyrannical state in which
 
the effect is not good vis-a-vis the destruction of freedom,
 
liberty, or the common good—even in the Prince—although he
 
gives the appearance of justification in the notion of ne
 
cessity. Machiavelli does not state that a ruler is justi
 
fied in seizing absolute power because he was opposed to it
 
in every form. Government under a "good prince" (one who is
 
not a tyrant) should serve the public interest, esteem
 
"virtue" (not vice), promote "peace" and security (not war
 
and disorder), respect the "senate's authority" and honor
 
the "magistrates" (not destroy the institutions of govern
 
ment), allow the "rich citizens [to enjoy] their wealth"
 
(not rob them of it at every convenience), (I. 10, 137) and
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most importantly, "regulate his conduct by laws." (I. 58,
 
252) Therefore, the means are not justified by the end
 
(tyranny), in the Prince, because the end itself is not
 
justified. This point is central to his satire. His argu
 
ments for absolute power, always from necessity, are thus
 
fraudulent and deceptive, having only the appearance of
 
justification.
 
Appearances play a major role in Machiavelli's satire,
 
and the art of appearances that he employs, in the Prince,
 
he also advises the new prince to cultivate. The wonderful
 
irony, then, is that he does to the prince what he tells the
 
prince to do to others. As he cautions, in Chapter Eight
 
een, "men are so simple and obedient to present necessities
 
that he who deceives will always find someone who will let
 
himself be deceived." (Ch. 8, 70)
 
In the notion of "the effectual truth of the thing,"
 
then, Machiavelli strips away the mask of appearances while,
 
at the same time, encouraging the new prince to perfect that
 
art. By instructing the new prince to turn vice to his ad
 
vantage, and call it virtue, Machiavelli reveals the prince
 
for the nefarious I character that he is, and one is treated
 
to the comic spectacle of Machiavelli's persuasive rhetoric
 
imploring the new prince to pursue his own folly.
 
Machiavelli shows his contempt for tyranny in the
 
notion of blame as well. In the Discourses, he states,
 
"Those who set up a tyranny are no less blameworthy than are
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 the founders of a republic or a kingdom praiseworthy," (I.
 
10, 134) for "when they might have founded a republic or a
 
kingdom to their immortal honor, turn their thoughts to tyr
 
anny, and fail to see what fame, what glory, security, tran-

A
 
quility, conjoined with peace of mind they are missing by
 
adopting this course, and what infamy, scorn, abhorrence,
 
danger, and disquiet they are incurring." (I. 10, 135)
 
Machiavelli's remonstrance has the tone of "the teaching of
 
a moral reactionary,"'® even in the Discourses. In the
 
Prince, he brings it to life in the Borgia model, although
 
his indictment is specifically aimed at the Medici who rep
 
resent the current threat of further calamity across the
 
peninsula.
 
Of all the princes of their kind, the Medici most suc
 
cessfully fostered the art of appearances. With Leo as the
 
new pope, the impression of religiosity was brought to great
 
heights in that family. Lorenzo the Magnificent had ulteri
 
or motives, however, when, young Giovanni was made cardinal
 
I
 
at the age of sixteen,'' "so that he could look after the
 
interests of the family and of Florence in Rome,"^" virtually
 
one and the same thing. Nor could a more liberal family be
 
found in Italy, and with their liberality they gained renown
 
at home and abroad, with the additional benefit of gaining
 
loyal partisans, who forme^ a Medici faction to whom they
 
showed their gratitude with public offices and other bene
 
fices.^' If a little cruelty was called for in maintaining
 
; , t '
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 their position, necessity demanded it in Italian politics.
 
Bernard Crick makes the point that "the strong indict^
 
ment of tyranny in this discourse [I. 10, pp. 134-8] makes
 
it clear how intensely Machiavelli hated tyranny, and hence
 
the last thing he had in mind in composing The Prince was to
 
help would-be princes to set up a tyranny. He believes that
 
autocracy is called for in certain circumstances, and that
 
these circumstances were realized in the Italy of his day,
 
but never tyranny.
 
Machiavelli does not recommend autocratic rule under
 
any circumstances, however, or any form of power that is
 
absolute, with the notable exception of the Prince. What he
 
does recommend, in the Discourses, is the appointment of a
 
dictator, circumscribed by law, based on the Roman model of
 
the republic. The appointment of a dictator provided a
 
means by which a republic could respond to crisis, for re
 
publics are "slow in functioning," and "reconciliation of
 
diverse views takes time," (I. 34, 195) In conferring
 
authority in one person^ efficacy is greatly, enhanced, but
 
by no means did he intend that the title of dictator be
 
understood as the granting of unlimited power;
 
It is clear that the dictatorship, so
 
long as it was bestowed in accordance
 
with public institutions, and not as
 
sumed by the dictator of his own author
 
ity, was always of benefit to the state.
 
For it is magistrates that are made and
 
; authority that is given in irregular
 
ways that is prejudicial to a republic,
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not that which is given in the ordinary
 
way, as is clear from the fact that dur
 
ing a very long period in Rome's his
 
tory, no dictator ever did anything but
 
good to that republic.
 
The reasons for this are obvious.
 
First, if a citizen is to do harm and is
 
to obtain extraordinary authority, he
 
must have many attributes which in a
 
republic that is not corrupt it will be
 
impossible for him to acquire; for he
 
will need to be very rich and to have
 
numerous adherents and partisans, which
 
he cannot have so long as the laws are
 
observed; and, even if he had them, men
 
of this kind are so dreaded that people
 
would not freely vote for him.
 
Furthermore, a dictator was appointed
 
for a limited time, and for the purpose
 
of dealing solely with such matters as
 
had led to the appointment. He had the
 
authority to make what decisions he
 
thought fit in order to meet a definite
 
and urgent danger, and to do this with
 
out consultation; anyone he punished had
 
no right of appeal. But he could do
 
nothing to diminish the constitutional
 
position of the government, as would
 
have been the case if he could have
 
taken away the authority vested in the
 
senate or in the people, or have abol
 
ished the ancient institutions of the
 
city and made new ones. Wherefore, in
 
view of the short duration of the dic­
tatortorship/ of the limited authority
 
which the dictator possessed, and of the
 
fact that the Roman people were not^
 
corrupt, it was impossible for the dic
 
tator to overstep his terms of reference
 
and to do the state harm,^^
 
Machiavelli states that the dictator "acquired the more
 
fame the sooner he resigned," (I. 30, 186) exemplified in
 
Camillus, who never abused his power and authority, "having
 
thrice been dictator [and who] always administered that
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office to the benefit of the public, not in his own inter
 
ests." (III. 30, 485) As mentioned above, it was not the
 
title of dictator but the length of office that lead to
 
tyranny. (I. 34, 193-4)
 
In Machiavelli's discourse on religion (I. 12,
 
pp. 143-46), in which he boldly criticizes the Roman Church
 
as a cause of Italy's decline because it contributed to
 
corruption by neglecting divine worship, and because the
 
Church "keeps Italy divided," (I. 12, 142-3) he does suggest
 
the need for some form of unity in Italy; "Now of a truth no
 
country has ever been united and happy unless the whole of
 
it has been under the jurisdiction of one republic or one
 
prince, as has happened to France and Spain." (I. 12, 145)
 
Although his preference was always for republics, he admired
 
the kingdom of France in which "the kings are pledged to ob
 
serve numerous laws," (I. 16, 156-7) "maintained by parlia
 
ments" which renovate the laws and institutions "whenever it
 
takes action against a prince of this realm or in its judge
 
ments condemns the king." (III. 1, 389-90)
 
Further, he states that the Church has had neither the
 
"power" nor the "virtue" to enable it "to usurp power in
 
Italy and become its leader," (I. 12, 145) despite its
 
efforts to the contrary, for, in Machiavelli's time, the
 
great usurpers streamed out of the Vatican, and the term
 
"leader," as a designation of power, reflects restraint (if
 
not hximor) on Machiavelli's part. The Church is the "cause
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why Italy has never come under one head, but has been under
 
many princes and signori bringing "disunion" and "weak
 
ness, thus becoming "prey" of anyone who attacks it, for
 
which our Italians have to thank the Church and nobody
 
else," yet another reference to the need for some form of
 
sole authority. (I. 12, 144-5)
 
In none of the above instances however does Machiavelli
 
call for a tyrant, despot, or autocrat to fulfill that need,
 
nor would he. Even when he refers to the Church and its
 
inability to "usurp power in Italy," the end he states is
 
leadership, not acquisition of the peninsula in the grip of
 
tyranny. In fact, Machiavelli closes this discourse with
 
praise for the Swiss religious and military "institutions,"^
 
which he suggests would be ruined if the Vatican relocated
 
in their midst.
 
Despite Machiavelli's charges against the Church, how
 
ever, in the Prince he appeals to the Vatican to unite
 
Italy, for the power he hoped would accrue to Giuliano and
 
then Lorenzo did not reflect their potential, but that of
 
Pope Leo as head of the Church, and that potential did not
 
promise the end of peace and security, but disunity, chaos,
 
and power,—precisely as the Borgia had attempted, although
 
the short life of popes promised almost no hope for success.
 
Without the wealth and power of the Church to assist him, a
 
fledgling prince had little hope to triumph, as the major
 
powers in Italy would move against him, most especially—as
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Machiavelli remarks in the Discourses—the Church, which was
 
never "so weak that it could not, when afraid of losing its
 
dominion over things temporal, call upon one of the powers
 
to defend it against an Italian state that had become too
 
powerful." (I. 12, 156)
 
In the Prince, then, Machiavelli calls upon the Church
 
to promote the rise of a.power in Italy, which would not
 
benefit the Church, however, although greatness would re
 
dound to "the Church," (Ch. 11, 47) but the new prince as
 
beneficiary of papal nepotism—the acquisition of a Medici
 
principality. And if the precepts in the Prince are fol
 
lowed by the new prince, the end Machiavelli calls for in
 
Chapter Twenty-six would result in "a bad form of govern
 
ment" (III. 8, 429) rather than liberty and freedom, as sug
 
gested in the notion of freeing Italy "from the barbarians."
 
(Ch. 26, 101)
 
Reality, and the imagination of it, is expressed in the
 
notion of what is and what should be, or ought ^ to be, by
 
Machiavelli, as when he states, "it is so far from how one
 
lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is
 
done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his
 
preservation." (Ch. 15, 61) The ^is' and the ^ought', so to
 
speak, form a basis for comedy in which the degree of humor
 
achieved resides in the amount of distortion the satirist
 
creates^ between the ideal and the reality, between what
 
should be, as given in custom, tradition, education, and
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sensibility, and what is presented as reality, which is the
 
property of the satirist in any case. MaChiavelli used the
 
^is' and the ^ought' as a device in his comedies, what Doug
 
las Radcliff-Umstead refers to as the application of "the
 
same effective truth... about how people really do live, not
 
how they ought to live,"^® which succeeds as comedy because
 
how the characters behave proceeds against an understanding,
 
on the part of the audience, of how they should behave. In
 
his farcical and comic play, Mandragola, Machiavelli satir
 
ized the "foibles and baseness of Italian Society,"^ mir
 
rored in such characters as "a doleful lover, a judge by no
 
means shrewd, a friar living wickedly, a parasite the dar
 
ling of malice [who] will be sport for you today.
 
As James B. Atkinson observed, Machiavelli "seized upon
 
comedy as a useful tool for hammering out his political mes
 
sage so that it reached a more immediate audience... like
 
Aristophanes, Machiavelli unsettles his audience with incon
 
gruity, distortion, and other techniques bordering on the
 
grotesque."^' In the Prince, Machiavelli's clever manipula
 
tion of the notion of what is and what ought to be forms the
 
lifeblood of his satire, given full reign in Chapters Fif
 
teen through Eighteen. "Wit has its eyes glued on reality.
 
It distinguishes, it makes invidious comparisons... wit
 
strips away flattering disguises and checks the poor, naked
 
anatomy that remains, fully exposed by Machiavelli in his
 
archetypal new prince, who is not new in the sense that
 
288
 
Machiavelli invented him, but in the sense that he personi
 
fies the modern princes as opposed to those of antiquity.
 
Like Tacitus, Machiavelli uses "irony" to "contrast the
 
appearances of public life with the underlying realities of
 
power, and a deliberate cultivation of ambiguity."'^
 
Machiavelli recommends that the prince "needs to have a
 
spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and varia
 
tions of things command him, as I have said above, not de
 
part from good, when possible, but know how to enter into
 
evil, when forced by necessity," (Ch. 18, 70) in which case
 
evil is still evil and good is still good. Yet, he also
 
states, "if one considers everything well, one will find
 
something appears to be virtue, which if pursued would be
 
one's ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if
 
pursued results in security and well being," (Ch. 15, 62)
 
and by his application of the word "appears," vice and
 
virtue become conditional entities, necessity becomes the
 
operative, and, as Mark Hulliung remarks, Machiavelli cre
 
ates "a transvaluation of values, in which what had been
 
called virtue—Christian and stoic virtue—is Henceforth
 
deemed corruption, and what has been considered vice—
 
Machiavellian politics—becomes virtue.
 
In Machiavelli's pairing of those qualities that "all
 
men," but "especially princes, since they are placed high
 
er," are deserving of "blame or praise," (Ch. 15, 61) one
 
finds that it is impossible to generate a listing of them
 
289
 
 (taken from the text in the order in which they appear,
 
organized in two columns), in which the heading of blame or
 
praise can be assigned:
 
1. 	 liberal — mean
 
2. 	 giver rapacious
 
3. 	 cruel merciful
 
4. 	 breaker of faith faithful
 
5. 	 effeminate — fierce
 
pusillanimous spirited
 
6. 	 humane proud
 
7. 	 lascivious chaste ,
 
8. 	 honest clever
 
9. 	 hard agreeable
 
10. 	grave light
 
11. 	religious unbelieving
 
(Ch. 15, 61-2)
 
Machiavelli was a clear and logical thinker. Yet, in
 
his haphazard ordering of the paired qualities in the text
 
(and one need not organize it into columns to recognize it),
 
it is impossible to discover what he considered "of the
 
above mentioned qualities" to be those "that are held good,"
 
(Ch. 15, 62) or deserving of blame. As he remarks in the
 
Discourses, "So that this is just one of those things in
 
which evil is so qlosely associated with gobd, and so bound
 
up are they one with the other, that it may easily happen
 
' ' 	 i .
 
that 	he who thinks he will get one, gets the other."
 
(III. 37, 507)
 
Machiavelli's satire in the Prince attacks what passes
 
for virtue or, as Edgar Johnson says of satire in general,
 
"foolishness" that passes for "sense:
 
But satire everywhere attacks evil arro
 
gant and triumphant, pride victorious
 
290
 
and riding for a fall. It attacks those
 
conventional respectabilities which are
 
really hidden absurdities or vices
 
blindly accepted by thoughtlessness,
 
habit, or social custom. It attacks...
 
stuffed shirts, hypocrisies aping mer
 
it... counterfeit passing for true. The
 
merely foolish, satire may be content to
 
take down a peg or two; the dangerous
 
and vicious it would reduce to ruin...
 
the ugliness revealed in its true colors
 
has masqueraded as merit.
 
1
 
The vices that call for the scourge of
 
satire, observes Sylvan Forester in
 
Melincourt, ^are those which pervade the
 
whole frame of society, and which under
 
some specious pretense of private duty,
 
or the sanction of custom and precedent,
 
are almost permitted to assume the sem
 
blance of virtue, or at least to pass
 
unstigmatized in the crowd of congenial
 
transgressions.^
 
The elements of satire discussed above are appropriate
 
to the Prince in many respects. Machiavelli not only gives
 
vice "the semblance of virtue," but attempts to justify it
 
in the "specious pretense of private duty," in his call to
 
the Medici to save Italy. His intent, however, was not to
 
establish the Medici as tyrants in Italy, but to warn
 
against the threat of tyranny. Just as Rome "sunk under
 
tyranny, having lost her virtue, Machiavelli thought Italy
 
was doomed as well, owing to the currents of corruption.
 
Because the Prince was not recognized as satire, it is
 
not surprising that it created such a scandal. "The horror
 
with which plain citizens heard of his counsels is suggested
 
by the fact that ^Old Nick', though already a familiar alias
 
for the devil, came to be associated with his name; that The
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Prince was called the Devil's Catechism or the Ten Command
 
ments Reversed,"^® and their horror was justified if they
 
were among the faithful who observed the teachings of the
 
Bible; "woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil;
 
that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that
 
put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter,"" a verse that
 
Machiavelli himself was probably familiar with. Those
 
citizens might have been less horrified if they knew the
 
Prince was a satire, but his irreverence would likely have
 
been appalling to them nonetheless.
 
Much has been written about Machiavelli's concept of
 
virtue: whether pagan or Christian, civic or military,
 
ancient or modern. The difficulty arises primarily from his
 
writing in the Prince, in which he departs from his defense
 
of liberty in the Discourses and the History* Everything is
 
made new or "afresh," patterned on his advice in the Dis
 
courses that "he who proposes to set up a despotism or what
 
writers call a ^tyranny', must renovate everything," (I. 25,
 
176) and "leave nothing of that province intact, and nothing
 
in it, neither rank, nor institution, nor form of govern
 
ment, nor wealth, except it be held by such as recognize
 
that it comes from you." (I. 26, 177) Therefore, while in
 
republics the purpose of renovation is to restore the gov
 
ernment to its "original principles," (III. 1, 385-6) in
 
reference to tyranny, Machiavelli recommends renovation by
 
obliteration.
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virtue is reflected in the traditional values
 
Machiavelli associates with republican government in the
 
Discourses, while in the Prince, he reverses himself to
 
accommodate the necessities of tyrannical rule. The only
 
conceivable bridge between the two works, that could be said
 
to harmonize with his democratic principles, is the notion
 
that in defense of liberty and for the preservation of a
 
free city or state, the end justifies the means, as I dis­
chssed above. In that context, the lessons he gives the new
 
prince should be observed by those that would defend their
 
freedom, the threat of tyranny personified in the new prince
 
himself. Beyond that consideration, however, any attempt to
 
justify his transvaluation of vice and virtue in the Prince
 
is fundamentally flawed, because there is no justification
 
for the precepts of the Prince in his political theory, as
 
expressed in his other major works. As he states in Chapter
 
Eighteen^ "in the actions of all men, and especially of
 
princes, where there is no court to appeal to, one looks to
 
the end," (Ch. 18, 71) and in the minds of modern and cor
 
rupt princes, it mattered little whether or not the end was
 
justified.
 
In persuading the new pringe to pursue the path of
 
vice, and thus to let go "of what should be done" for what
 
"is done" (Ch. 15, 61) Machiavelli seems to make the worse
 
argument appear the better, a technique that originated with
 
the sophists; a form of rhetoric (forensic) utilized in the
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art of persuasion. As a humanist scholar of antiquity,
 
Machiavelli would have been familiar with the sophists and
 
their arguments from the "antithesis of Nature and Conven
 
tion as moral authorities:"
 
Among the most significant thinkers of
 
the fifth century B.C. were the travel
 
ing lecturers known as sophists. They
 
were primarily teachers of political
 
excellence whose aims were practical and
 
immediate and whose investigations led
 
in many cases to a philosophical rela
 
tivism. Of these, Protagorus is the
 
best example. To him absolute truth was
 
unknowable and perhaps nonexistent. Man
 
is the measure of all things... and
 
truth must be approximated in each indi
 
vidual time and place somewhat in the
 
manner that the just is determined in a
 
court of law. In this process, rhetoric
 
is useful and legitimate, for only when
 
two sides are persuasively presented can
 
the choice between them be clearly per
 
ceived and intelligently made. Similar
 
ly, in political life no universal prin
 
ciples can be accepted. Courses Of
 
action must be determined between alter
 
natives presented in persuasive fash
 
ion.^®
 
Protagarus was the "originator of the Doctrine of Two
 
Logics (or Antilogoi)," the "so called Just (or Major or
 
Better) Logic and the Unjust (or Minor or Weaker) Logic.""*"
 
The Just is represented in "Nomos, with honor as its re
 
ward... [nomos] represents the ideal for man,""** that which
 
is given in law, custom, and tradition. The Unjust is
 
represented in "Physis... acts from motives of self-inter
 
est.""*^ "Physis, or nature" is thus antithetical to "nomos,
 
or law and custom."'*^
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In his comedy, The Clouds, Aristophanes creates a
 
"formal debate, between the Just and Unjust Discourses," in
 
which, as Lois Spatz explains, the "Unjust Discourse is
 
certain that he can manipulate the audience because they are
 
fools," while the "Just Discourse [relies] on the truth,
 
assuming the audience wise enough to discern it. He, of
 
course, believes that absolute truth and justice exist,
 
established by the gods as standards by which man is judged
 
and gains honor... the Unjust Discourse denies the existence
 
of any such standard."'*^ Aristophanes thus used the "Doc
 
trine of the Two Logics" for comic effect. As William
 
Arrowsmith remarks, Aristophane's "Logos is not logic but a
 
prelogical discourse of the whole human reason," and, there
 
fore, Mthe Just argxunent is helpless against his opponent.
 
His case cannot be expressed logically, and yet it remains
 
rational. Further, "for Aristophanes the antilogoi are
 
transparent sophistry, humbug on a huge scale, and he ac
 
cordingly makes the debate between the two Logo! the climax
 
of his comedy."''^
 
Although Machiavelli was familiar with Aristophanes'
 
The Clouds, as I mentioned above, and wrote a play in imita
 
tion of it, "Le Mechere" {The Masks),'" one can only specu
 
late concerning the influence Aristophanes' comedy may have
 
had on Machiavelli, with regard to the Just and Unjust
 
arguments that seem apparent to me, in the Prince. I have
 
referred to Aristophanes' comedy, however, to introduce the
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dynamics of making the worse argument appear the better, and
 
to make the point that using the antilogoi for comic effect
 
had a precedent in at least one work that is associated with
 
Machiavelli.
 
Machiavelli discusses liberality and its contrary,
 
mean, in Chapter Sixteen, the first of those qualities he
 
listed in the eleven pairs of contraries in the previous
 
chapter. As he explains, "someone is considered liberal,
 
someone mean (using a Tuscan term because avaro [greedy] in
 
our language is still one who desires to have something by
 
violence, misero [[mean]] we call one who refrains too much
 
r
 
from using what is his." (Ch. 15, 61)
 
Liberality is a virtue that received considerable at
 
tention from the humanists. "The subject of princely vir
 
tues" was important to them "as formulated in the medieval
 
mirror of princes," and "by confining themselves to the com
 
position of catalogues of virtues, the writers could pattern
 
themselves closely on ancient models and adopt schemes pro
 
vided by Aristotle in the Nicomachean ethics or by Cicero in
 
De Officiis... under this influence the humanist catalogue
 
of virtues took on a new aspect and came to differ from
 
those of the middle ages. Purely worldly virtues took their
 
place beside the religious ones and even superseded them in
 
the degree of interest they aroused... those worldly virtues
 
were considered purely from the point of view of their ef
 
fect, their advantages or disadvantages being exactly
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weighed. This is particularly true of liberalitus, which
 
was now regarded as a means of consolidating the position of
 
the ruler.
 
Machiavelli conforms to the humanist notion of liberal
 
ity as a useful "means of consolidating the power of a
 
ruler," in his discourse, but he distorts the issue by
 
recommending means that disregard the public welfare and
 
favors, instead, the greed and avarice of an ambitious
 
prince. The intended "effect," to be sure, was not in
 
harmony with Renaissance expectations of ruling power, which
 
he must have known would lead to reasoned objections, par
 
ticularly as he departed from broad generalizations in his
 
discourse, and began to focus on specific virtues that in
 
vited the scrutiny of centuries of scholarship. His de
 
fense, however (should he need one), lay in present neces
 
sity, grounded in the notion of effectual truth or political
 
reality that he offers in Chapter Fifteen. Therefore, even
 
though it is clear from the Discourses that Machiavelli
 
praised ancient virtue and deplored modern vices,"*' he freed
 
himself, in a sense, to treat liberality (and the other vir
 
tues) in a manner that reflects his satirical malice. In
 
the court of public opinion Machiavelli might be thought
 
perverse, but it would have been difficult for his adversar
 
ies, such as the Medici, to charge him with sedition, howev
 
er transparent his mask of innocence.
 
Aristotle "defined virtue as a habitual moderation,
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that is to say, the habitual avoidance of extreme modes of
 
conduct. Extremes are always evil, while virtue is a mean
 
between extremes."^® Aristotle's definition of virtue and
 
its associated vices provides the insight for understanding
 
the method Machiavelli used to develop his arguments in such
 
a way that vice is given the appearance of virtue. In
 
Aristotle's listing of "twelve^ important virtues," liberali
 
ty, for example, appears as follows; 
/ 
Vice Virtue Vice 
of of of 
Deficiency Moderation Excess 
Xlliberality Liberality Prodigality®' 
Machiavelli did not adhere to Aristotle's labeling of
 
the virtues and associated vices, when they were the same or
 
similar. Rather, he gives his own interpretation. Thus,
 
while Aristotle labels mean as an associate vice of the vir
 
tue magnificence,®^ Machiavelli pairs mean with the virtue
 
liberal, which may or may not have relevance to his satire.
 
The important point to consider, however, is Aristotle's
 
definition of virtue as "habitual moderation," the mean be
 
tween the vices of excess and deficiency, which reflects
 
three aspects of each quality. In his eleven pairs of con
 
traries, Machiavelli only includes two aspects. By exclud
 
ing one of the associated vices, for example, it becomes a
 
free agent, so to speak, which he thus incorporates into his
 
argument as part of his strategy. To illustrate the point,
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Machiavelli excludes the vice of excess in his pairing of
 
liberal and mean:
 
Vice 
of 
Deficiency 
Virtue 
of 
Moderation 
Vice 
of 
Excess 
Mean — — Liberal [Not Represented] 
As Machiavelli develops his argument regarding liberal
 
ity, however, it becomes Clear that it is grounded solely in
 
the extremes of deficiency and excess. He deceptively in
 
troduces the vice of excess into his argument, and it is
 
that vice (and not the virtue of moderation) that is used to
 
rationalize the necessity for adopting the vice of deficien
 
cy, meanness. The virtue of moderation is thus excluded,
 
and the contraries are redefined, from moderation-deficiency
 
to excess-deficiency. The thrust of Machiavelli's argument,
 
then, is predicated on relevance to political expedience and
 
necessity, or physis, the Unjust. Nomos, represented in the
 
virtue of moderation, retains its original quality. The
 
vice of deficiency triumphs over the vice of excess and, as
 
such, is given the appearance of virtue. In fact,
 
Machiavelli has merely chosen the greater of two evils, that
 
which affords the greatest utility for the prince.
 
Machiavelli begins by stating the Just argumerit, followed by
 
the Unjust:
 
Beginning, then, with the first of the
 
above mentioned qualities, I say that it
 
would be good to be held liberal; none
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theless, liberality, when used so that
 
you may be held liberal, harms you. For
 
if it is used virtuously and as it
 
should be used, it may not be recogniz
 
ed, and you will not escape the infamy
 
of its contrary. (Ch. 16, 62)
 
When Machiavelli states that "it would be good to be
 
held liberal," he reflects the time-honored standard of
 
liberality passed on from antiquity in custom, tradition,
 
and education; the Just. He never defends it, however, as a
 
viable option for the prince.
 
With the phrase, "nonetheless," he introduces the
 
Unjust argument, which redefines the contraries; "nonethe
 
less, liberality when used so that you may be held liberal,
 
harms you." To suggest that liberality be used for the
 
purpose of being held liberal imputes ulterior motives to
 
one's actions. In the following sentence, he identifies the
 
motive as recognition; "For if it is used virtuously and as
 
it should be used, it may not be recognized...," which is to
 
say, one will not acquire a reputation for liberality, if it
 
is used moderately. If liberality is used extravagantly,
 
however, it will be recognized, not just among the few, but
 
the many; "And so, if one wants to maintain a ndme for
 
liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any
 
kind of lavish display...," (Ch. 16, 63) a statement that
 
clearly defines the vice of excess; The original notion of
 
being held liberal, as stated by Machiavelli, "I say that it
 
would be good to be held liberal," has been corrupted by his
 
introduction of the word used. As a consequence, the virtue
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of moderation (deserving of praise) has been replaced by the
 
vice of excess (deserving of blame), and the transition is
 
clear even before he elaborates on "lavish display;" "For
 
if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, it may
 
not be recognized, and you will not escape the infamy of its
 
contrary." In the first place, it is a false claim to state
 
that if liberality is used virtuously (that is, in habitual
 
moderation, the defining quality of virtue), one will incur
 
the "infamy" of meanness, the "contrary." Had he stated,
 
"For if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, you
 
will not escape the infamy of its contrary," one can see how
 
foolish the statement is, for in that case, one is virtuous
 
and, at the same time, mean. By adding "it may not be
 
recognized," however, meanness (the contrary) becomes con
 
tingent upon recognition, and the argximent is altered to
 
reflect the extremes of the associated vices, excess and
 
deficiency. The virtue of moderation is replaced by the
 
vice of excess.
 
Machiavelli assails excess when he states that it is
 
"liberality when used so that you may be held liberal" that
 
"harms you," in the desire for reputation. He continues his
 
attack in the notion of "lavish display." The prince will
 
"consume" all of his recourses "in such deeds." It will be
 
"necessary" to "burden the people extraordinarily," to
 
resort to "taxes," and "do all those things that can be done
 
to get money." As a result, the prince becomes "hated by
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his subjects," who will "esteem" him "little" as he becomes
 
"poor." (Ch. 16, 63)
 
The notion that excessive use of liberality will lead
 
to hatred of the prince allows Machiavelli to move toward
 
his advocacy of the vice of deficiency in his argument.
 
"Thus, since a prince cannot, without damage to himself, use
 
the virtue of liberality so that it is recognized, he should
 
not, if he is prudent, care about a name for meanness."
 
(Ch. 16, 63) The virtue of liberality is again misrepre
 
sented as the vice of excess in this statement, with the
 
words use and recognize. Machiavelli reasons that the
 
prince should be reluctant to use his own resources, and
 
"spend," rather, "from what belongs to someone else," in
 
which case, "he should not leave out any part of liberality
 
[excess]." (Ch. 16, 64) That is, "Either the prince spends
 
from what is his own and his subjects, or from what belongs
 
to someone else." (Ch. 16, 64) Machiavelli makes a distinc
 
tion between what belongs to the prince and his subjects,
 
and what belongs to someone else, but it should be under
 
stood that his intent was to make the point that the wealth
 
of the people belongs to the prince, which constitutes the
 
wealth of someone else as well. He excludes the wealth of
 
the people as using someone elses, but his examples of
 
Julius II and King Ferdinand dispel that notion.
 
Pope Julius II, Machiavelli observes, "while he made
 
use of a name for liberality to attain the papacy, [he] did
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 not think of maintaining it later, so as to be able to make
 
war," an example of a "mean" prince, who "will always be
 
held more and more liberal when it is seen that with his
 
parsimony his income is enough for him, that he can defend
 
himself from whoever makes war on him, and that he can
 
undertake campaigns without burdening the people." (Ch. 16,
 
63) Julius' "income," however, was the wealth of the
 
Church, which he plundered to conduct his enterprises,
 
wealth that belonged to the institution of the Church,
 
comprised of the people over whom the pope presided as
 
prince; his subjects, so to speak. Julius albo used the
 
wealth of someone else in another sense, the spoils of a
 
. . ■ ■ - ■ ■ • ] 
conqueror. Julius "dispossessed Cesare... appropriating
 
[his] conquests for himself and the papacy, a fact that
 
may also clarify the reference Machiavelli makes to Julius
 
in Chapter Eleven; "Julius found the path still open to a
 
mode of accumulating money, never used before Alexander,"
 
(Ch. 11, 47) a comic portrayal of Cesare's demise and the
 
vengeance of Julius.
 
King Ferdinand of Spain offers the best evidence for
 
satirical malice, however, among the examples given by
 
Machiavelli for meanness. He comments that if Ferdinand
 
"had been liberal, he would not have been able to make war
 
or win so many campaigns." (Ch. 16, 64) Although Spain was
 
1
 
generating wealth as the result of exploration in the new
 
world, in the context of using someone else's, Machiavelli's
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intent was to demonstrate, by Ferdinand's' example, the
 
plunder of one's own subjects. And while he goes on to
 
elaborate on his enterprises, "he has always done and or
 
dered great things, which have always kept the minds of his
 
subjects in suspense and admiration, and occupied with the
 
outcome," one can interpret his meaning as reflective of the
 
"Marranos" specifically rather than the general population,
 
in which case his statement reeks of sarcastic venom.
 
Machiavelli also includes the example of King Louis XII
 
of France, who was "publically ridiculed for his economy,"^
 
as Allan Gilbert observes in his notes to the Prince,
 
Machiavelli makes the point that "the present king of France
 
carried on many wars without imposing an ex.traordinary tax
 
on his subjects, because the extra expenses were adminis
 
tered with his long practiced parsimony." (h. 16, 63-4)
 
Perhaps the king's parsimony was facilitated by the fact
 
that Italy was "taken as booty by Louis," as stated by
 
Machiavelli in Chapter Twelve, which shows the effects of
 
using someone elses from the perspective of the exploited.
 
Machiavelli's mention of Louis reminds one of his predeces
 
sor, King Charles VIII, an example that had particular
 
significance! for the Florentines. In the Discourses,
 
Machiavelli states, "In regard to untrustworthiness, for in
 
stance, everybody knows how often money was given to King
 
Charles VIII, and how he promised to restore the fortresses
 
of Pisa and never did so; whejreby this king displayed alike
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his untrustworthiness and no small avarice." (III. 43, 518)
 
Machiavelli's recommendation that a prince use someone elses
 
gives tacit approval to the means used by King Charles (as
 
well as Louis), which would not have pleased the Floren
 
tines.
 
In defense of the vice of deficiency, then, Machiavelli
 
states, "Therefore, so as not to have to rob his subjects,
 
to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and con
 
temptible, nor to be forced to be rapacious, a prince should
 
esteem it little, to incur a name for meanness, because this
 
is one of those vices that will enable him to rule." (Ch.
 
16, 64) It would be difficult to find a more rapacious
 
prince than King Ferdinand, however. Nor could Julius have
 
conducted his enterprises, in regaining the papal states,
 
without using the wealth of his flock. And although
 
Machiavelli only refers to one pope, Julius, the recommenda
 
tion that one should use the wealth of others extends to the
 
simony and nepotism of his predecessors, especially
 
Alexander VI, and excuses their immoral and venal practices.
 
Further, the issue of being "able to defend himself" is
 
not the issue. Rather, in the examples of Pope Julius,
 
Louis XII, Kind Ferdinand and Julius Caesar, (Ch. 16, 64)
 
the issue is making war on others, the great campaigns and
 
enterprises that give reputation to the prince, and bring
 
disorder and chaos to the people. Most certainly
 
Machiavelli had the Catholic king in mind when he mentions
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"a certain prince of present times, whom it is not well to
 
name, never preaches anything but. peace and faith, and is
 
very hostile to both."^®
 
Although Machiavelli argued against the use of liberal
 
ity for the purpose of acquiring reputation, because all of
 
one's resources are used in doing so, he concludes that
 
"when you are on the path" to becoming prince, "it is indeed
 
necessary to be held liberal" (Ch. 16, 64) This is true, of
 
course, because it is the method by which an aspiring prince
 
earns the reputation that elevates him above the rank of his
 
fellow citizens, and by which he gains power through his
 
influence, and followers who become his partisans.
 
Machiavelli deplored such men and their methods as anathema
 
to his republican principles. Their excessive liberality
 
hastened the process of corruption and decline in a republic
 
which in turn made the rise of a prince possible, and
 
threatened the destruction of freedom and liberty. A case
 
in point is Lorenzo the Magnificent, and in his example one
 
discovers that even when one's wealth has been consumed, the
 
way is open to using that of the public coffers, that which
 
belongs to the people, nor do such means lead to hatred and
 
low esteem. Quite the contrary.
 
In his History of Florence, Francesco Guicciardini
 
remarks that Lorenzo, who used his liberality to "gain him
 
the goodwill of the great," spent lavishly while his income
 
"diminished." He "knew nothing about business and paid
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 little attention to it, so that his affairs on many occa
 
sions fell into such disorder that he was on the point of
 
bankruptcy and had to fall back on his friend's money and on
 
public funds." Further, in financing the war in 1478, "he
 
arranged that the soldiers be paid by the Bartolini bank in
 
which he had shares. By his orders, they held back in their
 
payments about eight percent, which was to the detriment of
 
the commune since the condottieri keeps so many fewer men
 
and the commune had to pay for extra commissions. At other
 
times, too, he used public funds to supply his own needs.""
 
When Lorenzo died, there was "great sorrow" among the peo
 
ple, "especially" the "lower classes" who were always kept
 
by him in abundance, with many pleasures, entertainments,
 
and feasts," although, as Guicciardini remarks, "those who
 
were repressed were glad when he died."^*
 
Christopher Hibbert also faults Lorenzo's character and
 
use of public funds; "Refusing as always to allow moral
 
scruples to inhibit political or personal ambition, he did
 
not hesitate to delay that ruin by dipping his hands into
 
funds that did not belong to him... [he] helped himself to
 
money from the public treasury. After his death his heirs
 
were held responsible for the return of almost 75,000 flo
 
rins which had been withdrawn without the sanction of any
 
law and without authority, to the damage and prejudice of
 
the commune.""
 
Despite his abuse of privilege and power, however,
 
' 307
 
Lorenzo was by no means universally despised for his ac
 
tions. The many benefitted from his extravagance, and as he
 
controlled the government of Florence, the few who might
 
have raised objections had no recourse for their grievances.
 
In fact, the Medici were perhaps the most esteemed family in
 
Italy, and certainly so, in Florence. ;
 
Machiavelli does not raise the issue, however, of where
 
an aspiring prince might turn when his resources are deplet
 
ed, certainly an important issue for one who is on the
 
"path" and who must rely on his own wealth. This omission
 
is significant because Machiavelli could not have addressed
 
it without drawing attention to the Medici, his intended
 
target. But the implications are there if one reads the
 
discourse carefully, and if a powerful citizen could rob the
 
people in a republic with impunity, how much greater the
 
opportunity to rob his subjects, should he become a tyranni
 
cal prince, particularly when he views their wealth as his
 
own. This is the comic truth, the political reality that
 
underlies his recommendation that the prince use someone
 
else's money although it is hidden by the connotation he
 
gives to using someone else's—as the spoils of acquisi
 
tions, in empire. In the latter sense, one can compare
 
Cesare Borgia or Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici to the
 
examples given by Machiavelli, "of Cyrus, Caesar, and
 
Alexander," (Ch. 16, 64) who were very liberal with someone
 
else's—a comparison that invites profound ridicule of the
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modern princes and their aspirations.
 
With the introduction of the qualities "giver" and
 
"rapacious," Machiavelli advises the prince to indulge in
 
the vice of excess, but with the wealth of someone else,
 
which conforms, rather, to the vice of deficiency—-an ironic
 
twist in his argument that can be demonstrated by returning
 
to the earlier model (see Figure 1):
 
Figure 1: Liberal and Mean
 
Vice Vice Vice
 
of of.',, of
 
Deficiency Moderation Excess
 
Mean 
t/sesomeone else's 
Liberal 
[Excluded} 
giver 
useful 
prince 
rapacious 
contradictary 
conclusion 
illustrated defined
 
as as
 
useful harmful
 
[Not Repreisented]
 
useown wealth
 
Represented In:
 
1. Recognition
 
2. Lavish Display
 
prince aspiring prince
 
harmful useful
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The model illustrates the shift in Machiavelli's argu
 
ment, as the vice of excess takes the place of the virtue of
 
moderation, and thus the contraries are redefined to reflect
 
the associated vices; virtue is no longer represented.
 
"Giver" and "rapacious," the second pair of contraries
 
listed in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15, 61), conform in subs
 
tance, as defined by Machiavelli in Chapter Sixteen, to the
 
vice of deficiency and thus, by definition, neither quality
 
represents a virtue. (Ch. 16, 64) "Giver" represents ex
 
cess, but with the use of someone else's wealth.
 
Further, Machiavelli represents giver as one who also
 
takes, and rapacious as one who also gives. That is, he
 
defines "giver" in the following manner; "And of what is not
 
yours or your subject's one can be a bigger giver, as were
 
Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is
 
someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it
 
to you; only spending your own is what hurts you."
 
And in reference to what qualifies as rapacious,
 
Machiavelli advises, "And for the prince who goes out with
 
his armies, who feeds on booty, pillage, and ransom and
 
manages on what belongs to someone else, this liberality is
 
necessary; otherwise he would not be followed by his sol
 
diers." (Ch. 16, 64) On the surface, Machiavelli's argument
 
appears logical and compelling, but we should not be fooled
 
by appearances as Machiavelli intended that the new prince
 
be deceived in his little work.
 
310
 
The notion that a prince will only be followed if his
 
soldiers are allowed to pillage and plunder is a significant
 
marker for satire, for Machiavelli thus describes a prince
 
who either lacks discipline and authority, or one who is so
 
poor he cannot afford to pay them by any other means. It
 
should be noted that in the Discourses, Machiavelli praises
 
the Roman practice of paying their soldiers, which redounded
 
to the public benefit. Because they were paid, the Consuls
 
were not as generous with them concerning booty. "They
 
thought it a good plan that the public should benefit by it,
 
so that they would not have to tax the city to pay for their
 
enterprises. In a very short time, this made the treasury
 
very rich." (II. 6, 293) This seems good advice for a
 
prince, especially one whom Machiavelli has counseled to
 
take no art but the art of war—were it not for the fact
 
that it is not in the best interest of a tyrannical prince
 
to consider the pubic good.
 
Despite the fact that Machiavelli condoned rapacious
 
behavior as a necessary mode of liberality, as in the exam
 
ple of the military above, he condemns having "a name for
 
rapacity" in his conclusion. "So there is more wisdom in
 
maintaining a name for meanness, which begets infamy without
 
hatred, than in being under the hecessity, because one wants
 
to have a name for liberality, to incur a name for rapacity,
 
which begets infamy with hatred." (Ch. 16, 65) In either
 
case, Machiavelli only represents the associated vices.
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Moderation, as a matter of policy and good governance, is
 
never considered in this discourse. The Unjust argument was
 
destined to triumph from the beginning, for no matter which
 
vice Machiavelli preferred, utility for the prince, physis,
 
was his sole consideration, grounded in his argument which
 
deliberated the advantages or disadvantages of either vice.
 
Vice has not become virtue, however, nor has virtue become
 
vice. Machiavelli has merely condoned vice, the vice of
 
deficiency deemed more efficable for an established prince,
 
and the vice of excess favorable and necessary when on the
 
path to becoming prince.
 
Machiavelli did not intend to instruct the modern
 
prince with his advice concerning liberality, or the "effec
 
tual truth of the thing." (Ch. 15, 61) Rather, in their
 
actions and character, the modern princes instructed him and
 
he, in turn, as a servant of the public good, took it upon
 
himself to share his knowledge with others in the hope that
 
in doing so, he might inspire a desire for reform.®" The
 
Medici could not have been pleased to find their excessive
 
liberality exposed as a means to an end, and detrimental to
 
the greater good of Florence. How fortunate then, for them,
 
that his message was drowned in a flood of damnation against
 
which he could never defend himself without admitting the
 
true nature of the Prince-—and that it was dedicated to the
 
oppressed rather than their oppressors—'a revelation that
 
would have held the promise of dire consequences for the
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former statesman of Florence.
 
Machiavelli used a similar methodology in his treatment
 
of the contraries cruelty and mercy, in Chapter Seventeen.
 
Cruelty represents the vice of deficiency, and mercy, the
 
virtue of moderation. As in the previous example of liberal
 
and mean, the vice of excess is not represented. He begins
 
J
 
by stating the Just argument:
 
Descending next to the other qualities
 
set forth before, I say that each prince
 
should desire to be held merciful and
 
not cruel. (Ch. 17, 65)
 
Machiavelli probably intended that his reference to
 
"descending" have a double meaning. He is, of course, de
 
scending down the list of paired contraries given in Chapter
 
Fifteen. At the same time, however, he is also descending
 
further into that evil that earned him the title of "Old
 
Nick,"®V an unrepentant evil that masqueraded as virtuous
 
conduct, clothed in verbal irony, including "absurd sugges
 
tions made with apparent sincerity," as "praise of harmful
 
things under the pretext that they are good."®
 
As in the previous chapter, the Just argximent is never
 
elaborated or defended. In the examples of Manlius
 
Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus from the Discourses, howev
 
er, Machiavelli amplifies his views of mercy and harshness
 
with regard to princes and republics. Manlius and Valerius
 
were both successful generals, but proceeded by different
 
means. Manlius used "severity," while Valerius was consid­
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erate and "homely." Of Manlius, Machiavelli coricludes:
 
For a citizen who is living under the
 
laWs of a republic, I think it more
 
praiseworthy and less dangerous to adopt
 
the procedure of Manlius, since this way
 
of behaving was entirely in the public
 
interest, and was in no way affected by
 
private ambition, for it is impossible
 
to gain partisans if one is harsh in
 
one's dealings with everybody and wholly
 
devoted to the common good, because by
 
doing this one does not acquire particu
 
lar friends or—as I have just called
 
them—partisans. Wherefore, than such a
 
procedure none can be more advantageous
 
or more desirable in a republic, since
 
it neither fails to take account of the
 
interests of the public nor does it
 
suggest that personal power is in any
 
way being sought. (III. 22, 469)
 
Of Valerius, however, Machiavelli cautions that such
 
generals who gain the "goodwill of the troops" in a repub
 
lic, especially if he "should retain his command for long"
 
may, in itis effects, "be prejudicial to liberty" (as was the
 
case with Julius Gaesar). Although for these reasons
 
Machiavelli finds the modes of Valerius inappropriate in a
 
republic, he finds them desirable in a prince:
 
But if one takes the case of a prince,
 
which is the case Xenophon is consider
 
ing, we should have to decide wholly
 
with Valerius and to discard Manlius.
 
For a prince should seek to gain the
 
obedience and affection of his soldiers
 
and of his subjects; their obedience by
 
his fidelity to the constitution and by
 
the reputation he has for virtue; their
 
affection by his affability, kindliness,
 
compassion, and the other qualities for
 
which Valerius was conspicuous; and
 
Cyrus also, so Xenophon tells us. For
 
that a prince should be well liked by
 
each of his subjects and should have a
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devoted army, is in conformity with
 
other features appertaining to his
 
princely status. (III. 22, 470)
 
Machiavelli concludes that the method used by Valerius,
 
if used by a private citizen, "prepares the way for tyran
 
ny," while the behavior of Manlius "in a prince," is "harm
 
ful," (although he does not elaborate). (III. 22, 470-1)
 
In considering the qualities of cruelty and mercy in
 
the Prince, however, Machiavelli offers advice that contra
 
dicts that given in the Discourses. The modes of Manlius,
 
severe and "harsh," are favored in the new prince rather
 
than the "affection," "kindliness," and "compassion" dis
 
played by Valerius—which he praised as the qualities a
 
prince should have. The untrustworthiness of his argument
 
in the Prince, then, can be inferred both on the basis of
 
that contradiction and the devices he employs in the argu
 
ment itself, the Unjust, in which, as in the previous chap
 
ter, he redefines the contraries.
 
Having stated that "each prince should desire to be
 
held merciful and not cruel," he continues;
 
Nonetheless, he should take care not to
 
use this mercy badly. Cesare Borgia was
 
held to be cruel,v nonetheless his cruel
 
ty restored the Romagna, united it, and
 
reduced it to peace and to faith. If
 
one considers this well, one will see
 
that he was much more merciful than the
 
Florentine people, who so as to escape a
 
name for cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be
 
destroyed. A prince, therefore, so as
 
to keep his subjects united and faith
 
ful, should not care about the infamy of
 
cruelty, because with very few examples
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he will be more merciful than those who
 
for the sake of too much mercy allow
 
disorders to continue, from which come
 
killings or robberies, for these custom
 
arily harm a whole community, but the
 
executions that come from a prince harm
 
one particular individual. And of all
 
princes, it is impossible for a new
 
prince to escape a name for cruelty,
 
because new states are full of dangers.
 
(Ch. 17, 65-6)
 
In the notion that a prince should "not use this mercy
 
badly," badly is defined as "too much mercy," which repre
 
sents the vice of excess. Cruelty, the vice of deficiency,
 
is thus deemed "more merciful." The mean (the virtue of
 
moderation represented as mercy) is excluded from the debate
 
and, as in the previous chapter, the contraries have been
 
re-defined, from moderation-deficiency to excess-deficiency.
 
Ironically, "more" (excess) is also reflected in the less
 
(deficiency) side of the argument, demonstrated by
 
Machiavelli in the notion that a prince will "be held more
 
and more liberal" when he practices "parsimony," as well, in
 
the previous chapter. (Ch. 16, 63) There are, then, both
 
intriguing and comic aspects to his Unjust arguments.
 
Machiavelli targets Cesare Borgia, in Chapter Seven-

I
 
teen, to satirize Borgia's cruelty and the cruel nature of a
 
tyrannical prince. As I mentioned above, Garrett Mattingly
 
challenged Machiavelli's assumption that Cesare's "cruelty
 
restored the Romagna" and "united it." Machiavelli "never
 
mentions these statesmanlike achievements" in his reports
 
from Borgia's camp, "nor do any of the other reports from
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observers in the area, Spanish, French, Venetians, Sienese;
 
nor do any other contemporary sources. All the indications
 
are quite the contrary... the duke did nothing to end fac
 
tional strife and anarchy in the Romagna; he merely superim
 
posed the brutal rule of his Spanish captains on top of
 
it."®^ Mattingly's conclusion is supported by the fact that
 
Cesare's so-called unified state rapidly disintegrated with
 
the death of Alexander VI.
 
Further, Machiavelli's assertion that Cesare "reduced
 
[the Romagna] to peace and faith" is a questionable state
 
ment. One might say that order is reduced to chaos or that
 
good is reduced to evil, but it seems inappropriate in the
 
sixteenth century to refer to the population within the
 
papal states as having been "reduced" to "faith." The
 
Romagna was, of course, regained for the Church, but as
 
Ferdinand Schevill says of Cesare's "brutal seizures and
 
bloody conquests... in the course of little more than three
 
years he succeeded in uprooting a score of petty tyrants
 
planted in papal territory and in assembling hiS; whirlwind
 
gains into a single political unit. Technically, even after
 
his conquests had been consolidated, they constituted not
 
his personal realm but the state of the Church and owned the
 
pope as their ruler. No one doubted, however, that [Cesare]
 
was firmly resolved to keep as his property what he had
 
seized, as it was universally assumed that the pope, his
 
father, was so completely under the son's domination that he
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was fully prepared to coimit the monstrous felony of alien
 
ating the patrimony of St. Peter in order to supply his
 
bastard with the territorial basis required for a self-

perpetuating dynasty."*^ By "reduced" to "faith," then,
 
Machiavelli seems to convey the oblique nature of his con
 
quests, relevant to the greater good of the Church, as a
 
"rebel of Christ."®'
 
Machiavelli refers to the "killings" that arise from
 
"too much mercy" in the example of the Florentines, noting
 
that "these customarily harm a whole community," while the
 
"executions that come from a prince harm one particular
 
person," suggesting that killing one particular person would
 
have no such impact. The first "particular" person the
 
tyrant must eliminate, however, is the head of state.
 
Cesare was responsible for the murder of Astorre Manfredi of
 
Foenza,®® Guilio Cesare Varano of Camerino,®' and prince
 
Alfonso of Aragon, husband of Cesare's sister, Lucrezia,®*
 
among others. Cesare was implicated in the death of his
 
brother, Juan,®® whom the pope was excessively fond of, and
 
wanted to "elevate... to the throne of Naples."™ His elimi
 
nation of the Orsini and Colonna parties, praised by
 
Machiavelli in Chapter Seven in reference to events in
 
Sinigaglia, resulted in many murders, including "the tragic
 
death of Cardinal Orsini."'V William Ebenstein remarks that,
 
in addition to the assassination of Cesare's brother and his
 
sister's husband, "the number of his other assassinations is
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 legion, and his cruelty was matched only by his treachery
 
and debauchery."''^ Only the death of Remirro could be said
 
to reflect an execution that only harmed "one particular
 
person," and even benefitted the community.
 
Machiavelli does not go directly to the issue of hate,
 
as he did in Chapter Seven, when he stated that Remirro's
 
"past rigors had generated some hatred." Rather, he directs
 
our attention to love and fear, fear representing a response
 
to cruelty that is less inciteful than hate, particularly
 
when considered in the context of whether it is better for a
 
prince to be loved or fealred, a question that reflected the
 
concerns of the ancients, the subject of long debate. He
 
introduces the notion of fear with the phrase, "nonethe
 
less," which generally signals movement to, or within, the
 
Unjust argument, although his statement has the appearance
 
of returning to the Just, and moderation:
 
Nonetheless, he should be slow to be- '
 
lieve and to move, nor should he create
 
fear for himself, and he should proceed
 
in a temperate mode with prudence and
 
humanity so that too much diffidence
 
does not render him intolerable.
 
(Ch. 17, 66)
 
The prince should practice his cruelty with "humanity"
 
(a contradiction in terms), being neither "too confident"
 
(overbearing) or too "diffident" (hesitant) in proceeding.
 
He should adopt a "temperate mode" (moderation), the mean
 
between two extremes. Under cruelty (the vice of deficien
 
cy), then, Machiavelli has constructed the appearance of a
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virtue and its associated vices. "Humanity" represents the
 
virtue of moderation, while "too much confidence" (excess),
 
and "diffidence" (deficiency) represent the associated
 
vices. In the process, he has introduced the paired con
 
traries, "humane" and "proud," given in Chapter Fifteen,
 
(Oh. 15, 62) represented in "humanity" and "too much confi
 
dence," respectively. Combined with "diffidence," the three
 
aspects thus appear to conform to Aristotle's model of
 
virtue and its associated vices—but one should not be
 
confused by this distortion, for all three aspects fall
 
under the heading of vice, and there is no virtue in vice.
 
(See Figure 2)
 
Nor was there anything humane in Cesare Borgia's ac
 
tions. Rather, he was "universally feared,"'^ "hated" and
 
"despised," as "pitiless as a beast of the jungle... pre
 
pared to go through fire and wade through blood to reach his
 
goal.""*
 
Indeed, Cesare Borgia had "created" inordinate "fear
 
for himself," which Machiavelli never addresses. Rather, he
 
moves from the specific example of Cesare's cruelty to the
 
more general issue of "whether it is better to be loved than
 
feared, or the reverse. The answer is that one would want
 
to be both the one and the other; but because it is diffi
 
cult to put them together, it is much safer to be feared
 
than loved." (Ch. 17, 66) Machiavelli thus diverts atten
 
tion away from Cesare (who is not mentioned again in this
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 chapter), for Machiavelli's answer contradicts that given by
 
one ancient writer in particular, Cicero, who raised the
 
same question in his De Officiis.
 
Figure 2: Cruelty and Mercy
 
Vice Vice Vice
 
of of of
 
Deficiency Moderation Excess
 
Cruelty Mercy [Not Represented]
 
[mercy well used] [Excluded] use mercy badly
 
[less mercy] too much mercy
 
Gesare Bargia Florentines/Pistoia
 
less merciful
more merciful
 
restored peace/faith disorders
 
kill one particular person Killings; robberies
 
[does not harm community] harmful to community
 
[deficiency] [mean] [excess]
 
I I I
 
diffidence temperate=humanity too much confidence
 
diffident Humane Proud
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Cicero maintained that "fear... is a poor safeguard."'^
 
"To banish fear and hold fast to love, Cicero had affirmed,
 
offers the best means to maintain our influence over other
 
people and our own safety at the same time. Machiavelli
 
responds with a flat contradiction," in his statement that
 
"it is much safer to be feared than loved." Further,
 
"Cicero had gone on to add that there is no power so great
 
that it can hope to last if it is upheld by fear (II. 7,
 
25). Machiavelli replies that, because men are in general
 
so self-interested, they will break the bonds of love when
 
ever they find it useful, whereas fear of punishment will
 
always hold them effectively."'®
 
Innocent Gentillet, writing in the sixteenth century,
 
argues that Machiavelli's position is "entirely erroneous,
 
for there is nothing easier for a prince than to obtain them
 
both [love and fear], as sound reason will attest," exempli
 
fied in "the good emperors of old, such as Augustus, Trajan,
 
Hadrian, Antonius, and others, who were dreaded, loved, and
 
revered all at the same time."" Certainly Machiavelli's
 
advice that it is "safer to be feared than loved" does not
 
conform to his example of Valerius Corvinius in the Dis
 
courses, and if a prince should conduct himself in the
 
manner of Valerius, which has the greater weight of his
 
writings in support of it, the Prince has the appearance of
 
an aberration, by dsign. His contradiction of Cicero was
 
meant to be obvious; he makes a mockery of ancient wisdom
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and in so doing, apes the moderns who have no more regard
 
for it than he himself displays. "For Gicero, the honestum,
 
or the common good, and the utlle, or individual interest,
 
cannot conflict because man is a part of a larger social and
 
moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable
 
as a basis for ethical action. In such cases where the two
 
values appear to conflict, utility, to be sure, is the norm
 
invoked to resolve the conflict. But it is utility on a
 
social level, utilitus rel publicae,"'® not that of the
 
prince. Machiavelli's regard for physis, represented in
 
"safety" or the security of the prince, thus refutes
 
Gicero. Only in the Prince, however, does Machiavelli
 
abandon the public welfare, which indeed must be the case
 
when the advantage for the prince is the sole consideration.
 
The notion that "love is held by a chain of obligation,
 
which, because men are wicked, is broken at every opportuni
 
ty for their own utility, but fear is held by a dread of
 
punishment that never forsakes you," (Gh. 17, 66-7) is
 
defined by Innocent Gentillet as "a truly tyrannical pre
 
cept,"'^ and one that is doomed to failure if Gicero is cor
 
rect, in his belief that no power can last if "upheld by
 
fear."^® Such a regime is predicated on mutual fear, howev
 
er. The people fear the prince because he is a tyrant who
 
has taken their liberty, and will "revolt" (Gh. 17, 66)
 
whenever they have the opportunity. The tyrant fears the
 
people, because he cannot give them their liberty and retain
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 his ovm power at the same time. Therefore, he is under the
 
necessity to protect his own interests by every possible
 
means. As Garrett Mattingly observes, Machiavelli seems to
 
issue a warning to the prince,*^ further elaborated in his
 
remonstrance that the prince "should nonetheless make him
 
self feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love,
 
he escapes hatred." (Ch. 17, 67)
 
A prince will avoid hatred if he "abstains from the
 
property of his citizens and his subjects [a sovereign
 
' J
 
prince does not have citizens] and from their women, and if
 
he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do
 
it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause
 
for it. But above all, he must abstain from the property of
 
others, because men forget the death of a father more quick
 
ly than the loss of a patrimony."*^ This would seem good
 
advice for any ruler, but Machiavelli also uses the occasion
 
to ridicule his model prince, Cesare Borgia, in his state
 
ment that "men forget the death of a father more quickly
 
than the loss of a patrimony." While Pope Julius "was
 
confiscating all the duke's possessions," Cesare met with
 
Guidobaldo of Urbino at the Vatican, and uttered the follow
 
ing sentiments:
 
He made two extremely deep bows and laid
 
the blame on his youth, the bad advice
 
he had been given, the wicked deeds and
 
totally perverted character of the pope,
 
and all those who had encouraged him in
 
the venture. He cursed his father's
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memory. He promised to give back every
 
thing he had taken at Urbino... this was
 
a strange sight for those who had known
 
the arrogant Cesare in his time of tri
 
umph. But... he was preparing for the
 
future, believing that fickle fate would
 
allow him to return to power, perhaps
 
with his former victim's help. This
 
time he was mistaken; no one took him
 
seriously.®^
 
Nor should one forget the example of Liverotto da
 
Fermo, who turned on his adoptive father, Giovanni Fogliani,
 
and had him killed in order to claim his patrimony.
 
(Ch. 8, 35-7)
 
Such "epigrams [as] ^a man will forget the death of his
 
father sooner than the loss of his patrimony'... all seem to
 
come out of some sort of philosophical Grand Guignol and,
 
like the savage ironies of Swift's Modest Proposal, are
 
rendered the more spine chilling by the matter-of-fact tone
 
in which they are uttered."^
 
Cesare not only plundered the property of Guidobaldo of
 
Urbino and countless others, he also had a reputation for
 
violating women during his escapades as well. Caterina
 
Sforza (of Forli and Imola) and her forces were attacked by
 
Cesare at her fortress, "La Rocca." Caterina "was taken
 
prisoner" to "the town of Forli," where "Cesare installed
 
her in the same house as himself and treated her brutally,
 
even, if the story is to be believed, forcing her to sleep
 
with him... One of her partisans sent the pope a letter
 
impregnated with poison. The plot was uncovered, the man
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arrested, and he declared himself ready to lose his life if,
 
in killing Alexander, he could save his native city and his
 
princess."^® Cesare is described by Ivan Cloulas as an "un
 
scrupulous seducer... refusing to let anything stand in the
 
way of his enjoyment and pleasure."*® Machiavelli could not
 
have chosen a more spectacular model for the Prince than
 
Cesare Borgia. His exploits were well known, and thus his
 
example usually emphasizes the fallibility of Machiavelli's
 
counsel, as he intended, among those who understood the
 
facts.
 
/
 
Machiavelli returns to the question of cruelty and
 
mercy in his examples of Hannibal and Scipio. He mentions
 
Hannibal's "inhuman cruelty," and his "infinite virtues,"
 
which together made him successful. (Oh. 17, 67) Of Scipio,
 
Machiavelli reflects on his "excessive mercy" and his
 
"agreeable nature" which "would in time have sullied
 
Scipio's faioie and glory if he had continued with it in
 
empire; but while he lived under the government of the
 
Senate, this damaging quality of his was not only hidden,
 
but made for his glory." (Ch. 17, 68) One could go in depth
 
into a discussion over these points, but in considering the
 
relevance of these examples for the Prince, I think it comes
 
down to one issue. As Machiavelli states in the Discourses,
 
"those who desire to imitate [Valerius Corvinus and Manlius
 
Torquatus] may, however, fall into the vices I mentioned in
 
connection with Hannibal and Scipio, namely the evoking of
 
326
 
  
 
 
contempt or of hatred, vices which you can avoid only if in
 
you there be more than ordinary virtue, but not otherwise."
 
(III. 22, 468) Hannibal and Scipio had such virtue, but the
 
modern princes did not. Therefore, Cesare is the more
 
blameworthy for his excessive cruelty, which earned for him
 
the hatred he deserved.
 
Scipio's "excessive mercy" represents the vice of
 
excesJ in the Unjust argument, and Hannibal's "inhuman
 
cruelty," the vice of deficiency. The paired contraries,
 
"hard"!and "agreeable," (Ch. 15, 62) are reflected in
 
■ 1 ' ■ 
Hannibal and Scipio respectively; "agreeable" is mentioned
 
1 ■ ■ , ' 
specifically, while "hard" must be inferred from "venerable
 
i
 
and terlrible," (Ch. 17, 67) with regard to Hannibal. Nei­
1 ■ , . 
ther "agreeable" or "hard," then, reflect the virtue of
 
moderation. Machiavelli has excluded virtue from his argu-

I
 
ment, and, as in the previous chapter, the vice of deficien­
!
 
cy (cruelty) is deemed more worthy than the vice of excess
 
(too much mercy), giving it the appearance of virtue.
 
In his concluding statement, Machiavelli remarks,
 
i ■ " 
"returning to being feared and loved, that since men love at
 
i
 
their convenience and fear at the convenience of the prince,
 
a wise prince should found himself on what is his, not on
 
1
 
what is someone elses; he should only contrive to avoid
 
i
 
hatred, a's was said." (Ch. 17, 68) If the prince "should
 
only contrive to avoid hatred," it is reasonable to question
 
why Machiavelli failed to offer "the classical analysis of
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cruelty, from Seneca's De dementia," which "denounced cruel
 
ty as the characteristic vice of tyrants, and hence as the
 
evil most of all to be avoided by true princes."*' He might
 
also have turned to Cicero to clarify the point that "im
 
morality is expedient." That is, "There are certain ac
 
tions, such as tyrannicide and some forms of civil disobe
 
dience, which are good and expedient even though they vio
 
late the moral law,"** but that would have been manifestly
 
inappropriate for consideration in the Prince, and the same
 
could be said for Seneca<s advice, for Machiavelli's new
 
prince was not a "true prince," but a tyrannical usurper
 
whom both Cicero and Seneca would have opposed.
 
Machiavelli turns to the subject of faith and keeping
 
one's word in Chapter Eighteen. It would be difficult to
 
construct a model based on virtue and its associated vices
 
1
 
in this chapter because Machiavelli has confounded such
 
efforts by including three virtues in his opening arguments.
 
He begins by stating the Just:
 
How laudable it is for a prince to keep
 
his faith, and live with honesty and not
 
by astuteness, everyone understands.
 
(Ch. 18, 68),
 
"Honesty" and "faith" represent virtues, while astute
 
ness reflects the vice of deficiency in so far as cleverness
 
suggests manipulation of the truth and, thus, shades of
 
dishonesty. In the Unjust argument, he introduces a third
 
virtue, "loyalty:" ^
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Nonetheless one sees by experience in
 
our times that the princes who have done
 
great things are those who have taken
 
little account of faith [breaker of
 
faith] and have known how to get around
 
men's brains with their astuteness; and
 
in the end they have overcome those who
 
have founded themselves on loyalty.
 
(Ch. 18, 69)
 
Loyalty represents neither excess or deficiency, but
 
Machiavelli gives it the appearance of the vice of excess.
 
That is, the paired contraries "breaker of faith" and
 
"faithful," given in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15, 62) represent
 
deficiency and moderation respectively—and, thus, loyalty
 
takes on the appearance of excess. "Honest" and "clever,"
 
paired contraries that are given in Chapter Fifteen (Ch. 15,
 
62) represent moderation and deficiency respectively, as in
 
"how to get around men's brains" with "astuteness," repre
 
sented in the cleverness of the fox. I have discussed
 
Machiavelli's notion of "fortunate astuteness" in connection
 
with Chapter Nine on civil principalities. (Ch. 9, 39)
 
Machiavelli refers to law, but dismisses its further
 
consideration on the grounds that it is insufficient:
 
Thus, you must know that there are two
 
kinds of combat: one with laws, the
 
other with force. The first is proper
 
to man, the second to beasts: but be
 
cause the first is often not enough, one
 
must have recourse to the second.
 
Therefore, it is necessary for a prince
 
to know well how to use the beast in
 
man.
 
Machiavelli omits law from his discourse on the basis
 
that "it is often not enough," but he doesn't say in what
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cirGumstances law is not enough, or when force is necessary.
 
Where laws are observed, however, reason prevails, as law is
 
"proper to man," and "combat" is conducted in courts of law.
 
Where laws are overturned or not observed, force or fraud
 
may be the issue, reflecting the domain of beasts, in which
 
case "combat" is conducted in an arena outside the jurisdic
 
tion of established law and justice. With regard to the new
 
prince, I refer to Chapter Nine, to give an example of what
 
Machiavelli may have had in mind in the notion that law is
 
"often not enough." He counsels that a "wise prince" should
 
find a way to rid himself of the magistrates because he
 
won't "have time in the midst of danger to seize absolute
 
authority," (Ch. 9, 42) and thus the prince, must eitheir
 
destroy the government by force or resort to fraudulent
 
means by filling the magisteries and other government posts
 
with partisans he can rely on not to obstruct his designs.
 
In that sense, Machiavelli's remarks concerning man and
 
beast are intended as a criticism of force and fraud as a
 
means to an end, for he would never have approved of such
 
methods for the purpose of installing a tyrant. He makes a
 
clear distinction in the Discourses between princes (and
 
even tyrants) who observe the laws, however, and those who
 
do not. Even a "tyrant" can address the "demand for free
 
dom" (which he can never satisfy) by providing the people
 
with security in good laws. One means is to "introduce such
 
institutions and laws as shall, in conjunction with the
 
330
 
power of the prince, make for the security of the public as
 
a whole. When a prince does this, and the people see that
 
on no occasion does he break such laws, in a short time they
 
will begin to live in security and contentment." (I. 16,
 
155-6) Machiavelli issues no such counsel in the Prince,
 
however, that a prince should "on no occasion" break the
 
laws. Law and justice are never defined as principle compo
 
nents of the new regime, which is not surprising if one
 
considers that, by his very nature, a tyrant of the sort
 
described in the Prince must obtain to force and fraud to
 
maintain his power—or be undone by revolt or conspiracy.
 
In advancing his argument that a prince should learn to
 
use the beast in man, Machiavelli refers to "ancient writ
 
ers" who told of princes "given to Chiron the centaur to be
 
raised, so that he would look after them with his disci
 
pline. To have as teacher a half-beast, half-man means
 
nothing other than that a prince needs to know how to use
 
both natures; and one without the other is not lasting."
 
(Ch. 18, 69) The example of Chiron, however, betrays
 
Machiavelli's own use of the beast, the clever fox. Unlike
 
the other centaurs who were "violent" and "fierce crea
 
tures,"'" Chiron was a gifted teacher of medicine, "wise and
 
kindly"'* known everywhere for his goodness and wisdom... He
 
alone among the centaurs was immortal," but having been
 
injured in battle, "Zeus permitted [him] to die rather than
 
live forever in pain."'^ In yet another story, which gives
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the example of Chiron a particular relevance to the Prince,
 
he was "willing to die" for Prometheus, who "refused to
 
submit to cruelty and tyranny," and whose "name has stood
 
through all the centuries, from Greek days to our own, as
 
that of the great rebel against injustice and the authority
 
of power. Chiron, then, who is half-beast, represents
 
that which is proper to man, while Machiavelli's prince
 
stands for what is proper to beasts, and thus the example of
 
Chiron constitutes a great irony that is loaded with symbol
 
ism, particularly with regard to Prometheus and what he
 
represented, as a foe of "tyranny" and "injustice."
 
"Necessity" dictates that the prince must "know well
 
how to use the beast." "The lion does not defend itself
 
from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves.
 
So one needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to
 
frighten the wolves." (Ch. 18, 69) More to the point (if
 
one considers the modes used by the Medici and the Borgia),
 
one "needs to be a fox" to set "snares," and a "lion" to
 
devour the wolves, but at the same time, it is also "neces
 
sary to know well how to color this nature, to be a great
 
pretender and dissembler." (Ch. 18, 70)
 
Quentin Skinner makes the point that, in addition to
 
satirizing hypocrisy;
 
Machiavelli's other and even more point
 
ed satire is contained in his suggestion
 
that rulers must cultivate two natures—
 
a good one which they should follow when
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possible, and a bad one which they must
 
be prepared to follow when this is dic
 
tated by necessity. Cicero had already
 
observed in De Officiis that there are
 
two ways of gaining one's ends. One is
 
by argument, the other by force; the
 
first is proper to man, the second only
 
to beasts (I. 11, 34) Sharpening the
 
distinction, Cicero had added that
 
beastly methods, encompassing the use of
 
fraud as well as force, are completely
 
unworthy of men. Force reduces us to
 
the level of the lion, fraud to that of
 
the fox, and both must be avoided at all
 
costs (I. 13, 41).^
 
A tyrant, however, need not avoid beastly behavior,
 
because he is not encumbered with ethical and moral con
 
cerns. Machiavelli "reduces" him to "the level of the lion"
 
and "the fox," by attributing those qualities to him.
 
Mark Hulliung argues that "Machiavelli's image of the
 
lion and the fox is, then, Cicero's stoicism stood on its
 
head," for "there is in Machiavelli no passage more quoted
 
than his insistence... that the prince must avail himself of
 
the force of the lion and the fraud of the fox. Not a
 
single hximanist had excuse to miss the significance of
 
Machiavelli's words, which were taken from Cicero's De Offi
 
ciis—a work well known to all students of the classics—^and
 
turned upside down." Further, Hulliung remarks that "from
 
Machiavelli's point of view, the decisive baptism of Cicero
 
was the one sponsored by Dante:
 
Of all malicious wrong that earns Heav
 
en's hate the end is injury; all such
 
ends are Won either by force or fraud.
 
Both perpetrate evil to others; but
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since man alone is capable of fraud, God
 
hates that worst; the fraudulent lie
 
lowest, then, and groan deepest.
 
In "overturning both Cicero and Dante," Hulliung ar
 
gues, Machiavelli overturned "Stoicism and Christianity in
 
one efficient and brilliant move. And he did so using the
 
imagery (the lion and the fox) and the language (either
 
force or fraud) of On Duties and The Divine Comedy, two
 
works with which every educated person in Renaissance Italy
 
was conversant."®'
 
Only in the Prince, however, is there strong evidence
 
for Hulliung's argument. In his other works, and particu
 
larly in the Discourses, Machiavelli makes compelling argu
 
ments for virtuous character and actions, most notably from
 
the example of the Roman republic, expressing the ancient
 
wisdom he is accused of overturning. Perhaps Machiavelli
 
chose Cicero and Dante as sources precisely because "every
 
educated person in Renaissance Italy was conversant" in
 
them,, and thus his satire would not elude the erudite who
 
might be expected to perceive his departure from convention
 
al wisdom as a clear marker for his intent; to issue a
 
critique of evil. If Machiavelli were the devil incarnate,
 
as his accusers believed, his fiendish motives were kept
 
well hidden during the course of his service to the repub
 
lic, and all that it represented. And if he really desired
 
employment from the Medici, why would he ply his diabolical
 
counsel in what ampunts to a public epistle to his would-be
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benefactors, revealing the sum of his wisdom to anyone who
 
chanced to read the circulating manuscript? It is absurd to
 
think that he would, especially if one considers that Machi
 
avellian diplomacy and art of state in the Prince, were
 
dependent on deceit and cultivated appearances for success,
 
which by their very nature demand a covert application.
 
In order to succeed as a "pretender and dissembler," it
 
is only "necessary" that one "appear" to be "merciful,
 
faithful, humane, honest, and religious and to be so, but to
 
remain with a spirit built so that, if you need not to be
 
those things, you are able to know how to change to the
 
contrary," and Machiavelli mentions Alexander VI as a good
 
example, "because he well knew this aspect of the world."
 
(Ch. 18, 70) "To be" or "not to be" is a question the
 
prince must decide, predicated on necessity, and "This has
 
to be understood; that a prince, and especially a new
 
prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are
 
held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain
 
his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against
 
humanity, against religion." Therefore, he should "not
 
depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into
 
evil, when forced by necessity." (Ch. 18, 70)
 
In his play, Mandragola, Machiavelli's characters
 
"become comic especially when they fall into the traps the
 
truly cunning persons set for them,"®^ and there is a like
 
quality to the Prince, if one can imagine a new prince
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taking Machiavelli at his word—trying to figure out how to
 
use cruelty mercifully, or how to be a generous miser, a
 
humane executioner, a religious non-believer, or an honest
 
dissembler. The essential incongruity is reminiscent of the
 
comic tension created in Machiavelli's ill-fated "spirited
 
man riding a cowardly horse," (II. 18, 319) in which little
 
progress can expect to be made.
 
For added emphasis, Machiavelli repeats that "a prince
 
should thus take great care that nothing escape his mouth
 
that is not full of the above-mentioned five qualities and
 
that, to see him and hear him, he should appear all mercy,
 
all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion. And
 
there is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this
 
last quality." (Ch. 18, 70-1) This represents, it seems to
 
me, a distinct criticism of the Vatican and papal ambition
 
for they, above all others, were expected not to appear to
 
be, but to be the embodiment of the Church and its beliefs
 
and orders—the exemplars of Christian piety and ethics.
 
Their actions and example, however, hastened the onset of
 
the Protestant Reformation, and created chaos, misery and
 
fear among those Italian states that fell victim to the
 
emerging power of the Church. Machiavelli's emphasis on
 
"religion," then, should be taken as a barb flung at the
 
feet of Leo X and Alexander VI, but with an important and
 
somewhat comic distinction. While Leo's opportunity to
 
generate disorder was as great as that manifest in the
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Borgia, the Medici were compromised by their lack of abili
 
ty, so that whatever spectacle they might create across the
 
peninsula, although threatening to be sure, carried with it
 
a certain humorous aspect when compared to the more formida
 
ble Borgia, or even the impetuous .Julius II, for that mat
 
ter. Machiavelli counsels the new prince to take note of
 
the astute fox, but the Medici hardly needed lessons in the
 
art of fraud and deceit. If he had really intended to give
 
sincere advice to that family, MachiaVelli would have fo
 
cused instead on how the lion devours the wolves, the combi
 
nation of force and treachery that made the Borgia so power
 
ful.
 
The views of Cicero, then, take on a special signifi
 
cance in Machiavelli's time, for Machiavelli's frame of
 
reference included princes of the Church, as well as secular
 
rulers. In fact, most particularly it included the popes,
 
and Machiavelli's essential refutation of Cicero reflected a
 
refutation of the "ethical doctrine" handed down from the
 
Stoics, blended with "popular Platonism" and "Aristotle"
 
that was evident in "the writings of the Christian Fath
 
ers."®' Cicero maintained that "the virtue one seeks to
 
advertise must be virtue that one actually possesses. The
 
essence of the problem, he says, is to be what we wish to be
 
thought to be. Hypocrisy wins no glory; but equally impor
 
tant, it simply does not work. Sooner or later, the hypo
 
crite will be found out. In the long run, it requires less
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effort to possess virtue than to try to fake it."^™
 
To be sure, one cannot resort to deceit too often for,
 
among princes, if a contract, treaty, or verbal agreement is
 
broken, the injured party would be imprudent indeed to put
 
his trust in the perpetrator again. "Cicero's De Officiis
 
observes Quentin Skinner, "had treated it as axiomatic that
 
the keeping of promises represents the foundation of justice
 
(I. 7, 23). It had thus become proverbial to say that, even
 
when dealing with our enemies, we must always regard our
 
word as our bond,"^®^ although breaches of faith may be
 
reasonable in certain circumstances.
 
In the Prince, however, Machiavelli portrays breaches
 
of faith as commonplace, a game of cunning in which he who
 
is most clever outsmarts all of the others. "Nor does a
 
prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his failure to
 
observe faith. One could give infinite modern examples of
 
this, and show how many peace treaties and promises have
 
be^n rendered invalid and vain through the infidelity of
 
princes; and the one who has known best how to use the fox
 
has come out best." (Ch. 18, 69-70) As he states, in a
 
letter to Francesco Vettori (April 29, 1513), "And of loyal
 
ty and of promises no one today makes any account."^'® Pope
 
Alexander once said of Cesare, "no one ever kept his word
 
more faithfully than he; nor has he ever broken a prom
 
ise,"'*® but as Machiavelli remarks of the pope himself, he
 
"never did anything, nor ever thought of anything, but how
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 to deceive men." (Ch. 18, 70) In the end, however, Cesare
 
was compelled to rely on good faith in the hope of retaining
 
his acquisitions, and as Machiavelli wrote in his dispatches
 
from Rome, "The duke, who never kept faith with anyone, is
 
now obliged to rely on the faith of others.
 
Yet, in the Discourses, Machiavelli makes a point of
 
distinguishing exceptional circumstances in which a ruler
 
may break his word with good cause. "Promises extracted by
 
force ought not to be kept," for "it is not shameful to fail
 
to keep a promise which you have been forced to make.
 
Forced promises affecting the public will, in fact, always
 
be broken when the force in question is removed, and this
 
without shame to those who break them." (III. 42, 515-6)
 
The Florentines, for example, signed a treaty with Cesare
 
Borgia, but only to "rid" themselves of his "formidable
 
army."*"®
 
And regarding fraud generally, Machiavelli states,
 
• ■ ^ ' , ■ ■ ■ ■ 
"Although to use fraud in any action is detestable, yet in
 
the conduct of war it is praiseworthy and glorious. And a
 
man who uses fraud to overcome his enemy is praised, just as
 
much as is he who overcomes his enemy by force... I do not
 
mean that a fraud which involves breaking your word or the
 
contracts you have made, is glorious; for, although on
 
occasion it may win for you a state or a kingdom, as has
 
been said in an earlier discourse, it will never bring you
 
glory." (III. 40, 513) Bernard Crick comments that "this
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treatment of the legitimate and even ^glorious'' use of
 
>fraud' (something admitted to be ^dishonorable') both
 
narrows the grounds to war and to states of emergency, and,
 
compared to Prince 18, specifically excludes failure to keep
 
one's pledged word and the breaking of promises as legiti
 
mate types of fraud.
 
Perhaps, then, Machiavelli does not excuse the fraud
 
and deceit that he advises the prince to use, in the Prince,
 
despite appearances to the contrary, on the grounds that it
 
is dishonorable and> therefore, inglorious. He does refer
 
to the Prince in the Discourses, in this regard, but in an
 
ambiguous manner; "Everywhere in history one comes across
 
examples, of this [forced promises] of one kind or another,
 
and everyone is aware that it happens also at the present
 
day. And not only are forced promises not observed by
 
princes when the force in question is no longer operative;
 
but we also find that all other promises are broken when the
 
reasons which caused such promises to be made no longer hold
 
good. Whether this is praiseworthy or not, and whether a
 
prince should or should not behave in this way, we have
 
discussed at length in our treatise on The Prince. Here,
 
therefore, nothing will be said about it." (III. 42, 516)
 
Machiavelli does not state, in the Prince, that he deems
 
such behavior as "praiseworthy," but he does make a point of
 
exposing the fraudulent means used by princes; such state
 
ments as, "Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to
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color his failure to observe faith" and the prince need not
 
observe faith, because "they are wicked and don't observe
 
faith with you" indicate the extent to which the observance
 
of faith had been corrupted. (Ch. 18, 69) Machiavelli
 
gives the reader a sense of the degree to which princes do
 
not observe good faith when he refers to "infinite modern
 
examples," of the "infidelity of princes," although they
 
"color this nature" by pretending fidelity. (Ch. 18, 69-70)
 
Machiavelli does not state that such actions bring glory to
 
the prince.
 
Further, Machiavelli observes, "Where there is no court
 
to appeal to, one looks to the end. So let a prince win and
 
maintain his state [by force or fraud]; the means will
 
always be judged honorable, and will be praised by everyone.
 
For the vulgar are taken in by the appearance and outcome of
 
a thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar;
 
the few have a place there." (Ch. 18, 71) There is "no
 
court to appeal to" where "law," as he said in his opening
 
argument, is "not enough" (as when one wants to stop an
 
aggressor), whether power is seized by force, or by fraud
 
(when the laws are subverted to benefit one individual or
 
one faction over time). The "means" will be judged "honor
 
able" by the "vulgar," the many who "judge more by their
 
eyes than by their hands, because seeing is given to every
 
one, touching to few." (Ch. 18, 76) As he has emphasized
 
throughout this chapter, appearances are deceptive. But the
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reader should not be deceived, for if one can touch the
 
prince, which he has given to all, the deception is foiled,
 
nor should we think that a prince who makes a practice of
 
fraud—and even endeavors to be the best at his craft, "the
 
one who has known best how to use the fox [will] come out
 
best"^—(Ch. 18, 70) is either honorable or glorious. Rath
 
er, he is dishonorable and worthy of blame.
 
Pope Julius II made many promises prior to his election
 
as pope, including the "restitution of the whole state of
 
Romagna" to Cesare Borgia. Machiavelli, "believing it to be
 
impossible that the pope could have forgotten his old hat
 
reds and his exile, concluded with a touch of irony: ^The
 
Duke allows himself to be carried away by his brave confi
 
dence, and believes that other people's words are more to be
 
relied upon than his own were.'""" Machiavelli's model
 
prince would not have served as a good exemplar, then, for
 
his discourse onithe benefits of fraud and deceit, for
 
Cesare illustrates the point that even the most clever will
 
eventually become the prey of someone more wickedly splendid
 
than themselves.
 
When Machiavelli states that "in the world there is no
 
one but the vulgar; the few have a place there," Harvey C.
 
Mansfield, Jr. notes that "one manuscript says, "the few
 
have no place there... ," and the authorities are divided,
 
Casella, Russo, and Sasso accepting^no place,' Chabod and
 
Bertelli ^a place.'""'® I think it is more appropriate to
 
j
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accept "no place there," which applies to Machiavelli him
 
self. Those who understood the means used by princes to
 
achieve their ends had no voice to contest the will of the
 
many—who were taken in by the "false semblance of good" and
 
"renown," (I. 10, 135) and the "false appearance of advan
 
tage," (I. 53, 238) as he himself describes appearances in
 
the Discourses. As Machiavelli said of Cosimo de' Medici,
 
"they are all methods that bring men flying to the princi­
pate," although the people do not understand that they are,
 
nor do they listen to "such accusations. In that sense,
 
then, those who did understand were alienated from the many.
 
Machiavelli did not retreat from the issue, however, and he
 
should be admired both for his courage in writing the ­
Prince, and for his own brilliance as a pretender and a
 
dissembler which proves, even in our own centuty, that a
 
clever fox can trap the unwary in any corrupt age.
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Chapter XV. The Courte of Princes: How States are Lost:
 
Fortune
 
Machiavelli's satire is well developed by the conclu
 
sion of the first eighteen chapters. He has defined both
 
the character of the new prince, and the means by which he
 
will satisfy his ambition. Necessity dictates his actions,
 
grounded in the reality of a corrupt world. He has also
 
defined political reality as "the effectual truth," (Ch. 15,
 
61) in which the effect or outcome of a thing determines its
 
value, and thus utility for the prince outweighs moral and
 
ethical concerns. The public welfare is nowhere at issue,
 
nor is there any evidence of a visible government or civic
 
virtue which, together with his advocacy of vice, reflect
 
the essence of his satire.
 
Ashley Brown observes that, in Swift's A Modest Propos
 
al, "the reader must see the difference between the horrible
 
attitude he is being asked to endorse and some true moral
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standard. The tone of the essay is so ^reasonable,' and the
 
modern reader may consider overpopulation such a danger,
 
that he could get well into the satire before he realized
 
that he was in effect approving a mass-murder. What Swift
 
wants to do is shock the public into awareness."' The same
 
could be said for Machiavelli's Prince, especially with
 
regard to his contemporary readers. The matter-of-fact tone
 
of the Prince, coupled with the desperate need to rid the
 
peninsula of foreign intruders and resolve the political
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conflicts within tended to obscure the fact that Machiavelli
 
was indeed calling for the rise of a tyrant—as a solution
 
to the threat of servitude. His dedication of the work to
 
the Medici further clouded the issue so that, even among
 
those who were somewhat familiar with Machiavelli and his
 
political beliefs, one could, indeed, "get well into the
 
satire" before realizing what they were "being asked to
 
endorse" on behalf of the greater good of their country. If
 
Machiavelli did succeed in shocking some of his readers into
 
"awareness," they were too few in number to have an impact
 
on the political reality in Florence.
 
A prince who goes "beyond morals, laws, and customs,"^
 
instilling fear with his "hypocrisy and ingratitude, mean
 
ness, cruelty, and treachery," and who revels in "diabolical
 
cunning" and "ruthless disregard for moral standards"^
 
cannot escape hatred and contempt for long. In anticipation
 
of that objection, Machiavelli devotes two chapters to the
 
subject, but in doing so, he also adds emphasis to the
 
problem, treating it in his usual manner by giving assur
 
ances that the new prince can avoid the inevitable, if he
 
handles his affairs properly.
 
He begins by suggesting that the prince "should think
 
how to avoid those things that make him hateful and con
 
temptible," (Ch. 19, 71-2) which consists of virtually
 
everything that Machiavelli has advised the prince to do up
 
to this point in his discourse. "When he avoids them, he
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will have done his part and will find no danger in his other
 
infamies." He reminds the prince once again that "taking
 
away either property or honor from the generality of men"
 
will make him "hated above all." (Ch. 19, 12) His vices,
 
then, including cruelty, will not generate the same degree
 
of hatred; those "other infamies" that will pose "no dan
 
ger."
 
Taking away "honor from the generality of men" repre
 
sents more than tampering with the women of one's subjects.
 
Dismissal from public office without just cause, persecu
 
tion, calumny, violence, unjust punishments, a display of
 
malevolence, executions, and ingratitude all constitute
 
private injury that may bring dishonor to an individual or
 
his family, especially when there is no opportunity to
 
obtain justice. When Machiavelli states that the prince
 
"should insist that his judgments in the private concerns of
 
his subjects be irrevocable," (Ch. 19, 72) he is making the
 
point that the prince himself represents law and justice.
 
Machiavelli cautions that "what makes him contemptible
 
is to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous
 
[and] irresolute, from which a prince should guard himself
 
as from a shoal." (Ch. 19, 72) These qualities, however,
 
although undesirable in a ruler, apply most earnestly to
 
military commanders. In Chapter Twenty-three, Machiavelli
 
suggests that Emperor Maximilian I was irresolute and vari
 
able, and while he may have been held in contempt by Luca
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Rinaldi, a "bishop and ambassador of the emperor,"^ he
 
offers no evidence that the people found him contemptible.
 
Robert Ridolfi remarks that he was a "good," "generous and
 
noble prince."' A cowardly and irresolute prince would not
 
bode well for the state, but in a military leader, the
 
qualities mentioned above could mean certain disaster.
 
Machiavelli creates a false impression, then, by list
 
ing the most contemptible faults of military commanders as
 
those qualities that would generate the greatest contempt
 
for princes. As a commander in the field, a prince would
 
indeed earn the disdain of his men if he exhibited those
 
qualities. But in the business of governing, it is the
 
other vices of the prince that would engender the deepest
 
scorn and desire for revenge, whether it be his cruelty and
 
inhumanity, robbing his subjects of their property and
 
wealth, molesting their women, or threatening their lives.
 
(III. 6, 400)
 
Yet, when Machiavelli turns to the subject of conspira
 
cy, he does not caution the prince against personal inju
 
ries, except to say that he should avoid hatred. Rather, he
 
frames conspiracy in the larger context; "For whoever con
 
spires always believes he will satisfy the people with the
 
death of the prince, but when he believes he will offend
 
them, he does not get up the spirit to adopt such a course,
 
because the difficulties on the side of the conspirators are
 
infinite." (Ch. 19, 73) If this is true, that the conspira­
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tor "always believes he will satisfy the people with the
 
death of a prince," private vengeance is omitted as probable
 
cause for conspiracy, which is not true. As Machiavelli
 
observes in the Discourses, "The chief cause which led the
 
Pazzi to conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of
 
Giovanni Bonromie of which they had been deprived by the
 
Medici orders." (III. 6, 400)
 
There is "another cause, and this a very powerful one,
 
that makes men conspire against a prince," which Machiavelli
 
neglected to mention as a warning to the prince, "the desire
 
to liberate their fatherland [in which case the conspirator
 
would "satisfy the people" with his death] of which the
 
prince has seized possession. It was this that caused
 
Brutus and Cassius to turn against Caesar... nor can any
 
tyrant prevail over this spirit, except by discarding his
 
tyranny. And since one does not find tyrants doing this,
 
one finds few who have not come to a miserable end. Hence
 
the verse of Juvenal:"
 
To Pluto's realm few kings unscathed
 
descend nor tyrants oft escape a sticky
 
end. (III. 6, 400-01)
 
Machiavelli warns, in Chapter Five, that in republics
 
accustomed to liberty prior to their acquisition by a
 
prince, there is "greater hatred," and "desire for revenge,"
 
(Ch. 5, 21) yet he fails to reiterate this important point
 
in the context of conspiracies. Having been accused of
 
conspiracy by the Medici, however (of the liberation vari­
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ety), it would have been unwise for Machiavelli to suggest
 
any obvious parallels with himself in connection with con
 
spiracy on behalf of liberating one's native city. Never
 
theless, in his discourse on conspiracies, he speaks from
 
the point of view of the conspirator, reflecting on the
 
difficulties and warning that one can only "find company"
 
from "malcontents," and when you "disclose" a conspiracy to
 
a malcontent, "you give him the matter with which to become
 
content," because a content malcontent hopes "for every
 
advantage from it." (Ch. 19, 73) This passage probably had
 
a deeper significance for Machiavelli and his acquaintances,
 
as it has the tone of a comic tribute of sorts.
 
Machiavelli mentions "Nabis the Spartan" in this chap
 
ter, who "with[stood] every thrust." (Ch. 19, 72) As Harvey
 
C. Mansfield, Jr. notes, Machiavelli "does not disclose
 
here, as he does in the Discourses on Livy III. 6, that
 
Nabis was in fact killed by a conspiracy."® Since it is
 
clear that Machiavelli knew the facts, his misrepresentation
 
suggests a deliberate distortion of the truth, which has the
 
effect of ridiculing his own advice, and renders the text
 
unreliable.^
 
In his discussion pertaining to "how not to make the
 
great desperate and how to satisfy the people and keep them
 
content" with regard to conspiracies and avoidance of hatred
 
and contempt, Machiavelli refers to the examples of the ten
 
emperors, "from Marcus the philosopher to Maximus."
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(Ch. 19, 75) There are certain discrepancies in the text
 
that distort the truth in support of his arguments. He
 
I
 
remarks, for example, that "Pertinax... created hatred for
 
himself, and to this hatred added disdain since he was
 
old... , which caused his ruin. (Ch. 19, 77) In the Dis
 
courses, however, Machiavelli observes that "in Rome indeed
 
no attention had ever been paid to age; what it had always
 
looked for was virtue, whether in the young or in the old."
 
(I. 60, 260)
 
Of Alexander, he states, "He was of such goodness that
 
among the other praise attributed to him is this: that in
 
the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to
 
death by him without a trial." (Ch. 19, 77) In fact, mili
 
tary anarchy began during his reign, and "large sections of
 
the civilian and military populace lost faith in the govern
 
ment at Rome and lapsed into lawlessness."' By his remark,
 
Machiavelli gives the impression that there was good civil
 
order, but Alexander was incompetent in every aspect.
 
Severus personifies the qualities of the "lion" and the
 
"fox" (force and fraud) that Machiavelli advised the new
 
prince to acquire. Severus was extremely corrupt, but a
 
good example of successful crime, and Machiavelli calls him
 
a "criminal" in the Discourses.^ He also notes that of the
 
"twenty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus, sixteen were
 
assassinated and only two died a natural death... if among
 
those who died ordinary deaths, there was a wicked man, like
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 Severus, it must be put down to his great good luck and to
 
his ^virtue,' two things of which few men enjoy both." (I.
 
10, 136-7) Machiavelli attributed fortune but not virtue to
 
Cesare Borgia, nor does he assign virtue to the Medici. The
 
vices of the new prince disqualify him as virtuous, as well,
 
and, therefore, the new prince would do well to learn from
 
the "history of the emperors" to "distinguish between the
 
ways of renown and of infamy, the ways of security and
 
fear," as Machiavelli advises in the Discourses, (I. 10,
 
136) counsel he does not offer in the Prince.
 
Machiavelli attributes the success of Marcus to the
 
fact that he "succeeded to the empire by hereditary right
 
and did not have to acknowledge it as from either the sol
 
diers or the people," and to his "virtue." (Ch. 19, 77) He
 
also makes the point that "Pertinax and Alexander, because
 
they were new princes, it was useless and harmful to wish to
 
imitate Marcus, who was in the principate by hereditary
 
right." (Ch. 19, 82) Machiavelli contradicts this notion in
 
the Discourses, however. "It will be seen, too, from a
 
perusal of their [Roman emperors] history on what principle
 
a good kingdom should rest; for all the emperors who ac
 
quired imperial power by inheritance were bad men, with the
 
exception of Titus; those who acquired it through adoption
 
were all good, like the five counting from Nerva to Marcus;
 
and when it fell to their heirs a period of decadence again
 
ensued." (I. 10, 137) Alexander, like Marcus, was also
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 adopted.
 
Caracalla's "excellent parts that made him marvelous in
 
the sight of the people and pleasing to the soldiers"
 
(Ch. 19, 79) reflects neither his actions nor his character,
 
which were abominable, or his physical attributes which
 
earned him the nickname, "Tarautus," after "an ugly, inso
 
lent, and bloodthirsty gladiator whom he was thought to
 
resemble."' Machiavelli offers modest praise of Caracalla,
 
but adds, "nonetheless, his ferocity and cruelty were so
 
great and unheard of... that he became most hateful to all
 
the world," (Ch. 19, 79) and of his assassination, he warns,
 
"Here it is to be noted that deaths such as these, which
 
follow from the decision of an obstinate spirit, cannot be
 
avoided by princes because anyone who does not care about
 
death can harm him." (Ch. 19, 79) As he states in the
 
Discourses, however, Caracalla was suspicious of Macrinus,
 
and asked a friend in Rome to "inquire of the astrologer
 
whether anybody was aspiring to become emperor." He was
 
informed that "Macrinus was the man who had this idea in
 
mind, but the letter fell into the hands of Macrinus before
 
it got to the emperor, and, in consequence, Macrinus saw
 
that it was necessary either to kill him before a further
 
letter came from Rome, or to be killed," and he "instructed
 
Martialis," a "devoted" centurion, to "assassinate the
 
emperor." (III. 6, 411-12) There is a comic quality, then,
 
in Machiavelli's reference to Macrinus as an "obstinate
 
i ■ . 
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spirit," and "one who does not care about death" He cared
 
deeply for his own life, however, so much so that he ensured
 
the death of his predecessor to preserve it.
 
In the example of Maximinus, Machiavelli charges that
 
he was "hated and contemptible, in part because "he had
 
formerly herded sheep in Thrace (which was very well known
 
everywhere and caused great disdain for him in the sight of
 
everyone)." (Ch. 19, 80) It is unlikely that Machiavelli
 
accepted this explanation. Maximinus was never recognized
 
as emperor by the Senate in Rome, and the "disdain" in which
 
he was held by "everyone" undoubtedly had less to do with
 
his shepherd origins than with the fact that his office was
 
not sanctioned by the government, which put forth two sena
 
tors, Maximus and Balbinus, and thus his reign reflected
 
civil strife within the empire.
 
The example of the ten emperors illustrates, above all,
 
that cruel, arrogant, tyrannical rule leads more often than
 
not to the premature death of princes, yet Machiavelli has
 
advised the new prince to adopt similar means to achieve his
 
ends. In his conclusion, he simply remarks that it "waS
 
useless and harmful" for the new princes, "Pertinax and
 
Alexander," to imitate Marcus who was "in the principate by
 
hereditary right," a misleading remark for the reasons given
 
A
 
above. And he notes that "Caracalla, Commodus and
 
Maximinus" failed in their "pernicious" effort to imitate
 
"Severus," because they lacked his "virtue." Having no
 
(
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"hereditary right," then, a "new prince in a new principali
 
ty cannot imitate the actions of Marcus," nor "is it neces
 
sary to follow" the actions "of Severus," (Ch. 19, 82)
 
although Machiavelli has argued that "a prince is compelled
 
of necessity to know well how to use the beast," the "fox"
 
and the "lion," (Ch. 18, 69) as did Severus, who provides
 
his example. Machiavelli advises, then, that the prince
 
take "from Severus those parts that are necessary to found
 
his state," although the new prince lacks his "virtue" and
 
perhaps his "good luck," for there are "few men who enjoy
 
both." (I. 10, 136-7) And he advises the new prince to take
 
from Marcus that which is "fitting and glorious to conserve
 
a state that is established and firm," despite his observa
 
tion that to do so is "useless and harmful" without heredi
 
tary right.
 
As Marcus evidenced extreme loyalty in making his
 
adoptive brother "co-emperor" by his "own insistence,"
 
observed the laws, a "field most congenial to him," dis
 
played "personal nobility and dedication," and pursued
 
intellectual interests, most notably the writing of the
 
"Meditations... basically the moral tenets of Stoicism,"^® he
 
was a prince worthy of imitation, but not for Machiavelli's
 
new prince whom he advises against loyalty, and does not
 
counsel to observe the laws or traditional ethics. The
 
example of Marcus contradicts everything Machiavelli has
 
endeavored to teach the new prince, who has seized power and
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must: maintain it with extraordinary measures. Most espe
 
cially, Machiavelli would not recommend that the new prince
 
adhere to the beliefs of "Marcus the Philosopher," (Ch. 19,
 
75) who contemplated the "moral tenets of Stoicism" in his
 
quiet hours which Machiavelli, in his own leisure, wholly
 
rejected in the Prince.
 
Machiavelli considers the subject of fortresses in
 
Chapter Twenty, both in military terms, and for their
 
efficacy as a defense against one's own subjects. He also
 
discusses other matters related to the prince and the mili
 
tary, such as fostering animosities for the purpose of
 
gaining reputation:
 
Without doubt, princes become great when
 
they overcome difficulties made for them
 
and opposition made to them. So for
 
tune, especially when she wants to make
 
a new prince great—since he has a
 
greater necessity to acquire reputation
 
than a hereditary prince—makes enemies
 
arise for him and makes them undertake
 
enterprises against him, so that he has
 
cause to overcome them and to climb
 
higher on the ladder that his enemies
 
have brought him. Therefore, many judge
 
that a wise prince, when he has the
 
opportunity for it, should astutely
 
nourish some enmity so that when he has
 
crushed it, his greatness emerges the
 
more from it. (Ch. 20, 85)
 
The Pazzi conspiracy afforded Lorenzo the Magnificent
 
such an opportunity, and contributed to his greatness.
 
Pope Sixtus IV and King Ferdinand of Naples had sided
 
with the Pazzi family in their dispute with the Medici
 
which, as I said above, precipitated the conspiracy that the
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Pazzi conducted against the Medici. The Pope and Ferdinand
 
represented a "faction" in Italy that was opposed to the
 
"Venetians, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines," and the
 
"outbreak of war" threatened daily." When the Pazzi con
 
spiracy failed to kill both Giuliano and Lorenzo, the pope
 
and Ferdinand threatened to attack Florence, claiming "they
 
did not wish anything from that city except that it should
 
rid itself of Lorenzo de' Medici, who alone of all the
 
Florentines, they held as an enemy."" Meanwhile, the pope
 
excommunicated the Florentines.
 
In the History, Machiavelli recreates, in a set speech,
 
the words uttered by Lorenzo to a gathering of city digni
 
taries, Lorenzo grieved over the attack on his family, and
 
rejoiced that the city "defended" himself, and "avenged" his
 
brother. He said God had not deserted his family, and
 
denied that they had "privately wronged." those who were
 
"hostile;" "They wrong rather you than us, rather this
 
Palace and the majesty of this government than our house...
 
you have always raised our house on high with such complete
 
agreement, for no other reason than it has striven to sur
 
pass everybody in courtesy, in liberality, in conferring
 
benefits."" Lorenzo concludes, "Would God it were true,"
 
that the king and the pope were only coming after himself
 
and his house. If it were, "gladly would I put out your
 
fire with my ruin," and he offered "to end with my own blood
 
this war begun with that of my brother." The citizens,
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moved by his words, promised to defend him and provided
 
Lorenzo with a personal guard.
 
The pope and Ferdinand attacked Florentine territory in
 
1478, and war continued into 1479. Because Florence was
 
"distressed" by both war and plague, Lorenzo was sent to
 
Naples to seek terms from King Ferdinand. He was received
 
with "honor and with great expectation because, since so
 
important a war had been begun only to crush him, the great
 
ness of his enemies had made him appear very great. Al
 
though they reached agreement, Ferdinand held him until
 
spring to see if disturbances might arise in Florence to his
 
advantage. When they did not, Lorenzo returned to the city
 
"exceedingly great," and because the threat of continued war
 
resulted from the exclusion of the pope and the Venetians
 
from the peace agreement, the government was further consol
 
idated under Medici control.^®
 
Clearly Lorenzo was provided by his enemies with a
 
"ladder" to greatness, and the "enmity" that he "nourished"
 
(Ch. 20, 85) with the Pazzi family (because he feared their
 
power)—that ultimately involved the enemies of Florence
 
from without—worked in his favor to further advance his
 
position of power and erode the liberty of the Florentines.
 
In offering his recommendations to the new prince, then,
 
Machiavelli also revealed, at the same time, how the actions
 
of princes effect the public welfare, an ^effectual truth'
 
that is never directly stated in the Prince, but is meant to
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be understood.
 
Machiavelli brings his roguish wit to the issue when he
 
suggests, in reference to those who aided the prince from
 
within to seize the principality, "If it is not natural
 
affection toward them but only because those supporters were
 
not content with that state, he will be able to keep them
 
his friends with trouble and great difficulty, because it is
 
impossible for him to make them content. And while review
 
ing well the cause of this, with examples drawn from ancient
 
and modern things, he will see that it is much easier to
 
gain as friends to himself men who were content with the
 
state beforehand, and therefore were his enemies, than those
 
who, because they were not content with it, became friends
 
and gave him support in seizing it." (Ch. 20, 86) The
 
example of Florence (and Machiavelli's own experience)
 
contradicts this advice in so far as the Medici returned to
 
power, in 1512, with the support of their partisans within,
 
who enabled them to consolidate their power in a matter of
 
days. While it may not have been possible for the Medici to
 
satisfy or make "content" all of those who supported their
 
return, they would have been imprudent to put their trust in
 
old adversaries, some of whom conspired against them within
 
months of their restoration. On one level, Machiavelli
 
seems to suggest that a new prince cannot trust anyone. But
 
there are two other interpretations of this passage, as
 
well, that show the duplicitous character of Machiavelli.
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In the passage cited above, Machiavelli uses the word
 
"content" four times, which emphasizes the importance of it,
 
with regard to his intent.^' As a former adversary of the
 
Medici, he is in fact a new malcontent under the new regime.
 
Therefore, I think he had a dual purpose in mind. First, to
 
offer some sort of reasoned argument in support of his
 
masquerade as a former opponent who asks to be trusted, in
 
the capacity of adviser to the new government, a proposition
 
that finds no support in logic. If the former malcontents
 
cannot be made content in the new government, how will the
 
prince hope to content the new malcontents, his former
 
enemies? His other purpose, then, is to suggest with deli
 
cate subtlety the teaching he gave in the previous chapter,
 
that one contents a malcontent by disclosing a conspiracy to
 
him, (Ch. 20, 86) from which he would gain considerably more
 
advantage than present circumstances provided—a comic
 
reflection on a tragic reality.
 
Of fortresses, Machiavelli states, "the prince who has
 
more fear of the people than of foreigners ought to make
 
fortresses, but the one who has more fear of foreigners than
 
of the people, ought to omit them." (Ch. 20, 86-7) He then
 
goes on to say, in the same paragraph, "the best fortress
 
there is, is not to be hated by the people, because although
 
you may have fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred
 
fortresses do not save you." (Ch. 20, 87) As the two state
 
ments contradict one another, he creates confusion in the
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text. In his examples and in his concluding statement, he
 
supports the notion that a fortress won't save the prince
 
from the hatred of his subjects; "so, having considered all
 
these things, I shall praise whoever makes fortresses and
 
whoever does not, and I shall blame anyone who, trusting in
 
fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people."
 
(Ch. 20, 87) He reflects the confusion of his earlier
 
statements, then, when he states, "I shall praise whoever
 
makes fortresses and whoever does not." From the Discours
 
es, it is clear that he did not praise those who made for
 
tresses. "It must be borne in mind, then, that fortresses
 
are constructed as a defense either against enemies or
 
against subjects. In the first case they are unnecessary,
 
and in the second case harmful." (II. 24, 353) In his
 
lengthy discourse on the subject, he condemns reliance on
 
fortresses generally, (II. 24, 352-59) and thus his ambigu
 
ous approach in the Prince illustrates a desire on his part
 
to intentionally mislead the prince in a comical way—not to
 
give too much or too little, but just enough to give the
 
appearance that his advice is in accord with his beliefs—
 
and therefore represent himself as genuine and above
 
reproach.
 
Chapters Twenty-one through Twenty-five constitute a
 
curious amalgam of new ideas and old concepts revisited, so
 
to speak, to enhance the veneer of the new prince.
 
Machiavelli considers how the prince might gain esteem and
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reputation in Chapter Twenty-one, both at home and abroad.
 
The advice he gives would have certain appeal to an arro
 
gant, self-centered prince. "Nothing makes a prince so much
 
esteemed as to carry on great enterprises and to give rare
 
examples of himself." (Oh. 21, 87) With his counsel,
 
Machiavelli encourages the most frightening aspect of a
 
prince who undertakes such endeavors to enhance his reputa
 
tion, the depredations visited on the people in such circum
 
stances, particularly when it could have been avoided.
 
Lorenzo the Magnificent recommended that force be used
 
against Volterra in a dispute over the alum mines, in oppo
 
sition to those who thought it the wiser course to attempt
 
to seek terms peacefully. In this "enterprise," force won
 
the day, and Machiavelli notes, in the History, that Lorenzo
 
"rose to a very high reputation" with its success, although
 
"for all of one day [Volterra] was robbed and plundered.
 
Neither women nor holy places were spared, and the
 
soldiers... despoiled them." In a response that he assigns
 
to Messer Tommaso Soderini, Machiavelli expresses his disap
 
proval of the affair: "To me she seems lost, because if you
 
had taken her on terms, you would have gained from her
 
profit and security, but since you will have to keep her by
 
force, in adverse times she will bring you weakness and
 
trouble, and in peaceful times loss and expense. Hence, a
 
prince who undertakes such ventures often creates hazards
 
for himself that a prudent and wise prince would avoid.
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Machiavelli's advice to the new prince, then, has question
 
able worth regarding benefit either for the prince or for
 
the people that he governs.
 
With regard to "governing internally," Machiavelli
 
remarks that it "helps very much for a prince to give a rare
 
example of himself... similar to those that are told of
 
Messer Bernabo da Milano, when the opportunity arises of
 
someone who does something extraordinary in civil life,
 
either for good or for ill, and of picking a mode of reward
 
ing or punishing him of which much will be said." (Ch. 21,
 
89) Bernabo was the uncle of Giah Galeazzo Visconti [1378­
1402], who "brought the entire Visconti inheritance into his
 
possession by imprisoning his uncle Bernabd and the letter's
 
sons through a ruse."^® Bernabo was "killed" by Gian, who
 
"became sole prince of Milan. Machiavelli uses the ex
 
ample of Gian's murder of his uncle, Bernabo, to demonstrate
 
how fraud enables a man of "low position" to rise to a
 
"great position," in the Discourses. "Fraud," he observes,
 
"is always necessary" to those who, "from small beginnings
 
wish to rise to sublime heights, and the better they conceal
 
it, as the Romans did, the less blameworthy it is." (II. 13,
 
310-312) Machiavelli did not praise fraud, however, as I
 
mentioned above, as a means of winning "a state or a king
 
dom," which "will never bring you glory." Rather, he spoke
 
of the fraud "used in dealing with ah:enemy who has not kept
 
faith with you, i.e., of the fraud which is involved in the
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conduct of war." (III. 40, 513)
 
Therefore, if the example of Bernabo of Milan is con
 
sidered, the notion that "a prince should contrive to give
 
himself the fame of a great man and of an excellent talent
 
in every action of his" (Ch. 21, 89) implies infamy, not
 
glory—blame, rather than praise. "Giovan Galeazzo... since
 
it was not enough for him to become Duke of all Lombardy"
 
(after the murder of his uncle), "he wished to conquer
 
Tuscany. But when he thought he wds about to get control
 
and then be crowned King of Italy, he died."^^ Had he suc
 
ceeded, he "would have brought Florence into danger of
 
losing her freedom," but, as Machiavelli observes, "death
 
was always more friendly to the Florentines than any other
 
friend, and stronger to save them than any ability of their
 
own."22
 
When men are "deceived by... the false semblance of
 
renown," they "slip into the ranks of those who deserve
 
blame," establishing a tyrannical government rather than
 
founding a "republic or kingdom." (I. 10, 135) The new
 
prince, then, does not merit Machiavelli's esteem and
 
praise, but rather his scorn—and it is scorn that he heaps
 
upon him in his satire, "a sardonic description of the
 
political practices of his own day, and not a recommendation
 
of such practices,"22 despite all appearances to the con
 
trary. '
 
"People with nothing to do often are the tool of him
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who is attempting to cause a revolution," observes
 
Machiavelli in the History, and the more "elaborate and
 
splendid" the celebration, the longer it will take the
 
people to prepare for it.^ Therefore, Machiavelli recom
 
mends that the prince "at suitable times of the year keep
 
the people occupied with festivals and spectacles."
 
(Ch. 21, 91)
 
When Lorenzo the Magnificent chose an Orsini for his
 
bride, Clarice, he was "contriving an alliance with a family
 
of far-reaching influence" who "could raise soldiers as well
 
as money," but the Florentines "did not entirely approve of
 
the match," as it was not the "custom" to "look outside
 
Tuscany for brides and bridegrooms." One means "to recon
 
cile the Florentines to this unwelcomed event" was to ar
 
range a "splendid tournament," which was accomplished at
 
considerable cost and became the "subject" of "Luigi Pulce's
 
La Giostra di Lorenzo de' Medici,"^ Pope Leo was honored in
 
Florence with a "splendid reception," in 1515, at the cost
 
of "70,000 florins."^®
 
Savonarola warned, from the "Cathedral pulpit," that
 
"the Florentines had bartered their ancient liberties for
 
the spectacles provided them by a tyrant,"" in reference to
 
the Medici. As Machiavelli remarks in the History, however,
 
"After these shows had been presented, the citizens returned
 
to their earlier thoughts, and each one followed his own
 
opinion with more zeal than ever."" One might conclude,
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then, that festivals did provide a temporary distraction
 
from political concerns, and helped the prince gain the
 
goodwill of the people which, together with such things as
 
"prepar[ing] rewards... for anyone who thinks up any way of
 
expanding his city or his state," combined to keep the
 
public suitably occupied and entertained, and the prince in
 
command of the "majesty of his dignity," (Ch. 21, 91) a
 
prime example of Machiavelli's caustic humor.
 
When Machiavelli turns to the subject of the "secretar
 
ies" of princes, in Chapter Twenty-Two, and "flatterers," in
 
Chapter Twenty-Three, he satirizes the government of the new
 
prince. There is no evidence of civil government in the
 
Prince, to administer the affairs of state. There is, so to
 
speak, a head, but no body. The reader can fill the void
 
with assumptions and guesswork, but Machiavelli does not
 
provide the information which, when contrasted with the em
 
phasis he places on institutions, law, and governing bodies
 
in the Discourses and in the History, indicates a form of
 
disregard for the regimes of tyrants. The government is his
 
government, in any case. Nor does Machiavelli make any
 
reference to trade and commerce with regard to governing
 
bodies. He merely suggests that the new prince should "take
 
account" of "guilds" or "clans," and "meet with them some
 
times, and make himself an example of humanity and munifi
 
cence," (Ch. 21, 91) or, in other words, attempt to keep
 
them friendly. Therefore, although Machiavelli devotes
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 considerable attention to the problem of maintaining the
 
security of the prince, he spends virtually no time at all
 
on the 	intricacies of maintaining the state in every other
 
aspect, an omission that reflects his cynicism.
 
Nor is 	there any notion of civic virtue in the Prince.
 
As Marcia L. Colish observes:
 
The principle dimension that is present
 
in De Officiis and which Machiavelli
 
deliberately omits from the Prince is
 
the dimension of civic virtue... the
 
leaders whom Cicero addresses in the De
 
Officiis are an aristocracy, but in his
 
own mind they represent and inspire the
 
virtues the whole community can and
 
should 	manifest. Machiavelli, by con
 
trast, 	has difficulty envisioning such
 
an organic moral relationship between
 
,	 the ruler and the ruled in a principal
 
ity. Or perhaps more precisely, he has
 
difficulty envisioning it in the case of
 
a Medici ruler for whom the Prince was
 
intended. His omission of the Topos of
 
civic virtue [in] the Prince therefore,
 
can be seen as an ironic comment on
 
princes in general and in particular.
 
It is certainly an omission which con
 
temporary readers, steeped as they were
 
in Cicero's De Officiis, were bound to
 
notice.^'
 
It is certainly true that Machiavelli had "difficulty
 
envisioning" an "organic moral relationship between the
 
ruler and the ruled" under the Medici, and modern princes
 
generally, which is the point of his satire. But he offers
 
the example of "good princes" throughout the Discourses, in
 
which such things as "peace and justice... nobility and
 
virtue" are praised as worthy of imitation (I. 10, 137-8) by
 
modern 	princes. Machiavelli did share the views of Cicero,
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but he realized that his contemporaries, although "steeped"
 
in Cicero's De Officiis, had lost sight of those ancient
 
principles. If he had written a handbook for princes like
 
all the others, it would never have had the impact that the
 
Prince has generated. By shocking his readers into aware
 
ness, however, he hoped to inspire a desire for reform, and
 
in the Discourses, he discussed the means to achieve that
 
end.
 
In discussing the matter of choosing ministers,
 
Machiavelli defines the second kind of brain, one "that dis
 
cerns what others understand," (Oh. 22, 92) which imputes
 
limited intelligence, and he states that the prince will
 
"always be reputed wise because he has known how to recog
 
nize [a minister] as capable... ," "although he does not
 
have the inventiveness by himself," (Ch. 22, 92) in which
 
the word "recognize" is equivalent to "discern," and carries
 
the same assignation of second brain capacity. As I dis
 
cussed above, in connection with the dedication, Machiavelli
 
attributed the second rank brain to the Medici as well as
 
Pandolfo Petrucci.
 
Machiavelli makes a credible point in his warning that
 
a minister who is "thinking more of himself than of you, and
 
in all actions looking for something useful to himself," is
 
not trustworthy. (Ch. 22, 93) In corrupt times, however,
 
the new prince would be imprudent if he did not assume that
 
those around him Were as corrupt as himself. Therefore, to
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"keep" his ministers "good" by heaping "honors" and "wealth"
 
(Ch. 22, 93) on them is dangerous advice, as "conspirators
 
have all been men of standing or intimates of the prince,
 
and, of these, those who have been moved to conspire by too
 
many benefits are as numerous as those moved to conspire by
 
too many injuries, as was the case with Perennis versus
 
Commodus, Plautianus versus Deverus, and Sejanus versus
 
Tiberius. For to all these men their emperors had granted
 
such wealth and so many honors and titles that there seemed
 
to be nothing wanting to complete their power, save the
 
imperial title." (III. 6, 403)
 
A corrupt court also creates a general climate of
 
corruption among the populace. As Machiavelli remarks in
 
the Discourses, "the faults of Peoples are due to Princes,"
 
(III. 9, 483) as the ruler provides an example to the gov
 
erned, a notion that echoes Cicero's view that a "moral
 
relationship" should exist "between the ruler and the
 
ruled.
 
Machiavelli's statement, "he who has someone's state in
 
his hands should never think of himself, but always of the
 
prince," (Ch. 22, 93) reminds the reader that in tyrannical
 
regimes, the common good is never the first priority, but
 
rather the welfare of the prince himself. Nor does
 
Machiavelli neglect to call attention to the inherent arro
 
gance of the prince within his own court. He comments that
 
a minister "should never remember anything that does not
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pertain to the prince," (Ch. 22, 93) a comic reference, in
 
my estimation, to his self-centered interests, including the
 
notion that ai devoted minister should not in fact have
 
anything on his mind but the prince and his prosperity.
 
Certainly many interpretations of this remark are possible,
 
which is true of so many of his humorous asides that, as
 
they may reflect double entendre of a highly personal na
 
ture, we may never appreciate the full extent of his meaning
 
or his wit.
 
Machiavelli's chapter on flattery mirrors a "standard
 
topic in the literature of advice-books for princes, the
 
topic of flatterers and how to avoid them."^^ The underlying
 
reality, of course, is that the Prince itself constitutes
 
the epitome of flattery, in its appeal to the Medici as the
 
designated saviors of Italy—what Garrett Mattingly refers
 
to "at best like empty rhetoric, at worst like calculating
 
but stupid flattery. Indeed, flattery permeates the
 
little work, for the vanity of an arrogant prince makes him
 
a vulnerable target for the shrewd Machiavelli.
 
In addressing the problem of avoiding flatterers in the
 
court, and in what modes advice should be obtained,
 
Machiavelli notes that men "deceive themselves," (Ch. 23,
 
93) and he remarks that anyone is "deceived" who thinks that
 
a prince "who establishes an opinion of himself as prudent
 
is so considered not because of his nature, but because of
 
the good counsel he has around him," (Ch. 23, 95) although
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in the previous chapter, Machiavelli stridently emphasized
 
that the prince is judged by the men he has around him, "and
 
when they are capable and faithful, he can always be reputed
 
wise... ." (Ch. 22, 92)
 
Flattery is deceitful because it is insincere and lacks
 
conviction. Machiavelli does not caution the prince to
 
distinguish between truth and deceit, however. Rather, he
 
advises that the prince not accept the "truth" from every
 
one; "For there is no other way to guard oneself from flat
 
tery unless men understand that they do not offend you in
 
telling you the truth; but when everyone can tell you the
 
truth, they lack reverence for you. Therefore, a prudent
 
prince must hold to a third mode, choosing wise men in the
 
state; and only to these should he give freedom to speak the
 
truth to him, and of those things only that he asks about
 
and nothing else." (Gh. 23, 93-4) If the prince assumes
 
that everyone is telling him the truth (but he need only
 
accept it from "wise men"), he is oblivious to the danger of
 
flatterers. And in failing to distinguish between truth and
 
opinion, he is in danger of losing his state.
 
In Chapter Twenty-four, Machiavelli considers why the
 
"princes" in Italy have lost their states in modern times.
 
He observes that there are two reasons for this problem: a
 
"defect in arms,'' and the fact that either the "people" were
 
"hostile" or, if "friendly," the "lords" failed to "secure
 
themselves against the great." (Ch. 24, 96)
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The point Machiavelli is really trying to make in
 
Chapter Twenty-four, is that the princes of Italy lost their
 
states because they were incompetent with regard to arms.
 
He states, "For men are much more taken by present things
 
than by past ones, and when they find good in the present,
 
they enjoy it and do not seek elsewhere." (Ch. 24, 96). If
 
they "appear ancient," (Ch. 24, 96) it is not in the image
 
of Cyrus, or the mythical founder of Rome, Romulus.
 
Machiavelli's reverence for the ancients is generally
 
acknowledged among scholars of his works. More often than
 
not, they will make reference to his letter to Francesco
 
Vettori, December 10, 1513, in which Machiavelli expresses,
 
with delicate elegance, his profound respect for antiquity,
 
and the virtue and wisdom which adorned that distant age.
 
Writing from his farm in Sant' Andrea during the period of
 
his exile, he refers to the mundane tasks of his day, and
 
the time he spends at the "inn" with local inhabitants, the
 
"vulgarity" of his pursuits, playing "cricca" and "trick
 
track," and the "thousand disputes and countless insults
 
with offensive words... fighting over a penny... we are
 
heard shouting as far as San Cascino." And with these
 
"trifles," I keep my brain from growing mouldy, and satisfy
 
the malice of this fate of mine, being glad to have her
 
drive me along this road, to see if she will be ashamed of ­
it." But "on the coming of evening," Machiavelli leaves the
 
vulgar and mundane behind, the debris of his meaningless
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existence, and revels in the glories of the past, from which
 
he draws his courage and resolve
 
I return to my house and enter my study;
 
and at the door I take off the days
 
clothing, covered with mud and dust, and
 
put on garments regal and courtly; and
 
reclothed appropriately, I enter the an
 
cient, courts of ancient men, where,
 
received by them with affection, I feed
 
on that food which alone is mine and
 
which I was born for, where I am not
 
ashamed to speak with them and to ask
 
them the reason for their actions; and
 
they in their kindness answer me; and
 
for hours of time I do not feel boredom.
 
I forget every trouble, I do not dread
 
poverty, I am not frightened by death;
 
entirely, I give myself over to them.^
 
He continues with a reference to the Prince, giving the
 
impression that everything he learned in his long hours of
 
study, he condensed into that little work. More than that,
 
not only what he learned, but what he found worthy of in
 
structing others to imitate:
 
And because Dante says it does not pro
 
duce knowledge when we hear but do not
 
remember, I have noted everything in
 
their conversation which has profited
 
me, and have composed a little work On
 
Princedoms, where I go as deeply as I
 
can into consideration on this subjSet,
 
debating what a princedom is, of what
 
kinds they are, how they are gained, how
 
they are kept, why they are lost. And
 
if ever you can find any of my fantasies
 
pleasing, this one should not displease
 
ypu; and by a prince, and especially a
 
new prince, it ought to be welcomed.
 
Hence I am dedicating it to His Magnifi
 
cence Giuliano. Filippo Cassavecchia
 
has seen it; he can give you some ac
 
count in part of the thing in itself and
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the discussions I have had with him,
 
though I am still enlarging and revising
 
it.
 
Machiavelli, of course, learned two paths from his
 
study of antiquity, that of virtue and wisdom, reflected in
 
the Discourses, as evidenced by his own statements regarding
 
his purpose in writing that work,'® and the path of tyranny
 
and corruption, that he criticized in the Prince. That is
 
not to suggest that he does not discuss bad government in
 
the Discourses. The example of Julius Caesar's corrupt rise
 
to power is not neglected, (I. 10, 134-8), nor does he fail
 
to mention many others, including Nabis, Phalaris, and
 
Dionysius, (I. 10, 135) and the ambitious designs of such
 
men as Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus, (III. 8,
 
426-29) who were crushed in their efforts because the people
 
valued their liberty and were as yet uncorrupted. But the
 
Discourses is a work dedicated to reviving ancient virtue,
 
and the examples he finds worthy of imitation, such as
 
Lucius Quintius (Cincinnatus), (III. 24, 473-4) the two
 
Catos, (III. 1, 389) and Brutus and Cassius (III. 6, 400)
 
reflect the character and actions that he admired. He
 
praised those in anti^ity who had regard for the welfare of
 
others, rather than a high regard for their personal advan­
tage. As Allan Gilbert observed, Machiavelli believed that
 
government should serve the greater good of the community.''
 
Machiavelli champions modern princes in new principali
 
ties, in Chapter Twenty-Four, in a discourse devoted to the
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question of why princes in Italy have lost their states. He
 
doesn't simply praise new princes with glory, but "double
 
glory," for "having made the beginning of a new principali
 
ty, of having adorned it and consolidated it with good laws,
 
good arms, good friends, and good examples." (Ch. 24, 96)
 
In fact, the new principalities were "adorned" with none of
 
the above. "Good laws" can be understood in the context of
 
the good arms=good laws equation I discussed in connection
 
with Chapter Twelve. Nor were the arms of new princes good
 
arms. The "defect in arms" (Ch. 24, 96) that Machiavelli
 
refers to does not necessarily indicate a lack of arms,
 
which many of the princes (including the popes) obtained in
 
abundance by calling in foreigners, and hiring Italian
 
mercenaries. Rather, he means the lack of virtuous arms—
 
those arms that are owned by the prince himself, and on
 
which he alone depends, and this applies to republics as
 
well.
 
"Good friends" (Ch. 24, 96) were nowhere to be found
 
when Cesare Borgia needed them most, after the death of
 
Alexander VI, with the exception of a few Spanish captains.
 
He had alienated all those with power and influence who
 
might have come to his aid. And the notion that new princes
 
should be praised for their "good example" is Machiavelli's
 
way of ridiculing his own advice, to practice hypocrisy and
 
deception.
 
He creates the impression that only hereditary princes
 
374
 
were deprived of their states when he remarks, "double
 
shame" to those "who, having been born a prince," have "lost
 
it through [their] lack of prudence." (Ch. 24, 96) No doubt
 
he meant every word of this accusation. In The Art of War,
 
he remarks, "It did not enter the minds of these poor
 
wretches that they were preparing themseilves to be the prey
 
of whoever attacked them,"^* precisely because they were
 
unprepared. But new states were lost, as well, and for the
 
same reason. And in his example of Naples and Milan,
 
(Ch. 24, 96) Machiavelli illustrates this point with a
 
vengeance, for a defect in arms combined with the ambition
 
of a new prince for power (and not one who became prince by
 
hereditary right) resulted in decades of war and chaos in
 
Italy, precipitated by the actions of Ludovico Sforza.
 
Ludpvicb was "de facto ruler of Milan... a guardian of
 
the titular duke [Gian Galeazzo, 1476-1494], his nephew and
 
a minor. Gian was married to Isabella of Aragon, daughter
 
of Duke Alfonso of Calabria, and granddaughter of King
 
Ferrante of Naples. When Gian turned twenty, Isabella
 
called on her "southern relatives" to end Ludovico's "long
 
regency, which Ludovico resisted, having "long ago decided
 
never to yield his place." King Ferrante declared war, and
 
Lodovico called on King Charles VIII of France to "undertake
 
the long threatened campaign to vindicate his right to the
 
Neopolitan Crown." In the summer of 1494, the King of
 
France "emerged upon Italian soil."''" The invasion by France
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began "forty years of war,"'*' and, for that reason,
 
Machiavelli accuses Ludovico of causing Italy's "ruin," in
 
the History Ludovico was also the cause of his own ruin.
 
After the mysterious death of Gian Galeazzo, in 1494,
 
Ludovico became Duke of Milan, described as a "tyrant,"'*'
 
"utterly unscrupulous," and "pricked with ambition,"'*^ a new
 
prince thoioughly in accord with the quality of the times.
 
Following the death of Charles VIII, in 1498, Louis XII
 
became King of France and, in 1499, Louis invaded Italy,
 
with the intent to lay claim to both Milan and Naples. As
 
Machiavelli relates, in Chapter Three, Ludovico lost Milan.
 
He was taken prisoner to France, where he died in 1510. "No
 
Italian with as much as a touch of patriotism can have
 
viewed the catastrophe of the Moor with any other feeling
 
that a traitor had received his reward. Thus, both new
 
and old states were lost in Italy, despite impressions to
 
the contrary created by Machiavelli. Had he also emphasized
 
new princes who were deprived of their states, Cesare
 
Borgia, his model prince, would have figured prominently
 
aihong them, as Machiavelli maintained that he could "find no
 
fresher example than the actions of that man." (Ch. 7, 33)
 
His absence in this discourse is conspicuous, and intended
 
to be so, to contradict the notion that hew princes were
 
secure in their new principalities, and deserving of "double
 
glory" (Ch. 24, 96) for their acquisitions, particularly
 
with regard to arms.
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with the exception of those like the Duke of Urbino,
 
whose subjects tried to come to his aid, most of the princes
 
of Italy were undefended, which is precisely the point that
 
Machiavelli is trying to make, the notion of a "hostile
 
people," or failing to secure oneself "against the great,"
 
(Ch. 24, 96) while not without importance, J.s in this in
 
stance a ruse on his part, a means of ridiculing princes for
 
not organizing and training their subjects into a military
 
strong enough to defend the state. Therefore, a defect in
 
arms was the cause for the princes losing their states, as
 
"those defenses alone are good, are certain, and are last
 
ing, that depend on you yourself and on your virtue." (Ch.
 
24, 97)
 
In his conclusion to the Art of War, Machiavelli con
 
siders the plight of Italy with regard to military prepared
 
ness:
 
He then who despises these ideas, if he
 
is a prince, despises his princedom; if
 
he is a citizen, his city. And I repine
 
at Nature, who either should have made
 
me such that I could not see this or
 
should have given me the possibility for
 
putting it into effect, since I am an
 
old man, I do not imagine today that I
 
can have opportunity for it. Therefore,
 
I have been liberal of it with you who,
 
being young and gifted, can at the right
 
time, if the things I have said please
 
you, aid and advise your princes to
 
their advantage. By Italy's condition I
 
do not wish you to be dismayed or terri
 
fied, because this land seems born to
 
raise up dead things, as she has in
 
poetry, in painting, and in sculpture.
 
But so far as I am concerned, since I am
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 advanced in years, I have no hope. Yet
 
assuredly if Fortune had in the past
 
granted me a state large enough to per
 
mit such an attempt, I believe that in a
 
short time I could have shown the world
 
how much ancient customs are worth.
 
Without doubt I would have made my state
 
greater with glory or lost it without
 
shame
 
I
 
Machiavelli addresses the question of how fortune can
 
be opposed in Chapter Twenty-five. He makes the point that
 
"many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are
 
so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot correct
 
them with their prudence, indeed they have no remedy at
 
all." (Ch. 25, 98) And "because of the great variability of
 
things which have been seen and are seen everyday, beyond
 
every human conjecture," (Ch. 25, 98) people are more in
 
clined to that opinion than ever. He notes that he has,
 
himself, "been in some part inclined to that opinion,"
 
(Ch. 25, 98) a sentiment that is echoed in the Discourses as
 
well;
 
Hence men who in this life normally
 
either suffer great adversity or enjoy
 
great prosperity, deserve neither praise
 
^	 nor blame; for one usually finds that
 
they have been driven either to ruin or
 
to greatness by the prospect of some
 
great advantage which the heavens have
 
held out, whereby they have been given
 
the chance, or have been deprived of the
 
chance of being able to act virtuously.
 
Fortune arranges this quite nicely.
 
For, when it wants a man to take the
 
lead in doing great things, it chooses a
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man of high spirits and great virtue who
 
will seize the occasion it offers him.
 
And in like manner, when it wants a man
 
to bring about a great disaster, it
 
gives precedence to men who will help to
 
promote it; and, if anyone gets in the
 
way, it either kills him off or deprives
 
him of all power of doing good,
 
(II. 29, 371)
 
Machiavelli remarks that "men may second their fortune,
 
but cannot oppose it," yet they should never give up, "be
 
cause there is always hope... ." (II. 29, 372) Although he
 
states that fortune cannot be opposed, and even deprives men
 
of the chance to act virtuously, he allows that in some cir­
cximstances, virtue can oppose fortune. In reference to
 
Camillus, in the Discourses, Machiavelli remarks, "One sees
 
here how great men remain the same whatever befalls. If
 
fortune change, sometimes raising them, sometimes casting
 
them down, they do not change, but remain ever resolute, so
 
resolute in mind and conduct throughout life that it is easy
 
to see that fortune holds no sway over them. Not so do weak
 
men behave; for by good fortune they are buoyed up and in
 
toxicated, and ascribe such success as they meet with, to a
 
virtue they never possessed, so that they become insupport
 
able and odious to all who have anything to do with them,"
 
and when their fortune changes, they become "base and ab
 
ject." (III. 31, 488) Further, he states, "For where men
 
have but little virtue, fortune makes a great display of its
 
power; and since fortune changes, republics and governments
 
frequently change; and will go on changing till someone
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comes along so imbued with the love of antiquity that he
 
regulates things in such fashion that fortune does not every
 
time the sun turns round get a chance of showing what it can
 
do.". (II. 30, 375-6)
 
The notion that virtue can oppose;fortune is also
 
stated by Machiavelli in Chapter Twenty five; "It happens
 
similarly with fortune, which shows her power where virtue
 
has not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns
 
her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes have not
 
been made to contain her. And if you consider Italy, which
 
is the seat of these variations, and that which has given
 
them motion, you will see a country without dams and without
 
any dike. If it had been diked with suitable virtue, like
 
Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would not have
 
caused the great variations that it has, or it would not
 
have come here." (Ch. 25, 98-9) The idea that the flood
 
would not have come to Italy is in reference to foreign
 
invaders, against whom Italy had no virtuous arms (defined
 
as one's own, comprised of citizen or subject armies) for
 
defense. His reference to Italy as the "seat of these
 
variations, and that which has given them motion," however,
 
is a criticism ofltaly within—the lack of virtue that led
 
to disorders and, ultimately, to attack from foreign powers.
 
Across the corrupt landscape of Italy, as Machiavelli por
 
trayed it in the Prince and in the Discourses, there was no
 
virtue to oppose fortune—not in the sense of arms, in the
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rule of princes, in the institutions of government or in the
 
Church, nor was there virtue in the people themselves.
 
There is a tone of lament in this discourse, a sense of loss
 
or foreboding, or perhaps helplessness on Machiavelli's
 
part, to affect the changes he desired for Italy and espe
 
cially Florence. Despite the fact that he could have enter
 
tained little hope for change, however, he remained a re
 
lentless critic of the present.
 
The first indication that he is offering a distorted
 
perspective on his views regarding fortune is contained in
 
the statement, "I judge that it might be true that fortune
 
is arbiter of half of our actions, but that she leaves the
 
other half, or close to it, for us to govern." (Ch. 25, 98)
 
The idea that our actions are governed by fifty percent
 
fortune and fifty percent free will—or close to it—is pure
 
fiction, and he makes no effort to defend it. By adding "or
 
close to it," Machiavelli suggests that free will might not
 
quite represent fifty percent, in which case our will is
 
even more seriously compromised or disadvantaged. And if it
 
isn't fifty percent, what component fills the void that
 
remains? Machiavelli, it would seem, has intended that the
 
new prince ponder these foolish notions.
 
Free will, of course, means that a prince can choose
 
the path of virtue or vice, good or evil. Machiavelli makes
 
the point in the Discourses that he who acts in accordance
 
with the times will be the most prosperous. A "republic,"
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he maintains, "enjoys good fortune for a longer time than a
 
principality, since it is better able to adapt itself to
 
diverse circumstances owing to the diversity found among its
 
citizens than a prince can do." (III. 9, 431) ' It is diffi
 
cult to change our ways because "it is impossible to go
 
against what nature inclines Us to," and when "a certain
 
line of conduct" works well, it is "impossible to persuade
 
men that they can get on well by acting otherwise. It thus
 
comes about that a man's fortune changes, for she changes
 
his circumstances but he doesn't change his ways." (III. 9,
 
431-2) As he does in the Prince, he gives the example of
 
Julius II, whose impetuous actions accorded with the times,
 
and allowed for his success.
 
As fortune varies, then, a prince will prosper or not,
 
according to his ability to adjust to the "quality of the
 
times." (Ch. 25, 99) Machiavelli clearly defines the quali
 
ty of the times as corrupt when he states, "For one sees
 
that in the things that lead men to the end that each has
 
before him, that is, glories and riches, they proceed var
 
iously: one with caution, the other with impetuosity; one
 
by violence, the other with art [force and fraud]; one with
 
patience, the other with its contrary—and with these dif
 
ferent modes each can attain it." (Ch. 25, 99) Of glory,
 
Cicero "sternly warned in the De Officiis against assuming
 
that true glory can ever be gained by vain displays or
 
hypocritical talk. All such pretenses fall to the ground as
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quickly as fragile flowers, for nothing counterfeit possess
 
es any lasting quality."'^' It is clear, given the precepts
 
in the Prince, that the new prince does not seek glory from
 
virtuous conduct that is genuine, or frqm virtuous actions
 
that redound to the public good. Rather, he seeks glory in
 
reputation acquired in great enterprises, spectacles of
 
magnificence, and a display of those qualities that have the
 
appearance of virtue and noble conduct. Vanity motivates
 
the new prince, and not a sense of honor. He is then,
 
vainglorious, seeking selfish ends. An honorable ruler,
 
such as Cyrus, gained "repute" from his virtue, and because
 
he did not exhibit those vices associated, by Machiavelli,
 
with bad governing, (Ch. 20, 462) while the new prince
 
relies on cruelty and the other vices to sustain him in his
 
power, without honor or true glory.
 
With regard to "riches," (Ch. 25, 99) Machiavelli
 
observes that "honour... was paid to poverty in Rome," and
 
the "citizens thought it sufficient to win honours in a war,
 
and to leave all the profits to the public," a "poverty that
 
lasted to the days of Paulus Aemilius, which were the last
 
happy days the republic enjoyed, days wherein a citizen
 
would by his triumph bring riches to Rome, yet himself
 
remain a poor man." (III. 25, 476) This mode helped to
 
preserve the "freedom" of the state. (III. 25, 475) And
 
while Machiavelli believed that a citizen, in his own times,
 
should be free to enjoy his wealth, (II. 2, 280) he strenu­
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ously objected to those who used their wealth to advance
 
their private interests which corrupted the city, as evi
 
denced in the actions of Cosimo de^ Medici,^* and to princes,
 
as well, who "were poor, yet desired to live like rich men,"
 
and corrupted their subjects in the process.'*'
 
When the times conform to a mode of proceeding, then,
 
one will prosper, as did Pope Julius II, who "found the
 
times and affairs in harmony with his mode of proceeding,"
 
and "he always achieved a prosperous end." Had the "times"
 
changed, however, requiring him to "proceed with caution,
 
his ruin would have followed." (Ch. 25, 101) As the times
 
were corrupt, Machiavelli educated his new prince to proceed
 
accordingly, developing the character and modes of conduct
 
and actions that would enable him to achieve the end he
 
desired. But these were not the ends that Machiavelli
 
thought noble or desirable for Italy. His new prince was a
 
sham—a reflection of the dark and ugly side of fortune that
 
held sway over the country, and "deprived him [Machiavelli]
 
of all power of doing good." (II. 29, 371) As he demon
 
strated in his play, Clizla, however, fortune is influenced
 
more by "wit and fraud," than by "force, and Machiavelli's
 
wit and fraud constitute the elements of his satire in the
 
Prince that make it the remarkable literary work that it is.
 
Perhaps nowhere in the Prince are these elements better
 
demonstrated than in his concluding remarks, in Chapter
 
Twenty five, in which he urges the new prince to adversely
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affect his good fortune by attempting to influence it with
 
force, the least formidable means at his disposal. With all
 
the brutality of a licentious prince, then, Machiavelli
 
beckons him to tempt his own fate:
 
I judge this indeed, that it is better
 
to be impetuous than cautious, because
 
fortune is a woman; and it is necessary,
 
if one wants to hold her down, to beat
 
her and strike her down. And one sees
 
that she lets herself be won more by the
 
impetuous than by those who proceed
 
coldly. And so always, like a woman,
 
she is friend of the young, because they
 
are less cautious, more ferocious, and
 
command her with more audacity.
 
(Ch. 25, 101)
 
As in all of his conduct, necessity pardons the new
 
prince for his violence, even against fortune—the architect
 
of his path to riches, infamy, and power.
 
385
 
Chapter XVI. The Exhortation
 
In the first Twenty five chapters of the Prince,
 
Machiavelli crafted his satire with subtle shades of meaning
 
that often depended on a word or a phrase to convey his real
 
intent, a lively undercurrent beneath a mask of sincerity
 
offering every appearance of merit and justification. The
 
new prince represented an authentic phenomenon in Italy, but
 
Machiavelli's advocacy of such a man was pure artifice. In
 
this final chapter, he brings the various elements together
 
in a grand finale of rhetorical flourish—adorned with
 
biblical language and symbolism—that transforms his satire.
 
The chilling and sinister matter-of-fact tone of the previ
 
ous pages gives way to the realm of farce, in the ludicrous
 
and absurd notion that the Medici are poised to fulfill a
 
calling from God to lead their fellow Italians to a Promised
 
Land, a feat given no less significance, by Machiavelli,
 
than the suggestion of the Exodus, led by Moses. The Prom
 
ised Land before the Italians, however, was not their liber
 
ty and freedom in this incredible exhortation, but, rather,
 
the promise of servitude and injustice under new masters.
 
In his opening paragraph, Machiavelli sets the stage
 
for his blasphemous and ingratiating appeal to the Medici:
 
Thus, having considered everything dis
 
cussed above, and thinking to myself
 
whether in Italy at present the times
 
have been tending to the honor of a new
 
prince, and whether there is matter to
 
give opportunity to someone prudent and
 
virtuous to introduce a new form that
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would bring honor to him and good to the
 
community of men there, it appears to me
 
that so many things are tending to the
 
benefit of a new prince that I do not
 
know what time has ever been more apt
 
for it. (Ch. 26, 101-2)
 
The notion that the "matter" will provide "opportunity
 
to someone," specifically a tyrant, defines the times as
 
corrupt. In the Discourses, Machiavelli observes that where
 
there is good "material," the corrupt are thwarted in their
 
ambition, but when the "material" is "corrupt," it is possi
 
ble to "impress" a form of government that accords with
 
their "ambition." (III. 8, 428) As Machiavelli thought
 
Italy more corrupt than other states, (I. 55, 244) the
 
"matter" he refers to was clearly corrupt, and he concludes
 
that the present times do tend to the "honor of a new
 
prince," and, in fact, he doesn't know "what time has ever
 
been more apt for it." (Ch. 25, 101-2)
 
Tyranny is the form of government that Machiavelli
 
alludes to in reference to "form," which one can intimate
 
from the precepts given in the Prince, and he makes a point
 
of stating that he has "considered everything discussed
 
above" in reference to his previous chapters. (Ch. 26, 101)
 
v.­
Because the times are corrupt, then, the opportunity exists
 
for the rise of a tyrant, whose vices have been made to
 
appear honorable and virtuous as would be consistent with
 
times of that order, and the notion of prudence has given
 
way to "impetuosity." (Ch* 25, 101)
 
Above all, Machiavelli directs his sarcasm to the root
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of the problem of tyranny—a tyrant's disregard for the
 
public welfare. He suggests that the new "form" will not
 
only bring honor to the new prince, but "good to the com
 
munity of men" as well. In the jDlscourses, however,
 
Machiavelli observes that "Experience shows that cities have
 
never increased in dominion or wealth, unless they have been
 
independent," while "the opposite happens when there is a
 
prince" for when "tyranny replaces self-government," pro
 
gress "declines," and he notes that if anyone wants to "con
 
firm" his views on the matter, "let him read Xenophon's
 
treatise On Tyrannicide." (II. 2, 276)
 
In order to establish the need for the rise of a new
 
prince, Machiavelli appeals to the conditions in Italy, in
 
which the people are "more enslaved than the Hebrews, more
 
servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the
 
Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled,
 
torn, pillaged, and having entered ruin of every sort."
 
(Ch. 26, 102) Although conditions were deplorable in Italy,
 
especially from the perspective of a republican who not only
 
lamented the state of war in Italy, but the defeat of the
 
republican government in Florence, as well, what Machiavelli
 
is really describing is the fate that awaits Italy under the
 
rule of a tyrant prince, in which case "enslaved," "ser
 
vile," and "dispersed" all take on new meaning. And if
 
conditions seemed "deplorable" at the moment, the prospect
 
of the princes of Florence becoming the princes Of Italy
 
388
 
made those conditions pale in comparison, with regard to
 
liberty and freedom. He refers to "Moses," "Cyrus," and
 
"Theseus" (Ch. 26, 102) to recall the ancient models of
 
virtue that he offered in Chapter Six, but he omits
 
"Romulus," (Ch. 6, 21-4) as I mentioned above, who would
 
indeed be maligned in an exhortation to oppress the peopie
 
of Italy, despite the fact that Machiavelli notes at "pres
 
ent," Italy required the "virtue" of an "Italian spirit,"
 
(Ch. 26, 102) one who displayed the right intentions of
 
Romulus, a founder who exemplified authentic virtue, by
 
Machiavelli's standards.
 
The first biblical language employed by Machiavelli is
 
in reference to Cesare Borgia and Alexander VI, in a passage
 
that clearly reflects his irreverence for the Vatican in
 
Rome; "And although up to how a glimmer has shown in someone
 
who could judge that he had been ordered by God for
 
[Italy's] redemption, yet later it was seen that in the
 
highest course of his actions, he was repulsed by fortune."
 
(Ch. 26, 102) In so far as God and fortune are often used
 
interchangeably by Machiavelli,' one might interpret his
 
remark as an indication that Cesare was "repulsed" by God,
 
for to suggest that he was ordered by God^—-tc fulfill his
 
own ambition and greed—is an absurd notion. When Cesare
 
died, his sister, Lucrezia, "ordered Strozzi to compose... a
 
funeral chant," in which "II Valentino is depicted as a hero
 
sent by Providence to unite Italy and restore her to the
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glory of ancient Rome,"^ a' notion that would surely have
 
astounded Machiavelli, if he knew of it, and suggests the
 
nature of his satire, if indeed he was familiar with it. In
 
any case, the idea that Cesare was "ordered by God"
 
(Ch. 26, 102) seems intended as a mockery of Alexander VI,
 
from whom Gesare took his orders, and in whom there was
 
hardly a spark of divine grace.
 
In Chapter Six, Machiavelli states that Moses was the
 
"mere executor of things that had been ordered for him by
 
God." (Ch. 6, 22) He reiterates that theme with regard to
 
the Borgia, then, and repeats it in his appeal to the
 
Medici; "Nor may one see at present anyone in whom she can
 
hope more than in your illustrious house, with its fortune
 
and virtue, supported by God and by the Church of which it
 
is now prince, can put itself at the head of this redemp
 
tion." (Ch. 26, 102-^3) Having called the Medici to "head"
 
the "redemption," Machiayelli moves in the direction of
 
farce, for while his previous remarks were outlandish, one
 
might still judge that, taken at face value, he is sincere
 
(if a bit poetic). It becomes clear, however, that what
 
Machiavelli asks the reader to accept, with regard to the
 
Medici and their mission, is simply preposterous:
 
This is not very difficult if you summon
 
up the actions and lives of those named
 
above. And although these men are rare
 
and marvelous, nonetheless they were
 
men, and each of them had less opportu
 
nity than the present; for their under­
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taking was not more just than this one,
 
nor easier, nor was God more friendly to
 
them than to you. Here there is great
 
justice; "for war is just to whom it is
 
necessary, and arms are pious when there >
 
is no hope but in arms." Here there is
 
very great readiness, and where there is
 
great readiness, there cannot be great
 
difficulty, provided that your house
 
keeps its aim on the orders of those
 
whom I have put forth. (Ch. 26, 103)
 
Machiavelli refers to Cyrus, Moses, and Theseus in his
 
mention of the "actions and lives of those named above."
 
His comment that despite their "rare" and "marvelous" stand
 
ing, "nonetheless they were men" is not quite true, strictly
 
speaking. Theseus was a mythical hero, and thus not subject
 
to the limitations of man. Had he included Romulus in this
 
chapter, who also had mythical origins, every Italian who
 
read the Prince would have been stupefied to find Romulus
 
reduced to the stature of the Medici, with no greater an
 
opportunity nor, one might assume, ability. The inclusion
 
of Theseus, a hero in Greek mythology, seems less obvious
 
for, like Cyrus and Moses, he did not have historic ties
 
with the founding of Rome.
 
Nor does Moses quite fit the mold of an ordinary man,
 
having spoken to God, and whose "opportunity" was thrust
 
■ ^ ; ■ ■ ■ 
upon him as a servant of God to fulfill God's will, and not
 
his own ambition. Only Cyrus, whose success is not associ
 
ated with spiritual or mythical origins, can be said to have
 
relied wholly on his own virtue, and thus answers the de
 
scription of men implied in Machiavelli's statement. By
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suggesting that Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus were (only) men,
 
however, their heroic stature is effectively diminished, and
 
by adding that "each of them had less opportunity than the
 
present," Machiavelli reduced the scope of their achieve
 
ments to fit the circumstances in Italy. The Medici vision
 
of empire and family power thus invites an unfavorable
 
comparison to the motives of the great founders, who created
 
governments of lasting and profound significance.
 
Robert Ridolfi remarks that Machiavelli intended to
 
dedicate the Prince "to one who seemed to possess all the
 
qualities of the awaited ^new prince' except one: ^virtue.'
 
For that reason, in his book he quickly passes over heredi
 
tary principalities and deals briefly with those acquired
 
with virtue, to expiate instead on those acquired by good
 
fortune. This had been the case with II Valentino and Pope
 
Alexander, and it was repeating itself with Giuliano and
 
Pope Leo,"^ and, one might add, with Lorenzo as well. By
 
fortune, however, which also applies to the Borgia,
 
Machiavelli meant that side of fortune which raises up men
 
to promote "disaster," when that is fortune's desire.
 
(II. 29, 371)
 
The notion that "war is just to whom it is necessary,"
 
and "arms are pious when there is no hope but in arms"
 
(Ch. 26, 103) refers to armies who are at war, (III. 12,
 
440-43) and does not echo Machiavelli's beliefs, if necessi
 
ty pertains to his "exhortation" to the Medici "to seize
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Italy." (Ch. 26, 101) In fact, Machiavelli refers to the
 
issue of just arms and necessity, in the History, in the
 
context of liberty, specifically addressed in opposition to
 
the Medici. In a set speech delivered by Rinaldo degli
 
Albizzi, Albizzi endeavors to get "aid against COsimo's
 
government," from Duke Filippo, in which Machiavelli makes
 
the following assertions:"*
 
By all her people that city dese:rves to
 
be loved which loves all her people
 
equally, not that city which, neglecting
 
all the others, bows down before a very
 
few of them. No man should condemn in
 
all conditions weapons that citizens
 
turn against their native place. He
 
should not do so because cities, though
 
they are mixed bodies, bear likeness to
 
simple bodies. Just as in simple bodies
 
diseases often appear which cannot be
 
healed without fire and steel, so in
 
cities many times there are such dis
 
orders that a merciful and good citizen,
 
when steel is the necessary remedy,
 
would sin much more in leaving them
 
untreated than in treating them. In the
 
body of a republic what illness can be
 
more serious than servitude? What medi
 
cine is more necessary than that which
 
relieves it from disease? Only those
 
wars are just that are necessary; and
 
arms are holy when there is no hope
 
apart from them. I do not know what
 
necessity can be greater than purs, or
 
what holiness can surpass that which
 
takes any man's native city from slav
 
ery. It is therefore most certain that
 
our cause is holy and just—-something
 
that ought to be considered both by us
 
and by you,^
 
In the Prince, however, Machiavelli sanctioned the
 
predatory ambition of the Medici by offering the semblance
 
of necessity and just cause to their aspirations. It was a
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function of his satire to put "holy" and "just" arms at the
 
disposal of the unjust and the unholy, and thus make a
 
mockery of necessity and the ends desired by princes. In
 
the words of Plato:
 
The people have always some champion
 
whom they set over them and nurse into
 
greatness... . This and no other is the
 
root from which a tyrant springs; when
 
he first appears he is a protector.®
 
There was indeed great "readiness" in Italy, but for
 
the rise of tyranny rather than "redemption" of her ancient
 
glory. In reference to the "corrupt world" from "1434 to
 
1494," Machiavelli notes that "upon the Roman ruins nothing
 
has afterwards been built to redeem her from those ruins so
 
that under the government of a strong ruler, she could
 
proceed gloriously," for the world he describes was tainted
 
with "deceptions," and with those "tricks and schemes the
 
princes, the soldiers, the heads of the republics, in order
 
to keep that reputation which they did not deserve, carried
 
on their affairs."' The redemption Machiavelli calls for in
 
the Prince, however^ is underlined by deceit, hypocrisy, and
 
cieverness—those qualities that created the corrupt world
 
in the first place. Italy would not be redeemed by the new
 
prince, then, but brought to ruin and servitude.
 
The miracles that God performed for Moses and the
 
Israelites, Machiavelli claims. He is providing for Italy
 
and her redeemer, although he makes the point that they are
 
"without example," (Ch. 26, 103) to be sure:
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Besides this, here may be seen extraor
 
dinary things without example, brought
 
about by God: the sea has opened; a
 
cloud has escorted you along the way;
 
the stone has poured forth water; here
 
manna has rained; everything has con
 
curred in your greatness. The remainder
 
you must do yourself,God does not want
 
to do everything, so as not to take free
 
will from us and that part of the glory
 
that falls to us. (Ch. 26, 103)
 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that the miracles are
 
not "given in the same order as in the Bible," and that they
 
occur "just before the revelation at Mount Sinai,"* when God
 
revealed His Covenant with the people of Israel—His laws
 
for their governance, including the Ten Commandments.
 
Machiavelli leads his readers to the threshold, so to speak,
 
but not through the portal. The lesson that can be drawn
 
from the example of Moses, relative to the new prince and
 
his aspirations in Italy, is that law and justice provide
 
the foundation of great cities and states, and his models of
 
virtue all played a significant role in establishing laws,
 
and institutions to uphold them. And of the Ten Command
 
ments, who among the modern princes could be said to have
 
observed them, or the laws given by governments in the
 
cities they coveted/ most especially the popes, who had lost
 
all reverence for God's laws and the laws of man.
 
The notion that "God does not want to do everything, so
 
as not to take free will from us and that part of the glory
 
that falls to us," (Ch. 26, 103) is a profound distortion,
 
on Machiavelli's part, of Old Testament teachings. There is
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no part of God's glory that falls to us. In Isaiah 48:11,
 
the words of God are expressed thus; "For mine own sake,
 
even for mine own sake, will I do it: for how should my name
 
be polluted? And I will not give my glory unto another."'
 
Further, in Jeremiah 13:16; "Giye glory to the Lord Your
 
God, before he causes darkness, and before your feet stumble
 
upon the dark mountains, and, while ye look for light, he
 
turns it into the shadow of death, and make it gross dark
 
ness."^" Machiavelli advised the new prince to use religion,
 
for such qualities as religion are "useful," if one appears
 
to have them, (Ch. 18, 70-1) and he, in turn, has used reli
 
gion to deceive the prince, making that which is done from
 
unjust motives appear just and holy.
 
Machiavelli notes that the Italians have failed in
 
their "revolutions" and in their "maneuvers of war," because
 
"it always appears that military virtue has died out in her.
 
This arises from the fact that her ancient orders were not
 
good, and that there has not been anyone who has known how
 
to find new ones; and nothing brings so much honor to a man
 
rising newly as the new laws and new orders found by him."
 
(Ch. 26, 103-4) In this passage, Machiavelli clearly denies
 
his regard for ancient military and civic virtue, that which
 
he applauds throughout the Discourses and in his other major
 
works, including The Art of War. The ancient orders of
 
Italy begun with Romulus reached their apogee in the great
 
ness of Rome, that hallowed ground lauded and revered by
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 Machiavelli, together with the "highly virtuous actions
 
performed by ancient kingdoms and republics, by their kings,
 
their generals, their citizens, their legislators, and by
 
others who have gone to the trouble of serving their coun­
try," which is "so shunned" in the present, "that of the
 
virtue of bygone days there remains no trace... . The
 
"new laws and new orders found" by the new prince are not
 
informed by ancient wisdom and virtue, then, but discovered
 
in present necessity, as defined by the needs and desires of
 
the new prince, that which is not lacking for introducing
 
every form (Ch. 26, 104) of bad government and incompetent
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military preparedness. The "honor" that such a prince can
 
expect from his actions will not issue from Machiavelli,
 
however, but from those who praise infamy and its attendant
 
vices.
 
From the example of the "battle of Ravenna,"
 
Machiavelli makes the point that, in the disposition of
 
foreign arms, there are "defect[s]" in the "Swiss and Span
 
ish infantry," (Ch. 26, 103-4) and he calls for a "third
 
order" that "might not only oppose them but also be confi
 
dent in overcoming them." (Ch. 26, 104) He does not address
 
the issue of cavalry, however, although in the battle of
 
Ravenna the French cavalry won the day, and thus his example
 
leaves a favorable impression of the effectiveness of caval
 
ry generally. In fact, Machiavelli thought the infantry
 
"more highly esteemed" than cavalry, for "infantry, when
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well drawn up, can easily break cavalry, but with difficulty
 
are routed by them," and "among the sins committed by Ital
 
ian princes who have itiade Italy the slave of the foreigner,
 
there is none more grave than that of having held this arm
 
[infantry] of small account and of haying devoted all their
 
attention to mounted troops." (II. 18, 328-30) If this is
 
so, it would seem valuable information to share with a new
 
pririce who is cailed to free Italy from the barbarians.
 
Rather than make the point that infantry is superior to
 
cavalry, however, which is fundamental to his military
 
theory, he finds a "defect" in both the Spanish and Swiss
 
infantry. The lesson the new prince most needed to learn is
 
left untaught, and the status quo is fundamentally main
 
tained—which leaves little to recommend MaChiavelli's
 
military expectations of the new prinCe.
 
Machiavelli inculcates the "terrifying" aspect of the
 
"Swiss and Spanish infantry" when he observes, "the Swiss
 
have to be afraid of infantry if they meet in combat any
 
that are obstinate like themselves," (Gh. 26> 104) of which
 
they had little to fear from the Italian mercenaries. He
 
observes, however, that if the Italians would learn the
 
defects of the Swiss and Spanish infantry (the Spaniards are
 
overcome by French cavalry, and the Swiss are afraid of
 
combat with Spanish infantry), they could, by establishing a
 
"third order," learn to "resist" cavalry and overcome their
 
fear "of foot soldiers." (Ch. 26, 104-5) These broad
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generalizations/ if they have any merit, offer little in the
 
way of useful advice and seem designed to confuse rather
 
than clarify the issue. Thus, even when giving military
 
advice, Machiavelli does not quite take the matter serious
 
ly, as though he recognized the futility of his efforts.
 
Rather, he seizes the occasion to make light of his knowl
 
edge and experience.
 
The example of the battle of Ravenna also draws atten
 
tion to Pope Julius II, and another important aspect of the
 
conduct of war on the part of the Italian princes, that of
 
bringing foreign armies into Italy to achieve their ends.
 
Julius II "talked of delivering Italy from servitude and out
 
of the hands of the French. Opposed by the Venetians in
 
his struggle to regain the Romagna, Julius formed the
 
"League of Cambrai" with "Louis XII, Ferdinand of Aragon,
 
and Maximilian I for the reduction of Venice." When the
 
French defeated the Venetians, Julius became alarmed, fear
 
ing "the French would become the chief beneficiaries of the
 
league," prompting Julius to "come to terms" with Venice,
 
and turn against the French, who in turn moved to have
 
Julius "deposed" as "pope." Julius formed the '•Holy League"
 
with Venice and Spain, "to protect the Church and oust the
 
French from Italy." The French won the battle of Ravenna,
 
in 1512, but lost their commander, "Gaston de Foix." Julius
 
brought "Emperor Maximilian" into the fray, and the French
 
were driven from Italy."
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The actions of Julius II illustrate the point that the
 
modern princes gave little thought to the long-term conse
 
quences of bringing foreign powers into Italy, to achieve
 
their ends. Alexander VI and Julius II both relied on aid
 
from the "barbarians," and one might expect the Medici to
 
follow the example of Leo X's predecessors. Not only did
 
the Medici lack arms of their own but at the time
 
Machiavelli wrote the Prince, they had dismantled the Flor
 
entine militia he had struggled to create, thus demonstrat
 
ing an utter disregard for the principle of owning one's own
 
arms. Leo intended to "drive the foreigners from Italian
 
soil," and "form central Italy" into a "unified" state, as
 
discussed above. Without sufficient arms of their own,
 
however, the Medici could hardly expect to either acquire in
 
Italy without foreign assistance, or to free Italy from the
 
threat of foreign powers. Machiavelli's call to the Medici,
 
then (or any Italian prince), to free Italy from the barbar
 
ians, was intended to mock the general incompetence of the
 
princes in forming their own military—and their reliance on
 
the foreign arms he exhorts them to throw out of the coun­
try. The Medici, after all, had not hesitated to recover
 
their former position of power in Florence with the aid of
 
the Spaniards. Machiavelli didn't support their efforts
 
then, and with the exception of the Prince, there is no
 
evidence of his support in his other major writings.
 
In his concluding paragraph, Machiavelli's passionate
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 appeal to the Medici is almost unrestrained:
 
Thus, one should not let this opportuni
 
ty pass, for Italy, after so much time,
 
to see her redeemer. I cannot express
 
with what love he would be received in
 
all those provinces that have suffered
 
from these floods from outside; with
 
what thirst for revenge, with what ob
 
stinate faith, with what piety, with
 
what tears, What doors would be closed
 
to him? What peoples would deny him
 
^	 obedience? What envy would oppose him?
 
What Italian would deny him homage?
 
This barbarian domination stinks to
 
everyone. (Ch. 26, 105)
 
Would the powers in Italy, so jealous of their states
 
and their power, willingly succumb to the Medici? As Leo
 
Strauss observes, "The last chapter presents a problem not
 
because it is a call to liberate Italy but because it is
 
silent about the difficulties in the way... the chapter
 
creates the impression that the only thing required for the
 
liberation of Italy is the Italian's strong loathing of
 
foreign domination, and their ancient valor: the liberator
 
of Italy can expect spontaneous cooperation from all his
 
compatriots and he can expect that they all will fly to arms
 
against the foreigners once he ^takes the banner, and he
 
notes that "before the liberator can liberate Italy, he
 
would have to take not merely a banner, as is said in the
 
text of the chapter, but Italy herself, as is said in the
 
heading. It is a rare if not unique case in Machiavelli's
 
books that the heading of a chapter should be more informa
 
tive than its body, the "Exhortation to Seize Italy and to
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Free Her from the Barbarians." (Ch. 26, 101)
 
In response to the question, "what envy would oppose
 
him," one need look no farther than Venice, and of "what
 
peoples would deny him obedience," virtually every Italian
 
who valued their liberty would be numbered among them.
 
Machiayelli himself would be the first to "deny him homage,"
 
as his satire attests. As Leo Strauss observes, the Medici
 
must conquer Italy to make it their own:
 
To liberate Italy from the barbarians
 
means to unify Italy, and to unify Italy
 
means to conquer Italy... the liberator
 
of Italy cannot depend on the spontane
 
ous following of all inhabitants of
 
Italy. He has to pursue a policy of
 
iron and poison, of murder and treach
 
ery. He must not shrink from the ex­
terminmination of Italian princely fam­
illies and the destruction of Italian ^
 
republican cities whenever actions of
 
this kind are conducive to his end. The
 
liberation of Italy means a complete
 
revolution... Italians have to learn
 
that the patriotic end hallows every
 
means, however much condemned by the
 
most exalted traditions both philosophic
 
and religious... Cesare Borgia did not
 
become master of the Romagna except by
 
"cruelty well used," Philip of Macedon
 
did not become within a short time
 
"prince of Greece" except by use of
 
means which were inimical not only to
 
every humane manner of life but to every
 
Christian manner of life as well."
 
In the First Decennale, a work that reflects "ten years
 
of Florentine history, 1494-1504," Machiavelli observes that
 
the "kingdoms and the powers are not united and cannot be,'"*
 
due to conflicts among the powers in Italy, and the involve
 
ment of foreigners in the affairs of Italy. And in a letter
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written to Francesco Vettori, in 1513, the year Machiavelli
 
wrote the Prince, it is clear that he had not changed his
 
opinion; "As to the union of the Italians, you make me
 
laugh, first, because there never will be union here to do
 
anything good. Even though the leaders should unite, they
 
are not sufficient, because there are no armies here worth a
 
farthing, except the Spanish, who, because the^y are too few,
 
are not enough. Second, because the tails are not united
 
with the heads. The people of this generation will compete
 
in submitting to the Swiss before they will move a step to
 
use any opportunity that arises,"^®
 
Allan Gilbert observes of Machiavelli, "once for a
 
moment he became a dreamer, in the last chapter of the
 
Prince imagining a united Italy. Nowhere else does he
 
suggest such union as likely or feasible," nor was a union
 
"warranted by immediate conditions"^® But Machiavelli was
 
not an idle dreamer, as his comments above demonstrate. He
 
understood perfectly the limitations of present conditions
 
in Italy.
 
Eric Whelpton makes the point that, as late as 1525,
 
"the small states in Italy were helpless because their
 
jealousies and rivalries prevented them from uniting, nor
 
were "the political, economic, and military means necessary
 
to achieve Machiavelli's patriotic ends... then available in
 
Italy.
 
Sergio Bertelli remarks that, "Machiavelli did not so
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 much admire or scrutinize Borgia as oppose him, the Secre
 
tary being conditioned by the century-old Florentine politi
 
cal and diplomatic tradition of opposing any movement toward
 
unification at the expense of the city's libertas'—a posi
 
tion largely borne out by Machiavelli's observations of the
 
Duke recorded in the Legations. Most assuredly, if the
 
Medici succeeded in transforming Italy into a Medici princi
 
pality, liberty would be lost.
 
In a more perfect world, Machiavelli might have imag
 
ined a federation of sorts, comprised of the five major
 
powers, with the authority to grant dictatorial power to one
 
individual in times of crises—one who could marshall re
 
sources and reach decisions quickly, without endless arbi
 
tration. In such a world, the citizen and subject armies
 
would be well armed and trained, united in Common defense of
 
their country, in 1513, however, there was ho hope of any
 
such unification, no appreciable arms for defense, no virtu
 
ous leaders or military commanders, nor were the people
 
disposed to preserve their liberty. If Machiavelli sati
 
rized the comic stage of Italy in a "blaze of revulsion,
 
he did so with good cause, his sense of foreboding clearly
 
manifest in his call to the Medici princes to seize the
 
country—who symbolized the avarice, incompetence and hypoc
 
risy of the powerful who continued to lead Italy to her
 
ruin.
 
Machiavelli closes his exhortation to the Medici with 
V ■ ■ . . . . ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ 
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lines from Petrarch's Italia Mia:
 
Virtue will take up arms against fury,
 
and make the battle short,
 
because the ancient valour in Italian hearts
 
is not yet dead. (Gh. 26, 105)
 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Machiavelli also
 
wrote another exhortation, An Exhortation to Penitence,
 
which also closed with a quote from Petrarch, expressing a
 
sentiment with profound relevance to the Prince:
 
And repent and understand clearly
 
that as much as pleases the world is a short
 
dream.
 
The date of this oration is "undetermined,"^ but it was
 
likely written after "1495," the year that Machiavelli
 
became a member of the "Company of Piety," one of the "reli
 
gious companies" that were "common in Florence."^' Whether
 
it was written before or after the Prince, however, it
 
appertains to that work in the sense that in the Exhortation
 
to Penitence, Machiavelli speaks of God's forgiveness of
 
those who repent of their "sin," "eVil," and their display
 
of "ingratitude to God," in changing from "angel to devil,
 
from master to servant, from man to beast. Conversely, in
 
the Prince, Machiaveili inculcates sin and evil, satirizing
 
the beastly and wicked nature of princes.
 
Machiavelli's pious sentiments are evident in this
 
oration, in which he states that the Christian faith is
 
based on charity:
 
He cannot be full of charity who is not
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full of religion, because charity is
 
patient, is kindly, is not envious, is
 
not perverse, does not show pride, is
 
not ambitious, does not seek her own
 
profit, does not get angry, meditates on
 
the wicked man, does not delight in him,
 
does not take pleasure in vanity, suf
 
fers everything, believes everything,
 
hopes everything. Oh divine virtue!
 
Oh, happy are those that possess you!
 
These qualities, however, are precisely those that are
 
lacking in the new prince. They represent, rather, the
 
qualities of religious faith that Machiavelli advises the
 
prince he need only appear to have, creating an impression
 
of his religiosity. Robert Ridolfi refers to the "sad and
 
pious pages" of the Exhortation to Penitence as "the climax
 
of the author's Christian thought," through time "adjudged
 
by some otherwise most clear-sighted scholars... as a frivo
 
lous joke!"^° Ridolfi upholds Machiavelli's "^essential
 
Christianity,' the intimate religious foundation of his
 
conscience which breathes from all his works, and "finds
 
that Machiavelli was anti-clerical, but not an atheist...
 
who wrote [in addition to the Exhortation to Penitence} an
 
octave for a miracle play (recently found), and [lamented]
 
that ^no other hope remains to me but God.' While Harvey
 
C. Mansfield, Jr. notes that "none of Machiavelli's jokes"
 
are "frivolous," he maintains that "if Machiavelli had
 
considered penitence according to Christian virtue a serious
 
possibility, he would have discussed it in the Prince and
 
the Discourses, where he put everything he knew. If the
 
406
 
Prince is satire, however, the reason for not including it
 
seems obvious, for in that work he champions everything that
 
is at variance with the notion of penitence. A call to
 
repent in that unrepentant work would have spoiled the
 
subtlety of his grand artifice—by suggesting that the new
 
prince was, in fact, what Machiavelli portrayed him to be, a
 
beastly monster in need of God's forgiveness, and not a man
 
favored by God in a calling equated with that given to
 
Moses. As for the Discourses, perhaps Machiavelli was not
 
inclined to give his political theory the resonance of
 
Savonarola's beliefs, who was "determined to hold high the
 
cross as a symbol of unification, and to root out evil by
 
penitence."^'*
 
Of charity, then, Machiavelli observes that he who
 
"lacks it... does not teach the ignorant... does not advise
 
him who errs... does not help the good... does not punish
 
the evil."^^ By this definition, Machiavelli was indeed
 
charitable, for in his works he always sought to teach the
 
lessons that he had learned from his long consideration of
 
ancient and modern events that shaped the destiny of Flor
 
ence and the greater peninsula. And he was charitable to /
 
his fellow Italians, who gave him little cause for optimism,
 
for he persisted in his belief that, when fortune holds sway
 
over affairs, one should not "despair," because "there is
 
always hope," (II. 29, 372) perversely expressed in his
 
satire.
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Machiavelli states, "with what thirst for revenge" the
 
people await their "redeemer," the Medici, under whose
 
"emblem this fatherland may be ennobled and under its aus
 
pices the saying of Petrarch's may come true," that the
 
"ancient valour in Italian hearts is not yet dead." (Ch. 26,
 
105) But Petrarch did not issue a call for revenge in
 
Italia. Mia. "It was his indignation" at the outrages within
 
Italy, the "warring'* prihcipalities "devastated" by mercen
 
aries, that "made it again what it had been before, the
 
spoil of barbarian hordes," which inspired him to write
 
Italia Mia, "from his desire to see peace re-established"^®
 
within Italy itself;
 
If thus by our own hands we have defiled
 
Our native soil, whose arm shall set us free?
 
Now, prisoned in one cage
 
Wild beasts and gentle flocks together dwell.
 
Until the good must suffer from the base.
 
^For love of God,' I cry
 
^Some time take thought of your humanity
 
And spare your people all their tears and grief!
 
From you they seek relief
 
Next after God. If in your eyes they see
 
Some mark of sympathy.
 
Against this mad disgrace
 
They will arise, the combat will be short
 
For the stern valour of our ancient race
 
Is not yet dead in the Italian heart.
 
From strife and slaughter cease.
 
From hatching grievous ills, and consecrate
 
Your lives to a better fate.
 
To deeds of generous worth.
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To gracious acts that cheer and bless mankind;
 
Thus will you gather joy and peace on earth
 
And heaven's pathway opened wide will find,^'
 
Petrarch conveys his sense of despair over the condi­
tions in Italy in this "noble ode,"^® that is echoed in
 
Machiavelli's Prince, as well. "Petrarch's work," however,
 
"rings with the cry for peace, the hope of peace to unify
 
Italy within to enable his countrymen to battle the invading
 
hordes. Machiavelli's battlecry differs significantly,
 
then, from Petrarch, for Machiavelli does not call for unity
 
through peace, but a unification predicated on battles for
 
supremacy fought within--an invitation to continued chaos
 
and a further weakening of Italy that made it prey to for
 
eign intruders in the first place. '
 
It seems incredible that anyone should have believed
 
such foolishness to have emanated from the politically
 
astute Machiavelli. After nearly five centuries, no evi
 
dence has surfaced to indicate the Medici reaction to the
 
work, nor is there likely to be. As Garrett Mattingly
 
observes, "we have never found the copy which should have
 
had the best chance of preservation—I mean that copy,
 
beautifully lettered on vellum and richly bound, presented
 
with its dedication to the Medici prince. Not only is it
 
absent from the Laurentian Library now, there is no trace
 
that it was ever there. There is no evidence that it ever
 
existed. Probably Machiavelli figured that the joke was not
 
worth the extra expense."'*"
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But Machiavelli's other work on government, addressed
 
to the Medici, was nevet intended as a joke. In The J?einod­
eling, Machiavelli put forth his ideas for saving the liber
 
ty of Florence in earnest, yet with all the diplomacy that
 
the circumstances demanded. Following the death of Lorenzo
 
de' Medici (1519), Cardinal Giulio de' Medici became ruler
 
in Florence, until his election to the papacy in 1523. As
 
no legitimate male heirs remained in the Medici line.
 
Cardinal Giulio, at the request of Pope Leo, solicited the
 
opinions of the Florentines regarding the future government
 
of the city. Pope Leo died in 1521, and the Cardinal was
 
elevated to the papacy in 1523, taking the name Pope Clement
 
Vll. As 1 mentioned above, in his final considerations,
 
Clement probably "never seriously entertained any other
 
thought than to preserve the Florentine dominion for his
 
family," and thus he "disclosed the existence of two young
 
Medici bastards," Ippolito and Alessandro.''^
 
Machiavelli's discourse was rejected by the Medici but
 
it is clear, from this work, that he did not favor a Medici
 
tyranny. Following the death of Lorenzo, who provided a
 
military arm, so to speak, for seizing Italy (as had Cesare
 
Borgia to Alexander VI), one might argue that Machiavelli's
 
hopes for a conquered, united Italy (as expressed in the
 
Prince, in Chapter Twenty-six) were destroyed, and thus he
 
turned his thoughts away from the prospects of unifying the
 
country, although Giovanni delle Bande Nere (the Medici of a
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secondary line)"*' showed the promise for fulfilling the mili
 
tary opportunity compromised by the death of Lorenzo. But
 
Machiavelli did not pursue the ambitious enterprise he
 
called for in the Prince, in the Remodeling, nor is there
 
any mention of unifying Italy in this discourse. Rather, he
 
pleaded for the return to republican rule and the preserva
 
tion of liberty—in a work that reflected his true beliefs.
 
He does not adorn the work with extravagant embellishments
 
taken from scripture, or call on the Medici to redeem the
 
ancient glory of Rome by becoming tyrannical lords over
 
greater Italy, in pursuit of empire. The glory of Rome was
 
the ancient republic, and Machiavelli appeals to the Medici
 
to forsake their own personal glory for the greater good of
 
Florence. He could have desired no less for the greater
 
good of Italy as a whole.
 
With considerable tact, then, Machiavelli invites the
 
Medici, in The Remodeling, to satisfy their personal power
 
while they live, but on the death of the pope and the cardi
 
nal, to return the government to the people. In preparation
 
for that eventuality, Machiavelli goes into considerable
 
detail on how the government should be constructed, includ
 
ing reconstituting Savonarola's Great Council, yet "uphold
 
ing" the "security" of the Medici "friends," and the "power"
 
of the Medici pope."*^ Machiavelli ignored the issue of
 
governing bodies in the Prince. But in this discourse, his
 
regard for democratic principles is made plain, and I do not
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think anything in Machiavelli's writings, including the
 
Discourses, so negates the absurd precepts that he offers in
 
the Prince as this little work in which, with prudent fore
 
sight, Machiavelli implores the Medici to give up their
 
power and choose that path which will bring the greater
 
glory to their house:
 
I believe the greatest honor possible
 
for men to have is that willingly given
 
them by their native cities; I believe
 
the greatest good to be done and the
 
most pleasing to God is that which one
 
does to one's native city. Besides
 
this, no man is so much exalted by any
 
act of his as are those men who have
 
with laws and with institutions remod
 
eled republics and kingdoms; these are,
 
after those who have been gods, the
 
first to be praised. And because they
 
have been few who have had opportunity
 
to do it, and very few those who have
 
understood how to do it, small is the
 
number who have done it. And so much
 
has this glory been esteemed by men
 
peeking for nothing other than glory
 
that when unable to form a republic in
 
reality, they have done it in writing,
 
as Aristotle, Plato, and many others,
 
who have wished to show the world that
 
if they have not founded a free govern
 
ment, as did Solon and Lycurgus, they
 
have failed not through their ignorance
 
but through their impotence for putting
 
it into practice.'*^
 
These are not the words of a man predisposed to politi
 
cal solutions grounded in force, fraud, and unlimited power
 
vested in one individual. Even in the most dire circum
 
stances, Machiavelli does not advocate tyrannt. He never
 
intended that the Medici increase either their dominion or
 
their authority, as he would have us believe in the Prince,
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Rather, his intent was to ridicule their ambition and that
 
of modern princes generally, who had become the scourge of
 
Italy. He mocks their ignorance, their failure to compre
 
hend the consequences of their ambition, which held the
 
promise of continued chaos, war, and their own inevitable
 
ruin.
 
As did Aristotle and Plato before him, Machiavelli
 
endeavored to found, at least with words, a "free govern
 
ment," a republic that redeemed the virtue of his ancestors
 
in the Republic Of Rome, in the Discourses, The Prince
 
casts a long shadow over that noble effort. Taken at his
 
word in the Prince, and considering his other works, as
 
well, moral and immoral practices, good and evil, virtue and
 
vice, liberty and servitude, and justice and injustice all
 
vie for their place within the theoretical limitations of a
 
republican regime founded on democratic principles—in which
 
survival depends on rooting out the corrupting influence of
 
vice, immorality, evil, and injustice, which ultimately lead
 
to ruin. Nor can society raise up a tyrant to meet present
 
necessities, and hope to recover lost freedom and liberties
 
when the crisis is past, when necessity becomes the property
 
of the prince.
 
Machiavelli would never advocate the principles and ac
 
tions of the new prince he satirized so brilliantly in the
 
Prince. In defense against such a character, however,
 
Machiavelli would deploy every weapon in his arsenal to
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combat the threat of tyranny and oppression. "One's country
 
should be defended whether it entail ignominy or glory," for
 
"it is good to defend it in any way whatsoever." (III. 41,
 
514) Freedom is what Machiavelli fought to preserve in his
 
writings, (III. 41, 515) and if the Prince is understood as
 
satire, there are no exceptions to that principle in his
 
works; the enigma that surrounds Machiavelli thus evapo
 
rates. Political life, in his view, was grounded in morali
 
ty and ethics, an essential component if tyranny, or the
 
corruption that leads to the rise of tyrannical government,
 
was to be avoided. The more decadent and avaricious the
 
public becomes, the greater the danger that ultimately
 
liberty will be lost. If there is a timeless quality to
 
Machiavelli's thought, it resides in this perspective from
 
his works, so long neglected by scholars of history and
 
political science.
 
In a collection of essays edited by Bhikhu Parekh and
 
R.N. Berki, the question of whether or not "politics has a
 
moral basis" is addressed. Parekh and Berki suggest that
 
"we are today living through an acute moral crisis and in
 
particular through an agonizing state of interregnum in the
 
morality of politics" calling for "a thorough re-examination
 
of the problems of political morality, for a renewed and
 
persistent questioning of the relevant but hitherto neglect
 
ed principles of moral and political philosophy." "Dogma
 
tism" and "subjectivism," they argue, have failed, and there
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is a "need... not for indignant denunciations and unilateral
 
ideological credos, but for patient—even plodding and
 
pedestrian—academic attempts designed slowly to disentangle
 
the knots, and to generate a new spirit of inquiry. Big
 
questions don't always require big answers...
 
Machiavelli should not be excluded from this dialogue, for
 
his concern was also for the common good, what Parekh and~
 
Berki define as "the public interest of the whole communi
 
ty,"'*' that can only be realized when moral and ethical
 
considerations are joined to political principles.
 
How unfortunate, then, that Machiavelli's genius re
 
coiled on his intentions in the Prince. We have been duped
 
by his cleverness, although he could not have expected to
 
escape discovery—perhaps the greatest danger a satirist
 
risks in weaving his deceptions—especially by those who
 
would be expected to weigh the Prince against his Discourses
 
and other works that followed. Regrettably, however, his
 
satire was not understood and the message was lost. The
 
"counterfeit" passed for "true,"'*® and the critic behind the
 
mask became an advocate, a most perverse irony visited on
 
Machiavelli himself. To label such practices (which he
 
would surely disavow) ^ Machiavellian,' then, is to play a
 
cruel joke on the sage prankster, although no doubt he would
 
allow that he deserved it. After all, as he confided to his
 
friend Francesco Guicciardini:
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For a long time I have not said what I
 
believed, nor do I ever believe what I
 
say, and if indeed sometimes I do happen
 
to tell the truth, I hide it among so
 
many lies that it is hard to find it.^'
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APPENDIX A; A DISCOURSE ON REMODELING
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF FLORENCE
 
[Written on t,he request of Pope Leo X, Giovanni de' Medici]
 
THE REASON WHY FLORENCE THROUGHOUT HER HISTORY HAS
 
frequently varied her methods of government is that she has
 
never been either a republic or a princedom having the
 
qualities each requires, because we cannot call that repub
 
lic well-established in which things are done according to
 
the will of one man yet are decided with the approval of
 
many;^ nor can we believe a republic fitted to last, in
 
which there is no content for those elements that must be
 
contented if republics are not to fall. And that this is
 
the truth, we can learn from the governments Florence has
 
had from 1393 until now.
 
Beginning with the alteration made at that date by
 
Messer Maso degli Albizzi, we see that then the lawmakers
 
intended to give her the form of a republic governed by
 
aristocrats, but their form had so many defects that it did
 
not last longer than forty years; and it would have been
 
less permanent if the Visconti wars had not ensued, which
 
kept it united. Its defects were, among others, that it
 
prepared the list of those eligible to office far ahead of
 
time; because of this, fraud was easy, and the choice could
 
be not good; for, since men change easily and turn from good
 
to bad and, on the other hand, places were given to citizens
 
much ahead of time, it could easily happen that the choice
 
was good and the drawing bad.^ Besides this, nothing was
 
established to cause fear in great men, so that they would
 
not set up factions, which are the ruin of a government.
 
The Signeria,^ moreover, had slight prestige and too much
 
power, being able to dispose without appeal of the life and
 
property of the citizens, and being able to call the popu
 
lace to a parliament. Hence it came to be not the defender
 
A description of the government of Cosimo and
 
Lorenzo de' Medici, in which the real authority had to get
 
the consent of the nominal authority.
 
A citizen might be fit for an office when his name
 
was put in the pouch containing the names of those eligible,
 
but might be unfit when, much later, on the drawing out of
 
his name, he assumed office.
 
The head of the Florentine government, consisting of
 
the Gonfalonier and (usually) eight Priors.
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of the state but a means for causing its ruin, whenever an
 
influential citizen could either control or befuddle it. On
 
the other hand, as has been said, it had little prestige,
 
because, since often it included men of low station, young
 
men, and had a short term, and did not carry on important
 
business, it could not have prestige.
 
That constitution also suffered from a failing hot of
 
slight importance: that men in private station took part in
 
deliberations oh public busihess. This kept up the prestige
 
of the meh ih private statiohs ahd took it away from those
 
ih official ones, and it had the effect of taking away power
 
and prestige from the magistrates—a thing opposed to every
 
sort of well-ordered government. To these failings of that
 
constitution was added another, which amounted to as much as
 
all the rest: the people did not have their share. These
 
conditions, altogether, caused countless injustices, ahd if,
 
as I have said, external wars had not kept that government
 
solid, it would have fallen sooner than it did.
 
Next, after this, Cosimo's governmeht was established,
 
tending more toward the princedom than toward the republic.
 
If yet it lasted longer than the other, the cause lay in two
 
things: one, that it was established with the people's aid;
 
the other, that it was controlled by the prudence of two
 
such men as Cosimo and Lorenzo his grandson. Nevertheless,
 
such weakness resulted from its having to decide through a
 
large n\amber what Cosimo planned to carry out,^ that many
 
times he risked the failure of a plan. From this came the
 
frequent parliaments and the frequent exiles that took place
 
during his control, and than at last, at the critical time
 
of King Charles's expedition, the Medici government fell.
 
After that, the city decided to resume the form of a
 
republic, but did not apply herself to adopting it in a form
 
that would be lasting, because the ordinances then made did
 
not satisfy all the parties among the citizens; and on the
 
other hand, the government could not inflict punishment.
 
And it was so defective and remote from a true republic that
 
a Gonfalonier for life, if he was intelligent and wicked,
 
easily could make himself prince; if he was good and weak,^
 
could easily be driven out, with the ruin of the whole
 
government. Since it would be a long matter to set forth
 
all the reasons, I will tell just one: the Gonfalonier did
 
not have those around him who could protect him, if he were
 
His plans became law only through republican chan^
 
nels.
 
virtually a reference to Piero Soderini, such a
 
Gonfalonier for life, driven out in 1512.
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good; nor anyone who, if he were bad, could restrain him or
 
set him right.
 
The reason why all these governments have been defec
 
tive is that the alterations in them have been made not for
 
the fulfillment of the common good, but for the strengthen
 
ing and Security of the party.® Such security has not yet
 
been attained, because there has always been in the city a
 
party that was discontented, which has been a very powerful
 
tool for anybody who wished to make a change.
 
The only government now left to consider is that from
 
1512 to the present, and what its weaknesses and strong
 
qualities have been, but because it is a recent affair and
 
everybody knows it, I shall not speak of it. To be sure,
 
the Dxoke's death has brought things to a point where new
 
types of government must be considered.' So I believe that,
 
to show my loyalty to Your Holiness, I cannot err in saying
 
what occurs to me. First I shall give the opinions of many
 
others as I have heard them stated, next adding my own
 
opinions; if I err. Your Holiness must excuse me as more
 
loving than wise.
 
I say, then, that some judge no government can be
 
established firmer than that existing in the times of Cosimo
 
and of Lorenzo. Some others wish one more inclusive.® They
 
s^y, indeed—those who would like a government like
 
Cosimo's—that things easily go back to what is natural.
 
For this reason, since naturally Florentine citizens honor
 
your house, enjoy those favors that come from it, and love
 
what it loves, and since they have followed this habit for
 
sixty years, nothing else can happen but that when they see
 
the same ways,® the same frame of mind will return to them.
 
Moreover they believe few could continue in an opposing
 
frame of mind~and those few would do so through a habit of
 
opposition, easily got rid of. To these reasons they add
 
necessity, showing that Florence cannot continue without a
 
director; and since she has to have one, it is much better
 
that he be of the house the people are accustomed to bow
 
down to than that either, not having a director, they should
 
6. The party making them.
 
Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, was in charge of
 
Florence until his death in 1519.
 
®- Taking in a larger number of citizens.
 
®- The ways they had been accustomed to under Medici
 
rule.
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live in confusion or, having one, should get him elsewhere—
 
which would bring less prestige and less satisfaction to
 
everybody.
 
Against this opinion we answer that a government of
 
that sort is risky if for no other reason than that it is
 
weak. If the government of Cosimo had in those times so
 
many weaknesses as are abduced above, in these times such a
 
government would redouble them, because the city, the citi
 
zens, the times are different from what they were then, so
 
that by no possibility can anyone devise a government in
 
Florence that can last and be like that one. In the first
 
place, Cosimo's government had the approval of the people
 
generally, and the present one has their disapproval. The
 
citizens of Cosimo's time had never experienced in Florence
 
a government that gave greater power to the people; the
 
present citizens have experienced one that they think more
 
just and that pleases them better. In Italy at that time
 
there was neither army nor power that the Florentines, even
 
though standing alone, could not with their armies resist;
 
but now, since Spain and France are here, the Florentines
 
must ally themselves with one of the two; yet if the ally
 
they select loses, at once they are left as the booty of the
 
victor—-a thing that in Cosimo's day would not have hap
 
pened. Formerly, the citizens were accustomed to paying
 
many taxes; now, through either inability or change in
 
custom, they are out of the habit; and to try to get them
 
back into it is a matter hateful and dangerous. The Medici
 
who were governing then, since they had been educated and
 
brought up among the citizens, conducted themselves with
 
such friendliness that they gained favor. Now, they have
 
grown so great that, since they have gone beyond all the
 
habits of citizens, there cannot be such intimacy and conse
 
quently such favor. Hence, considering this unlikeness in
 
times and in men, there cannot be a greater deception than
 
to believe that upon such differently shaped matter one can
 
stamp the same form. And if in that day, as I said above,
 
every ten years the Medici were in danger of losing control,
 
now they would actually lose it. Nor should anyone believe
 
that men easily return to a way of life that is old and
 
habitual, because in truth they do so when the old way of
 
living is more pleasing than the new one, but when it pleas
 
es less, they do not return to the old way unless forced to,
 
and they live in it only as long as that force lasts.
 
Besides this, though it is true that Florence cannot
 
P. 103, "the frequent parliaments Cf. DISCOURSES
 
3. 1; HISTORY OF FLORENCE 6. 7; 7. 1 end.
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exist without a director, and that if she should have to
 
decide,between one unofficial director and another, she
 
would like better a director from the house of Medici than
 
one from any other house, nevertheless, if it is a decision
 
between an official and an unofficial director," the offi
 
cial director would always be more pleasing-—no matter where
 
taken from^—than the unofficial director.
 
Some hold the opinion that you cannot lose control of
 
the government without an attack from outside, and believe
 
you will always have time enough to make a friendly arrange
 
ment with any invader. In this they deceive themselves
 
seriously, because,, usually, alliance is not made with the
 
strongest power but with the power which just then has the
 
best opportunity for injuring you or which your spirit and
 
your fancy most dispose you to love. Your ally may chance
 
to be defeated (and if defeated he is left in the power of
 
the victor) and his conqueror may not decide on a treaty
 
with you, either because you are too late in asking for it
 
or because he has grown to hate you as a result of your
 
connection with his enemies. For example, Lodovico the Duke
 
of Milan would, if he could, have made a treaty with King
 
Louis XII of France. King Frederick would have made a
 
treaty with the same ruler if he could have secured one."
 
Both of these princes lost their states through not being
 
able to make treaties; at such times a thousand accidents
 
spring up to hold you back. Hence, everything considered,
 
we cannot call a government modeled on Cosimo's either safe
 
or firm, since it has so many causes for lack of firmness.
 
Therefore, it should not be acceptable to Your Holiness and
 
your friends.
 
As to those who prefer a government more inclusive than
 
Cosimo's, I say that unless it is inclusive in such a way
 
that it will become a well-ordered republic, its inclusive­
ness is likely to make it fall more rapidly. And if they
 
will explicitly tell how they would like it organized, I
 
shall give an explicit answer, but since they continue in
 
generalities, I am not able to answer other than generally.
 
I believe the following answer alone is enough; so to con
 
fute the government of Cosimo, I say this; No firm govern
 
ment can be devised if it is not either a true princedom or
 
a true republic, because all the constitutions between these
 
"• An official director would be one constitutionally
 
chosen, as opposed to Cosimo de' Medici as a prince without
 
legal recognition.
 
"• King Frederick of the Kingdom of Southern Italy.
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two are defective. The reason is entirely evident, because
 
the princedom has just one path to dissolution, that is, to
 
descend toward the republic. And similarly the republic has
 
just one path toward being dissolved, that is, to rise
 
toward the princedom. Governments of a middle sort have two
 
ways; they can rise toward the princedom and descend toward
 
the republic. From this comes their lack of firmness. It
 
is therefore not possible. Your Holiness, if you wish to
 
give Florence a firm government for your own glory and the
 
security of your friends, to set up there other than a true
 
princedom or a republic having its distinctive parts. Any
 
other form would be useless and short-lived.
 
Now as to the princedom, I shall not discuss it in
 
detail, both because of the difficulty of establishing one
 
here and because there are no facilities for doing it.
 
Moreover Your Holiness needs to understand that in all
 
cities where the citizens are accustomed to equality, a
 
princedom cannot be set up except with the utmost difficul
 
ty, and in those cities where the citizens are accustomed to
 
inequality, a republic cannot be set up except with the
 
utmost difficulty. In order to form a republic in Milan,
 
where inequality among the citizens is great, necessarily
 
all the nobility must be destroyed and brought to an equali
 
ty with the others, because among them are men so above all
 
rules that the laws are not enough to hold them down, but
 
there must be a living voice and a kingly power to hold them
 
down. On the contrary, in order to have a princedom in
 
Florence, where equality is great, the establishment of
 
inequality would be necessary; noble lords of walled towns
 
and boroughs would have to be set up, who in support of the
 
prince would with their arms and their followers stifle the
 
city and the whole province. A prince alone, lacking a
 
nobility, cannot support the weight of a princedom; for that
 
reason it is necessary that between him and the generality
 
of the people there should be a middle group that will help
 
him support it. This can be seen in all the states with a
 
prince, and especially in the kingdom of France, where the
 
gentlemen rule the people, the princes the gentlemen, and
 
the king the princes.
 
But because to form a princedom where a republic would
 
go well is a difficult thing and, through being difficult,
 
inhximane and unworthy of whoever hopes to be considered
 
merciful and good, I shall pass over any further treatment
 
of the princedom and speak of the republic, both because
 
Florence is a subject very suitable for taking this form and
 
because I know that Your Holiness is much inclined toward
 
one; and I bplieve that you defer establishing it because
 
you hope to find an arrangement by which your power in (
 
Florence may continue great and your friends may live in
 
security. Since I believe I have discovered one, I hope
 
Your Highness will give attention to my discovery,so that if
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there is anything good in it, you can make use of it and
 
also learn from it how great is my wish to serve you. And
 
you will see that in this republic of mine your power is not
 
only preserved but is increased, your friends continue to be
 
honored and safe, and the whole body of citizens has evident
 
reasons for being satisfied. With the utmost respect, I beg
 
Your Holiness not to condemn and not to praise this dis
 
course of mine without first reading it through. And like
 
wise I beg you not to be disturbed by some changes in the
 
magistrates, because when things are not well organized, the
 
less there is left of the old, the less there is left of the
 
bad.
 
Those who organize a republic ought to provide for the
 
three different sorts of men who exist in all cities, name
 
ly, the most important, those in the middle, and the lowest.
 
And though in Florence the citizens possess the equality
 
mentioned above, nonetheless some of her citizens have ambi
 
tious spirits and thihk they deserve to outrank the others;
 
these must be satisfied in organizing a republic; the last
 
government, indeed, fell for no other cause than that such a
 
group was not satisfied. To men of this sort it is not
 
possible to give satisfaction unless dignity is given to the
 
highest offices in the republic—which dignity is to be
 
maintained in their persons.
 
By no possibility can this dignity be given to the
 
highest offices in the government of Florence if the Signo­
ria and the members of the College remain in the same condi
 
tion as in the past. On account of the way in which these
 
groups are chosen-—since important and influential men now
 
sit in them only rarely—either this governmental dignity
 
must be lowered and be put in unsuitable places (which is
 
contrary to all political order), or must be abandoned to
 
private individuals." Therefore this method is necessarily
 
to be corrected, and in its correction the loftiest ambition
 
in the city is to be satisfied. This is the way to correct
 
it. Abolish the Signeria, the Eight of Practica, and the
 
Twelve Good Men;''* and in exchange for them, in order to give
 
dignity to the government, ordain sixty-five citizens of
 
forty-five years and more, fifty-three for the major guilds
 
and twelve for the minor guilds, who should remain for life
 
in the government, in the following manner: Choose from the
 
said nxomber a Gonfalonier of Justice for two or three years.
 
"■ To allow the government to be controlled by politi 
cal bosses, not in office, as in COsimo's time. 
The Eight of Pratica dealt with foreign and mili 
tary affairs; the Twelve Good Men with finance and trade. 
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if it should not seem proper to;set him up for life; the
 
sixty-four citizens who are left are to be divided into two
 
groups, thirty-two for each. One group is to govern along
 
with the Gonfalonier for one year, the other group the next
 
year; and so in succession they are to exchange, keeping the
 
arrangement indicated below. All together are to be called
 
the Signeria.
 
The Thirty-two are to be divided into four groups,
 
eight to a group; and each group is to reside with the
 
Gonfalonier three months in the Palace, and to assume the
 
magistracy with the ceremonies that are customary, and to
 
carry on all the business that the Signoria alone carries on
 
today. And after that,i with its other companions of the
 
thirty-two, it should have all the authority and carry on
 
all the business that today the Signoria, the Eight of
 
Practica, and the members of the College carry on; these are
 
abolished above. So this, as I have said, would be the
 
Chief head and chief arm of the government. This arrange
 
ment, if it is carefully considered, will be recognized as
 
giving dignity and influence to the head of the government,
 
for, evidently, weighty men, who have prestige, will always
 
occupy the highest places. It will not be necessary to
 
consult private individuals—which I said above is perni
 
cious in a republic—because the thirty-two who are not that
 
year in the magistracy can serve for advice and consulta
 
tion. It will also be possible for your Holiness to put in
 
this first selection, as I shall explain below, all your
 
friends and trusted followers. But let us come to the
 
second rank in the government.
 
I believe it is necessary, since there are three sorts
 
of men, as I said above, that there be also three ranks in a
 
republic, and not more. Therefore I believe it good to get
 
rid of the jumble of councils that have existed for some
 
time in your city. These have been formed not because they
 
were necessary to good government but to feed through them
 
the vanity of more of the citizens, and to feed it with a
 
thing that in truth is of no consequence for the well-being
 
of the city, because all of these councils can by means of
 
parties be demoralized.
 
If I am trying, then, to design a republic with three
 
components, it seems to me necessary to abolish the Seventy,
 
the Hundred, and the Council of the People and of the Com
 
munity; and in exchange for all these to set up a Council of
 
Two Hundred, composed of men at least forty years old, forty
 
of them chosen from the minor guilds and a hundred and sixty
 
from the major guilds; not one of them would be permitteia to
 
belong to the Sixty-five. They should hold office for life
 
and be called the Council of the Selected. This Council,
 
along with the Sixty-five named, should do all the things
 
and have all the power that today is held by the above
 
mentioned councils abolished to make way for it. And this
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would be the second rank in the government; all of its
 
members would be chosen by Your Holiness. In order to make
 
these changes and to support and regulate the above-men
 
tioned groups and those that will be described below, and
 
for greater security to Your Holiness' authority and
 
friends, Your Holiness and the Most Honorable Cardinal of
 
the Medici must have, by means of the Balla, as much au
 
thority during the lives of both as is held by the entire
 
people of Florence. The magistracy of the Eight of Defence
 
and Balia is to be appointed by the authority of Your Holi
 
ness, from time to time. Also, for greater security of the
 
government and of Your Holiness' friends, thei levy of infan
 
try is to be divided into two brigades, to which Your Holi
 
ness, on your own authority, should provide annually two
 
commissioners, one commissioner for each brigade.
 
We see that by the things mentioned above we satisfy
 
two sorts of men, and give firmness to your authority in the
 
city and to that of your friends, since you have the mili
 
tary and criminal justice in your hand, the laws in your
 
bosom, and all the heads of the government as your support
 
ers,
 
It is now left to satisfy the third and final class of
 
men, which is the whole general body of citizens, who will
 
never be satisfied (and he who believes differently is not
 
wise) if their power is not restored or if they do not have
 
a promise that it will be restored. And because to restore
 
it all at one time would not be for the security of ypur
 
friends, nor for the upholding of the power of Your Holi
 
ness, it is necessary in part to restore it and in part to
 
promise to restpre it in such a way that they will be alto
 
gether certain of having it again. And therefore I judge
 
that you are under the necessity pf reopening the Hall of
 
the Council of one Thousand, or at le^st of the Six Hundred
 
Citizens, who would allot, just as they formerly did, all
 
the offices and magistracies except the aforenamed Sixty-

five, the Two Hundred, and the Eight of Balia; all of these
 
during the life of Your Holiness and of the Cardinal you
 
would appoint. Moreover, in order that your friends may be
 
certain, when there is a choice in the Council, that they
 
have been put in the pouches. Your Holiness is to select
 
eight couplers, who, remaining in secrecy, can declare
 
Balia means, in general, power. Specifically, here
 
and usually in Machiavelli, it is a committee with arbitrary
 
power to remodel the Florentine government.
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elected whom they wish, and can deny election to anybody.^®
 
And in order that the citizens generally may believe that
 
the names^ of those elected were taken from the pouches," the
 
Council must be permitted to send in security two citizens
 
chosen by it to witness the pouching.
 
Without satisfying the generality of the citizens, to
 
set up a stable government is always impossible. Never will
 
the generality of the Florentine citizens be satisfied if
 
the Hall is not reopened.^* Therefore, if one is to set up a
 
republic in Florence, this Hall must be reopened and this
 
allotment made to the generality of the citizens. Your
 
Holiness should realize that whoever plans to take the
 
government from you will plan before everything else on
 
reopening it; therefore it is a good scheme to open it with
 
conditions and methods that are secure, and to take away
 
from anybody who may be your enemy opportunity for reopening
 
it to your indignation and with the destruction and ruin of
 
your fiends. If once the government were so arranged, it
 
would not be necessary, if Your Holiness and the Most Rever
 
end Monsignor" were going to live forever, to provide for
 
anything else, but you must cease to be, and you wish to
 
leave behind a perfect republic made strong with all needed
 
parts, which everybody will see and realize needs to be just
 
as it is. Therefore, in order that the generality of the
 
people (both because of what is given to them and of what is
 
promised to them) may be contented, it is necessary, in
 
addition, to arrange as follows: The sixteen Gonfaloniers
 
of the Companies of the People are to be chosen in the way
 
and for the time for which they have: been chosen up to now;
 
they may be appointed on the authority of Your Holiness or
 
chosen by the Council, as you please; you would merely make
 
a second term less usual, so that the office will be dis-

Texts read: "will not be able to deny election,"
 
but considering that the function of the couplers was to see
 
that the right men held office, I assume that the negative
 
should be omitted.
 
"• The word for he elected, gain the office, is singu
 
lar but its meaning seems plural.
 
The Hall of the Grand Council, now called the Hall
 
of the Five Hundred, in the Palace of the Signory (Palazzo
 
Vecchio). The Grand Council was part of Savonarola^s gov
 
ernment formed in 1495.
 
Cardinal Giuliano de' Medici, later Pope
 
Clement VII.
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tributed more widely through the city; and it should be
 
specified that none of them could be taken from the Sixty-

five. When they have been selected, four Provosts should be
 
among them by lot, to hold office a month hence at the end
 
of their term all will have been Provosts. Among these
 
four, one should be chosen, to reside a week in the Palace
 
with the nine Signers in residence, so that at the end of
 
the month all four of them will have been in residence. The
 
said Signers resident in the Palace are not to do anything
 
in a Provost's absence; he would not have to give his vote,
 
but merely be a witness of their proceedings. He could
 
indeed veto their decision in a case,^" and appeal it to all
 
the Thirty-two in a body. So in the same way the Thirty-two
 
could not decide anything without the presence of two of the
 
said Provosts; yet the two would not have there other au
 
thority than to delay a decision considered among the Thir
 
ty-two and appeal it to the Council of the Selected. Nei
 
ther could the Council of the Two Hundred decide anything,
 
if there were not present at least six of the sixteen with
 
two Provosts; yet the latter could not do anything other
 
than take a case away from the Council and appeal it to the
 
Grand Council, when three of them were in agreement to do
 
it. It would not be possible to assemble the Great Council
 
without twelve of the said Gonfaloniers, among them at least
 
three Provosts; there they would be allowed to give a vote
 
like the other citizens. /
 
The establishment of such colleges is necessary after
 
the lifetime of Your Holiness and of the Most Reverend
 
Monsignor for two reasons. One is that if the Signoria or
 
one of the councils^^ does not decide a matter as the result
 
of discord, or does things opposed to the common good
 
through wickedness, somebody may be at hand to take from
 
them that power and appeal their decision to another body,
 
because it is hot good that one kind of magistrate or coun
 
cil should be able to retard public business without some
 
one's being there who can arrange for action. It is also
 
not good that office-holders should not have somebody to
 
observe them and make them abstain from actions that are hot
 
good, the other reason is that on taking from the generali
 
ty of the citizens (by removing the present Signoria) the
 
possibility of becoming a Signor, it is necessary to restore
 
to them an office resembling that taken away, and this
 
What follows makes this evident as the meaning,
 
though the text does not warrant it.
 
This meaning is required by what follows but is not
 
derived from either of the usual readings.
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provostship is greater, more useful to the republic, and
 
more honorable than the earlier office. For the present, it
 
would be well to choose these Gonfaloniers, in order to get
 
the city into proper procedures, but not to allow them to
 
exercise their powers without the permission of Your Holi
 
ness; and you might make use of them to get a review of the
 
actions of those groups with respect to your authority and
 
your government.
 
Besides this, in order to give perfection to the repub
 
lic after the lifetime of Your Holiness and of the Most
 
Reverend Monsignor, in order that it may not want any part,
 
it is necessary to arrange for a Court of Appeal from the
 
Eight of Defence and Balia, made up of thirty citizens, to
 
be taken from the pouches of the Two Hundred and of the
 
Sixty together. This Court of Appeal would be able to
 
summon the accuser and the accused within a certain time.
 
This appeal, during your lifetime, you would not allow to be
 
used without your permission. This appeal is essential in a
 
republic because a few citizens do not have the courage to
 
punish important men, and therefore it is necessary that for
 
such a result many citizens should join, that their judgment
 
may be secret, and since it is secret, each man may excuse
 
himself. Such an appeal will also be useful during your
 
lifetime in causing the Eight to expedite cases and do
 
justice, because, for fear lest you permit the appeal, they
 
will judge more justly. To keep everything from being
 
appealed, appeal can be forbidden in cases of fraud that do
 
not involve at least fifty ducats, and in cases of violence
 
in which there has been neither breaking of bones nor shed
 
ding of blood, unless the damage rises to the sum of fifty
 
ducats.
 
i believe, considering all this organization as a
 
republic, and without your authority, that it lacks nothing
 
necessary to a free government according to what is above
 
debated and presented at length. But if it is considered
 
while Your Holiness and the Most Reverence Monsignor are
 
still living, it is a monarchy, because you have authority
 
over the armed forces, you have authority over the criminal
 
judges, you keep the laws in your bosom. I do not know
 
anything more to be wished for in a city. Also there is
 
nothing that your friends, such as are good men and intend
 
to live on their own property, need to fear, since Your
 
Holiness has so much power and they sit in the highest seats
 
of the government. We do not see also how the generality of
 
the citizens can be other than satisfied, seeing that part
 
of the allotments have already been made and the others seem
 
as though little by little they would fall into their hands.
 
Because Your Holiness could now and then let the Council
 
choose one of the Sixty-five who is lacking, and also one of
 
the Two Hundred; and some of them you yourself would choose
 
according to the times. And I am certain that in a short
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time, by means of the power of Your Holiness, who will steer
 
everything, this present government will change in such a
 
Way into the other one, and the other into this, that they
 
will become one and the same, and all one body, with peace
 
for the city and everlasting fame for Your Holiness, because
 
always your power can take care of such defects as arise.
 
I believe the greatest honor possible for men to have
 
is that willingly given them by their native cities; I
 
believe the greatest good to be done and the most pleasing
 
to God is that which one does to one's native city. Besides
 
this, no man is so much exalted by any act of his as are
 
those men who have with laws and institutions remodeled
 
republics and kingdoms; these are, after those who have been
 
gods, the first to be praised. And because they have been
 
few who have had opportunity to do it, and very few those
 
who have understood how to do it, small is the number who
 
have done it. And so much has this glory been esteemed by
 
men seeking for nothing other than glory that when unable to
 
form a republic in reality, they have done it in writing, as
 
Aristotle, Plato, and many others, who have wished to show
 
the world that if they have not founded a free government,
 
as did Solon and Lycurgus, they have failed not through
 
their ignorance but through their impotence for putting it
 
into practice.
 
No greater gift, then, does Heaven give to a man, nor
 
can Heaven show him a more glorious road than this. So of
 
all the many blessings God has given to your house and to
 
Your Holiness in person, this is the greatest; that of
 
giving you power and material for making yourself immortal,
 
and for surpassing by far in this way your father's and your
 
grandfather's glory. Consider, then. Your Holiness, first
 
of all, that by holding the city of Florence under these
 
present conditions you risk, on the coming of accidents, a
 
thousand dangers; and before they come. Your Holiness has to
 
endure a thousand vexations unbearable by any man. (Of
 
these vexations you will be assured by the Most Reverend
 
Lord Cardinal, since he has been for these past months in
 
Florence.) They come partly from many citizens who in
 
asking are arrogant and unbearable; partly from many who-—
 
since they believe that at present they do not live in
 
security—do nothing else than declare that order should be
 
brought into the government; one says it should be extended
 
and one that it should be retracted, and nobody comes to
 
particulars about the way for retracting br extending,
 
because they are all confused. Though they suspect they are
 
not secure in their present way of life, they do not know
 
22. Including Pope Leo's great-grandfather, Cositao.
 
429
 
how they would like to adjust it; any man who might know
 
how, they do not trust. Thus with their confusion they are
 
enough to upset the most orderly brain.
 
If you wish, then, to escape these vexations, there are
 
but two ways: either be more sparing with audiences and do
 
not give the people courage to ask, even in an ordinary way,
 
or to speak when they are not asked, as did the Duke of
 
illustrious memory; or organize the government in such a way
 
that it will administer itself and that Your Holiness will
 
need only to keep half an eye turned on it. Of these meth
 
ods, this last frees you from dangers and from vexations;
 
the first frees you from vexations only.
 
But to return to the dangers you run if affairs remain
 
as they are, I wish to make a prediction. I say that if an
 
emergency comes when the city is not at all reorganized, one
 
of two things will be done, or both of them at once; either
 
in riot and haste a head will be set up who with arms and
 
violence will defend the government; or one party will run
 
to open the Hall of the Council and plunder the other party.
 
And whichever of these two things comes about (which God
 
forbid), Your Holiness can image how many deaths, how many
 
exiles, how many acts of extortion will result, enough to
 
make the cruelest man—much more Your Holiness, who is most
 
merciful—die of sorrow. There is no other way for escaping
 
these ills than to give the city institutions that can by
 
themselves stand firm. And they will always stand firm when
 
everybody has a hand in them, and when everybody knows what
 
he needs to do and in whom he can trust, and no class of
 
citizen, either through fear for itself or through ambition,
 
will need to desire revolution. Gilbert (1965)
 
V.l pp. 101-115.
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